JUDGMENT : R.M. Doshit, J. 1. Heard the learned advocates. 2. Pending this petition, the petitioner has passed away. Since passing away of the petitioner, the matter has been prosecuted by his heirs and legal representatives. 3. The petitioner was an officer in the respondent - State Bank of India in Junior Management Grade [Scale-I]. In connection with certain irregularities committed by the petitioner, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner on 16th June, 1986. By Order dated 26th September, 1987 made by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was ordered to be removed from service. Against the said order made by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner challenged the impugned order on the sole ground that the petitioner was not furnished a copy of the report of the enquiry officer. Consequently, he also challenged the constitutional validity of the relevant Rule 50 (3) (ii) & (iii) of the State Bank of India [Supervising Staff] Service Rules. The petition came up for hearing before the Division Bench [Coram : C.K Thakkar, J., as he then was & Y.B Bhatt, J.]. The Bench, by its common judgment and order dated 5th August, 1991 allowed the group of petitions; including the present petition. The Bench, relying upon several precedents including the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] held that, "even if there is no statutory provision and the statute is silent about the application of the principles of natural justice, those principles would apply. In fact, the settled legal position appears to be that the principles of natural justice would operate only in areas not covered by the law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of land but supplement it." "We are of the opinion that furnishing a report of the Enquiry Officer is considered to be a part and parcel of natural justice which the Supreme Court had held in no uncertain terms in Mohd. In other words, they do not supplant the law of land but supplement it." "We are of the opinion that furnishing a report of the Enquiry Officer is considered to be a part and parcel of natural justice which the Supreme Court had held in no uncertain terms in Mohd. Ramzan Khan, a copy of such report must be made available to the delinquent officer before a finding of guilt is recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and before the final order of punishment is imposed on him." With reference to the challenge to the relevant rules, the Court held that, "The constitutional validity of the relevant statutory provisions is upheld and the prayer to declare those provisions as ultra vires and unconstitutional is rejected. However, since all those provisions are required to be interpreted in consonance with the principles of natural justice, the disciplinary action and final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in every petition is hereby quashed and set aside. We hold that delinquents are entitled to be supplied a copy of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and also any other material which the Enquiry Officer has sent to the Disciplinary Authority, so as to enable delinquents to make representation to the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, before they are held guilty by the Disciplinary and before any penalty is imposed on them. We also hold that the Forty Second Amendment of the Constitution has not made any change so far as the above legal position is concerned and all rules and regulations must be read in the light of our conclusions in this group of petitions." The above judgment was challenged by the Bank before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Appeal arising from the present petition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its Order dated 13th January, 1994 held that, "The ground on which the Writ Petitions have been allowed has been negatived by the Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1993 (6) Judgment Today, P.1]. In the normal course we would have allowed the appeals straight away but it is submitted by Mr. In the normal course we would have allowed the appeals straight away but it is submitted by Mr. Mukul Mudgal, Learned Counsel for the respondent, have raised several other points too in the writ petitions but in as much as all the writ petitions were clubbed together and heard in respect of one point alone, they could not urge those individual points. As we have stated above, there is no indication in the judgment of this fact. Even so, we are inclined to give an opportunity to the respondents to urge the other points raised by them in the Writ Petitions, but subject to the condition that even in case of their success ultimately, they shall not be entitled to the emoluments for the period commencing from the date of their respective removal to the date of the judgment of the High Court i.e., 5.8.1991." Pursuant to the above order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the present petition has come up for hearing before me. 4. It should be noted that in the present petition, the petitioner had raised no other point except the breach of principles of natural justice in as much as the petitioner was not furnished a copy of the report of the enquiry officer and the petitioner had no opportunity to make comment upon the said report before the Disciplinary Authority. Even after the order of remand made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioner did not raise any other point in the present petition till he passed away in the year 1998. Since his passing away, his legal representatives sought amendment to the petition and raised other points of challenge to the impugned order of punishment. 5. In my view, this course of action was not open to the petitioner. As it is reflected from the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was urged before the Supreme Court that there were other issues raised in the petition which required consideration. For that purpose only, the matter was remanded. No liberty was given to the petitioner to raise other issues afresh. Nevertheless, after remand also, the petitioner did not raise any other point of challenge to the impugned order of punishment. For that purpose only, the matter was remanded. No liberty was given to the petitioner to raise other issues afresh. Nevertheless, after remand also, the petitioner did not raise any other point of challenge to the impugned order of punishment. In my opinion, the legal representatives of the deceased delinquent servant do have a right to prosecute the matter but have no authority to raise fresh grounds of challenge to the impugned order of punishment. Nevertheless, as the amendment was granted and it has been carried out, the petitioners are permitted to urge the matter on the grounds now raised, are considered and are being decided on merits. 6. Mr. Tanna has submitted that considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [ AIR 1994 SC 1074 ], though not furnishing the enquiry report to the petitioner may not ipso facto vitiate the order of punishment, the Court is under an obligation to examine whether by not furnishing the enquiry report or in absence of enquiry report any prejudice was caused to the delinquent servant. If the delinquent establishes that he had suffered any prejudice, the order of punishment ought to be set-aside. The delinquent servant should be given an opportunity to make comment upon the report of the enquiry officer and the matter should be examined afresh by the disciplinary authority. He has submitted that in the present case, as demonstrated particularly in paragraph 3A & 3B, in absence of the report of the inquiry officer, the petitioner had suffered a grave prejudice. He has read over the report of the inquiry officer in extenso and has submitted that the inquiry officer was biased in favour of the Bank. The defence representative was not permitted to cross examine the vital witness one Dr. Trivedi to elicit further information in connection with the dubious transactions entered into by the said witness so as to establish the credibility or the lack of it of the witness. He has also submitted that though the petitioner had stated that the petitioner's letter to CVO was written under duress and coercion the same was accepted in evidence and was used to prove the allegations made against the petitioner. He has next submitted that in the incidence under inquiry, one Mr. He has also submitted that though the petitioner had stated that the petitioner's letter to CVO was written under duress and coercion the same was accepted in evidence and was used to prove the allegations made against the petitioner. He has next submitted that in the incidence under inquiry, one Mr. Raval, a Clerk in the Bank and one another Shri V.I Shah, an employee of the Bank had connived. Against the said Mr. Raval and Mr. Shah, the Bank decided to lodge prosecution under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, whereas against the petitioner, the Bank decided to proceed departmentally. As the rules of evidence in criminal prosecution are quite stringent, it is quite likely that the said Mr. Raval and Mr. Shah may not be convicted and they may go scot-free. Whereas, the petitioner has been unduly punished in the departmental proceeding. He has submitted that, first, the petitioner had not acted with mala fide intention or had not caused any loss to the Bank. The petitioner had acted in good faith with a view to bringing more business to the Bank. If at all any irregularity was committed in the process, the same cannot be said to be a misconduct. Mr. Tanna has also submitted that it was specific defence of the petitioner that the whole incidence was originated by Mr. Raval, Clerk and Mr. V.I Shah. The petitioner was, therefore, required to examine the said Shri Raval and Shri Shah in the departmental inquiry. Nevertheless, as a criminal prosecution was pending against the said Shri Raval and Shri Shah, both refused to give evidence in the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. The petitioner had, therefore, requested the inquiry officer to stay the proceeding till the criminal prosecution against the said Shri Raval and Shri Shah was terminated and they were free to give evidence in the departmental inquiry against the petitioner. The inquiry officer, however, did not accept the request made by the petitioner. In absence of the evidence of the said Shri Raval and Shri Shah, the defence of the petitioner was adversely affected. The petitioner had thus been denied a fair opportunity of defence. He has further submitted that if everything else were held against the petitioner, then also, for the extent of involvement of the petitioner, at the most, the petitioner could have been issued a 'reprimand'. The petitioner had thus been denied a fair opportunity of defence. He has further submitted that if everything else were held against the petitioner, then also, for the extent of involvement of the petitioner, at the most, the petitioner could have been issued a 'reprimand'. For such an act, the order of removal from service is shocking, harsh and requires to be interfered with by this Court. 7. Mr. Desai has contested the petition. He has submitted that every opportunity of defence had been offered to the petitioner. The relevant rules of the Bank did not require that the petitioner be furnished a copy of the report of the inquiry officer before the disciplinary authority held the petitioner guilty and imposed punishment, as aforesaid. He has further submitted that the petitioner was permitted to cross examine the vital witness Dr. Trivedi in connection with the matter at issue. If the petitioner had any intention to uncover the history or the other dubious transactions illegally entered into by the said witness which had no connection with the incidence in question, the inquiry officer was wholly justified in not allowing the petitioner to cross examine the witness on the facts not germane to the inquiry in question. He has submitted that the petitioner's involvement in the incidence was undisputed. The petitioner being the Manager in the Bank, his responsibility towards the Bank was higher. By the transaction under inquiry, the petitioner had committed an illegality in contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations. Such an act on the part of the managerial officer cannot be dealt with leniently; whether the Bank suffered loss or not shall not be relevant for the purpose. He has also submitted that the extent of punishment required to be imposed upon a delinquent servant is a matter to be decided by the disciplinary authority. Unless the order of punishment is shockingly disproportionate, the Court shall not interfere with the same in exercise of power of judicial review. In support of his contention, Mr. Desai has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of K.L Tripathi v. State Bank of India & Ors. [ AIR 1984 SC 273 ]; and of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [ 2003 (3) SCC 583 ]. 8. In support of his contention, Mr. Desai has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of K.L Tripathi v. State Bank of India & Ors. [ AIR 1984 SC 273 ]; and of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [ 2003 (3) SCC 583 ]. 8. The two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are relevant to the matter at issue are the judgments in the matters of Union of India & Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] and of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [ AIR 1994 SC 1074 ]. 9. In the matter of Re : Mohd. Ramzan Khan, the Hon'ble Court was called upon to examine the amendment made to Article 311 by Constitution Forty Second Amendment Act. Particularly in light of the right of delinquent servant to a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer, the Hon'ble Court held that, "Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311 (2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenance by fair procedure." Thus, the long standing controversy was put an end to as above. Nevertheless, the Hon'ble Court observed that, "There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Forty-Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view." but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground." The above referred judgment was delivered on 20th November, 1990. Thus, any order of punishment made prior to 20th November, 1990 was not open to challenge on this ground. This position was made clear further by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad [Supra]. Thus, any order of punishment made prior to 20th November, 1990 was not open to challenge on this ground. This position was made clear further by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad [Supra]. The Court held that, "In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private." Considering the effect of this ruling, it further added that, "Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an 'unnatural expansion of natural justice' which in itself is antithetical to justice." "Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Courts/Tribunals find that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, but placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." 10. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." 10. In the present case, it was alleged that the petitioner and the Clerk Mr. Raval approached one Dr. Trivedi as the said Dr. Trivedi had some investment to be made and was desirable of subscribing to certain National Saving Certificates in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. It was proved that the petitioner requested the said Dr. Trivedi to deposit the said sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in the account of certain builder and in turn he would be given National Saving Certificates worth Rs. 1,00,000/- and a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in cash. The said Dr. Trivedi did not accept the offer made by the petitioner. The said Dr. Trivedi was, therefore, requested to make investment in National Saving Certificates through the agency of Shri V.I Shah, another employee of the Bank. Later, at the instance of the petitioner and the aforesaid Shri Raval, the said Dr. Trivedi was induced to issue a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- for subscription to NSC in favour of "self" or "Bearer" instead of in favour of the Post Master General. The said cheque was issued by the said Dr. Trivedi as subscription for NSCs. However, the petitioner deposited the said cheque in the account of one Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman, the sister of one Shri Rajubhai Shah [a builder and an acquaintance of the petitioner]. It turns out that the account of the said Dr. Trivedi and the aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman were NRE [Non Resident External] accounts and were regulated by the Exchange Control Manual. The aforesaid deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- made in the account of said Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman was contrary to the instructions issued by the said Dr. Trivedi and the Exchange Control Regulations. It was further alleged that the petitioner issued a false certificate declaring that the aforesaid cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was used for the purchase of National Saving Certificates, though to the knowledge of the petitioner it was deposited in the account of the aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman. Trivedi and the Exchange Control Regulations. It was further alleged that the petitioner issued a false certificate declaring that the aforesaid cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was used for the purchase of National Saving Certificates, though to the knowledge of the petitioner it was deposited in the account of the aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman. According to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority, the imputation of charge made against the petitioner was wholly proved. In view of the finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner, by impugned Order, he was removed from service. 11. As recorded hereinabove, the impugned order having been made before 20th November, 1989 it is not open to challenge as violative of principles of natural justice as the petitioner had not been afforded opportunity to meet the finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer. In my view, it is equally not open to challenge that in absence of the report of the inquiry officer, the petitioner had suffered prejudice. Moreover, on perusal of the report of the inquiry officer, it is quite evident that the charge of the petitioner having approached the said Dr. Trivedi; Dr. Trivedi having issued a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- drawn in favour of self or bearer and the said cheque having been deposited in the account of aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman were proved by evidence on record. In fact, there was no dispute that such cheque was issued by Dr. Trivedi and it was deposited in the account of the aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman. Whether the petitioner did it at the instance of the aforesaid Shri Raval or Shri V.I Shah or of his own was hardly relevant. In my view, therefore, no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner for the petitioner could not examine the said Shri Shah or Shri Raval or that the disciplinary proceeding was not stayed till the criminal prosecution against the said Shri Raval and Shri Shah was completed. It is true that the petitioner did allege that the said Dr. Trivedi had earlier also entered into some dubious transactions and the petitioner did want to cross examine the said Dr. Trivedi with respect to such dubious transactions and that the inquiry officer did not permit the petitioner to cross examine the said witness on such matter. It is true that the petitioner did allege that the said Dr. Trivedi had earlier also entered into some dubious transactions and the petitioner did want to cross examine the said Dr. Trivedi with respect to such dubious transactions and that the inquiry officer did not permit the petitioner to cross examine the said witness on such matter. In my opinion, the inquiry officer was perfectly justified in not allowing the petitioner to cross examine the said Dr. Trivedi on the matter which was not germane to the subject matter of inquiry. The fact remains that the petitioner did ask the said Dr. Trivedi to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in the account of some builder. In turn, he assured issuance of National Saving Certificates in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- and a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in cash. Thus, the petitioner went out of his way to oblige his acquaintance, certain builder. As the said Dr. Trivedi was not willing to be part of such illegal transaction, the petitioner persuaded him to issue a cheque in favour of "self" or "Bearer" and deposited the said cheque in the account of the aforesaid Mrs. Kalpana Wiseman, the sister of the aforesaid Rajubhai Shah contrary to the instructions issued by the said Dr. Trivedi. Thus, the petitioner abused his position as an officer of the Bank, acted in contravention of the instructions issued by the customer of the Bank to oblige his acquaintance, the aforesaid Shri Rajubhai Shah. In the process, he also violated the Exchange Control Regulations. In-spite of knowledge, the petitioner also gave false certificate declaring that the cheque issued by the said Dr. Trivedi was used for subscription to National Saving Certificates. Thus, not only the imputation of charge made against the petitioner was proved but in my view, the acts of omission and commission committed by the petitioner were grave enough to warrant the order of removal from service. It is not necessary that only those wrongs which cause loss to the Bank shall entail grave consequence of termination of service. In absence of any loss to the Bank also, the illegality committed by the petitioner, may be with an intention to bring more business to the Bank, cannot be excused. 12. I have perused the report of the inquiry officer. In absence of any loss to the Bank also, the illegality committed by the petitioner, may be with an intention to bring more business to the Bank, cannot be excused. 12. I have perused the report of the inquiry officer. It appears that the petitioner had written a letter to the Circle Vigilance Officer on 29th January, 1985. The said letter was produced by the Bank in evidence at ME 14. The said letter was considered by the inquiry officer. He did observe that the said letter or its contents was not disputed by the petitioner in the enquiry proceeding. However, in the defence brief for the first time he questioned the genuineness of the contents of the said letter. In absence of any evidence to the contrary the inquiry officer did not accept the objection raised by the petitioner. I am of the opinion that the finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer was based on the evidence on record. Whether or not to accept a particular piece of evidence is in realm of appreciation of evidence. This Court exercising power of judicial review shall not sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, re-appreciate the evidence and record the findings of its own. 13. No other contention is raised before me. 14. In view of the above discussion, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. The parties shall bear their own cost. Petition dismissed.