JUDGMENT :- These two Second Appeals arise out a common judgment in A. S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1997, on the file of the learned I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. The appeals, in turn, arose out of a common judgment rendered by the Court of I Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, in O. S. Nos. 1361 of 1991 and 17 of 1992. The appellants are plaintiffs in the suits and the respondent is common to both the suits. 2. The appellants filed the suits for the relief of perpetual injunction. According to them, they purchased an extent of 660 sq. yards of land each in Sy. No. 786/1 to 5 of Mettuguda Revenue Village through sale deeds, dated 6-8-1984 and 19-1-1985, from the original owners. It was stated that the land of their vendors in various survey numbers admeasuring an extent of Ac. 33.03 gts was acquired by the respondent, for the purpose of constructing quarters and in the process, claim is being made to the plots purchased by the appellants. They pleaded that the respondent has no right or claim over the respective plots of the appellants and sought for the relief of perpetual injunction. 3. The respondent filed separate written statements with the same contents. He pleaded that the suit schedule property as well as the land in the neighborhood is vested in the Railways several decades ago and that it is in their possession. He disputed the genuinity of the sale deeds through which the appellants are said to have purchased the lands and pleaded that their vendor does not have the title to sell the property. The llegations as to interference were denied. It was also stated that the appellants encroached into the suit schedule property, which belongs to the Railways and that steps would be taken to remove the encroachments. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suits, through a common judgment dated 3-12-1996. The lower appellate Court recorded certain findings in favour of the appellants but dismissed the appeals, on the ground that the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982, which was filed by the vendor of the appellants, operates as res judicata. 5. Sri. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suits, through a common judgment dated 3-12-1996. The lower appellate Court recorded certain findings in favour of the appellants but dismissed the appeals, on the ground that the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982, which was filed by the vendor of the appellants, operates as res judicata. 5. Sri. M. Ravindra Nath Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the trial Court had undertaken extensive discussion, in relation to the title and comparison of boundaries, whereas the short question involved in the suits was about grant of perpetual injunction. He submits that comparison of boundaries was undertaken in such a hypertechnical manner, that certain aspects which have no bearing on the matter were treated, as of vital importance and the suits were dismissed, even after holding that the respondent failed to establish his claim over the suit schedule property. He further urges that when the respondent admitted that the appellants are in possession of the property, the Courts below ought not to have refused the relief of perpetual injunction. Learned counsel further points out that the lower appellate Court committed material irregularity in dismissing the appeals, on the ground of res judicata, though no issue was framed before the trial Court nor the judgment, which is said to have operated as res judicata was made part of the record. 6. Sri Gouri Shankar Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the suit schedule property vested in the Railways is owned by it for the past several decades and the record produced by them before the trial Court establishes that the Learned standing counsel submits that the appellants trespassed into the suit schedule property after obtaining orders of temporary injunction and the reference to the possession in the written statement was to this and not to any possession of the appellants, anterior to the filing of the suit. He further submits that the record placed by the respondent is very old and a presumption as regards the title and possession deserves to be drawn on the strength of the same. He places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Board Wakf v. Government of India, 2004 (4) Supreme 631 . 7. The appellants filed the suits for the relief of injunction-simplicitor. He places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Board Wakf v. Government of India, 2004 (4) Supreme 631 . 7. The appellants filed the suits for the relief of injunction-simplicitor. The only question that assumes importance is as to whether they were in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. The examination of title becomes almost secondary. It is confined to the extent of verifying, whether the relief is based on any semblance of right. The appellants specifically pleaded that they purchased their respective plots under sale deeds marked as Ex.A.1 in the suits. They have also filed the receipts of payment of tax for those lands. The respondent, on the other hand, denied the title as well as possession of the appellants over the land and asserted title in themselves. The trial Court framed necessary issues. Common evidence was recorded in the suits. In each suit PW.1 alone was examined. In O.S. No. 17 of 1992, Exs. A.1 to A.16 and O.S. No. 1361 of 1991, Exs. A.1 to A.14 were marked. On behalf of the respondent, DWs. 1 and 2 were examined and common documentary evidence, in the form of Exs.B.1 to B.17, was marked. 8. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court discloses that much of the discussion was devoted to the comparison of boundaries. Several alleged defects on the title deeds were pointed out in the sale deeds through which the suit schedule properties were purchased. It is rather interesting to note that, on the one hand, the trial Court recorded a finding that the respondent failed to make out any case of their own, but on the other hand, dismissed the suits, on the ground that the description of the properties was not perfect. There is hardly any pointed discussion as to the nature of possession over the property in question. 9. The lower appellate Court recorded a finding to the effect that the appellant in Second Appeal No. 108 of 2005 has established his possession over the suit schedule property and that the appellant in the other Second Appeal failed to establish her possession. 9. The lower appellate Court recorded a finding to the effect that the appellant in Second Appeal No. 108 of 2005 has established his possession over the suit schedule property and that the appellant in the other Second Appeal failed to establish her possession. In this regard, it needs to be observed that in the written statement filed on O.S. No. 1361 of 1991, the respondent pleaded as under : "This defendant submits that the plaintiff is an encroacher and also this defendant is taking separate steps against the plaintiff under the Land Grabbing Act". 10. In the written statement filed in the other suit, the pleading runs as under : "The defendant further submits that the plaintiff is never in possession of the suit schedule property and he has trespassed into the railway land". 11. Learned counsel for the respondent had made strenuous effort to contend that the possession referred to in the written statement is the one subsequent to filing of the suit and assumed on the strength of orders of interim injunction. Therefore, much would depend on as to how the nature of possession of the appellants was explained by the respondent in the oral evidence. 12. DW.2 is an Inspector of Works of the South Central Railways. He has referred to the various proceedings that ensued between the vendors of the appellants, on the one hand, and the respondent, on the other. It is also stated that the Railways filed a complaint before the local Police authorities to evict the appellants from the suit schedule properties. In his cross-examination, he stated as under : "Ever since 1987, we are trying to evict PW.1 from the suit land as his possession is illegal". 13. This clarifies any doubt that exists as regards a purport of the pleadings in the written statement. When the respondent has admitted that the appellants are in possession of the property and that in fact they have been taking steps ever since 1987 to evict the appellants, the grant of relief of injunction was almost a matter of course. 14. The lower appellate Court denied the relief of injunction, on the sole ground that the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982, operates as res judicata. Firstly, though the respondent has taken the plea of res judicata, the trial Court did not frame an issue on it. 14. The lower appellate Court denied the relief of injunction, on the sole ground that the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982, operates as res judicata. Firstly, though the respondent has taken the plea of res judicata, the trial Court did not frame an issue on it. No evidence was adduced touching on that aspect. Therefore, the trial Court did not deal that issue at all. Secondly, the lower appellate Court did not undertake any verification as to the contents and purport of the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982. Res judicata, being a mixed of question of fact and law, depends on the verification of the contents of earlier judgment, in the context of the subject matter, parties etc. When the judgment in O.S. No. 869 of 1982, filed by the vendors of the appellants did not form part of the record, it was impermissible to dismiss the appeals on that sole ground. 15. Without standing on technicalities, this Court has undertaken comparison of the judgment in that suit, which has now been taken on record as Ex.A.19. A perusal of the same discloses that the suit was filed for the relief of perpetual injunction and the vendor of the appellants herein figured as one of the plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed 'for default' on 9-9-1987. It is well settled principle of law that it is only a judgment, which has determined the rights of the parties, on merits, that would operate as res judicata, and not the one, which ensued on dismissal of the suit for default. 16. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis for the judgments of the Courts below. It has emerged that the respondents themselves have admitted the possession of the appellants over the suit schedule property. If they are of the view that the appellants deserve to the evicted, it shall always be open to them to do so, in accordance with law. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the second Appeals are allowed and the judgments and decrees of the trial Court are set aside. The suits filed by the appellants shall stand decreed, for the relief of perpetual injunction. It is, however, made clear that if the respondent is of the view that the appellants deserve to be evicted under any provisions of law, it shall be open to them to do so. The suits filed by the appellants shall stand decreed, for the relief of perpetual injunction. It is, however, made clear that if the respondent is of the view that the appellants deserve to be evicted under any provisions of law, it shall be open to them to do so. There shall be no order as to costs.