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2005 DIGILAW 727 (PNJ)

Neeraj v. State Of Haryana

2005-07-11

SATISH KUMAR MITTAL

body2005
Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. The petitioners, who are juvenile, have filed this revision petition against the order dated 14.1.2005 and judgment dated 13.5.2005, passed by Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat and Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, respectively, vide which their application under Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as `the Code) for dropping the inquiry/trial against them has been dismissed. 2. The petitioners are accused in case FIR No. 59 dated 10.3.2002 under Sections 364, 392, 201, 120-B, 34 IPC, registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Sonepat. Since all the accused were below the age of 18 years at the time of the alleged occurrence, therefore, challan against them was filed by the police before the Juvenile Justice Board, Sonepat (hereinafter referred as `the Board). Thereafter, on the request of the defence counsel, the case was adjourned to 13.8.2004 and 17.9.2004 for consideration on notice of accusation. 3. On 29.10.2004 the petitioners filed an application under Section 258 of the Code for dropping the proceedings against them with the averment that under Section 14 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred as `the Act), the Board has to hold an inquiry against the juvenile and it has to be concluded within four months. If the time of four months is not extended, then the proceedings against the juvenile cannot be allowed to continue and are liable to be dropped. 4. The Board, vide order dated 14.1.2005, dismissed the aforesaid application while holding that due to heavy pendency of civil as well as criminal cases, it was not possible for the Board to conclude the inquiry in all the cases within a period of four months. It was observed that though under Section 14 of the Act, the inquiry in cases relating to juvenile has to be completed within a period of four months from the date of its commencement unless the period is extended by the Board having regard to the circumstances of the case and in special cases after recording the reasons in writing for such extension, but the said provision is not mandatory and if the time was not extended, it can be extended subsequently. Merely on the ground that inquiry in such cases is not complete within the stipulated period, the proceedings cannot be dropped. 5. Merely on the ground that inquiry in such cases is not complete within the stipulated period, the proceedings cannot be dropped. 5. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioners filed an appeal before Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 13.5.2005, while holding that under Section 14 of the Act, there is a provision that the Board shall conclude the inquiry within four months, but further this provision is silent that if the Board fails to extend the time for holding the inquiry beyond the period of four months, then what will be the fate of the case. Since no consequence has been provided for not following the said requirement, it was observed that this provision is not mandatory in nature. It is just a caution to the concerned authorities to expedite the matter for concluding the inquiry or trial within four months. If the prescribed time is not extended, then it cannot be said that the Board has committed any infirmity. Rather, it can be said that it is an irregularity, which can be cured. It has been further observed that in this case, while extending the period till conclusion of the trial at the time of passing of the order, the trial Court has committed no illegality. 6. Against the aforesaid judgment, the instant revision petition has been filed. 7. Counsel for the petitioners contends that both the Courts below have misconstrued and misread the provisions of the Act. Section 14 of the Act clearly provides that where a juvenile having been charged with the offence is produced before the Board, the Board shall hold the inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Act and will make such order in relation to the juvenile as it deems fit. Section 14 of the Act further provides that an inquiry under the Act shall be completed within a period of four months from the date of its commencement, unless the period is extended by the Board having regard to the circumstances of the case and in special cases after recording the reasons in writing for such extension. Counsel for the petitioners further submits that intention of the legislature while making the provisions under this enactment is very clear that against the juvenile, the inquiry must be completed within four months, so that rights of the juvenile may not be jeopardized. Counsel for the petitioners further submits that intention of the legislature while making the provisions under this enactment is very clear that against the juvenile, the inquiry must be completed within four months, so that rights of the juvenile may not be jeopardized. Counsel contends that still further, the legislature makes it amply clear that if within such period the inquiry is not completed by the Board having regard to the circumstances of the case, then he can extend the period, but he is bound to record the reasons thereof in writing for such extension. Counsel submits that in the instant case, neither the inquiry was completed by the Board within stipulated period of four months nor any reason for extension of further time for completion of the inquiry was recorded in writing and as such, grave and manifest injustice has been caused to the petitioners. Counsel for the petitioners submits that while declining the application of the petitioners to drop the proceedings, the Board has observed that since there is heavy rush of civil as well as criminal cases because the Board has to look after the cases of juveniles of five districts namely Karnal, Panipat, Sonepat, Rohtak and Jhajjar, therefore, it was not possible for the Board to complete the inquiry within a period of four months. By giving this reason, the time was extended. Counsel submits that the reason given by the Board is not reasonable and on such a reason, a juvenile cannot be allowed to suffer as the intention of the legislation was to complete the inquiry/trial of the juvenile within stipulated period. Hence, the order/judgment passed by the Courts below are not sustainable and the inquiry pending against the petitioners is liable to be dropped. 8. After hearing counsel for the petitioner and going through the contents of the impugned order, I do not find any merit in this petition. 9. In this case, vide order dated 14.1.2005, the Board has extended the time for conducting the inquiry/trial under the proviso to Section 14 of the Act and further has refused to drop the proceedings on the ground that the inquiry/trial has not been completed within four months from the date of its commencement. Section 14 of the Act reads as under :- "14. Inquiry by Board regarding juvenile. Section 14 of the Act reads as under :- "14. Inquiry by Board regarding juvenile. - Where a juvenile having been charged with the offence is produced before a Board, the Board shall hold the inquiry in accordance with the provisions of this Act and may make such order in relation to the juvenile as it deems fit : Provided that an inquiry under this section shall be completed with a period of four months from the date of its commencement, unless the period is extended by the Board having regard to the circumstances of the case and in special cases after recording the reasons in writing for such extension." 10. The proviso to the aforesaid section provides that the inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of four months from the date of its commencement, unless the period is extended by the Board having regard to the circumstances of the case. This provision is silent that if the Board fails to extend the time for holding inquiry beyond the period of four months, then what will be the fate of the case. Now the question for consideration is whether the aforesaid provision is mandatory or directory. Generally, the use of the word `shall prima facie indicates that the particular provision is imperative, but that is not always so. The meaning to be given to a word depends upon the context in which it is used. In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject matter, the importance of the provision, the relation of the provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law. In Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1149, the Honble Apex Court has held that the use of word `shall is not conclusive and decisive of the matter and the Court has to ascertain the true intention of the legislature, which is the determining factor, and that must be done by looking carefully to the whole scope, nature and design of the statute. The question whether the direction to lay the rules before Parliament is mandatory or merely directly will depend upon circumstances of each case or wordings of the statute under which the orders or the rules are made. Two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are : (i) absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed, and (ii) serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act of the Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for non-compliance with the particular provision. 11. In the instant case, proviso to Section 14 of the Act does not provide that in case inquiry/trial is not completed within a period of four months and the time is not extended, then what will happen to the said trial. Merely on that point inquiry against a juvenile cannot be dropped as it will result into prejudice to the general public as the offender will go free. Even the object of the Act will not be achieved. The petitioners are accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Merely because the proceedings could not be completed within the stipulated period of four months, the proceedings cannot be dropped. In this case, the Board has extended the period till the conclusion of the trial. The object of Section 14 of the Act is to hold the inquiry in case of juvenile expeditiously, but it is not the intention that the inquiry must be dropped in case the same is not completed within a period of four months, that is why the Board has been empowered to extend the period by recording the reasons. These facts indicate that the aforesaid provision is not mandatory but is directory. In Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224, the Honble Apex Court, while interpreting Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award within 30 days, held that the provision for publication of award within 30 days is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the publication of the award ought not to be held up. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the publication of the award ought not to be held up. But the fixation of the period 30 days mentioned therein does not mean that the publication beyond that time will render the award invalid. 12. To my mind, the only object of Section 14 of the Act is that the trial of a juvenile be concluded expeditiously. The object is not to drop the inquiry/trial in case the same is not completed within the stipulated time. The right of speedy trial though is essence of justice, but the accused cannot be allowed to be acquitted merely on the ground of delay in conducting the trial, particularly for an offence under Section 302 IPC. Thus, in my opinion, the provision of Section 14 of the Act is not mandatory in nature and it is directory. It is just like a caution to the concerned authority to expedite the matter for concluding the inquiry or trial within a period of four months. The reasons given by the Board for extending the time cannot be said to be invalid, particularly when one Board has to look after the cases of juveniles of five Districts. For the reasons recorded above, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order and judgment. Dismissed.