( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O. S. NO. 78 of 1987 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Amalapuram, East Godavari. He filed the suit for the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession, in respect of three items of property indicated in the schedule. ( 2 ) ONE Bonthu Bulleyya was the maternal uncle of the appellant and the respondent. He is said to have executed a deed of settlement, way back on 20. 04. 1956 retaining life interest in the properties referred to therein, and creating vested remainder, in favour of the respondent. The appellant pleaded that late Bulleyya executed another deed of settlement on 29. 06. 1985, marked as ex. A. 1, by retaining the life interest in respect of 60 cents of land in three different Survey Numbers in himself and creating vested remainder in favour of the appellant. It was alleged that under the influence of the respondent herein, the said Bulleyya executed a revocation deed, dated 07. 08. 1985, and a corresponding settlement deed in favour of the respondent on the same day, marked as Exs. B. 21 and B. 22 respectively. Pleading that the settlement deed ex. A. 1 could not have been revoked, except by filing the suit, the appellant prayed for declaration of title, and for recovery of possession. ( 3 ) THE respondent resisted the suit and pleaded that the appellant brought about Ex. A. 1 through acts of misrepresentation and undue influence on late bulleyya and when the latter realized it, he took remedial steps by executing a deed of revocation and a subsequent settlement deed. The trial Court dismissed the suit through its judgment, dated 07. 07. 1995. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed A. S. No. 75 of 1995 in the Court of the learned II Additional district Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry. The appeal was dismissed on 24. 10. 2000. Hence, this Second Appeal. ( 4 ) SRI M. Lakshmana Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the findings recorded by the trial Court and the observations made by the lower appellate Court are not borne out by record. He submits that the only basis, on which the Courts below dismissed the suit and the appeal, was that Ex. A. 1 was not read over to the executant. He submits that the only basis, on which the Courts below dismissed the suit and the appeal, was that Ex. A. 1 was not read over to the executant. He submits that no suggestion to that effect was made to any of the witnesses and that the very fact that Bulleyya himself executed a deed of revocation discloses that he executed Ex. A. 1. He further submits that a deed of settlement cannot be revoked unilaterally and that the only course open to him was to file a suit for necessary relief, in this regard. ( 5 ) SRI M. V. Suresh, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the evidence of P. Ws 2,3 and 4, the attestors and the scribe respectively, is so inconsistent that it hardly proves the execution of Ex. A. 1. He further submits that item No. 3 of the suit schedule was already settled in favour of the respondent through Ex. B. 13 and it was impermissible for Bulleyya himself to have settled it once again in favour of the appellant. ( 6 ) THE trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues, in view of the pleadings before it. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled fro the declaration and possession of plaint schedule property? 2. Whether the documents relied on by the defendant, revocation deed and settlement deeds dated 7-8-85 are true, valid and binding on the plaintiff?additional Issues:-1. Whether the court-fee paid is correct? 2. Whether the settlement deed, dated 29-6-1985, alleged to have been executed by late Bulleyya in favour of the plaintiff is true, valid and binding against the defendant? 3. Whether the plaintiff s suit is not maintainable without the registered documents for the plaint A-schedule property executed by late Bulleyya are cancelled? ( 7 ) THE controversy was mostly about the genuinity of Ex. A. 1. There was no serious dispute that in case Ex. A. 1 was validly executed, it could not have been revoked through Ex. B. 21 and if at all it was found to be defective in any manner, a suit ought to have been filed for the necessary relief. ( 8 ) THE appellant examined himself as P. W. 1. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are the attestors and P. W. 4 is the scribe of Ex. A. 1. He filed Exs. A. 1 to A. 3. ( 8 ) THE appellant examined himself as P. W. 1. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are the attestors and P. W. 4 is the scribe of Ex. A. 1. He filed Exs. A. 1 to A. 3. On behalf of the respondent, D. Ws. 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. B. 1 to B. 42 were marked. The report submitted by the Advocate-Commissioner and the plan attached thereto were marked as Exs. C. 1 and C. 2. ( 9 ) IT is true that there is material inconsistency in the depositions of p. W. 2, one of the attesting witnesses of Ex. A. 1. He stated that he did not see bulleyya signing upon the document. P. W. 3 deposed that he has seen the executant of the document signing it. In his chief-examination, P. W. 4, the scribe, did not speak about the presence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 nor did he say that the executant signed the document. Notwithstanding these discrepancies, the trial court held that Ex. A. 1 was proved. However, it refused to decree the suit on the ground that it was not established that the document was shown to Mr bulleyya before he signed it. The lower appellate Court concurred with this finding. ( 10 ) THE very fact that Bulleyya has chosen to execute the deed of revocation, marked as Ex. B. 21, discloses that he was aware of the existence of Ex. A. 1. If he did not execute Ex. A. 1, there was no necessity for him to revoke it. A perusal of deed of revocation discloses that he did not dispute the existence of ex. A. 1 but he was of the view that he was unduly influenced or otherwise coerced by the appellant to sign Ex. A. 1. That recital is sufficient to establish that bulleyya did not dispute his signature upon the document, but pleaded certain circumstances, which were not to his liking. Therefore, Ex. B. 21 can be relied on, as an intrinsic evidence, to prove the execution of Ex. A. 1. Then the controversy shifts to the validity of the revocation, from the proof of Ex. A. 1 itself. ( 11 ) A deed of settlement brings about a particular set of legal rights and obligations vis--vis the persons mentioned in it. B. 21 can be relied on, as an intrinsic evidence, to prove the execution of Ex. A. 1. Then the controversy shifts to the validity of the revocation, from the proof of Ex. A. 1 itself. ( 11 ) A deed of settlement brings about a particular set of legal rights and obligations vis--vis the persons mentioned in it. While certain persons derive right in respect of the property mentioned in it, the others would be placed under obligation to respect them. Though the deed of settlement may be unilateral in nature, comparable to a gift deed, the rights created through it become absolute, once the execution is complete. If for any reason, the executant intends to resile from such disposition, the only course open to him, is to file a suit under Section 31 of Specific Relief Act. Such a course was not adopted by late Bulleyya. Hence, the execution of Ex. B21 cannot be said to have annulled Ex. A. 1 ( 12 ) IF this were to be all, the suit deserves to be decreed in its entirety. However, the principle enunciated above applies to Ex. A. 1 vis- -vis Ex. B. 13. Through the latter document, the same individual had settled various items of property including item No. 3 of the suit schedule in favour of the respondent. Therefore, the said item of property was not available to be dealt with, under ex. A. 1. To that extent, Ex. A. 1 cannot be said to have taken away the rights of the respondent created in him under Ex. B. 13. Ex. A. 1 has to be taken as holding good, only insofar as it relates to items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule are concerned. ( 13 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the Second Appeal is partly allowed and the decrees and judgments of the Courts below are set aside. The suit shall stand decreed insofar as it relates to item Nos. 1 and 2 of the suit schedule is concerned and dismissed as regards item No. 3. There shall be no order as to costs.