JUDGMENT T. Vajphei, J. 1. Dismissing the writ petition of the Appellant by the learned Single Judge of this Court for declaring members of the Barua community as belonging to Magh community and thereafter directing the Respondents to treat such community as Scheduled Tribe, this writ appeal has been filed. 2. To appreciate the controversy, we may at the very outset notice the salient features of the case. The Appellant is an association under the name and style of "All Tripura Budist Association (Barua Magh community)" formed by members of the Barua community living in Tripura with surnames such as "Barua", "Singha", 'Talukdar", "Choudhury", "Mutsuddy", "Rajbanshi", etc. The association is registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 having registration No. 1993 and is formed with the aims and objects of protecting the interest and welfare of Barua community and for preserving their status, etc. The association is represented in this case by its General Secretary and authorized by its regulations. 3. Admittedly, members of the Barua community with the surnames noted earlier had been recognized as Scheduled Tribes by the State Government till July, 1987 and were accordingly issued Scheduled Tribes Certificates for availing of the various benefits conferred upon members of Scheduled Tribes of the State. However, the Respondent No. 2 by the letter No.F. 14079-94/TW/6-33(Vol-II)/78-79 dated 17.7.1987 issued various instructions to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khowai with copies endorsed to District Magistrates/Collectors of all the Districts, all Sub-Divisional Officers/Block Development Officers in the State, which according to the Appellant, has the effect of de-recognizing members of Barua community as Scheduled Tribes. Since this notification is the meat of the matter, the same is reproduced below in extenso: GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA TRIBAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT No. F. 14079-94/TW/6-33 (VOL-II)/78-79, Dated the 17th July. 1987 To The Sub-Divisional Officer, Khowai, West Tripura. Subject: Instruction for issuing Sch. Tribe Certificates to 'Barua community'. Sir, I am directed to refer to your letter No. 749/Firewoods -32/SDO/TW/VOI-II/85, dated 25.6.87 on the subject noted above and to say that it has been clearly stated in the Notification No. 20048-20148/TW/6-33/VOL-II/77, dated 24.11.77, the Authorised Officers will make detailed enquiry to satisfy themselves to issue Caste/Tribe Certificates about the eligibility of the candidate with particular reference to the following points: (i) The person as well as his parents actually belong to the Community claimed. (ii) The community is included in the Sch. (ii) The community is included in the Sch. Caste/Tribe Order (Amendment) 1976 issued by the Government of India, dated 20.9.76 specifying the names of the Sch. Caste/Tribe in the State of Tripura. It is therefore imperative that the Issuing Authority should be completely satisfied about the intrinsic correctness of the case before issue of a Certificate and the question of the verification assured all the more importance. Any person having the Surname other than the name of the community listed in the Sch. Caste/Tribe, Certificates will be issued provided he/she is actually belonging to any of the communities as included in the Presidential List and if the Authorised Officer is satisfied that the person has not applied on a false pretext. In this context, I am to inform you that: (i) The 'Surname' has not been included in the Sch. Tribe List of the Presidential Order of Tripura. (ii) There is no evidence that Barua community is a part of Magh Tribe. (iii) The mother-tongue of the Barua community is Bengali. Hence there is hardly any scope to treat Barua as a part of Magh Tribe. The papers relating to Shri Bimal Kumar Barua and Shri Sindhu Kumar Barua are sent back to your herewith. Sd./- P.C. Bhattacharjee 17.7.87 Under Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura. 4. The contention of the Appellant is that the enjoyment of the status of Scheduled Tribes by members of Barua community in the State of Tripura for some fifty years has conferred upon them a vested right to be treated as Scheduled Tribes; the impugned letter de-recognising them as Scheduled Tribes is arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice for not affording them of reasonable opportunity of hearing before their de-recognition as Scheduled Tribes. It is also contended that the impugned letter cannot be treated as a Government order inasmuch as the same was not issued in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution of India. It is also the case of the Appellant that the list of Scheduled Tribes for the State of Tripura specified in the Presidential Order issued in terms of Article 342 of the Constitution does not categories the Scheduled Tribes by their surnames but only defines the communities and accordingly, "Magh" representing the entire community inclusive of "Barua" community etc. has been specified in item No. 12 of the Presidential Order. has been specified in item No. 12 of the Presidential Order. According to the Appellant, "Barua", being one of the surnames of Magh community, is not included separately in the list of such Scheduled Tribes nor is such exercise necessary. A number of examples have been indicated by the Appellant wherein surnames of a tribe belonging to Scheduled Tribes have been recognized as Scheduled Tribes even though such surnames are not separately listed as Scheduled Tribes. To show that Barua community is a part of Magh community, the Appellant refers to the following gazetteers and glossaries: (a) Eastern Bengal District Gazettor by L.S.S.O. Malley, ICS, Bengal Secretariat Press, (b) The Tribes and Caste of Bengal, Vol. H by H.S. Risley, 1891, (C) Final Report of Survey and Settlement of Chittagong, 1888 to 1898, by C.G.H. Allen, ICS and (d) Statistical Account of Bengal by W.W. Hunter, Director, Statistics of India, Vol. VI, Chittangong Hill Tract. It is thus contended that surnames cannot be an indicator for treating a class of people belonging to a particular tribe and that the fact that the mother tongue of the Barua is 'Bengali' is also not decisive for determination of this community as "Magh" community. 5. The stands taken by the Respondents as seen from their affidavit-in-opposition are virtually found in the writ petition itself, which have been adverted to earlier, and we do not propose to reiterate them herein. After hearing both the parties through their respective counsel, the learned Single Judge by the judgment and order dated 20.8.2002 dismissed the writ petition. A perusal of the impugned judgment would indicate that the learned Single Judge did not deal with the various contentions of the Appellant but confined himself to the question whether, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind and Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 4 , the writ petition required consideration. Holding that the writ petition is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the learned Single Judge disposed of the same as being devoid of merit. He however, gave liberty to the Appellant to approach the National Commission for Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes to make recommendation to the Central Government for inclusion of their community as Scheduled Tribes in terms of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court. This judgment is now under challenge. 6. Unfolding his case, Mr. He however, gave liberty to the Appellant to approach the National Commission for Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes to make recommendation to the Central Government for inclusion of their community as Scheduled Tribes in terms of the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court. This judgment is now under challenge. 6. Unfolding his case, Mr. Kashi Kanta Maitra, the learned senior counsel for the Appellant, submits that the impugned letter is not an order issued in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution and has no force of law and, therefore, cannot be acted upon. Though it has no force of law, contends the learned senior counsel, it nevertheless has the potential of creating grave public mischief as evident by the subsequent refusal of the competent officers to issue Scheduled Tribes Certificate to Barua community and, as such, the same is liable to quashed forthwith by this Court. According to the learned Counsel, the impugned letter is merely an inter-departmental correspondence and is clearly not authorized by Article 166 of the Constitution. He further contends that any administrative order curtailing the rights of citizens must be preceded by due publication in the official gazette and when that is admittedly not done in this case, such letter cannot deprive the members of Barua community represented by the Appellant of their vested rights to be recognised as members of Magh community and, therefore, Scheduled Tribes. Assailing the decision of the learned Single Judge, he vehemently submits that the learned Single Judge has completely misread the decision of the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra) and has, in the process, erroneously held that the instant writ petition needed no consideration. He also contends that the learned Single Judge has grossly erred in relegating the Appellant to National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which is admittedly not an equally efficacious alternative remedy and has, accordingly, failed to exercise his jurisdiction. Inviting our attention to the letter dated 15.5.2000 (Annexure-2 to the memo of appeal) of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes addressed to the Chief Secretary of West Bengal, he points out that the Commission had advised the West Bengal Government to continue issuing Scheduled Tribes Certificates to persons belonging to Magh community including Baruas claiming to be Maghs and that in terms of this advice, the Calcutta High Court by the order dated 18.6.2002 in W.P.(C) No. 14728 (W)/2000. All India Federation of Bengali Budhists Association v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. directed the Government of West Bengal to issue Scheduled Tribes Certificates to the members of the "Barua Magh" community of West Bengal in accordance with the prescribed procedures. According to the learned senior counsel, the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the official publications of ancient nature (referred to earlier) having evidentiany value on their findings that Barua community are belonging to Magh community and that this vital omission on his part has caused grave miscarriage of justice. In support of his various contentions, the learned senior counsel cites the following decisions of the Apex Court: (a) State of J and K. v. T.N. Khosa AIR 1974 SC 1 , (b) Ghaio Mai and Sons v. State of Delhi AIR 1959 SC 65 , (c) Comm. of Police v. Gordhandas AIR 1952 SC 16 , (d) H.L. Trehan v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 568 , (e) Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab AIR 1987 SC 948 and (f) Harla v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1951 SC 467 . 7. Per contra, Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel for the Respondents, submits that when the Presidential Order in question does not include Barua community as a Scheduled Tribes, this community cannot be considered as Magh community and, therefore, a Scheduled Tribes. He vehemently disputes the claim of the Appellant that Barua community is a community belonging to Magh Community and asserts that Barua Community do not follow a tribal way of life, usages, customs and culture and uses Bengali as their mother tongue and, as such, they cannot under any circumstances be treated as tribal community of Magh. Referring to "Kuki" tribe in the Presidential Order in question, Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel, submits that where a particular tribe has its sub-tribes or is comprising of different surnames, the same are specifically mentioned therein. To illustrate his contention, he invites our attention to item No. 9 of Part-XV-Tripura of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 in respect of Kuki tribe. This item admittedly refers to Kuki tribe inclusive of 17 sub-tribes specified therein. To illustrate his contention, he invites our attention to item No. 9 of Part-XV-Tripura of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 in respect of Kuki tribe. This item admittedly refers to Kuki tribe inclusive of 17 sub-tribes specified therein. Therefore, submits the learned senior counsel for the Respondent Government, if the community known by the name of "Barua" or "Barua Magh" is not specifically included in the list of such Scheduled Tribes, notwithstanding their status as tribals, they cannot be treated as Mag or Mogh or Magh community for the purpose of Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned senior counsel, the impugned letter does not suffer from any infirmity calling for the interference of this Court. Moreover, he contends that the question whether Barua community is a part of Magh community or not is not a matter which can be decided by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. A plain reading of the impugned letter reproduced earlier will indicate that the message conveyed therein can be divided into two parts. The first part authorizes the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khowai to make detailed inquiry before issuing Scheduled Tribes Certificates to satisfy himself on the eligibility of the applicant with particular reference to the following points, namely, (i) the person as well as his parents actually belong to the community claimed, and (ii) the community is included the Scheduled Caste/Tribes Order as amended in 1976. No exception can be taken on this aspect of the matter. No exception can also be taken to the other instruction that any person having the surname other than the name of the community listed in the Scheduled Caste/Tribe will be issued certificate provided he/she is actually belonging to any of the communities as included in the Presidential Order and the authorized officer is satisfied that the person has not applied on false pretext. It is the second part of the message upon which grievance has been made by the Petitioner-association. In the second part of the message, the author of the impugned letter informed the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khowai that the 'surname' (of Barua) has not been included in the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the said Presidential Order; there is no evidence that Barua community is a part of Magh tribe; the mother tongue of the Barua community is Bengali. From this, the author of the impugned letter concluded that there is hardly any scope to treat Barua as a part of Magh tribe. Copies of the impugned letter were apparently endorsed to the District Magistrate and Collector of all the Districts of Tripura, all the Sub-Divisional Officers in Tripura and the Block Development Officer, Dambur Nagar/Kanchanpur. The outcome of such endorsement can hardly be a matter of speculation. In our opinion, the second part of the message has cabined and caged the discretionary power given to the issuing officer to make enquiry on the status of the applicant for Scheduled Tribes Certificates. It is a trite law in public law domain that in general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. This is exactly the outcome of the impugned letter which cannot be sustained in law. But then the matter is not so simple nor is this the end of the controversy, as will become apparent hereafter. 9. In the instant case, the case of the Appellant is that members of the Barua community belong to Magh Community and are a part and parcel of Magh tribe, and, are entitled to be treated as Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. From the pleadings of the Respondents, it is obvious that there has been a consistent practice of the State Government to issue Scheduled Tribes certificates to individuals, whose surnames or sub-tribes or clans or sub-clans are not specifically included in the list of Scheduled Tribes if the issuing officer is otherwise satisfied that they nevertheless belong to or is a part and parcel of the listed Scheduled Tribes. Having been satisfied that Barua community is neither included in the said list of Scheduled Tribes nor is it a part of the Magh community, the impugned order came to be issued by the concerned Department. As noticed earlier, a number of publications of the Government, which are admittedly ancient in nature and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in W.P.(C) No. 14728 (W)/2000. All India Federation of Bengali Budhists Association v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. As noticed earlier, a number of publications of the Government, which are admittedly ancient in nature and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in W.P.(C) No. 14728 (W)/2000. All India Federation of Bengali Budhists Association v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. have been referred to and extensively read on behalf of the Appellant to persuade us to hold that Barua community is entitled to be treated as Magh community and, therefore, Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. When they have been treated as Scheduled Tribes for the last nearly half a century, contends the learned senior counsel for the Appellant, the impugned letter unceremoniously derecognising them as Scheduled Tribes amounts to abrogation of their vested rights or, at least, defeats their legitimate expectation. These submissions would have been valid but for the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 1 SCC 4 . In our considered view, the decision has set at naught the various contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellant. 10. In Milind case (Supra), the Apex Court held that the words "castes" or "tribes" in the expression "Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes" are not used in the ordinary sense of the term but are used in the sense of the definitions contained in Article 366(24) and 366(25). Hence, a caste is a Scheduled Caste or a tribe is a Scheduled Tribe only if they are included in the President's Orders issued under Articles 341 and 342 for the purpose of the Constitution. The Apex Court further held therein that whether a particular tribe caste or tribe is Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be, within the meaning of the entries contained in the Presidential Orders issued under Article 341(1) and 342(2), is to be determined looking into them as they are. Article 341(2) and 342(2) do not permit any one to seek modification of the said orders by leading evidence that the caste/tribe (A) alone is mentioned in the Order but caste/tribe (B) is also a part of caste/tribe (A) and as such caste/tribe (B) should be deemed to be a Scheduled Caste/Tribe as the case may be. Article 341(2) and 342(2) do not permit any one to seek modification of the said orders by leading evidence that the caste/tribe (A) alone is mentioned in the Order but caste/tribe (B) is also a part of caste/tribe (A) and as such caste/tribe (B) should be deemed to be a Scheduled Caste/Tribe as the case may be. Therefore, it serves no purpose to look at gazetteers or glossaries for establishing that a particular caste/tribe is a Scheduled Caste/Tribe for the purpose of the Constitution, even though it is not specifically mentioned as such in the Presidential Orders. The Apex Court further observes therein that Courts cannot and should not expand jurisdiction to deal with the question as to whether a particular caste; a group or part of tribe or sub-tribe is included in any one of the entries mentioned in the Presidential Orders issued under Articles 341 and 342 particularly so when in Clause (2) of the said Article, it is expressly stated that the said orders cannot be amended or varied except by law made by Parliament. The power to include in or exclude, amend or alter Presidential Order is expressly and exclusively conferred on and vested with Parliament and that too by making a law in that regard. The President had the benefit of consulting the States through Governors of State which had the means and machinery to find out and recommend as to whether a particular caste or tribe was to be included in the Presidential Order. If the said Orders are to be amended, it is Parliament that is in a better position to know having the means and machinery unlike Courts as to why a particular caste or tribe is to be included or excluded by law to be made by Parliament. The Apex Court affirms the following observations made by the Constitution Bench in B. Basavalingappa v. D. Municinnapa AIR 1965 SC 1269 : It may be accepted that it is not open to make any modification in the Order by producing evidence to show (for example) that though caste A alone is mentioned in the Order. Caste B is also a part of caste A and, therefore, must be deemed to be included in caste A. It may also be accepted that wherever one caste has another name it has been mentioned in brackets after it in the Order. Caste B is also a part of caste A and, therefore, must be deemed to be included in caste A. It may also be accepted that wherever one caste has another name it has been mentioned in brackets after it in the Order. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be open Appellant give evidence that the Voddar Caste was the same as the Bhovi caste specified in the Order for Voddar caste is not mentioned in brackets after the Bhovi caste in the Order. 11. The facts of the case in Milind case (Supra) are that the writ Petitioner, on the basis of the School Leaving certificate and other records of himself and his close relative, obtained a caste certificate from the Executive Magistrate, Nagpur on 20.8.1981 as belonging to "Halba" Scheduled Tribe and that on the basis of such certificate, he was selected in the Government Medical College for MBBS degree course for the year 1985-86 in the reserved category meant for Scheduled Tribes. The certificate was sent for verification to the Scrutiny Committee constituted under the Directorate of School Welfare. After necessary enquiry, the Inquiry Committee recorded a finding to the contrary and rejected the Certificate. The Appellate Authority, after detailed examination of the evidence, dismissed the appeal of the writ Petitioner and held that he belonged to "Koshti" caste and not to "Halba/Halbi" Scheduled Tribe. However, the Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned orders inter alia holding that it was permissible to inquire whether any sub-division of a tribe was a part and parcel of the tribe mentioned therein and that "Halba-Koshti" was a subdivision of the main tribe "Halba/Halbi" as per Entry 19 in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 applicable to Maharashtra. The State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal against the said decision of the High Court. The Apex Court allowed the appeal and held that the Com-wutee conducting the inquiry as the appellate authority, having examined all relevant materials and having recorded a finding that the writ Petitioner belonged to "Koshti" caste and has no identity with "Halba/Halbi" which is the Scheduled Tribe under Entry 19 of the Presidential Order, relating to the State of Maharashtra, the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction by making a roving and in-depth examination of the materials afresh and in coming to the conclusion that "Koshtis" could be treated as "Halbas". It was further held therein that since in the light of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, a Scheduled Tribe Order can be amended only by Parliament, the High Court erred in holding that orders/circulars issued by the State Government, which have the effect of amending the Scheduled Tribes Order, were binding on the Government or other affected parties. In para 36 of the judgment, it was held: 36. In the light of what is stated above, the following positions emerge: 1. It is not at all permissible to hold any inquiry or let in any evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in the entry concerned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. 2. The Scheduled Tribes Order must be read as it is. It is not even permissible to say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes Order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it. 3. A notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342, specifying Scheduled Tribes, can be amended only by law to be made by Parliament. In other words, any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe can be included or excluded from the list of Scheduled Tribes issued under Clause (1) of Article 342 only by Parliament by law and by no other authority. 4. It is not open to State Governments or Courts or tribunals or any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342. 5. Decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Bhaiya Ram Munda v. Anirudh Patar and Dina v. Narain Singh did not lay down law correctly in stating that the inquiry was permissible and the evidence was admissible within the limitations indicated for the purpose of showing what an entry in the Presidential Order was intended to be. As stated in Position (1) above no inquiry at all is permissible and no evidence can be let in, in the matter. 12. As stated in Position (1) above no inquiry at all is permissible and no evidence can be let in, in the matter. 12. We are conscious of the fact that Clause 5 of the Tripura Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and Posts) Rules, 1992 prescribes the procedure for issuing Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe certificate. In terms of this Rules, the competent authority for issuing such certificate is the Sub-Divisional Officer. However, before issuing such certificate, the Sub-Divisional Officer is required to make local inquiry through his administrative agency and the Block Level/Municipal Level/Scheduled Caste Welfare Sub-Committee or Scheduled Tribe Welfare Sub-Committee constituted by the State Government to ascertain as to whether the applicant for such certificate really belongs to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. It is only after getting the enquiry report and after obtaining the opinions of the Sub-Committee that the applicant actually belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as the case may be, that the Sub-Divisional Officer may issue such certificate. Clause 6 also provides for dealing with a situation in which the enquiry report and the opinion of the Sub-Committee differ and final decision thereon is to be taken by the Director of Welfare for Scheduled Castes or the Director of Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be. Then, Clause 6 of the Rules deals with cancellation of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe certificate already issued by the competent authority. This clause empowers the competent authority to cancel such certificate at a subsequent stage, if he, after making an enquiry and after giving the party concerned an opportunity of representing his case in writing, finds that the holder of such certificate does not actually belongs to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be. In cancelling such certificate, the competent authority is also expected to take the opinion of the concerned Sub-Committee. 13. In cancelling such certificate, the competent authority is also expected to take the opinion of the concerned Sub-Committee. 13. At this stage, we may also notice that before the Tripura Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and Posts) Rules, 1992, which is framed under the provisions of the Tripura Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and Posts) Act, 1991, came into force, the procedures for issuing Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Certificates were regulated by the Notification No. 20.048-20.148/TW/F.6-33(Vol-I)/77, dated 24.11.1977 issued by the Department of Welfare for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, the Memorandum No. 7665-775/F.TW/6-38/Vol-III/84, dated 9.4.1987 issued by the Tribal Welfare Department, the Memorandum No. 20164- 219/F.2-118/SCW/GL/89dated 24.11.1989 issued by the Department of Welfare for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the Memorandum No. 19.161-215/F.2-118/SCW/GL/89, dated 22.12.1990 issued by the Directorate of Welfare for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These Notifications and Memoranda have now been repealed by Clause 19(1) of the Tripura Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and Posts) Rules, 1992. This much is clear. Under the aforesaid Notifications/Memoranda and Rules, the competent authority for issuing the caste or tribe certificate have been given extensive powers to determine as to whether the applicant for such certificate actually belongs to a Scheduled Tribe or not and also determine as to whether a particular tribe or sub-tribe, etc., which are not expressly specified in the list of scheduled Tribe included in the Presidential Order, 1950 as amended from time to time, is really a part of or actually belongs to the listed Scheduled Tribe. The moot point now is whether such discretionary power still remains in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra). 14. The moot point now is whether such discretionary power still remains in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra). 14. We have taken the pain of reading and re-reading the observations of the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra) and are given to understand from para 36(1), (2) and (4) of the judgment that no such discretion is now left even with the State Government or any other authority to (i) say that a tribe or sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the Scheduled Tribe Order, if they are not specifically mentioned in it, or (ii) to modify, amend or alter the list of-Scheduled Tribes specified therein, or (iii) to hold any inquiry or let in any evidence for the purpose of showing what an entry in the Presidential Order was intended to be. Thus, where in the judgment of the Apex Court, the language used is unmistakable, the logic at play irresistible, the conclusion reached is inescapable, no inquiry at all is, therefore, permissible and no evidence can be admitted to determine whether a particular community, not expressly named in the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the Presidential Order, 1950, is a part and parcel of the listed Scheduled Tribe. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Apex Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Pronouncement of the Apex Court constitutes the law of the land. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp.(4) SCC 595, the Apex Court held that any order passed by a Court of law, more so by the higher Courts and especially the Supreme Court are not only entitled to respect but are binding and have to be enforced and obeyed strictly and that no Court, much less, an authority howsoever high, can ignore it. The Apex Court in Milind case (Supra) was called in to decide on the following questions: (1) Whether at all, it is permissible to hold enquiry and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in the entry concerned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950? (2) Whether "Halba-Koshti" caste is a sub-tribe within the meaning of Entry 19 (Halba/Halbi) of the Scheduled Tribes Order relating to the State of Maharashtra, even though it is not specifically mentioned as such? 15. It is obvious from above that the first question decided by the Apex Court is not confined to the Scheduled Tribe Order of the state of Maharashtra but to the entire entries made in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Apex Court stated those principles as a rule of law, applied them to the facts of the case before it and acted upon them. That those principles are not limited to the State of Maharashtra alone is clear from its observations that Courts cannot and should not to expand jurisdiction to deal with the question as to whether a particular caste, sub-caste; a group or part of tribe or sub-tribe is included in any one of the entries mentioned in the Presidential Orders issued under Articles 341 and 342 and further that allowing the State Governments (not State Government) or Courts or authorities or tribunals to hold such inquiry may lead to problems, (emphasis ours) Those observations of the Apex Court cannot be said to be observations of general nature relating to the issue only of whether "Halba-Koshti" caste is a sub-tribe of Halba/Halbi tribe within the meaning of Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order before it. No can it be said that the observations were not necessary for the purpose of deciding the case and were beyond the occasion. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court on principle that the latter cannot, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, embark on roving and in-depth examination of the materials afresh and in coming to the conclusion that "Koshtis" could be treated as "Halbis". It cannot, therefore, be said that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Milind case (supra) must be restricted to the facts appearing in the said case or that they are obiter dicta or casual observations made in the judgment on a point not calling for decision. It cannot, therefore, be said that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Milind case (supra) must be restricted to the facts appearing in the said case or that they are obiter dicta or casual observations made in the judgment on a point not calling for decision. In the case at hand also, the learned Single Judge was called upon to decide as to whether members of the Barua community represented by the Appellant-association is a part and parcel of Magh community, which is recognized as a Scheduled Tribe vide Entry 12 relating to the State of Tripura of the Presidential Order. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra), the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. In our considered view, there is no infirmity in the decision of the learned Single Judge. 16. On the question of whether the vested rights of the members of the Barua community to be treated as Scheduled Tribe have been taken away by the impugned letter, the submissions of the learned senior counsel is attractive at the first blush, but does not hold water on deeper consideration. As noted earlier, when the Apex Court has unambiguously laid down the law that the power to include in, or exclude, a particular caste or tribe in the Presidential Orders issued under Article 341 and 342 of the Constitution is expressly and exclusively conferred on and vested with Parliament and, that too, by making a law in that regard, any attempt made by the Courts or tribunals or State Governments or other authorities to seek modification of the said orders by admitting evidence that caste/tribe (A) alone is mentioned in the Order but caste/tribe (B) should be deemed to be a Scheduled Caste/Tribe as the case maybe, would be unconstitutional. In the light of the law so laid down by the Apex Court, in our considered opinion, the power of the issuing officer conferred by Clauses 5 and 6 of the Tripura Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and Posts) Rules, 1992 and the various instructions/memoranda issued earlier to hold enquiry on whether a particular caste; a group or part of the tribe or sub-tribe is included in any one of the entries mentioned in the Presidential Orders would be, or deemed to have been contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Milind case (Supra) and, therefore, unconstitutional. 17. It is a settled law that when the highest Court in the land gives an exposition of law, it has to be taken as if that was always the position of law. Therefore, the authority empowered to issue caste/tribe certificate should act subservient to the highest constitutional Court and not to the Rules or instruction/memoranda which have been denuded of their rationale and substratum under the impact of the authoritative pronouncement of the highest Court. Alternatively, those Rules, instructions/memoranda have to be suitably read down so that they would not come into conflict with the decision of the Apex Court, which the issuing authority are under a constitutional obligation to follow. In the light of the aforesaid legal principles, members of the Barua community represented by the Appellant cannot be said to have any vested right to be treated as Magh tribe and, therefore, a Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Article 342 of the Constitution. Any Scheduled Tribe Certificate issued to members of this community prior to 1987 were apparently made contrary to law as declared by the Apex Court in Milind case (supra). Consequently, when an action is unconstitutional, it cannot be upheld merely because it had been in vogue for a very long period. See Radhey Shyam Singh v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 60 . Similarly, when only one conclusion could be drawn, the omission on the part of the Respondent No. 2 to give a hearing to the Barua community before issuing the impugned letter derecognising them as Scheduled Tribe or to that effect will not be vitiative. In the view that we have taken, we hold that the learned Single Judge is correct in not allowing the writ petition. 18. In the view that we have taken, we hold that the learned Single Judge is correct in not allowing the writ petition. 18. Having said that, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that due to the consistent practice of the authorities to issue Scheduled Tribe certificates to members of the Barua community till 1987, such consistent past practice may have given them a legitimate expectation, but not a vested right, to be treated as a Scheduled Tribe. The law in this regard has now been well settled in a long line of decisions rendered by the Apex Court, which may not be burdened with this judgment. Suffice it to say, a person may have a "legitimate expectation" of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. A legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one, who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the Court, to apply for judicial review. But a claim based on merely legitimate expectation, without anything more, cannot ipso facto give a right. It can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognized general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and concept of legitimate expectation. The powers of the Court to review administrative action must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasure of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shut the Court out of review on merits", particularly, when the elements of speculation and uncertainty are inherent in the very concept. For legal purposes, expectation is not the same as anticipation. Legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law, see Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 SCC 625 . For legal purposes, expectation is not the same as anticipation. Legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law, see Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 SCC 625 . The concept of legitimate expectation is thus to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negating a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such is involved. From the above crystallized principles, it can be safely said that the doctrine of legitimate expectation, howsoever high it may be to the person seeking to invoke the doctrine, cannot defeat the law, constitutional or otherwise. 19. Notwithstanding our observations about the inability of this Court to assume jurisdiction and enter into enquiry to determine whether the term "Magh" indicated in the said Presidential Orders covers Barua community for enabling the latter to claim the status of Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Article 342 of the Constitution, we nevertheless deem it appropriate to commend to the Respondents that they re-examine the claim of the Appellant representing the Barua community to be covered by Magh community for their recognition as Scheduled Tribe and, if their claim is found to be genuine, make appropriate recommendation to Parliament for amendment of the Presidential Order to that effect. 20. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, this Writ Appeal is dismissed subject to the observations indicated above. It is made clear that the impugned letter dated 17.07.1987 and the related provisions of Tripura scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and Posts) Rules, 1992 shall hereafter be read down consistent with the law laid down by the Apex Court in Milind Case (Supra) in this regard. To avoid administrative chaos and to prevent unsettling the settled positions resulting from some of the observations made by us elsewhere in this judgment, it is further directed that the members of Barua community, who have been issued Scheduled Tribes Certificate and already availing of the benefits of reservation in terms of such Certificates, shall not be affected by this judgment. Order accordingly. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.