ORDER: The plaintiff obtained an order of interim injunction in O.A.No.267 of 2005 on 4.3.2005. The respondents have filed the above applications to suspend and to vacate the interim order. 2. Reference to parties will be in accordance with their array in Application No.267 of 2005. 3. The applicant filed C.S.No.207 of 2005 for a declaration that the notice of termination dated 5.2.2005 issued by the first respondent, terminating the Memorandum of Understanding dated 5.3.2004 entered into between the applicant and the respondents is illegal, null and void and for a permanent injunction restraining respondents 1 to 3 from importing/manufacturing in India, any kind of cosmetic products with the LG logo for sale and also for a permanent mandatory injunction directing the first respondent to supply all types of LG cosmetic products under the LG cosmetics brand name “LACVERT”, “E’ZUP”, “EXPRIM” and “ISAKNOX” with the LG logo to the applicant for sale in India. 4. According to the applicant, the first respondent has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on 1.11.2003 with the applicant for distribution and marketing of their FMCG with LG logo in India. The suit is not concerned with the Memorandum of Understanding. It appears that the Regional Sales Manager of the first respondent contacted the applicant and enquired whether they would be interested in selling the LG brand cosmetic range of products in India, in addition to the existing relationship for FMCG products. The applicant agreed and hence, the Regional Sales Manager of the first respondent met the applicant in India. The applicant was informed that the business plan would include the setting up of a minimum LG Cosmetic Beauty Parlours within the first year. The applicant agreed for the same and on the visit of the officials of the applicant to Korea, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 5.3.2004 was signed in Korea. The four products mentioned above were subject matter of the Memorandum of Understanding. The applicant agreed to import a minimum of US$1,000,000 (one million US dollars) worth of products for the period from May, 2004 to May, 2005 and to set up 300 beauty parlours and also to undertake the marketing, advertising and distribution of the products with LG logo. The four products mentioned above were subject matter of the Memorandum of Understanding. The applicant agreed to import a minimum of US$1,000,000 (one million US dollars) worth of products for the period from May, 2004 to May, 2005 and to set up 300 beauty parlours and also to undertake the marketing, advertising and distribution of the products with LG logo. Thereafter, there was exchange of correspondence by e-mail and the applicant was given to understand that the President of the first respondent had accorded his approval and so, the applicant initiated the process of establishing a minimum of 100 beauty parlours all over India by setting up a team of nearly 100 professionals in all the regions of India and started spending several crores of rupees. The applicant worked strenuously and invested crores of rupees to establish the beauty parlours before May/June, 2004 when the senior officials of the first respondent were due to visit India as per the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. The applicant wanted to ensure that the first respondent would start the supply of their products at the earliest and provide necessary support as per the Memorandum of Understanding. In the meantime, the first respondent required the applicant to send three of their high level officials to Korea to explain the status of the progress made by the applicant and accordingly, the applicant’s team visited Korea on 9.6.2004. The three officials of the applicant were taken to one of the best LG Cosmetic Beauty Saloons owned and managed by the first respondent. 5. The applicant continued the setting up of the infrastructure and waited for the two senior officials of the first respondent to visit India as agreed. They neither visited India nor did they supply the products as agreed. Instead, they sent an e-mail on 2.7.2004, regretting that there were some internal problems regarding the official who originally transacted with the applicant, Mr.J.B.Kim and that their commitment to the applicant was to be postponed. In July, 2004, the applicant informed the first respondent that the first LG Beauty Parlour-cum-Cosmetic store was ready and requested the first respondent to send five pieces of each cosmetic product as samples for display. In July, 2004, the applicant informed the first respondent that the first LG Beauty Parlour-cum-Cosmetic store was ready and requested the first respondent to send five pieces of each cosmetic product as samples for display. In the meantime, the officials from the FMCG Division of the first respondent requested the Chairman of the applicant to send their senior officials to accompany them to a meeting with the Managing Director of the second respondent. Though “there was no privity of contract between the applicant and the second respondent”, the applicant agreed to send their officials to meet the second respondent in August, 2004. At this meeting. the second respondent indicated that they would like to sell and market the cosmetic products with LG logo by themselves. The applicant indicated the inordinate expenditure incurred by them and also made it clear to the first respondent that the first respondent would have to “indemnify the applicant towards all the losses the applicant would face due to the non-co-operation and slowing down of the activities by the first respondent”. Two senior officers of the LG Cosmetics Division of the first respondent attended the inauguration of the applicant’s new five floor building on 2.9.2004. 6. A meeting was held on 3.9.2004 between the parties wherein the first respondent had assured all support to the applicant, but within 13 days thereafter, the first respondent sent a fax message on 16.9.2004 to the applicant to “put on hold the cosmetic business until the first respondent’s internal issue pertaining to the LG logo was resolved”. Thereafter, the first respondent, by their fax message dated 25.10.2004, requested the applicant to open the Letter of Credit by 27.10.2004 to enable the first respondent to shift the products to the applicant. The applicant, in order to avoid any further delay, “applied for opening the letter of credit to the State Trading Corporation” and also “paid the margin money”. On 3.12.2004, the first respondent informed the applicant that though they had packed the products for shipment, some objection was raised by the second respondent regarding the LG logo and therefore, they could not ship the products. The applicant sent several letters, but there was no response from the respondents. On 23.12.2004, a delegation of high officials from Korea visited the applicant. The first respondent promised the applicant to resolve the issue. The applicant sent several letters, but there was no response from the respondents. On 23.12.2004, a delegation of high officials from Korea visited the applicant. The first respondent promised the applicant to resolve the issue. However, since there was no subsequent positive response from the first respondent, the applicant “had to virtually close down their cosmetic business to prevent further loss in maintaining and sustaining such huge overheads built for the implementation of the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding”. According to the applicant, this incurred the wrath of the distributors and employees, apart from hurting the applicant very badly in terms of loss of reputation and the huge investments made by them. On 5.2.2005, the applicant received a fax message from the first respondent calling upon the applicant to stop using the LG trademark and logo and thereby terminated with immediate effect all the business relationships with the applicant. 7. According to the applicant, the reason given by the first respondent for terminating the agreement is totally unsustainable and the first respondent has, with a mala fide intention, decided to reap the benefits of the hard work done by the applicant for creating a market for the cosmetic products of the first respondent and had therefore decided to terminate the agreement. The applicant had to be aggressive in its marketing strategies and had thus incurred huge expenses since that was the only way the applicant could face the fierce competition from other brands like Lakme, Revlon and L’Oreal. According to the applicant, the alleged objections of the second and third respondents for the use of the LG logo by the applicant are not bona fide. The respondents have mala fide decided to terminate the agreement only to take advantage of the growing business opportunities. It is in these circumstances that the suit was filed and the interim injunction was sought for. 8. The respondents have mala fide decided to terminate the agreement only to take advantage of the growing business opportunities. It is in these circumstances that the suit was filed and the interim injunction was sought for. 8. Learned senior counsel Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram appearing for the applicant submitted that the first respondent had, for nearly a year, led the applicant to believe that they would be given the sole distributorship of the cosmetic products of the first respondent and while initially some other reason was given for stalling the launch of the products in India, subsequently, the first respondent has come up with a totally unsustainable reason, viz., the problem relating to the use of LG logo and has, on its own, decided to call off the agreement between the parties. According to the learned senior counsel, the first respondent had made a firm commitment and the applicant had incurred huge expenditure on the basis of this and now, it was not open to the first respondent to withdraw from the said commitment. Learned senior counsel also submitted that there was absolutely no denial of any of the averments made in the affidavit or the plaint. According to the learned senior counsel, the third respondent, which was not a party to the contract, alone has chosen to file a counter, whereas the first respondent, which alone had entered into the Memorandum of Understanding with the applicant, has not filed any counter. Learned senior counsel submitted that the averments in the plaint have not been traversed by the respondents in the counter and so, cannot be attacked for the first time by raising oral arguments, since the contesting party would be deprived of the opportunity to meet those allegations, and for this purpose, relied on S.S.Sharma v. Union of India, (1981)1 A.I.S.L.J. 443. 9. Learned senior counsel Mr.C.A.Sundaram and Mr.Arvind Dattar appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that this was a unique case where the owner of a logo was restrained from using their own logo. According to the learned senior counsel, the injunction cannot be granted in favour of the applicant and relied on Secs.14(1)(a) and (c), Explanations (ii)(a) and (b) to Sec.10 as well as Sec.41(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (‘Act’ in short). In any event, respondents 1 and 2 cannot be restrained by an order of injunction, since there is no privity of contract. In any event, respondents 1 and 2 cannot be restrained by an order of injunction, since there is no privity of contract. It was submitted on behalf of the third respondent that the pleadings did not support the reliefs that are sought for. According to the learned senior counsel, the persons who are said to have transacted with the applicant had no authority to make a commitment of this sort and hence, criminal proceedings have been launched against them. Further, according to the learned senior counsel, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the applicant had incurred any expenditure or that the applicant had fulfilled their side of the obligation. Reliance was placed on Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 . 10. The documents filed by the applicant and the pleadings were looked into in order to see if the applicant is entitled to the injunction sought for. It is clear that what the applicant wants is a specific performance of the Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum of Understanding dated 5.3.2004 reads, "This memorandum of understanding is about sales and marketing of cosmetic products by LG Cosmetics for India." The products to be introduced as per the Memorandum of Understanding are "LacVert", "E’Zup" and "Exprim". The applicant is referred to as IHHL and the obligations of IHHL under this Memorandum of Understanding were - to import cosmetics for US$1,000,000 from May, 2004 to May, 2005; to open a minimum of 100 LG Cosmetics Beauty Parlour units in the first year and totally upto 300 units:to do all the marketing, advertising and distribution work in the Indian market; and to get all clearance and approval from the Government of India. As per the Memorandum, IHHL shall not directly or indirectly sell the products to other countries except India. The obligations of the first respondent under this Memorandum of Understanding was to provide marketing support of 20% of IHHL’S import value; and to provide samples of all actual size products for every order. According to the Memorandum of Understanding, the General Manager of the first respondent will visit India in May or June, 2004 and see the development and brand building activities of IHHL and would support IHHL further. According to the Memorandum of Understanding, the General Manager of the first respondent will visit India in May or June, 2004 and see the development and brand building activities of IHHL and would support IHHL further. This Memorandum of Understanding is "valid temporarily until the main contract is signed by both parties and will be terminated if any of the parties fails to accomplish its obligations". 11. By the e-mail dated 22.3.2004, Mr. M.K.Cheong, Regional Sales Manager of the first respondent informed the applicant that he "already got the approval from the President of my company". On 3.7.2004, the applicant sent an e-mail to the first respondent indicating that they were "in the process of opening the US$1,000,000 Letter of credit for our first year of cosmetic products and the same will be handed over to your company officials in India". There was a meeting in Mumbai on 3.9.2004. At this meeting, the officers of the first respondent confirmed that they will send US$2,000,000 worth of cosmetic products to the applicant for the ten exclusive cosmetic stores "that are going to be opened by the end of October, 2004". The parties agreed, inter alia, that after reaching Korea, the first respondent will send agreement papers in order to complete all the Governmental formalities as well as for opening the Letter of Credit. On 17.8.2004, the applicant sent an e-mail informing the first respondent that they have appointed a core team of about 50 professionals and have also identified ten prime stores at strategic locations because, "we are going to open the exclusive cosmetic stores for selling only LG branded cosmetic products". On 25.10.2004, the first respondent sent an e-mail to the applicant requiring them to open the Letter of Credit by Wednesday, the 27th of October, 2004, "so that we may ship the goods as soon as possible". Thereafter, there was exchange of correspondence which indicated that the first respondent was "slowing down". Then, the applicant addressed a letter to the first respondent on 9.12.2004 as follows: "We just calculated the damages of our LG Cosmetics Business in India. We have spent USD 4.45 Million till now by way of salaries, advertisements, lease agreements for cosmetic showrooms, etc. Thereafter, there was exchange of correspondence which indicated that the first respondent was "slowing down". Then, the applicant addressed a letter to the first respondent on 9.12.2004 as follows: "We just calculated the damages of our LG Cosmetics Business in India. We have spent USD 4.45 Million till now by way of salaries, advertisements, lease agreements for cosmetic showrooms, etc. Also we have a commitment of USD 21.34 Million to our associates for advertisement, machineries and setting up the showrooms for this business.“ On February 5, 2005, the applicant received a legal notice on behalf of the first respondent stating that the licence agreement and the minutes were null and void and not binding for several reasons and that officers involved in the execution of the agreement did not have the necessary authorization of the management and that they did not even report about the execution of the agreement to the management until several months thereafter and that the management has, therefore, taken punitive action against those officers. The legal notice also required the applicant to stop using LG trademarks and logos. 12. At the discretion of the Court, specific performance may be enforced: (a) where there is no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by non-performance; or (b) when compensation for non-performance in terms of money would not afford adequate relief. The Explanation to Sec.10 of the Act shows that there is a presumption that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately be relieved by monetary compensation. Whereas, the presumption is that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be relieved by monetary compensation, except - (a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market, or (b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff. In the present case, the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties was to export by the first respondent to the applicant, specific cosmetic products to the value of US$1,000,000 in the first year, subject to revision. In the present case, the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties was to export by the first respondent to the applicant, specific cosmetic products to the value of US$1,000,000 in the first year, subject to revision. These cosmetic products are ordinary articles of commerce; they consist of goods which are easily obtainable in the market and cannot be said to be of special value or interest to the applicant since even as per the pleadings, the first respondent’s competitors, viz., Lakme, Revlon and L’Oreal sell the same kind of products; nor are the products held by the first respondent as the applicant’s agent or trustee. 13. Sec.14(1) of the Specific Relief Act reads as follows: ”14. Contracts not specifically enforceable: (1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely: (a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief; (b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms; (c) a contract which is in its nature determinable; (d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the Court cannot supervise. “ In the present case, as seen from the correspondence, the applicant has quantified the loss incurred by them and has in fact, informed the first respondent that the first respondent will have to indemnify the loss sustained by them. Therefore, admittedly the applicant has not made out a case that compensation in terms of money is not an adequate relief for their loss. Secondly, to grant an injunction would be to compel the first respondent to continue to engage the applicant as distributor for their products in India. And this, the Court will refrain from doing, since the relationship would involve trust and confidence. It has been held, ”It would be contrary to public policy to impose upon an unwilling principal, an agent whom he did not wish to employ, especially when the agent could bring an action for damages “ vide., Brett v. East India and London Shipping Company, 2 H and M 404. The same reasoning will apply to the present case. The contract is, on the face of it, determinable. The same reasoning will apply to the present case. The contract is, on the face of it, determinable. Admittedly, the main contract referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding was not signed and anyway, the Memorandum of Understanding was only for the period from May, 2004 to May, 2005. Either party could have decided not to enter into the main contract and there was nothing to stop them from doing so. If the injunction sought for is granted, the first respondent will be required to continuously supply its products to the applicant. This Court cannot supervise the performance of such continuous supply and on this ground too, the contract is not specifically enforceable. 14. Sec.41 of the Specific Relief Act specifically provides that injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which cannot be specifically enforced. This equally applies to interlocutory applications seeking injunction. 15. In Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991)1 S.C.C. 533 , the Supreme Court held that the distributorship agreement between the parties for sale of LPG was one for rendering personal service. This being so, the Supreme Court held that granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Sec.14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to ‘the law governing such cases’ and that the grant of this relief in the award cannot; therefore, be sustained. In the present case, what is indirectly sought for is restoration of distributorship. The applicant calls it sole distributorship. Even the Memorandum of Understanding does not indicate that there was an agreement to award sole distributorship to the applicant as averred by the applicant. 16. In Rajasthan Co-operative Dairy Federation Limited v. Mahalaxmi Mingrate Marketing Services Private Limited, (1996)10 S.C.C. 405 , the Rajasthan Dairy Federation invited applications for selling agents. The respondent company was appointed as the selling agent. Though the respondent was not indicated as the sole selling agent, the agreement incorrectly described the respondent as the sole selling agent. The agreement was terminated by revoking the letter of agreement. Challenging that, the respondent filed a writ petition. The writ petition was allowed and the Division Bench confirmed it. The respondent company was appointed as the selling agent. Though the respondent was not indicated as the sole selling agent, the agreement incorrectly described the respondent as the sole selling agent. The agreement was terminated by revoking the letter of agreement. Challenging that, the respondent filed a writ petition. The writ petition was allowed and the Division Bench confirmed it. Against that, the federation went before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it was open to the federation to satisfy itself regarding the financial position of the selling agent before committing itself, and if the contract has been cancelled, it cannot be considered as an arbitrary action nor violation of a fundamental right. The following para of that judgment appears to be relevant: ” Respondent No.1 contends that in anticipation of entering into a contract with the appellant, respondent No.1 incurred heavy expenses. This statement of respondent No1 has to be established on evidence. A writ petition is not an appropriate proceeding if any claim for damages based on disputed facts is required to be established. We do not wish to pronounce on the question whether, in anticipation of entering into a contract, a party which incurs expenses, can recover them from the other party if that other party ultimately, rightly declines to enter into a contract". 17. In M/s.Gujarat Bottling Company Limited v. Coca Cola Company, A.I.R .1995 S.C. 2372, the issue of granting an injunction to perform a negative agreement was dealt with in detail. The Supreme Court held therein, "The Court is, however, not bound to grant an injunction in every case and an injunction to enforce negative covenant would be refused if it would indirectly compel the employee either to idleness or to serve the employee". In the present case, the injunction indirectly prevents the first respondent from marketing its own products with the logo that it legally owns in India. Further, the question is, can the first respondent be restrained from marketing their products directly or by appointing another distributor? In Gujarat Bottling case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the doctrine of restraint of trade must be confined only to contracts of employment and will not apply to other contracts and held, "There is no rational basis for confining this principle to a contract for employment and excluding its application to other contracts". In Gujarat Bottling case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the doctrine of restraint of trade must be confined only to contracts of employment and will not apply to other contracts and held, "There is no rational basis for confining this principle to a contract for employment and excluding its application to other contracts". The Supreme Court referred to the observation of Lord Pierce in Esso Petroleum Company Limited v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Limited, 1968 A.C .269 that, "If, however, the contract ties the trading activities of either party after its determination, it is a restraint of trade, and the question of reasonableness arises". 18. In Shri Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College, (1972)1 S.C.C. 623 , The Supreme Court held, "If a master rightfully ends the contract, there can be no complaint. If the master wrongfully ends the contract, then the servant can pursue a claim for damages. So, even if the master wrongfully dismisses the servant in breach of a contract, the employment is effectively terminated". Though this principle is related to a master-servant contract, it equally applies to the contract on hand, as seen from the M/s. Gujarat Bottling Company Limited v. Coco Cola Company,A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2372. In Dr.Bool Chand v. Kurukshetra University, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 292, the Supreme Court held that when there has been purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service which subsisted would rarely be made and would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that the Courts do not grant specific performance of contracts of service. In Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P.Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel, (2001)5 S.C.C. 101 , the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of a clause which terminates the contract at will. In this case, reference was made to the judgment in Central Bank of India Limited v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company Limited, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1288, wherein the Supreme Court had observed as follows: "Further, we do not think that it can be said that if a party has a right at will to terminate a contract, the imposition by him of a condition, however hard, on failure to fulfil which the termination was to take effect, would make the termination illegal, for the party affected was not entitled even to the benefit of a difficult condition. The agreement was that the power to terminate could be exercised without more and that is what we think was done in this case." The Supreme Court, in Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi case Supra, held that the contract could not be specifically enforced since it involved the performance of a continuous duty, which the Court cannot supervise, This case involves the continuous supply of the cos-cosmetic products. 19. In Nandganj Sihori Sugar Company Limited, Rae Bareli v. Badrinath Dixit, (1991)3 S.C.C. 54 , the suit was instituted for a mandatory injunction to enforce a contract alleged to have been entered between the plaintiff and the defendant. The trial Court dismissed the suit, the appeal was allowed and this was confirmed by the High Court. As against that, the employer went before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that it was surprising that the High Court should have “proceeded on the assumption that any enforceable contract existed. Neither from the plaint nor from the evidence is it possible to identify any concluded contract to which the plaintiff is a party of which the plaintiff can enforce and even assuming that . . . ..any such contract bound the parties, to have decreed the suit for specific performance of a contract of personal service, on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, was to violate all basic norms of law”. The Supreme Court said, “Courts do not ordinarily enforce performance of contracts of a personal character, such as a contract of employment”, quoting the words of Jessel, M.R. in Rigby v. Connol, (1880)14 Ch.D. 482. 20. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.Vol.44, at para.407), it is stated, “Court does not seek to compel persons against their will to maintain continuous personal and confidential relations. However, this rule is not absolute and without exception . . . . No Court may, whether by way of an order for specific performance of a contract of employment or an injunction restraining a breach or threatened breach of such a contract, compel an employee to do any work or attend at any place for doing of any work. This principle applies not merely to contracts of employment, but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous services by one person to another . . . Contracts of agency . . . This principle applies not merely to contracts of employment, but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous services by one person to another . . . Contracts of agency . . . come under the same rule.” On the facts of the above case, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was clearly wrong in issuing a mandatory injunction to appoint the plaintiff. Even if there was a contract in terms of which the plaintiff was entitled to seek the relief, the only relief which was available in law was damages and not specific performance. Breach of contract must ordinarily sound in damages and particularly so in the case of personal contracts. 21. It is clear, therefore, that legally, the applicant is not entitled to the interim injunction, which will have the effect of restraining the first respondent from marketing their own products with their own logo. 22. The following reasons also support the conclusion. Though the applicant has dwelt at length about the inordinate expenditure that was incurred by them, except for the reference to the opening of a showroom in Chennai, no details are given with regard to the showrooms said to have been opened in all the zones of India, nor even any name of the 100 and odd professionals who are said to have been engaged is mentioned. In these circumstances, the applicant cannot be said to have made out a case of hardship. Further, the applicant did not open the Letter of Credit for US$1,000,000, as they were bound to do under the Agreement. There can be no import of the products of the first respondent without the applicant opening the Letter of Credit and on this score also, the applicant is not entitled to the injunction that is sought for. The Memorandum of Understanding was “with regard to cosmetic products supplied by LG cosmetics”. It is a moot question whether it is the same as “any cosmetic product with LG logo”, which is the subject matter of the present applications. and whether interim relief can be obtained not just against LG cosmetics, but others too. The grant of injunction is only discretionary. 23. The applicant themselves have pleaded that they have to be indemnified for their losses; so admittedly, any loss suffered by the applicant, if proved, can be compensated monetarily (Sec.14(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act). and whether interim relief can be obtained not just against LG cosmetics, but others too. The grant of injunction is only discretionary. 23. The applicant themselves have pleaded that they have to be indemnified for their losses; so admittedly, any loss suffered by the applicant, if proved, can be compensated monetarily (Sec.14(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act). The applicant has no privity of contract with respondents 2 and 3 and so, they cannot be restrained from using their own logo. Admittedly, the second respondent had indicated as early as in August, 2004 that they may want to market their cosmetic products themselves. Even if the Memorandum of Understanding binds the respondents, it is limited to the supply of US$1,000,000 worth of cosmetics (for which no Letter of Credit was opened) and it is for a limited period and "valid temporarily". The applicant has not proved that they have opened 100 outlets, as they were obliged to do so as per the Memorandum of Understanding. In view of the negative response from the respondents, the applicant has "virtually closed" down business and so, the balance of convenience is not in favour of the applicant. As regards the alleged loss of reputation, the applicant has not even claimed damages. Therefore, on the basis of the applicant’s own pleadings and the legal provisions, the applicant fails. 24. In M/s.Gujarat Bottling Company Limited v. Coca Cola Company, A.I.R. 1995 S.C, 2372, the Supreme Court begins the judgment with the following words, Nowadays, there are wars between the Corporations, more particularly Corporations having multinational operations for the protection and advancement of their economic interests. These wars are fought on the economic plain, but some of the battles spill over to Courts of law. The present case is one such battle". The correspondence between the parties appears to indicate that the conduct of the first respondent has also not been blameless. May be, this is just a warning to Indian Corporations to be better armed in these wars. The question, whether in a claim for damages the respondents can absolve themselves from all liability by now stating that the persons who entered into the Memorandum of Understanding were not authorized by them to do so, is left open. 25. May be, this is just a warning to Indian Corporations to be better armed in these wars. The question, whether in a claim for damages the respondents can absolve themselves from all liability by now stating that the persons who entered into the Memorandum of Understanding were not authorized by them to do so, is left open. 25. For all these reasons, the order of interim injunction granted by this Court on 4.3.2005 is hereby vacated and therefore, O.A.Nos.267 and 268 of 2005 are closed and Appn.No.1925 of 2005 is ordered. Post the other Applications on 30.6.2005.