JUDGMENT T.N.K. Singh, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal dated 22.11.2004 passed in Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of 2004 Ref: (1) Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 and (2) Original Suit 3 of 2003, for rejecting the application for condoning the delay of 47 days in filing the accompanying miscellaneous application, which had been registered as Judicial Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004, for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 14.5.2004 passed in Original Suit No. 3 of 2003. 2. Heard Shri N. Kerani Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. L. Dhinkar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Defendant and Shri M. Manglem Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/Plaintiff. 3. A short factual panorama will suffice for effective decision of the present revision petition. The Respondent/Plaintiff instituted a Suit being Original Suit No. 3 of 2003 against the present Petitioner/Defendant in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Thoubal for the relieves: (a) Declaration of title over a piece of agricultural land covered by patta No. 58 of 927 of Kakching Khulen Village in Thoubal District, Manipur on the basis of adverse possession. (b) Recovery of rent of 24 (twenty four) Phou-Pot of paddy per annum from the year 1996-2002 (for 7 years), and (c) A preliminary decree for possession of the said land till full realization of an alleged loan of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only taken by the Petitioner/Defendant from the Respondent/Plaintiff. 4. The present Petitioner/Defendant contested the Suit by filing written statement of defence. Admittedly, the present Petitioner/Defendant contested the Suit by appointing/ engaging one Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate residence of Kakching. It is said that the present Petitioner/Defendant had full faith and confidence that her Counsel Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate would appear before the Court on all the dates fixed for hearing and/or further proceedings of the said O.S. No. 3 of 2003. During pendency of the said Suit, the present Petitioner/Defendant through her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate had placed 2 (two) preliminary issues, i.e. lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and (2) the said Suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. The Civil Judge (Jr. During pendency of the said Suit, the present Petitioner/Defendant through her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate had placed 2 (two) preliminary issues, i.e. lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and (2) the said Suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. The Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal by passing an order dated 10.2.2004 had disallowed the said 2 (two) preliminary objections/issues raised by the present Petitioner/Defendant. 5. It is said that the present/Defendant being aggrieved by the said order of the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal dated 10.2.2004, obtained a certified copy of the said order dated 10.2.2004 on 26.2.2004 and thereafter consulted with her Senior Advocate, i.e. Shri N. Kerani Singh for filing an appeal/revision against the said order dated 10.2.2004 before a higher Court. It is said that for that purpose with the consent and knowledge of her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate, Petitioner/Defendant had taken the file of the case temporarily from him for perusal and examination by Sr. Counsel for the purpose of filing an appeal/revision against the said order dated 10.2.2004. The present Petitioner/Defendant had the full faith and confidence with Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate that her Counsel would appear on all the dates fixed for hearing and/or further proceedings of the Original Suit No. 3 of 2003 before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal as the case file had been taken from him with his consent temporarily for perusal by the Sr. Advocate, Shri N. Kerani Singh. Unfortunately, it is said that after Sr. Advocate took at considerable time to examine the said order of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal dated 10.2.2004, file of the case entrusted to him for giving his opinion as to the filing of appeal/revision against the said order dated 10.2.2004 had been returned on 20.5.2004 with the instructions to contest the Suit on merit. 6. But because of the bona fide mis-understanding and communication gap between the present Petitioner/Defendant and her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate, it is said that her Counsel Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate did not appear before the Court of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal on all the dates fixed for further proceedings of the O.S. No. 3 of 2003 under the bona fide impression that the learned Sr. Division), Thoubal on all the dates fixed for further proceedings of the O.S. No. 3 of 2003 under the bona fide impression that the learned Sr. Advocate would have filed the appeal/revision against the said order of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal dated 10.2.2004 before the high Court and would have obtained the order for stay of the further proceedings of the O.S. No. 3 of 2003. It is also said that Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate did not give any information about the progress of the O.S. No. 3 of2003 but the present Petitioner/Defendant who is an illiterate village woman was under the bona fide impression that her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, Advocate, to whom she had full faith and confidence, would be appearing to conduct her case properly on all the dates fixed for further proceedings of her case, i.e. O.S. No. 3 of 2003, before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal as the file was taken from him with his consent temporarily for perusal by the Sr. Counsel for the purpose mentioned above. On such bona fide believe and impression, the present Petitioner/Defendant was waiting the advice of the learned Sr. Counsel regarding the filing of appeal/revision against the said order of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal dated 10.2.2004. It is said that such being the situation, neither the present Petitioner/Defendant nor her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh appeared before the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal on all the dates fixed for further proceedings of the said O.S. No. 3 of 2003 while awaiting the advice of the learned Sr. Counsel regarding the filing of appeal/revision of the said order dated 10.2.2004. It is said that the O.S. No. 3 of 2003 was proceeded ex parte and an ex parte judgment and decree was passed on 14.5.2004. Such fact was known to the present Petitioner/Defendant for the first time on 8.7.2004 on receiving notice for execution of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004 in the Execution Case No. 2 of 2004 filed by the present Respondent/Plaintiff before the Civil judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal. 7. After knowing the passing of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004 only on 8.7.2004, the present Petitioner/Defendant, it is said, had taken prompt action by filing an application which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Division), Thoubal. 7. After knowing the passing of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004 only on 8.7.2004, the present Petitioner/Defendant, it is said, had taken prompt action by filing an application which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal in O.S. No. 3 of 2003. As there was a delay of 47 days, for the reasons mentioned above, in filing the said application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004, the present Petitioner/Defendant had filed a separate application for condoning the delay of 47 days, which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of 2004. The said application for condoning delay filed by the present Petitioner/Defendant was also supported by the affidavits sworn by the present Petitioner/Defendant and her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh. In that affidavit sworn by her Counsel, Shri Y. Muhindro Singh, he clearly mentioned that he had handed over the file to the present Petitioner/Defendant temporarily for perusal by the learned Sr. Counsel for filing the appeal/revision against the said order of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal dated 10.2.2004 and also that he had the bona fide impression that the Sr. Counsel would have filed the appeal/revision against the said order dated 10.2.2004 before the high Court and he would have obtained the order for stay of further proceedings of the O.S. No. 3 of 2003 and on such bona fide plea, he did not appear before the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal on all the dates fixed for further proceedings of the said O.S. No. 3 of2003. Shri Y. Muhindro Singh in his affidavit further states that the file was brought back to him on 20.5.2004 after the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal had already passed the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004. The Respondent/Plaintiff also filed written objections to the said application for condonation of delay, which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of2004 and also the said application which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004. Division), Thoubal had already passed the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004. The Respondent/Plaintiff also filed written objections to the said application for condonation of delay, which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of2004 and also the said application which had been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004. The main grounds, inter alia, taken by the Respondents/Plaintiff in his written objections for dismissing the said application for condonation of delay were that the present Petitioner/ Defendant and her Counsel were negligent, it was only a delaying tactics to delay the execution of the decree and there is no explanation for every day's delay. The learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal by passing the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 had dismissed the application for condonation of delay for 47 days for the reasons, that the present Petitioner/Defendant did not explain day to day delay from the last date of limitation and there is gross negligence on the part of the present Petitioner/Defendant and the Petitioner and her lawyer remained silence till the filing of the application for condonation of delay on 30.7.2004. Being aggrieved, the present Petitioner/Defendant by the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 filed the present revision petition. 8. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner strenuously submitted that there were sufficient grounds for condoning delay of 47 days and refusal on the part of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal to condone the delay by taking highly technical views of the matter is erroneous and amounts to an error in exercising jurisdiction vested to her by the law. He further submitted that the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division\) had acted in exercise of the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity by refusing to accept the explanations furnished by the present Petitioner/Defendant for condoning the delay of 47 days and the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) had misappreciated the expression "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and she had taken a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter occasioning a grave miscarriage of justice to the present Petitioner/Defendant. He also strenuously submitted that the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) had misappreciated the expression "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and she had taken a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter occasioning a grave miscarriage of justice to the present Petitioner/Defendant. He also strenuously submitted that the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal had passed the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 in fragrant violation of the principle and proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court regarding the interpretation of "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 9. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the present Petitioner/Defendant by relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and other reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 submitted that the legislature had conferred the powers to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matter on merit. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts and also that "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed. He referred the following portions of the judgment in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and other (Supra): It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not sand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account' of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the present Petitioner/Defendant in order to bolster up his submissions referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another reported in AIR 2000 SC 2306 and submitted that the powers to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to party by disposing the matter on merit and also the purpose of limitation was not to destroy the right, but it is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury such as barred by limitation. The learned Sr. Counsel further submitted that if the explanation for condonation of delay did not smack, mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In support of his submission he made a reference to para-13 of the judgment in State of Bihar and other v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (Supra) which reads as follows: 13. In support of his submission he made a reference to para-13 of the judgment in State of Bihar and other v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (Supra) which reads as follows: 13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614 : 1995 AIR SCW 4650: 1996 Lab IC 610 this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : 1998 AIR SCW 313: AIR 1998 SC 3222 this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a party of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed (Para 9 of AIR 1998 SC 3222 ): It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be unconscionable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, mush less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. 10. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the present Petitioner/Defendant also referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 176 . The fact in that case was that the Appellant did not appear before the Court after his case is entrusted to his Counsel but on the failure of the Counsel, the case was proceeded ex parte and decreed the suit ex parte. The learned Counsel of the Appellant did not appear on behalf of the Appellant because of the communication gap and also the person who was appearing on behalf of the Company (Appellant) left the service because of the death of his son and none had informed him (Appellant) about the further proceedings in the Court. The Apex Court held that even though the Appellant appears not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. Under this circumstances, the Apex Court had allowed to condone the delay of 554 days in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. Paras-7 and 10 of the judgment and order in M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam (Supra) read as follows: 7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan: Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the Appellant. 10. In the instant case, the Appellant tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree as is evident from his application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the Appellant appears not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. We are of the opinion that the inconvenience caused to the Respondent for the delay on account of the Appellant being absent from the Court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. In the interests of justice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree. To avoid further delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex parte decree as well. 11. The learned Sr. Counsel in order to substantiate his submissions that the expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that justice has done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide cannot be imputed to the party concerned and also that acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal should be the exception. The learned Sr. Counsel referred to Ram Nath @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and other reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 . In that case, the Apex Court by considering the expression "sufficient cause" in Section5 of the Limitation Act, 1965, liberally and also holding that there is inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the Appellant in filing the application for setting aside of the abatement which were late by 130 days, 3 years and 5 years respectively. By referring to the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Nath @ Ram Nath Sahu and other v. Gobardhan Sao and other (Supra), the learned Sr. Counsel submits that as no inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to the present Petitioner/Defendant for the reasons more fully mentioned in her application for condonation of delay, the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) would have accepted the explanation furnished by the Petitioner/Defendant as the acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal as exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party (present Petitioner/Defendant). Division) would have accepted the explanation furnished by the Petitioner/Defendant as the acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal as exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party (present Petitioner/Defendant). But the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter had rejected the explanation submitted by the Petitioner/ Defendant for condonation of delay of only 47 days while passing the impugned judgment and order in a routine like manner. Para 12 of the judgment and order in Ram Nath @ Ram Nath Sahu and other v. Gobardhan Sao and other (Supra) reads as follows: 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the Courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-line manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, Courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. 12. Taking into over whole consideration of the explanations and reasons for condoning delay of 47 days in filing the said application for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 14.5.2004, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the present Petitioner/Defendant would have been more vigilant in contesting the O.S. No. 3 of 2003 but her conduct, as a whole, does not warrant to eastigate her as an irresponsible litigant and impute negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide to her. 13. The learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff/Respondent very capably and efficiently put up the case of the Respondent. His main thrust for rejection of the present Civil Revision Petition is that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be exercised only when the subordinate Court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with materials irregularities. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/Plaintiff further submits that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to the cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non exercise or illegal assumption of jurisdiction by the subordinate Court. If a subordinate Court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide the matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularities even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct an error of fact however, gross or even error of law unless the error have relations to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff precisely submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court could only be exercised only when the subordinate Court committed any error relating with the jurisdiction only. In order to bolster up his submissions, the learned Counsel referred to the decisions of the Apex Court: 1. Sher Singh v. Joint. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff precisely submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court could only be exercised only when the subordinate Court committed any error relating with the jurisdiction only. In order to bolster up his submissions, the learned Counsel referred to the decisions of the Apex Court: 1. Sher Singh v. Joint. Director of Consolidation & other, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1341 2. D.L.F. Housing and Constn. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and other reported in AIR 1971 SC 2323 3. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronatutics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderbad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchaser and Store) 14. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. reported in AIR 1973 SC 76 . 14. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents/Plaintiff further submitted that there is no jurisdictional error or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal in passing the impugned judgment and order and as such the present revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/plaintiff by referring to the decisions of the Apex Court in M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory and another v. Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar and other reported in AIR 1984 SC 1894 submits that as the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) had passed the impugned judgment and order in exercise of her jurisdiction duly conferred by the law, the High Court shall not interfere with the impugned judgment and order by taking a different view on fact. The learned Counsel also further submits that in order to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, the present Petitioner/Defendant must show that if the impugned and order is allowed to stand, it would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the present Petitioner/Defendant. In support of his submission, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons, Jew Town, Cocking, etc. etc. v. Sunderdas Rathenaietc. reported in AIR 1988 SC 812 . In contrary to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff, the learned Sr. In support of his submission, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons, Jew Town, Cocking, etc. etc. v. Sunderdas Rathenaietc. reported in AIR 1988 SC 812 . In contrary to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the present Petitioner/Defendant submitted that in the present case this Court would exercise the revisional powers for the reasons that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party which raised them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court, an erroneous decision on these pleas, therefore, can be said to be concerned with the questions of jurisdiction falling with the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Such being the well settled principle of law, according to the learned Sr. Counsel for the present Petitioner/Defendant, the erroneous decision of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal in the impugned judgment and order can be said to be concerned with the question of jurisdiction felling within the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure In support of his submissions, the learned Sr. Counsel had referred to a decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and other v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and other, reported in AIR 1966 SC 153 . Para-10 of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and other v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and other (supra) reads as follows: 10. The provisions of Section 115 of the Code have been examined by judicial decisions on several occasions. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact, however, gross they may be, or even errors of law, unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. As Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115 indicate, it is only in cases where the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may arise in proceedings instituted before subordinate Courts which are related to question of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court and so. an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that Court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115. 16. Admittedly, the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 passed in the present case relates with the limitation matter and as such erroneous decision of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) in the matter for condoning the delay of 47 days in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case be said to be concerned with the question of jurisdiction which falls within the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to considered view of this Court. 17. Lastly, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the present Petitioner/Defendant submitted that innocent party, i.e. the present Petitioner/Defendant who had done everything in her power at the expectation that her conducting Counsel should not commit any omission and misdemeanor on his part, should not suffer. And further, the Petitioner/Defendant should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission and misdemeanor of her conducting Counsel. In this regard, the learned Sr. Counsel cited a decision of the Apex Court in Rafiq and another v. Mushilal and another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 wherein the Apex Court held that the parties should not suffer for the inaction of their conducting Counsel. The relevant portion of the para 3 of AIR in Rafiq and another (supra) is quoted below: However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. The relevant portion of the para 3 of AIR in Rafiq and another (supra) is quoted below: However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the high Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the Respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs. 200/- should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K. Sanghi. The said ratio of the Apex Court laid down in Rafiq and another (supra) had been followed by this Court (Division Bench) in Nirmal Das Gupta v. Prasanta Das Gupta and other reported in AIR 1985 Gau 3 . 18. For the reasons discussed above, I am of the considered view that the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal had passed the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 by committing an error of jurisdiction and also in fragrant violation of the principle and proposition of laws as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above and also by mis-construing the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by taking pedantic and hypertechnical view of the explanations furnished by the present Petitioner/Defendant for condonation of only 47 days' delay in filing the said application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 passed in Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of 2004 (Ref: Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 and O.S. No. 3 of 2004) of the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal, is hereby set aside. 19. In the result, delay in filing the said misc. application which has been registered as Judl. Misc. Misc. Case No. 24 of 2004 (Ref: Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 and O.S. No. 3 of 2004) of the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Thoubal, is hereby set aside. 19. In the result, delay in filing the said misc. application which has been registered as Judl. Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 14.5.2004 is hereby condoned and the learned trial Court is directed to heard the judicial Misc. Case No. 25 of 2004 on merit after giving proper notice to both the parties. 20. With the above observation and direction, this civil revision petition is allowed. No order as to costs. 21. Registry is directed to send down the Lower Court records immediately.