R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions are filed by C. P. Kalappa and four others challenging the order dated 28-8-2004 in Case No. LR/inam/1/83-84/87-88 connected with proceedings No. MAG 71/2002-2003 at Annexure-B. They also want for a direction directing the fourth respondent to get the allegations levelled in the writ petitions enquired into by COD or any other high level agency followed by appropriate action to secure the ends of justice. ( 2 ) PREDECESSORS of the petitioners obtained vast extent of lands by way of usufructuary mortgage for a period of 99 years under two mortgage deeds during the years 1955 and 1967 bearing Survey Nos. 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Bettageri Village from the predecessor in title of the 2nd respondent Sri N. Channabasava Deshikendra Swamigalu (for short, 'swamiji' ). Petitioners sticceeded to the said mortgaged property along other successors of the original mortgage. They are in actual possession of the property. The bulk of the properties are cultivated with coffee and the coffee registration certificates are all standing in the name of the petitioners. The said property so mortgaged were inam lands and the mortgages have been accorded according to the then law in force by obtaining prior permission of the State Government. After coming into force of the Kamataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977 ('inams abolition Act', for short), second respondent preferred an application before the 1st respondent seeking occupancy rights of the mortgaged property by filing Form 1. Same was allowed by the Tahsildar on 11-2-1993. Petitioners challenged the same in this Court in Writ petition No. 6379 of 1993. This Court ruled that the second respondent is not entitled for the occupancy rights and the petitioners are also not entitled to continue in possession of the mortgaged lands. This Court further ruled that the lands vest with the State Government and the state Government should resume the lands for distribution to the landless persons. Appeals were filed against the said order in Writ appeal Nos. 5689 of 1997 and 5816 of 1997 (N. Channabasava desikendra Swamigalu v C. P. Poonacha and Others, ILR 1999 Kar. 4394 (DB) ). A Division Bench of this Court confirmed the occupancy rights granted by the Land tribunal in favour of the Swamiji subject to the mortgage deeds. Appeals were filed against the said order in Writ appeal Nos. 5689 of 1997 and 5816 of 1997 (N. Channabasava desikendra Swamigalu v C. P. Poonacha and Others, ILR 1999 Kar. 4394 (DB) ). A Division Bench of this Court confirmed the occupancy rights granted by the Land tribunal in favour of the Swamiji subject to the mortgage deeds. This court in terms of the order dated 14-6-2002 corrected the errors in terms of I. A. No. 2 of 2002. Against the said order of correction, Swamiji had preferred SLP before the Supreme Court and leave has been granted without continuing the stay in the matter. Petitioners refer to various litigations including two writ petitions challenging the issuance of Form 5 and also the transfer of revenue records in favour of second respondent. The appeal preferred against the transfer of revenue records in favour of second respondent in obedience to the directions of this court is still pending disposal. Two civil suits are also pending in O. S. No. 92 of 2002 and O. S. No. 74 of 2001 in the matter. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, first respondent-Tahsildar, behind the back of the petitioners passed an order dated 28-8-2004 in Case No. LR/inam/1/83-84/87-88. The said case was disposed of along with a connected matter in No. MAG 71/2002-2003 authorising the second respondent to evict the petitioners from the occupation of the mortgaged lands. The said order was not at all pronounced in the open Court. First respondent had issued a notice to the petitioners on 21-8-2004 calling upon them to appear before him on 28-8-2004. Petitioner-Kalaiah attended the Tahsildar's office but the first respondent the Tahsildar did not turn up to the office at all on 28-8-2004. Therefore, the order at annexure-B was not pronounced in the open Court. The author of annexure-B, the third respondent herein retired from service on 31-8- 2004. Till his retirement he did not pronounce the impugned order at all. According to the petitioners third respondent prepared the impugned order on 2-9-2004 in collusion with the second respondent ante dating it as 28-8-2004 and planted it into the office file on 2-9-2004. Second respondent is a Mathadipathi and politically influential person and has won over the first respondent in terms of the petition averments. Petitioners therefore say that Annexure-B is a fabricated document. Second respondent is a Mathadipathi and politically influential person and has won over the first respondent in terms of the petition averments. Petitioners therefore say that Annexure-B is a fabricated document. Second respondent taking advantage of the impugned order is making all efforts to dispossess the petitioners from their lawful possession of the lands by physical force. Moreover, the second respondent prevented the petitioners in the matter. Police registered a case against the second respondent under the Act. A copy of the FIR is filed in these writ petitions. The impugned order is without basis. It is a concocted order. Petitioners state that the second respondent is entitled to be in actual possession of the mortgaged property only after the mortgage period of 99 years expires and not before that. The lands vested with the State government under Section 4 (b) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 are subject to mortgages and not free from mortgages. The impugned order is without authority of law, illegal and without jurisdiction. Petitioners want this Court to set aside the impugned order in these petitions. ( 4 ) RESPONDENTS have entered appearance and filed their statements of objections. ( 5 ) SECOND respondent states that the order dated 31-3-2004 at annexure-D is under Section 118 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Second respondent was the Inamdar of the lands in question bearing Sy. Nos. 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Bettageri Village. Land to an extent of 177. 20 acres was mortgaged in favour of one Muthappa and Kalappa. After the death of Kalappa a settlement deed came to be executed by the wife of kalappa, namely B. K. Ponnavva. Appropriate shares were allotted in favour of her daughters Kaveramma, Janaki and Rohini and grand-daughter Hema Nachappa. Respective allottees came in possession of their respective shares of land and started enjoying the same accordingly. Muthappa executed a registered partition deed dated 7-10-1972. He allotted various shares of lands in question in favour of his sons-Uttappa, Chinnappa and Thimmaiah (alias Thimmanna ). Respective allottees came in possession and enjoyment of their shares in the lands in question. On coming into force of the Karnataka Certain inams Abolition Act, 1977, second respondent filed Form 1 claiming grant of occupancy rights in respect of the entire lands in question measuring 197. 20 acres. Same was objected to by the petitioners. A detailed enquiry was conducted. On coming into force of the Karnataka Certain inams Abolition Act, 1977, second respondent filed Form 1 claiming grant of occupancy rights in respect of the entire lands in question measuring 197. 20 acres. Same was objected to by the petitioners. A detailed enquiry was conducted. Parties led their evidence. Land tribunal passed an order dated 11-2-1993 granting occupancy rights in favour of second respondent. Same was challenged in this Court. Respondent refers to an order passed by the learned Single Judge and also by the Division Bench. ( 6 ) PURSUANT to the said judgment dated 24-9-1998 passed by the learned Division Bench, Land Tribunal issued occupancy certificate in support of the entire lands in question. Same was challenged in W. P. No. 19723 of 2000. The said petition was disposed of by an order dated 14-11-2000. Grant of occupancy rights granted in favour of the respondent 2 was confirmed by this Court in terms of Annexure-R6. Certain observations made by the learned Single Judge were challenged in Writ Appeal No. 408 of 2001. Writ appeal was disposed of by an order dated 13-8-2001. Matter was remitted back to the learned Single Judge. Second respondent made an application to the Tahsildar seeking for change of Khata and delivery of possession. Since Tahsildar failed to consider the said representation, second respondent filed a writ petition in W. P. No. 32915 of 2001. Same was allowed and a direction was issued to the Tahsildar to pass orders on the said representation. Tahsildar passed an order changing the Khata in favour of second respondent in terms of Annexure-R9. Same was challenged by Chinnappa and Uttappa in Writ Petition No. 27514 of 2002. It was dismissed in terms of annexure-R10. It is also to be noticed that after remand, learned Single judge disposed of W. P. No. 19723 of 2000 in terms of the order dated 18-12-2003 (Annexure-11 ). ( 7 ) IN the light of these proceedings, second respondent sought for possession and filed Form 5 before the Tahsildar in terms of the karnataka Land Reforms Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The tahsildar, Virajpet, in exercise of his powers under Section 41 of the karnataka Land Reforms Act held an enquiry. Petitioners appeared through Kalaiah, and Advocate in the matter. Petitioners objected for grant of prayers. After enquiry and after providing an opportunity, the impugned order was passed by the Tahsildar. The tahsildar, Virajpet, in exercise of his powers under Section 41 of the karnataka Land Reforms Act held an enquiry. Petitioners appeared through Kalaiah, and Advocate in the matter. Petitioners objected for grant of prayers. After enquiry and after providing an opportunity, the impugned order was passed by the Tahsildar. The said order is proper and illegal. Respondent 2 denied other allegations parawise in a detailed objection statement filed by him. ( 8 ) THIRD respondent filed his objections with an affidavit. It is stated therein that; on 28-8-2004 there was a strike called by ABVP. A representation was received by him. He was supposed to attend a matter in the Court of a Civil Judge. He has written a letter in this regard. Petitioner's Advocate Kalaiah did not attend the office of the third respondent on 28-8-2004. Petitioner-Kaverappa and Appanna had come to the office of the third respondent. They informed the third respondent that having regard to the bund-call they would not stay after 11 O'clock. They left the office of the third respondent at 10. 45 a. m. The order sheet was marked as Annexure-P4. The documents would reveal of attendance of the third respondent on 28-8-2004 and there is also evidence of his having pronounced the judgment. He denies various allegations made against him. He however says that he was not under any infhience by the second respondent and that he has merely attended to his job within the four corners of law. ( 9 ) WRIT Petition Nos. 35307 and 35358 to 35361 of 2004 are filed by c. P. Kaveramma and four others questioning the same order at annexure-B, dated 28-8-2004 with the same allegations. Writ Petition nos. 37296 to 37298 of 2004 are filed by C. P. Kaveramma and two others challenging Annexure-D the Mahazar dated 31-8-2004 prepared by the Tahsildar with the same or similar allegations. ( 10 ) BOTH sides addressed their arguments. After hearing both sides, I have perused the material records available on the file. Original records are also made available to me. ( 11 ) SRI A. K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the petitioners initially argued that the material on record would require serious view of the matter in the light of the allegations made against the Tahsildar in the case on hand. Original records are also made available to me. ( 11 ) SRI A. K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the petitioners initially argued that the material on record would require serious view of the matter in the light of the allegations made against the Tahsildar in the case on hand. According to him, Swamiji is highly influential person and that influence has resulted in the impugned order. He says that factually no order as such was passed in pre-dating in terms of the allegations. He mentions that the Tahsildar retired immediately. He therefore says that a careful reading of the entire material on record would show that the order is tainted in character. ( 12 ) HIS second argument is that the second respondent cannot maintain an application in Form 5. Learned Counsel invites my attention to the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act to contend that the application ought to have been filed before the Deputy commissioner and not before the Tahsildar. Even otherwise, learned counsel says that in the given circumstances of the case possession could not be granted since the petitioners are still in possession as mortgagees. The case of mortgagees are not covered under these provisions of the Act. Learned Counsel elaborated by saying that in the light of the orders of this Court from time to time there can be no possession as on today that could validly be got from the petitioners. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel also says that the application, assuming as maintainable, is barred by time. He says that the application is not filed within the prescribed time. He would argue that even on merits it can be seen that the petitioners were mortgagees have been granted lease for 99 years and that till that time is reached, it is not open to the Swamiji to seek possession notwithstanding the orders in his favour from the authorities in terms of the tenancy laws. He relies on several judgments in the matter. ( 14 ) PER contra, Sri G. S. Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel took me through the entire material on record to say that the allegations of mala fide against the Tahsildar has no basis and are unacceptable in law. Allegations, according to the learned Counsel, lacks material particulars and material details. He relies on several judgments in the matter. ( 14 ) PER contra, Sri G. S. Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel took me through the entire material on record to say that the allegations of mala fide against the Tahsildar has no basis and are unacceptable in law. Allegations, according to the learned Counsel, lacks material particulars and material details. He took me through the material on record to say that the order in question cannot be set aside by this Court in the light of inadequate pleadings and inadequate material available 'on record. Even otherwise, learned Counsel would say that the case was heard and it was set down for pronouncement of judgment. This being the material on record, he says that passing of the order on 28-8-2004 is proper and legal and that the theory of fabrication or plantation of the order is totally opposed to the material on record. ( 15 ) INSOFAR as applicability of the Act is concerned, learned Counsel invites my attention to the provision of the Karnataka Certain Inams abolition Act to say that Section 11 of the said Act would be an answer to the jurisdiction of Tahsildar in the matter. He would say that the application could be maintained for possession in the light of Section 112 (1) read with Section 126 of the Act. He refers to various provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act to say that the authorities has necessary power and jurisdiction to consider the case of possession. Insofar as limitation is concerned, learned Counsel would say that it is within time. Respondent 2's right to file an application commences from 10-7-2002 and the application came to be filed in Form 5 on 19-1-2004 within two years, and that therefore, learned Counsel would say that the argument of limitation requires to be noticed for the purpose of rejection. ( 16 ) ON merits, learned Counsel would say that Swamiji's application was considered by the authorities in accordance with law and that order is accepted by this Court in writ appeal. That being the position, it is not open to the other side now to say that despite the order in his favour he cannot seek possession in the given circumstances. That being the position, it is not open to the other side now to say that despite the order in his favour he cannot seek possession in the given circumstances. He says that in terms of the order of the Tribunal, confirmed by this Court, he has every right to maintain Form 5 and that is what has exactly been done in the case on hand. While opposing the petition, he also relies on various judgments. ( 17 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsels on both sides, following issues arise for my consideration: (1) Validity of the order; (2) Jurisdiction of the Tahsildar; (3) Maintainability of the application; (4) Law of limitation; (5) Right of Swamiji to maintain the application. ( 18 ) VALIDITY.-THIS issue has to be sub divided in the light of the pleadings as follows.- 'motive' is attributed to the Tahsildar. The other division is one of procedure adopted by the Tahsildar. ( 19 ) MOTIVED Order.-Insofar as 'motive' is concerned, there are pleadings in these petitions. Allegations against the Tahsildar is found in paragraph 3 of the W. P. Nos. 36175 and 36529 to 36552 of 2004. It is stated therein that the first respondent, namely, the Tahsildar, behind the back of the petitioner, passed an order on 28-8-2004 which was a closed matter. It is further stated that the order was not pronounced in open Court to the information and belief of the petitioners. It is further stated that the third respondent prepared the impugned order only in collusion with the second respondent and antedating it as 28-8-2004 planted it in the file on 2-9-2004. Second respondent is a Mathadhipathi, and is politically influential and financially formidable. He is capable of bringing pressure from highly placed persons particularly those attached to his Math. This allegation is denied by the contesting respondent in the statement of objections. The Tahsildar who is made a respondent in his personal capacity has chosen to say in paragraphs 3 and 4 that on 28-8-2004 he not only attended the office but also adjudicated upon certain other cases along with the matter pertaining to the petitioners herein. It is further stated that on 28-8-2004 there was a strike called by ABVP and the Tahsildar in his capacity as Taluk magistrate had received the representation from ABVP. It is further stated that on 28-8-2004 there was a strike called by ABVP and the Tahsildar in his capacity as Taluk magistrate had received the representation from ABVP. He had to attend a Civil Judge's Court, but he had written a letter with regard to his remaining in the office on account of maintaining law and order situation created by the ABVP. Petitioner's Advocate Sri Kalaiah has never attended the office. Petitioners C. P. Kaveramma and C. P. Appanna came to the office and informed the third respondent having regard to the Bundh call they were not able to remain after 11 O'clock. Third respondent in his objections has made other allegations also against the petitioners. ( 20 ) ORIGINAL file was made available to me. Learned Counsels for the parties have reiterated their submissions made in terms of the pleadings in the case on hand. ( 21 ) LET me see as to whether any 'motive' can be attributed to the tahsildar. It is seen from the material on record that the only allegation made against the third respondent is that he has colluded with the second respondent, and he ante-dated the order and that he has planted in the file on 2-9-2004. It is further stated that the order was not pronounced on 28-8-2004. It is also stated pressure was brought from the highly placed persons attached to the Mutt. These allegations are denied by the contesting respondent. 'motive' allegations are serious in character. There must be proper particulars forthcoming with regard to such allegations. Any motivated order has no legs to stand and it has to be thrown out at the threshold by Courts to maintain majesty of law. At the same time motive allegations have to be made with all details so that contesting respondent/party may be in a position to counter the same in a manner known to law. Unfortunately, in the case on hand, except making general allegations against the Tahsildar, no specific details are forthcoming in the petitions filed by the petitioners in these cases. In the circumstances, Sri G. S. Vishweshwara, learned Senior counsel is right in his submission that the 'motive' allegations cannot be accepted in the case on hand by this Court. Learned Counsel relies on a judgment in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha v Special Land Acquisition officer, Bangalore, 1902 (1) Kar. In the circumstances, Sri G. S. Vishweshwara, learned Senior counsel is right in his submission that the 'motive' allegations cannot be accepted in the case on hand by this Court. Learned Counsel relies on a judgment in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha v Special Land Acquisition officer, Bangalore, 1902 (1) Kar. L. J. 589 (DB) : ILR 1 991 Kar. 3556 (DB) with regard to fraudulent orders. There can never be any doubt that fraudulent orders can neither be accepted nor can it be encouraged by any Court of law. Fraud pollutes law. Fraudulent order is nothing but a polluted order. Collusion has no place in Courts. Whether fraud is proved or not is totally a different question that requires to be answered by Courts of law in the event of proper pleadings and proper principles in a given case. In this case the said judgment of this Court is not applicable to the given set of facts. ( 22 ) IN the circumstances, I rule that the allegations of mala fide and the motive attributed to the first respondent is not substantiated in any manner known to law in terms of the pleadings. This argument of the petitioners is therefore rejected for want of material details. ( 23 ) MANNER in which the order is passed.-However, I must notice the manner in which the order was passed by the first respondent. Admittedly, this order gives a room for doubt as I could see from the material on record. Several proceedings have taken place between the parties. Ultimately Mathadhipathi, the Swamiji, was successful before the Division Bench of this Court in terms of the earlier proceedings. In these circumstances he has made an application in Form 5 seeking possession of the property. The contesting respondent has stated that the matter was heard and the contested parties argued that the matter was earlier heard and the matter was reserved for orders on 12-3-2004. According to the respondent, a notice was issued on 21-8-2004 only to appear before the Tahsildar on 28-8-2004. The contesting respondent has stated that the matter was heard and the contested parties argued that the matter was earlier heard and the matter was reserved for orders on 12-3-2004. According to the respondent, a notice was issued on 21-8-2004 only to appear before the Tahsildar on 28-8-2004. ( 24 ) IT is seen from the original file that the order sheet gives the names the following parties as follows.- plaintiff: Inspector of Police, Siddapur Police Station, Siddapur defendants: 1st party: (1) M. Devappa Yane Swami, Administrator, Kannada Mutt, Hosuru, Bettageri Village 2nd party: (1) C. P. Appanna Kannada Mutt, Hosuru, Bettageri Village (2)K. P. Vargees son of Varki, Kunalis House, Sultan Batten, Kerala State (3) Smt. Kaveri Poonachcha, Owner Kaveri Tea Estate, Hosuru, Bettageri Village, Virajpet Taluk whereas, in the impugned order it is shown as follows.- applicants.- sri Ni. Pra. Channabavadeshikendra Swamigalu, mathadhipati, Kannada Mutt, Bettadapura Mutt, piriyapattan Taluk, Mysore District (By Sri N. C. Channabasavaiah, Advocate) respondents: 1. Smt. Kaveramma, Major Kom. Sri late C. P. Poonachcha 2. Sri C. P. Kalappa, Major bin Sri Late C. P. Poonachcha 3. Smt. C. P. Shaila, Major kom. V. T. Vijayakumar 4. Smt. C. G. Yasheel, Major kom. Sri Shivaraju 5. Smt. C. A. Rohini, Major kom. Sri Annappa 6. Smt. Hemavathi Nachappa, Major Kom. Nachappa 7. Sri C. M. Chinnappa, Major bin C. P. Muthappa 8. Sri C. P. Muthappa, Major bin Late Ponnappa 9. Sri C. M. Uttappa, Major bin C. P. Muthappa 10. Smt, C. A. Janaki, Major kom. Late Sri Ayyamma 11. Smt. C. A. Dechamma, Major kom. Late C. M. Thimmaiah (All residents of Bettageri Village, Ammatti Hobli, Virajpet taluk, Kodagu District) (By Sri Kalaiah, Advocate) it is seen that the number given to the case before the Tahsildar is with reference to a closed matter as rightly pointed out by Sri A. K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel. Be that as it may, the order sheet would reveal that the case was adjourned to 24-2-2004 and then to 12-3-2004. It is seen from Annexure-P4 to the objection statement filed by the third respondent that there is overwriting with regard to the month/year and date. On 24-2-2004 the matter was adjourned to 12-3-2004. On 12-3-2004 it is stated that after hearing the parties it was reserved for final orders. It is seen from Annexure-P4 to the objection statement filed by the third respondent that there is overwriting with regard to the month/year and date. On 24-2-2004 the matter was adjourned to 12-3-2004. On 12-3-2004 it is stated that after hearing the parties it was reserved for final orders. Further, it is seen from Annexure-C a notice dated 21-8-2004 that the parties are to be present at 11 O'clock on 28-8-2004 with regard to "takararu Ithyartha" meaning "to settle the dispute or to decide the dispute". That has been issued only to Smt. Kaveri poonachcha. Tahsildar has not explained in his affidavit as to why annexure-C was issued if the case is reserved for orders. He has not explained as to why has called upon Smt. Kaveri Poonachcha to be present on 28-8-2004. No acceptable explanation is forthcoming either from the original records or from the objection statement of the tahsildar. Even otherwise, it is seen that the words "takararu ithyarthada Bagge" can be interpreted as "with regard to settlement/decision of the dispute". Affidavit filed by the Tahsildar is silent with regard to his explanation. To my repeated questions, the third respondent's Counsel was unable to answer or convince me with regard to the object of Annexure-C in the matter after reservation of the matter for orders. It is seen that on 28-8-2004 the order in question was pronounced in open Court. Affidavit of the Tahsildar would show that the parties were present in the earlier part of the day. Nothing prevented the Tahsildar to pronounce the order at that time when parties were present on the early part of that day. No such submission is made in the affidavit of the Tahsildar. Admittedly, parties were present on 28-8-2004 and they left the office on account of ABVP Bundh call in terms of the affidavit of the Tahsildar. Tahsildar says that he could not go out due to tense situation created by the Bundh call. In the circumstances, it is ununderstandable to : ae as to why the order was passed by him later particularly in the absence of the other side. Some doubt is created in the mind of the Court with regard to pronouncement of orders on 28-8-2004. In the circumstances, it is ununderstandable to : ae as to why the order was passed by him later particularly in the absence of the other side. Some doubt is created in the mind of the Court with regard to pronouncement of orders on 28-8-2004. ( 25 ) AT this stage, without going into the merits of the matter, it is seen that the Tahsildar has chosen to refer the matter to the Assistant commissioner in terms of his own findings in his order, and thereafter he has chosen to pass this order. In these circumstances, I am of the view that notwithstanding serious arguments of the respondents with regard to acceptance of this order, the order has to be set aside on account of the order having being passed in the light of the order of the assistant Commissioner's order in terms of the findings in the matter. The authority who is vested with power to pass orders has to pass the order by himself without in any way depending upon anybody or without referring the matter to anybody. Any reference to anybody would show that the order is not an order that would be acceptable in the eye of law. The reference to the Assistant Commissioner by the Tahsildar would show that he has not applied his mind to the material in the case on hand. ( 26 ) AT this stage, I must also notice a serious objection raised by Sri a. K. Subbaiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. He mentions to me that the Tahsildar was due to retire on 30th August, 2004 and he has pronounced the orders on 28-8-2004 itself. Matter having been heard long ago and the order having come to be passed in the absence of parties and that too after referring the matter to the assistant Commissioner and two days before retirement, has cast some shadow on the order impugned in these proceedings. Though it may not be a mala fide order, but still the way in which the proceedings have gone on gives me an impression that the said order cannot stand the test of law. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in setting aside the order though not for reason of mala fides, but for the objectionable way in which the proceedings were conducted by the Tahsildar. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in setting aside the order though not for reason of mala fides, but for the objectionable way in which the proceedings were conducted by the Tahsildar. No litigant must go with a feeling that the orders are passed in such peculiar circumstances casting doubt in the mind of the litigant with regard to bias and bona fides of the order. Material on record would show that all is not well in the case on hand. It is seen from the records that the respondent's Advocate has signed the order sheet for having received a copy of the order on 2-9-2004. From the original records it is seen that the Tahsildar has chosen to send a letter to the Revenue Inspector informing him of an order having been passed in favour of Swamiji with regard to possession. The said letter is filed in the original file at page 618. It is seen from the order sheet that a copy application is made to the Tahsildar by the second respondent and the same has been made available on 31-8-2004. The Tahsildar has also written a letter on 28-8-2004 to the police station with regard to having passed an order on that day. It is seen that the Revenue Inspector has drawn Mahazar on 31-8-2004 after making reference and after obtaining orders from the assistant Commissioner on 31-8-2004 itself. All these would show that all is not well in the case on hand. It points out to and directs me to draw a conclusion of bias against the petitioners in terms of the procedure and in terms of the material on record referred by me in the earlier paragraphs of this order. I am not satisfied that the order is passed in a manner known to law in the light of various circumstances referred to by me in this order. In the circumstances, I deem it proper to accept the argument of Sri Subbaiah that the order passed is with coloured glass by the Tahsildar. ( 27 ) JURISDICTION of the Tahsildar.-Serious arguments have been advanced with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar. It is contended before me that in terms of the Division Bench judgment, mortgagee can retain possession till the mortgage period is over. ( 27 ) JURISDICTION of the Tahsildar.-Serious arguments have been advanced with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar. It is contended before me that in terms of the Division Bench judgment, mortgagee can retain possession till the mortgage period is over. In terms of Section 4-B of the Act, the land vested with the State Government is subject to mortgage and that therefore the Tahsildar could not have passed any orders in this regard. Same is countered by the respondents. To answer this issue one has to see the history of the case on hand. ( 28 ) THERE are several litigations between the parties. Admitted facts would reveal that the Kannada Mutt is a religious institution and it was granted a large acres of land by Sri Veera Rajendra Wodeyar. It is an admitted fact that the properties were granted for a period of 99 years in favour of the petitioners by the Mutt by way of mortgage. In the light of the death of the Kalappa there were settlement deeds entered into between the parties in terms of material already available on record. On 12-6-1980 Sri Channabasava Deshikendra Swamiji was appointed as mathadhipathi as successor to the Mutt. He has filed an application seeking for occupancy rights of lands in the light of abolition of Inams in the year 1987. After several long years, the Land Tribunal allowed the application and granted occupancy rights in favour of him. A writ petition was filed by the petitioners in W. P. No. 6379 of 1993. Learned single Judge of this Court has accepted the case of the petitioners and quashed the orders of grant. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge dated 22-9-1997, Swamiji preferred an appeal in W. A. No. 5689 of 1997 and the petitioners filed W. A. No. 5816 of 1997. On 24-9-1998, the Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeal filed by swamiji and rejected the appeal filed by the petitioners. Thereafter, a direction seeking grant of certificates of occupancy rights was sought for by the Swamiji in a writ petition in W. P. No. 31984 of 1999. This Court issued a direction to the respondents issue the certificate in terms of its order dated 26-10-1999. Thereafter, one of the petitioner's filed an application for impleading and recalling the order dated 26-10-1999. This Court issued a direction to the respondents issue the certificate in terms of its order dated 26-10-1999. Thereafter, one of the petitioner's filed an application for impleading and recalling the order dated 26-10-1999. The said application filed by Poonacha, one of the petitioner's, was allowed on 27-3-2000 by this Court. On 15-4-2000, Form 2 was issued in favour of Swamiji and hence the writ petition was dismissed on 23-5-2000 as having become infructuous. Writ Petition No. 19723 of 2000 came to be filed by C. M. Chinnappa challenging the certificate of registration issued in favour of Swamiji. The said writ petition was disposed of by this court on 14-11-2000. Writ appeal was filed by Swamiji in W. A. No. 408 of 2001. That was disposed of on 13-8-2001. ( 29 ) IN the meanwhile, Swamiji submitted an application before the tahsildar on 12-1-2001 in the matter of delivery of possession and for change of Khata. W. P. No. 32915 of 2001 filed earlier came to be allowed on 26-11-2001 with a direction to the Tahsildar to consider the said application filed by Swamiji. Thereafter, Khata was ordered to be issued without possession of the properties. Thereafter mutation entries were made in favour of Swamiji. Against the said order of the Tahsildar a writ Petition No. 27514 of 2002 came to be filed by C. M. Chinnappa and c. M. Uttappa and that was dismissed by this Court with a direction to file an appeal and an appeal is pending as on today. In the light of an order of this Court dated 18-12-2003, the order dated 14-11-2000 passed in W. P No. 19723 of 2000 was modified. On 19-1-2004 Swamiji filed form 5 and on 28-8-2004 the impugned order came to be passed. Mahazar was drawn on 31-8-2004 and that is challenged in the connected writ petitions. ( 30 ) FROM the above history of the case what is clear to this Court is that in terms of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, form 5 was filed by the petitioners. The Karnataka Certain Inams abolition Act came to be passed in 1977. The said Act provides for abolition of certain personal, religious and charitable inams in the State. Section 3 defines various terms. 'inam' has been define to mean an inarn village and a minor inam, a jagir, whether personal, religious, charitable or otherwise. The Karnataka Certain Inams abolition Act came to be passed in 1977. The said Act provides for abolition of certain personal, religious and charitable inams in the State. Section 3 defines various terms. 'inam' has been define to mean an inarn village and a minor inam, a jagir, whether personal, religious, charitable or otherwise. 'inamdar' is defined to mean as under:" (I) in the case of a personal inam, a person holding in trust or owning for his own benefit an inam village or a share therein and includes the successors in interest of an inamdar; and (a) where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator; (b) where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family such joint hindu family; and (ii) in the case of a religious or charitable inam, the religious or charitable institution owning an inam". 'inam land' or 'inam village' is defined to mean a land or village held as an inam in trust or owned by a person for his own benefit. The said act further defines 'minor inam' to mean an alienated holding other than an inam village, situated in an alienated village or in an unalienated village. 'tribunal' is defined to mean a Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Section 4 provides for abolition, vesting of inams and the consequences thereof. In terms of Section 4 (2) (b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar cease and vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Section 5 provides for registration as occupants and section 6 provides for exceptions to such registration to certain lands. Section 11 provides for procedure for registration as occupants. In terms thereof, an application is to be filed to the Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 on or before 31st March, 1991 and such an application shall be disposed of by the Tribunal as if it is an application made under the said Act. Section 11 (2) (b) states that: "the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applicable to enquiries, proceedings and conduct of business of Appellate Authority under the said Act including the provision of Section 121 thereof shall mutatis mutandis apply to enquiries, proceedings and conduct of business of the Appellate Authority under this Act". Section 11 (2) (b) states that: "the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applicable to enquiries, proceedings and conduct of business of Appellate Authority under the said Act including the provision of Section 121 thereof shall mutatis mutandis apply to enquiries, proceedings and conduct of business of the Appellate Authority under this Act". ( 31 ) AT this stage, I must also notice that the Karnataka Inams abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 came to be enacted, and, in terms thereof the words 'deputy Commissioner' were substituted by the word 'tribunal'. This was with reference to the Mysore (Religious and charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955. Certain Inams Abolition Act was not amended. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act created an Appellate authority for considering orders passed by the Land Tribunal. The appellate Authority was subsequently abolished in terms of Act 18 of 1990 thereby omitting Section 2 (A) (4-A) of the Karnataka Land Reforms act. Therefore, what is clear to me is that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in the matter in terms of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms act read with the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act. ( 32 ) SRI Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel invites my attention to Section 18 of the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977 to say that the mortgagee has to be provided with notice by the Deputy commissioner in the matter. Learned Counsel also says that Section 21 of the said provides for claims of creditors. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction particularly in the light of various provisions referred to above and also in the light of the earlier proceedings, and, that therefore it cannot be said that the present application filed by Swamiji has no legs to stand. This argument is, as rightly pointed out by Sri Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel, requires to be rejected. ( 33 ) PETITIONERS' Counsel relies on Papanna v State of Karnataka and others, ILR 2001 Kar. 580. In the said judgment of this Court was considering the scope of section 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1990 and section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. This Court was dealing with the doctrine of prospective operation. ( 33 ) PETITIONERS' Counsel relies on Papanna v State of Karnataka and others, ILR 2001 Kar. 580. In the said judgment of this Court was considering the scope of section 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1990 and section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. This Court was dealing with the doctrine of prospective operation. That was a case in which this Court ruled that the State Government has to take steps to appoint the Deptity Commissioner in the light of the judgment in W. P. Nos. 29071 to 29089 of 1994. Learned Counsel further relies on C. N. Nagendra Singh v The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District and Others, 2002 (6) Kar. L. J. 391 (FB) : ILR 2002 Kar. 2750 (FB) this case was dealing with the Karnataka Land Revenue act. This Court in the said case was considering as to whether the revenue Officer was competent to hold an enquiry and decide the question of genuineness of the Will in a proceeding under Section 129 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. In that case, the Court ruled that the Revenue Courts have no jurisdiction to go into the question of title in respect of immoveable properties, which exclusively Civil Courts has. No such issue is involved in the case on hand. Learned Counsel further into service in the case of A. C. Anantha Swarny and Others v state of Karnataka and Others, 1998 (5) Kar. L. J. 480 : ILR 1998 Kar. 3089. It was a case dealing with an order of the Land Tribunal. The Court considered the matter in the light striking down the Karnataka Act 26 of 1979. The present set of facts stand on a different footing. Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha's case, is with regard to acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Mallawwa Fakirappa and Others v Nagayya and Others, 1967 (1)Mys. L. J. 328. is a case where decision of title by mamlatdar is under dispute. This case is not applicable to the facts of this case. ( 34 ) SRI Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel relies on a judgment of this Court in Ramakrishniah v Land Reforms Tribunal, ramanagaram and Another, 1977 (1) Kar. L. J. 334. L. J. 328. is a case where decision of title by mamlatdar is under dispute. This case is not applicable to the facts of this case. ( 34 ) SRI Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel relies on a judgment of this Court in Ramakrishniah v Land Reforms Tribunal, ramanagaram and Another, 1977 (1) Kar. L. J. 334. In that case this Court ruled that.-"it is clear from the above that the provisions of the Act are applicable insofar as they confer any rights and impose obligations on tenants and landlords holding lands in inam and other alienated villages or lands and to landlords and inamdar holding such villages or lands. Therefore, the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Hence, the impugned order are set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the Land Tribunal, Ramanagaram for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties to produce evidence and of being heard". Learned Counsel invites my attention to Shri Kudli Sringeri Maha samsthanam, Kudli v State of Karnataka, 1992 (3) Kar. L. J. 258 (DB): ILR 1992 Kar. 1827 (DB ). to contend that this Court was considering only the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams abolition Act, 1955, and the present set of facts being covered under the certain Inams Abolition Act, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. The submission of the learned Counsel is well-founded. ( 35 ) POSSESSION.-THE next question is one of possession. The karnataka Land Reforms Act provides for Form 5 in the matter of possession in the light of the order of the Land Tribunal. Whether possession can be given in the given circumstances is a different question. But, at any rate, it cannot be said that no Form 5 can be filed as argued by Sri Subbaiah. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act provides under Section 112 for an application to be disposed of by the Tahsildar and the power is available with the Tahsildar. Section 126 of the karnataka Land Reforms Act not only applies to the landlord but also applies to tenants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 and so also the Inamdars. Section 113 provides for summary eviction subject to enquiry in the matter. Section 126 of the karnataka Land Reforms Act not only applies to the landlord but also applies to tenants under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 and so also the Inamdars. Section 113 provides for summary eviction subject to enquiry in the matter. In the light of various provisions it cannot be said that the Tahsildar has no power at all as argued to consider Form 5 is filed by Swamiji. Therefore, Tahsildar is entitled to consider the application and the Form 5 filed, in my view, is maintainable in law in the given circumstances. ( 36 ) RESPONDENTS' Counsel places before me a Division Bench order of this Court in Lakshminarayana Adiga v Ramakrishna Adiga, 1993 (3) Kar. L. J. 397 (DB) : ILR 1993 Kar. 2593 (DB ). with regard to possession. This Court in paragraph 7 has ruled as under:"a reading of Section 130 (b) of the Act would make it clear that it does not merely cover cases with reference only to landlord or tenant, but the expression used being 'any person' would even refer to a person who is a trespasser. Provisions of Sections 41 and 130 of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings giving effect to the decree or orders passed by the authorities in question. In addition to that, those provisions can be invoked where possession may be unlawful. To confine the scope of Section 130 only to cases where possession becomes unlawful in the circumstances specifically mentioned in the provisions of the Act will be reading down the scope of the provisions of the Act and unnecessarily cutting down the jurisdiction of the authorities thus depriving the rights of tenants or other persons entitled to possession under the valid orders made by the authorities under the Act nullified. In that event the scope of Section 130 if correctly understood certainly enables the authorities concerned even if section 41 is not applicable to evict the petitioner and put respondent 1 in possession thereof. "this Court has specifically ruled that the express used being 'any person' would even refer to a person who is a trespasser. This judgment supports the case of the respondents. ( 37 ) MERITS.-IT is argued before me by Sri Subbaiah, learned Senior counsel that in the light of the Division Bench order possession cannot be given to Swamiji. "this Court has specifically ruled that the express used being 'any person' would even refer to a person who is a trespasser. This judgment supports the case of the respondents. ( 37 ) MERITS.-IT is argued before me by Sri Subbaiah, learned Senior counsel that in the light of the Division Bench order possession cannot be given to Swamiji. Learned Counsel invites my attention to paragraph 16 of the order of the Division Bench to say that at the most mathadhipathi can have only constructive possession. Physical possession cannot be given in the light of the mortgage as argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Same is countered by Sri G. S. Vishweshwara, learned Senior Counsel. ( 38 ) IN the light of arguments on both sides, I have carefully perused the impugned order. There are several litigations between the parties. Case is pending fairly for a long time. Large acres of land involved in the case on hand. An enquiry is necessary with regard to these aspects of the matter hefore the Tahsildar. Since I have already come to a conclusion that the present order passed by the Tahsildar cannot stand of law, I deem it proper not to express any opinion with regard to the merits of the matter in the light of the Division Bench judgment and I leave that question to be decided by the Tahsildar. Liberty is reserved to the parties with regard to placing of their views before the Tahsildar in a manner known to law. ( 39 ) LIMITATION.-SERIOUS arguments are also advanced with regard to limitation. From the material on record, it is clear that limitation is provided under the Act. According to the learned Counsel for the Mutt, right to claim possession has arisen only on 18-12-2003 in the light of the disposal of the Writ Petition No. 19723 of 2000. This question is also left open to be decided by the Tahsildar with reference to the facts while deciding the merits of the matter. ( 40 ) HOWEVER, in the light of the findings in the earlier paragraphs of this order, I deem it proper to set aside the impugned order. Matter is remitted back for redecision. Parties are at liberty to place their arguments in accordance with law and in a manner known to law in terms of this order. ( 40 ) HOWEVER, in the light of the findings in the earlier paragraphs of this order, I deem it proper to set aside the impugned order. Matter is remitted back for redecision. Parties are at liberty to place their arguments in accordance with law and in a manner known to law in terms of this order. Liberty is also reserved to the parties to place any additional documents or additional material before the Tahsildar. Both the parties are required to be present without waiting for any notice on 8-2-2005. The Tahsildar is to consider the case afresh on merits without reference to the authorities and come to an independent conclusion in accordance with law after hearing the parties within four months from the date of this order. ( 41 ) IN the light of my quashing of the order of the Tahsildar, the consequential order of Mahazar also stand quashed. ( 42 ) IT is seen that this Court on 8-9-2004 has noticed the submission of Sri Basava Prabhu Patil to the effect that the impugned order has already been implemented and that possession was delivered to respondent 2. Now that I have quashed the impugned order, possession has to be redelivered to the petitioners pending final orders of the tahsildar in terms of this order and the revenue authorities are directed to take such steps as are necessary for redelivery of possession in the matter. No costs. R. Gururajan, J. Dated 2-2-2005 order ON BEING SPOKEN TO heard the learned Counsel with regard to the IA filed on 1-2-2005 seeking to stay the order passed by me on 1-2-2005 for a period of two months. After hearing I have carefully perused the affidavit filed by the respondent. Respondent has stated in the affidavit that the respondent intends to file an appeal against my order dated 1-2-2005. In the given circumstances, I deem it proper to stay my order dated 1-2-2005 and continue the interim order granted on an earlier occasion by me, in all the three cases for a period of three weeks. Ordered accordingly. --- *** --- .s