MAHAMOD FAZLULLA v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, TUMKUR
2005-11-21
K.SREEDHAR RAO
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT This Court in M.F.A. Nos. 1622 to 1625 of 1997 declared that the liability of the insurer is only limited to Rs. 20,000/- per passenger, since the policy is issued under Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The balance of compensation is directed to be payable by the insurer. The insured has filed the above review petitions. 2. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which came into effect from 1-7-1989. The provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 correspond to provisions of Section 147 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 3. The Counsel for the insurer resisted the review petition on the ground that the points urged in the review regarding the scope and legal effect of Section 147(2) was not urged in the course of appeal. Therefore, not entitled to re-argue the appeal under the guise of review. 4. The Supreme Court in the cases of National Insurance Company Limited v Nathilal and Others and New India Assurance Company Limited v C.M. Jaya and Others, has held that the liability of the insurer is two-fold. One is based on the statutory liability and the other on the basis of contractual liability as per the terms of liability. Since, the terms of policy restricted the liability of the insurer to Rs. 20,000/per passenger, the order of this Court passed in M.F.As is sound and proper and does not call for review. There is no apparent error on the face of record to invoke review jurisdiction. 5. The policy is issued on 28-1-1989 and valid upto 27-1-1990. The accident occurred on 5-8-1989, after the amended Act came into effect. The policy was issued prior to the advent of the M.V. Act, 1988 and it was in force after the amended Act came into effect. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v Behari Lal and Others, in para 7 and para 11 has made the following observations regarding the scope of legal effect and implications of Section 147(2) of the M.V. Act, 1988.- "Para 7.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v Behari Lal and Others, in para 7 and para 11 has made the following observations regarding the scope of legal effect and implications of Section 147(2) of the M.V. Act, 1988.- "Para 7. It is quite clear that sub-section (2) of Section 147 of the new Act directs that subject to proviso to sub-section (1), a statutory policy shall cover the amount of liability incurred except in respect of damage to any property of a third party for which a limit of rupees six thousand is specified. A careful reading of the proviso to sub-section (2) discloses that any policy of insurance, issued with any limited liability and in force immediately before the commencement of the new Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. Para 11. In this context, it will be useful to refer to the decision of this Court in Padma Srinivasan v Premier Insurance Company Limited, 1982 ACJ 191 (SC). In that case after the policy was taken under Section 95(2)(a) of the old Act, it was amended in 1969 so as to increase the liability of the insurer from Rs. 15,000/to Rs. 50,000/-. The accident which gave rise to the appeal occurred after the amended provision came into force. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for a three-Judges Bench observed: "Since the liability of the insurer to pay a claim under a motor accident policy arises on the occurrence• of the accident and not until then, one must necessarily have regard to the state of law obtaining at the time of the accident for determining the extent of the insurer's liability under a statutory policy. In this behalf, the governing factor for determining the application of the appropriate law is not the date on which the policy of insurance came into force but the date on which the cause of action accrued for enforcing liability arising under the terms of the policy. That we consider to be a reasonable manner in which to understand and interpret the contract of insurance entered into by the insured and the insurer in this case". We are not persuaded to accept the contention of Mr.
That we consider to be a reasonable manner in which to understand and interpret the contract of insurance entered into by the insured and the insurer in this case". We are not persuaded to accept the contention of Mr. Jitendra Sharma that the proviso in question is incorporated to nullify the effect of that judgment. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 147 cannot be read as a proviso to Section 217(2)(c) of the new Act and it does not, in case of the existing policy being in force on the date of the occurrence of the accident, limit the liability of the Insurance Company to the amount mentioned in Section 95(2) of the old Act". 7. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Behari Lal's case squarely applies to the facts of the case. The decisions of the Supreme Court in C.M. Jaya's case and in Nathilal's case has no application to the facts of the case. The scope and effect of Section 147(2) was not in question in the said case. But, the Supreme Court in Behari Lal's case, has categorically held that the liability of the insurer will be unlimited with effect from the date, the M.V. Act, 1988 came into force. It is explicitly held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 147 do not control or suspend the immediate coming into effect the declaration of law in Section 147(1). 8. It is further held that the declaration of law in Section 147(2) that the provisions of Section 147(1) shall come into effect after lapse of four months from the date of commencement of the M.V. Act, 1988 is held to be an irrational provision. The decisions rendered in M.F.As were not in confirmity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is a case of legal error apparent on the face of record. Accordingly, the review petitions are allowed. 9. The insurer shall pay the entire compensation awarded. Consequently, the direction issued to the insured-petitioner herein to pay the balance of compensation is set aside.