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2005 DIGILAW 762 (GAU)

Subal Sarkar v. Purabi Sarkar

2005-11-02

A.B.PAL

body2005
ORDER A.B. Pal, J. 1. The petitioners called in question the legality of the judgment and order dated 2-3-2005 rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in Criminal Revision No. 27(4)/2004 whereby the order dated 24-8-2004 of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur in CR 287 of 2003 on the question of local jurisdiction of the said Court to try an offence punishable under Section498-A of the Indian Penal Code has been quashed with a direction to that Court to proceed with the case in accordance with law. 2. The background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows :-- On 28-7-2003, the respondent herein Smt. Purabl Sarkar Instituted a proceeding in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur by filing a written complaint against her husband Shri Subal Sarkar, the first petitioner herein and other petitioners alleging that since after her marriage on 13-5-2000 she was under pressure from the petitioners to bring dowry from her father to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- though her father at the time of marriage paid Rs. 25,000/- in cash and spent an amount of Rs. 1,25,000/- in the marriage which was beyond his financial capacity. Her unwillingness to approach her father for more money culminated to mental and physical torture by all the petitioners and when she was pregnant for three months, the first, sixth and seventh petitioners had taken her to Agartala, got her admitted in the I.G.M. Hospital and against her will forced termination of her pregnancy. The story of cruelty did not end there. On 23-3-2003 and 27-3-2003, the petitioners tortured her physically on demand of Rs. 50,000/- and then drove her away. Since then she had taken shelter with her parents and when all attempts to settle the dispute failed, she was compelled under the circumstances to formally lodge a complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence on 29-7-2003 and after examining the respondent wife under Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. issued bailable warrant of arrest. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence on 29-7-2003 and after examining the respondent wife under Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. issued bailable warrant of arrest. The proceeding continued till 16-8-2004 after examination of three witnesses on 18-10-2003 produced by the respondent wife and at that stage the learned Counsel for the petitioners herein submitted a petition under Section 177 read with Section 462 of the Criminal Procedure Code advancing a prayer that as the alleged incident of physical and mental torture had taken place in the matrimonial house at Charilam under West Tripura District, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of South Tripura District had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint only because she was temporarily residing in the house of her parents within the local jurisdiction of that Court. By an order dated 24-8-2004, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur disposed of the said petition after holding that it had no local jurisdiction to entertain such a complaint in the face of the admitted facts constituting the alleged offence having occurred within local jurisdiction of the competent Court of West Tripura District. Accordingly, all the accused persons were discharged after rejecting the complaint. 4. The said judgment dated 24-8-2004 was, however, called in question by the respondent wife in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, who by impugned judgment and order dated 2-3-2005 reversed the findings of the learned C.J.M. after taking a view, which is backed by a decision of this Court in Bina Dey v. Prathiva Dey (Baidya) reported in that, an offence under Section 498-A of the IPC being a continuing offence, the learned CJM, South Tripura, Udaipur had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the complainant was living at the relevant time with her parents within the local jurisdiction of that Court. The learned C.J.M. was further directed to proceed with the case and give it to its logical conclusion. This judgment and direction of the learned Sessions Judge has been assailed in the present petition. 5. I have heard Mr. B. Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. T. D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the respondent. 6. The learned C.J.M. was further directed to proceed with the case and give it to its logical conclusion. This judgment and direction of the learned Sessions Judge has been assailed in the present petition. 5. I have heard Mr. B. Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. T. D. Majumder, learned Counsel for the respondent. 6. The only question, which has fallen for consideration in the present proceeding, is whether under the facts and circumstances of the case noted above, the learned CJM, South Tripura has local jurisdiction to entertain the complaint lodged by the respondent wife. The factual position which is necessary for disposal of this controversy regarding the residential address of the parents and in-laws of the respondent and that after the alleged physical and mental torture she had taken shelter with her parents within the local jurisdiction of the learned CJM, South Tripura, Udaipur are not in dispute. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners herein that the allegations of the wife, which are per se without any basis having taken place in the matrimonial house at Charilam within the local jurisdiction of the learned CJM, West Tripura, Agartala, the proceeding instituted in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur is not maintainable on the question of jurisdiction only. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai. In that case, the question of local jurisdiction had arisen for decision of the Court under similar circumstances as the present one and the Apex Court proceeded to decide the question after examining the factual situation of that case on the anvil of the provisions contained in Section 177 and 178 of the Cr. P.C. The above two provisions may be gainfully quoted below ;-- 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.-- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local, jurisdiction it was committed. 178. P.C. The above two provisions may be gainfully quoted below ;-- 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.-- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local, jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial.-- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 7. After taking a view that the expression 'cause of action' is not a stranger to criminal cases, the Apex Court reiterated the settled law that 'cause of action' consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. To understand and appreciate the importance of cause of action, which is of much relevance in the present case, the views expressed by the Apex Court on the said expression, are quoted below :-- 15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a. judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right, itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows :- Cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court to a remedy against another person. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows :- Cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court to a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action. 19. When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the concerned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent No. 2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. It would thus appear from the factual matrix of the above case that no part of cause of action, which is a bundle of facts, constituting the alleged offence did arise in Chennai and, therefore, it was held that the concerned Magistrate in Chennai had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 8. In a similar case, this Court in Crl. Rev P. No. 33 of 2005 by an order dated 7-4-2005 (T. Vaiphei, J.) placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court noted above quashed the proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Sonamura on the ground that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, made a submission that the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC being a continuing one, it is open to the complainant wife to choose the appropriate forum and institute a proceeding in the Court having local jurisdiction over the place where she has been temporarily residing with her parents. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, made a submission that the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC being a continuing one, it is open to the complainant wife to choose the appropriate forum and institute a proceeding in the Court having local jurisdiction over the place where she has been temporarily residing with her parents. In order to buttress this submission reliance has been sought from the decision of this Court in Bina Dey v. Prathiva Dey (Baidya). In that case the alleged cruelty had taken place at Mariani in the District of Jorhat while the proceeding under Section 498-A, IPC was instituted in the Court at Silchar. After discussing the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Mohan Lal v. State, Allahabad High Court in Vijay Ratan Sharma v. State of U. P. and of Rajasthan High Court in Jagdish v. State of Rajasthan, this Court agreeing with the ratio laid down by the Allahabad and the Rajasthan High Court and disagreeing with that of the Delhi High Court held, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that it would amount to deprivation of right to prosecute properly if the deserted lady, who is compelled to take shelter with her parents, cannot institute a proceeding in the Court having jurisdiction where she is temporarily residing. It was thus held that in an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC, the place where the wife is forced to take shelter has the jurisdiction to try the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. 10. It needs no reiteration that the legal position on the question of local jurisdiction of a Court in entertaining a complaint such as this has been finally laid down by the Apex Court with reference to the provisions of Sections 177 and 178 of the Cr. P.C. and the only thing, which is required to be decided by the Court in every such case is to place the. factual position on the anvil of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court as discussed above. P.C. and the only thing, which is required to be decided by the Court in every such case is to place the. factual position on the anvil of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court as discussed above. The bundle of facts, which constitutes the cause of action varies from case to case and if it can be shown that a part of such cause of action has taken place in the Court where the proceeding has been instituted, it can be said following the above principle that such Court has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint. In the case on hand, several allegations of physical and mental torture have been brought forth in the complaint petition and none of such facts is alleged to have taken place within the jurisdiction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur. Though the details of the facts situation of the case in Bina Dey (supra) has not been narrated in the judgment, it is to be presumed in the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Y. Abraham (supra) that atleast a part of the cause of action must take place within the jurisdiction of the Court where the proceeding has been instituted, the above decision of this Court has been rendered in the particular facts and circumstances of that case taking into consideration the place where the cause of action and the bundle of facts constituting the same has occurred. 11. From the above discussion it would be evident that if the allegations of physical and mental torture are to be believed in to toto as alleged by the respondent wife, it has to be admitted that the entire episode had taken place in her matrimonial house, not in her parental house or in any place within the jurisdiction of South Tripura District and, therefore, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura has got no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint instituted by her. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition has to be accepted and accordingly, the same is allowed setting aside the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur impugned herein. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition has to be accepted and accordingly, the same is allowed setting aside the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur impugned herein. The respondent wife shall, however, be at liberty to institute a fresh proceeding in the Court at Agartala, which has jurisdiction over the place where her matrimonial house is located and where allegedly all the incidents of physical and mental torture had taken place. Petition allowed