ARUN KUMAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision is directed against the order dated 20. 04. 2000 passed by the ld. Additional Sessions Judge, 6th court, Alipore in Criminal Motion No. 62 /99 affirming the order of conviction and sentence dated 10. 05. 99 passed by the ld. Judicial Magistrate 1st Court, diamond Harbour in Case No. C. 80/96 under section 46a (e) (ii) of Bengal Excise Act. ( 2 ) THE miniaturized version of the prosecution is that on 17. 01. 96 at about 10. 30 a. m. the present petitioner was apprehended on Falta Road near Fatehpur market for unlawful possession of 40 litres of i. d. liquor in a polythene jar. He was arrested and the article was seized after observing formalities followed by taking sample in a separate bottle which was forwarded to the chemical examiner. The analysis report is in the positive with the finding that the liquid contained 61. 2% alcohol which is of illicit origin. The Government suffered a loss of Rs. 1400/- towards revenue. ( 3 ) FOUR witnesses on behalf of the prosecution while five witnesses on behalf of the defence were examined, and after considering the facts, circumstances and materials on record, the ld. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty under section 46a (e) (ii) of Bengal Excise Act, convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to suffer R. I. for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- i. d. to R. I. for one month which was affirmed by the impugned order in the said criminal motion preferred by the petitioner. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by, and dissatisfied with, the said order, the petitioner has preferred the present revision. ( 5 ) ALL that now requires to be considered is whether the ld. Court below was justified in passing the said order. ( 6 ) MR. Satyajit Mondal, ld. counsel for the petitioner, advanced argument contending that no independent witness to the alleged seizure has been examined. Relying upon the case of Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1995 Cr. LJ 3988 (SO, Mr. Mondal further contended that since P. W. 1 who is the complainant acted as investigating officer, no reliance should be placed upon his testimony as also other prosecution witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration. Mr. R. P. Bhattacharya, ld. Relying upon the case of Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1995 Cr. LJ 3988 (SO, Mr. Mondal further contended that since P. W. 1 who is the complainant acted as investigating officer, no reliance should be placed upon his testimony as also other prosecution witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration. Mr. R. P. Bhattacharya, ld. counsel for the State, submitted that though there is concurrent finding, as P. W. 1 acted as complainant and I. O. , the benefit of doubt may be given to the petitioner. ( 7 ) SO far as the first contention above is concerned, as per provision of section 81 (1) of the Bengal Excise Act, the provisions of Cr. PC relating to arrest, search etc. are applicable to arrest, search etc. under the Act. The provisions of section 100 Cr. PC apply to "place" and not to "person" and so absence of any independent witness dues not render the search and seizure invalid. Moreover, it is a matter of common experience that the members of public normally try to avoid to be associated with the police or excise cases. Here too, it is the specific evidence of P. W 1 that despite his request the persons present did not agree to be witnesses to the seizure. The question whether the testimony of an official witness is by itself sufficient to base conviction is one upon which no rule of universal application can be formulated. The testimony of an official witness is not liable to be rejected merely on the ground of his official status if it has otherwise the characteristics of trustworthy evidence. The evidence of P. W. 1 regarding unlawful possession of contraband article by the accused/petitioner is buttressed by the testimony of other three prosecution witnesses. No animus of those witnesses against the accused having been made out, it improbabilises the hypothesis of their false implication of the accused. The accused/petitioner as D. W. 1 contended that the jar was lying about 10 cubits away from the place where the Excise officials in plain dress got down from the vehicle. D. W. 2 saw d. W. 1 when he was in excise vehicle. D. W. 3 found the accused from a distance of 50 cubits and so he cannot be expected to see whether D. W. 1 had any plastic jar with him. D. W. 2 saw d. W. 1 when he was in excise vehicle. D. W. 3 found the accused from a distance of 50 cubits and so he cannot be expected to see whether D. W. 1 had any plastic jar with him. D. W. 4 did not see any plastic jar when accused was taken to the vehicle which raises a reasonable doubt about his presence nearby the P. O. Therefore, there is no ground to discard the testimony of P. Ws in regard to recovery of the contraband article from the possession of the accused. ( 8 ) AS regards the second contention above, under sub-section (2) of section 73 of the Act an Excise Officer, specially empowered by the Government, may investigate any offence. The Excise Officer making an investigation has certain powers (sections 160 to 171 Cr. PC) and in respect of the offences punishable under sections 46, 46a etc. any of the powers [conferred by clause (a)of subsection (1) of sections 41 and 55 of the Code] by a police officer or officer-in-Charge of a police station. In other words, an excise officer possesses certain powers of a police officer for limited purpose as mentioned in the Act. Even though under sub-section (4) of section 74 of the Act the report of investigation by excise officer shall be deemed to be a police report for the purpose of section 190 only of the Criminal Procedure Code, it being not a "police report" within the meaning of clause (r) of section 2 of the Code but a complaint [section 2 (d)], the procedure laid down for trial of warrant cases otherwise than on police report (Sections 244 to 247 Cr. PC) is to be followed. It is to be borne in mind that the provisions of section 173 of the Code does not come under the purview of an excise does not come under the purview of an excise officer. So, when there are a lot of differences between the powers and procedure, merely because p. W. 1 being the Officer-in-Charge of Bishnupur Circle lodged the complaint after investigation, it cannot be held to be any ground for holding the trial to be vitiated. So, when there are a lot of differences between the powers and procedure, merely because p. W. 1 being the Officer-in-Charge of Bishnupur Circle lodged the complaint after investigation, it cannot be held to be any ground for holding the trial to be vitiated. That apart, unlike a police station which is usually manned by an officer-in-Charge of the rank of Inspector or Sub-Inspector and 2/3 or more sub-Inspectors depending upon the area or jurisdiction of the P. S. , number and nature of crime etc. , an excise circle is manned by a few staff and officer. There is nothing to suggest in the testimony of P. W. 1 that barring him there was any other Sub-Inspector in that circle. If the above principle that a complainant can never investigate into an offence is accepted, the entire object of the Act will be frustrated and the figure of offences will increase and continue unabated which is an absurd proposition. Whether a complainant should investigate or not depends upon the fact of the given case. In Sunil Kumar vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1170 , as against the contention that the officer appointed as the enquiry officer was one who had drafted the charges and also advised earlier that there was material for holding the enquiry against the application, the Court repelled the same invoking the analogy of the Magistrate who frames the prima facie charge against the accused and then tries the case also. The nemo judex in re sua rule is subject to the doctrine of necessity and yields to it. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case is exasperating. Furthermore, in State vs. Jayapaul, reported in 2004 AIR SCW 1762. it was held that the police officer who laid/recorded the FIR is competent to investigate the case and submit the report in final form. The facts and circumstances of the case of Megha singh (supra) so referred to by the ld. counsel for the petitioner, where it was observed that the practice of investigation by complainant should not be resorted to, are quite different from the case on hand, and as such the said decision cannot be applicable to the present case. Accordingly, this contention too of the Id. counsel for the petitioner fails. counsel for the petitioner, where it was observed that the practice of investigation by complainant should not be resorted to, are quite different from the case on hand, and as such the said decision cannot be applicable to the present case. Accordingly, this contention too of the Id. counsel for the petitioner fails. ( 9 ) IN regard to the contention of the ld. counsel for the State, in State of M. P. vs. Dharkole, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri.) 225 it was held:"doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence or from the lack of it as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. "in the present case, how there was any scope for any doubt regarding the guilt of the accused is really not understood, and so the above contention is not at all tenable. ( 10 ) IN the premises, in the light of the above discussion, the present revisional application being devoid of any merit be dismissed. ( 11 ) THE petitioner is directed to surrender before the Trial Court immediately to serve out the sentence, in default, the Trial Court will take steps for securing his arrest in due course of law and thereafter will send the convict to the correctional home for serving out the sentence. Let a copy of this order be sent down at once to the ld. Court below. Revisional application dismissed.