( 1 ) THE 1st plaintiff in O. S. No. 256 of 1982 on the file of the learned principal District Munsif Judge, Addanki, filed this Second Appeal. The three respondents are others. The appellant and the 1st respondent herein filed the suit against respondents 2 and 3 (for short the respondents") for the relief of perpetual injunction. The trial Court decreed the suit through its judgment, dated 18. 12. 1996. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed A. S. No. 3 of 1997 in the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Addanki. The appeal was allowed on 30. 10. 2002 and the decree of the trial Court was reversed. Hence, this second Appeal. ( 2 ) THE appellant pleaded that the 1st respondent was assigned an extent of ac. 2. 25 cents of agricultural land in the year 1971, through Ex. A. 1, and that he purchased it through a sale deed, dated 06. 01. 1982, marked as Ex. A. 2. He alleged that the respondents started interfering with his possession over the land without any basis. The respondents, on the other hand, pleaded that the assignment in favour of their brother, the 1st respondent, was provisional in nature and was for the benefit of the entire family. According to them, the 1st respondent left the village several years before the suit was filed and that the suit land was under their cultivation and occupation. They also pleaded independent rights, on the strength of the pattas granted in their favour, marked as Exs. B. 1 and B. 2, during the pendency of the suit. Reference was made to the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Civil Rules of Practice as well the entries in the Adangals. ( 3 ) SRI Ravi Shanker Jandhyala, learned counsel for the appellant submits that his client proved that he was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, as on the date of filing of the suit, as absolute owner, and that the trial Court decreed the suit, on finding that the respondents have no basis to interfere with the appellant s possession. He submits that the lower appellate court exceeded the scope of the suit and the appeal, in declaring that the sale through Ex. A. 2 was hit by the provisions of the A. P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition and Alienation) Act (for short the Act ). He submits that the lower appellate court exceeded the scope of the suit and the appeal, in declaring that the sale through Ex. A. 2 was hit by the provisions of the A. P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition and Alienation) Act (for short the Act ). He also submits that the pattas granted in favour of the respondents as well as the entries made in Exs. X. 1 to x. 13 were admittedly subsequent to the filing of the suit, and that they ought not to have been relied upon by the lower appellate Court. ( 4 ) SRI O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that except the alleged sale deed, Ex. A. 2, and the Cist Receipt, ex. A. 3, the appellant did not place any material in the suit, to prove his possession. He submits that though the provisional patta was granted in favour of the 1st respondent, the property was under the possession of his brothers, the respondents. He points out that even assuming that the respondents were not able to prove their possession as on the date of filing the suit, that does not become a factor to grant the relief of injunction in favour of the appellant. ( 5 ) IT is matter of record that the suit schedule property was provisionally assigned through Ex. A. 1 in favour of the 1st respondent in the year 1971. A perusal of Ex. A. 1 discloses that the assignment was exclusively in favour of the 1st respondent. He, in turn, sold the land in favour of the appellant through ex. A. 2. Inasmuch as the suit came to be filed within few months after the purchase made by the appellant, he cannot be expected to file the records such as Adangals to show his possession. The question as to whether any entries were made in the Adangals for the said land prior to 1982, did not fall for consideration, obviously because no entries adverse to the interests of the appellant and his vendor, the 1st respondent, were relied upon. Apart from examining a neighbouring owner as P. W. 4, the appellant filed Ex. A. 3, Cist receipt. Apart from examining a neighbouring owner as P. W. 4, the appellant filed Ex. A. 3, Cist receipt. The only ground, on which the lower appellate Court refused to act upon the Cist receipt, is that it was obtained a few months prior to the filing of the suit and that it evidences payment of Cist for several years. As long as long the genuinity of this receipt, Ex. A. 3, is not doubted, the refusal cannot be sustained. ( 6 ) THERE is absolutely no doubt about the proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the respondents that it was for the appellant to prove his possession over the land. The nature and extent of proof, however, differ from case to case. In a given suit, the plaintiff may be in a position to place voluminous documents in the form of entries in the revenue records etc. , if his possession was spread over many years. Where, however, the period of possession over the property is very short, before the suit came to be filed, it is difficult to expect such voluminous record. The possession, being a pure question of fact, needs to be proved by pleading the attendant circumstances, and no standard pattern can be expected in this regard. The plaintiff can be said to have discharged his burden in this regard, if he is able to place some reliable material, in support of his possession. Once that is done, the scene of consideration shifts to the examination of evidence adduced by the defendant. The purpose is not to require the defendant to prove his possession, but is to verify as to whether the claim put forward by the defendant is superior in any way to that of the plaintiff. If the Court finds that the defendant had probablised his possession, it becomes a factor to deny the relief to the plaintiff, than to pronounce upon the nature of the rights of the defendant. These factors become relevant because the relief is claimed against the defendant and not in rem. Viewed from this angle, it is evident that while the appellant had placed Ex. A. 3 and some oral evidence in support of his possession, no such evidence was forthcoming from the respondents. These factors were taken into account by the trial Court and decreed the suit. Viewed from this angle, it is evident that while the appellant had placed Ex. A. 3 and some oral evidence in support of his possession, no such evidence was forthcoming from the respondents. These factors were taken into account by the trial Court and decreed the suit. ( 7 ) THE lower appellate Court was mostly impressed by the fact that the sale of the suit schedule property in favour of the appellant was hit by the provisions of the Act. Basically, that question was totally outside the scope of the suit and the appeal. The Act is a self-contained code and it prescribes the procedure for dealing with the alienation of assigned lands. Several factors such as whether the land was assigned to a landless poor, whether any condition was incorporated in the assignment, prohibiting sale etc. , need to be examined. It is only when a sale is held to be void, in the proceedings initiated under the Act, that Ex. A. 2 ceases to bear any utility. Even in such a case, the possession of a transferee under such sale deed does not automatically revert to the vendor or the Government, much less to a third party. It has to be recovered in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law. ( 8 ) ANOTHER factor that weighted with the lower appellate Court was that pattas were granted by the local revenue authority, marked as Exs. B. 1 and B. 2, in favour of the respondents. Those pattas by themselves do not result in dispossession of the appellant and delivery of possession of the land in favour of the respondents. Necessary proceedings need to be initiated for this purpose, at appropriate levels. The entries in the Adangals relied upon by the lower appellate Court were of the years subsequent to the filing of the suit. When it had clearly emerged that the appellant was in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit, there was no justification for the lower appellate Court in reversing the decree of the trial Court, by treating Ex. A. 2 as null and void, and by taking into account, the documents, that came into existence subsequent to the filing of the suit. A. 2 as null and void, and by taking into account, the documents, that came into existence subsequent to the filing of the suit. So far as the initiation of proceedings, under Section 145 of Civil Rules of Practice are concerned, they pale into insignificance, once a civil suit is filed in relation to the same property, whether before or after such initiation. For the foregoing reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside. Consequently, the decree passed by the trial Court shall stand revived. It is, however, made clear that the decree of the trial Court and the judgment in the Second Appeal do not come in the way of the respondents in working out their remedies in accordance with law. Further, this judgment shall not be taken as pronouncement on the validity or otherwise of the pattas granted in favour of the respondents, Exs. B. 1 and b. 2, nor the observation of the lower appellate Court on Ex. A. 2 shall be treated as final. There shall be no order as to costs.