BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against order dated June 1, 2004 passed by the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate tribunal, East Zonal Bench, Kolkata in an appeal preferred by the present appellant against the order dated June 19, 2003 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Kolkata. ( 2 ) THE following facts are not in dispute: (a) On 15th November, 2001, the appellant imported 12 cases of Model G-1518, AT-Planetarium Instrument System with 13 Panorama Screens and other accessories for the purpose of establishing a Planetarium in lucknow. The petitioner filed the Bill of Entry for warehousing those goods on 14th December, 2001. The customs authorities granted permission for warehousing those goods on 21st December, 2001 and thereafter on 27th December, 2001 those were warehoused with the central Warehousing Corporation, an undertaking of Union of India under section 60 of the Customs Act, 1962. (b) Union of India issued an exemption notification being 21/02 on March 1, 2002 and in terms thereof, the petitioner became entitled to full exemption from the duty of those goods then lying in warehouse. (c) On 21st March, 2002 the customs authorities called upon the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 600. 00 on account of overtime charges to the proper officer for the clearance of those goods to enable the petitioner to remove those items. (d) On 8th August, 2002 the petitioner submitted an application for refund of duty under section 27 of the Act on the ground that the petitioner was not liable to pay any duty in view of the notification of exemption. (e) The authorities below rejected the application for refund on the ground that on the date of clearance of the goods for warehousing the petitioner being liable to pay duties, the petitioner cannot get benefit of notification of exemption which became effective from a period when the petitioner had already cleared the goods for warehousing and goods were in the warehouse. ( 3 ) BEING dissatisfied the petitioner has preferred the present appeal. ( 4 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the customs authorities has raised a pure question of law on the question of maintainability of the present appeal. According to Mr. ( 3 ) BEING dissatisfied the petitioner has preferred the present appeal. ( 4 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the customs authorities has raised a pure question of law on the question of maintainability of the present appeal. According to Mr. Mukherjee, in view of the provision contained in section 130e of the Act the appeal is to be preferred before the supreme Court as the only question involved herein relates to the rate of duty payable by the present appellant. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal on the aforesaid ground. 4. The aforesaid preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mukherjee is seriously disputed by Mr. Chowdhury, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. He contends that the question involved herein is not the one as regards tariff duty of any goods but the only question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to claim refund by taking aid of the notification of exemption and as such, section 130e cannot have any application to facts of the present case. In support of such contention, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of I. T. C. Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, Patna, reported in 1997 (11) SCC page 660. He, therefore, prays for disposal of this appeal on merit. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mukherjee, the following provisions of the Customs Act are relevant and those are quoted below:"130e. Appeal to Supreme Court.-An appeal shall lie to the Supreme court from- (a) any judgment of the High Court delivered on a reference may [under section 130 or section 130a] in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after the passing of the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; or (b) any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment. " (Emphasis Supplied) ( 6 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after going through the aforesaid provisions of the Customs Act, we find that the sole question involved herein is whether the benefit of the notification of exemption of the duty would be available to the appellant for the purpose of claiming refund. ( 7 ) IN the case of I. T. C. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with similar provision contained in section 35l of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 came to the conclusion that if the question relating to value of the goods arises on the claim of refund of excise duty submitted by a person, the question of valuation of goods in that context cannot be regarded as a question "having relation to the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment" within the meaning of section 35l. In the case before us, the appellant claimed for refund of the duty paid in terms of assessment already made and thus, the question involved here cannot be said to be a "question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs for the purpose of assessment" within the meaning of section 130e (b) of the Customs Act. ( 8 ) MR. Mukheriee lastly tried to convince us that the assessment in this case was not a final assessment but a provisional one as would appear from the averments made in the application itself and thus, the aforesaid decision of the supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 9 ) WE find that the assessment order pursuant to which the duty was paid has been annexed to the application and that the same is not a provisional assessment order in terms of section 18 of the Customs Act. We, therefore, find substance in the contention of Mr. Chowdhury that in the application through mistake the same was described as a "provisional assessment order". ( 10 ) WE, therefore, find no substance in the preliminary objection raised by mr. Mukherjee. Let the appeal come up for hearing on merit after vacation. Appeal decided for next hearing.