Judgment :- The plaintiff society, who was successful in getting a decree as prayed for in O.S.No.5934/1987 on the file of the VIII Additional City Civil Judge, Madras, failed to sustain the same, when it was challenged before the first appellate Court in A.S.NO.300/92 on the file of the V Additional City Civil Judge and the result is this second appeal by the plaintiff. 2. Facts necessary to dispose of the appeal, as pleaded:- (a) The plaintiff society by name Vattavila Sree Bhadrakali Educational Society had established two schools by name Sridevi Girl's Higher Secondary School, Kollamcode and Sridevi Primary School, Panavila, Kollamcode, Kanyakumari District in the years 1977 and 1979 respectively. The two educational institutions are under the control and management of the plaintiff society, which was formed with a view to mitigate the lack of sufficient facilities, for the education of the linguistic minorities of Kanyakumari District. (b) The members of the Society, belong to Nayar Community, living in and around Kanyakumari District, representing the linguistic minority of the District. Since the members of the plaintiff society come within the linguistic minorities, they are entitled to establish minority institutions, as provided and safeguarded under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The two educational institutions were established, administered, maintained, only for the benefit of linguistic minority of Kanyakumari District, over which the defendants have no power to impose any restrictions, though they can impose reasonable regulations, for the limited purpose of proper and healthy administration of the institutions. The defendants are causing interference in the daily administration of the institutions, thereby causing inconvenience to the plaintiff, violating Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. (c) The plaintiff society, when had established educational institutions of its choice for the benefit of linguistic minorities, as contemplated under Article 350A of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Government to encourage the same, not to impose unnecessary restrictions, causing hurdles to the smooth administration of the institutions. In view of the unnecessary interference by the defendants, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit for declaration and for a consequential relief of permanent injunction, despite the fact, a notice has been issued as contemplated under Section 80 C.P.C., there was no positive response. In view of the unnecessary interference by the defendants, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit for declaration and for a consequential relief of permanent injunction, despite the fact, a notice has been issued as contemplated under Section 80 C.P.C., there was no positive response. (d) The defendants/respondents 1 & 2 in their statement have stated, that both the educational institutions were permitted to be opened only as private schools and not on the ground that the institutions were established as minority institutions. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any declaration, much less the consequential relief of permanent injunction. The plaintiff society applied and obtained permission to open the schools only under non minority rights and in fact, the medium of instructions are both in Malayalam and Tamil, students belonging to various communities were admitted and in addition, teachers of various communities are also working in these institutions. In this view, the contention of the plaintiff that these two educational institutions were established and being administered for the benefit of linguistic minority in Kanyakumari District, is incorrect. (e) As these institutions were permitted to be opened under non minority right and accepting the same, schools were opened by the society, the plaintiff is bound to act as per the rules in force, for the non minority institutions. After establishing the institutions as minority institutions, having enjoyed that benefit, after a decade, the plaintiff society is not entitled to claim that the institutions come under the purview of the linguistic minority, seeking aid and protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The defendants are not interfering in the day-to-day administration of the plaintiff institutions and in fact, it is bound to follow the rules and regulation that are in force, which alone are sought to be enforced. In view of the fact, that institutions were permitted to be opened under non minority right, further continuance of the recognition of the school also should be in the statements prescribed for the non minority institution and there cannot be any deviation and in this view, the suit is liable to be dismissed. In view of the fact, that institutions were permitted to be opened under non minority right, further continuance of the recognition of the school also should be in the statements prescribed for the non minority institution and there cannot be any deviation and in this view, the suit is liable to be dismissed. (f) The learned VIII Additional City Civil Judge, considering the rival claims of the parties, as well as the documents produced before it, came to the conclusion, that the institutions are entitled to the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, over which the defendants have no right to interfere in the administration. Thus taking the view, by a cryptic judgment, without any discussion about the origin of the schools, how the schools were established etc. and without considering the prayer for injunction, whether it could be granted or not, the suit was decree as prayed for as per the judgment dated 9.4.1991, which came to be challenged before the Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in A.S.No.300/92. (g) The learned V Additional City Civil Judge, who was in charge of the IV Additional City Civil Court, considering the scope of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, as well as the origin and establishment of the two educational institutions felt, though the plaintiff society is a minority one, the institutions were established not on the basis of linguistic minority, whereas the institutions were established only as non minority institutions, over which the defendants are entitled to exercise their jurisdictions as per the provisions of Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). Thus, unable to agree with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court upset the same, by the judgment dated 18.8.1993, thereby dismissing the suit with costs, which is challenged in this second appeal. 3. This Court, while admitting the second appeal, had formulated the following substantial questions of law, for consideration and they are: (1) Whether the lower Appellate Court is right in holding that Sreedevi Girls Higher Secondary School, Kollamcode and Sreedevi Primary School, Panavila, Kollamkode are not minority institutions within the meaning of Art.30 (1) of the Constitutional of India on the ground that Tamil Students were also admitted in the schools even though the schools were established and administered by the Malayalees of Kanyakumari District. (2) Whether the finding of the learned Appellate Judge that by admitting a non-member into a minority institution the institution will shed its character and cease to be a minority institution, is correct in law. (3) Whether the finding of the lower Court is opposed to Art.29 (2) of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Supreme Court of India reported in A.I.R. 1992 SC 1630. 4. Mr. T.R. Rajaraman, the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant(s) society submitted, that the plaintiff society had established two educational institutions, only on the basis of linguistic minority, which is recognised under the Constitution of India and the position being so, refusing to declare the institutions as minority institutions is against law. Further, it is the submission, that once minority institutions were established, it will not loose its character, only because of the fact, that non minority people were admitted in the schools or minority schools obtained grant from the Government and despite all these facts, the protections given to the linguistic minorities cannot be taken away. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel placing reliance upon 2002 (8) SCC 481 and AIR 2003 (SC) 3724 , that the plaintiff society alone is competent to administer the minority institutions, over which under the guise of exercising jurisdiction under the Act, the defendants are not entitled to interfere in the day-to-day administration and in fact they had interfered, thereby it seeks permanent injunction also. 5. The learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Gandhi, appearing for the third respondent, who was impleased as a party in the second appeal, while opposing the above submissions submitted, that though the plaintiff society was managed by the linguistic minority people, in fact the two educational institutions were established only as non minority institutions and therefore, taking advantage of the fact, that it was managed by the linguistic minority people, institutions cannot be labeled as minority institutions, seeking protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel, Mr. It is the further submission of the learned senior counsel, Mr. Gandhi, that the plaintiff society had applied for permission to establish and start the schools only as private schools and not as minority institutions and accepting the case of the plaintiff society alone, defendants 1 & 2 have granted permission, which cannot be nullified, after a decade or so, as if they are minority institutions, over which the provisions of the Act are not applicable. In support of the above submissions, my attention was drawn to certain rulings, as well as to certain documents also, which were supported by the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1&2. 6. Originally, the plaintiff/appellant has filed the suit only against defendants 1 & 2/respondents 1 & 2. After the disposal of the first appeal, when the plaintiff had challenged the decree and judgment of the first appellate Court in this appeal, the third respondent herein, who is a staff in the plaintiff's one of the schools, moved an application to implead himself as a party and the same was ordered in C.M.P.No.18582/1999. Since the interest of the staff is well protected by the third respondent herein, the other staff of the schools, who are petitioners in C.M.P.No.4243/2000 need not be impleaded at the stage of the second appeal. In this view, C.M.P.No.4243/2000 deserves to be dismissed. 7. The third respondent has filed C.M.P.No.17855/2004 under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. for admitting additional documentary evidence, which are filed along with the petitions. Since the third respondent herein was not the defendant in O.S.No.5934/1987, before the lower court concerned, he had no opportunity to say, what is his case and how the case is supported by the documentary evidence. After impleading himself as a party to the suit in the second appeal, to canvas the point, that the schools, which are in question were established as non minority institutions, certain documents are sought to be filed i.e. proceedings issued by the Educational Department at the time of granting permission to the schools, as well as some of the agreements executed by the teachers, while they were appointed as teaching or non teaching staff, as the case may be, as contemplated under the Act. For the reception of the documents, despite the fact, time was granted, no objection has been filed, thereby showing those documents are non controversial documents, that could be admitted in evidence, even in the absence of oral evidence to prove its content. All the documents are more or less between the parties to the suit and in this way also, there would be no difficulty in admitting those documents as evidence, provided conditions under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. are complied with. 8. Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. empowers the Court for the production of additional evidence in appellate Court subject to certain conditions. In this case, the first two conditions viz., refusal of the documents to be admitted in evidence which ought to have been admitted by the trial Court and despite the exercise of due diligence, the party seeking to produce additional evidence was unable to produce the same, may not be available, as far as the third respondent is concerned, since he was not a party to the proceedings, in the sense he was not the defendant, when the trial Court and the first appellate Court had disposed the case. Therefore, if at all the third condition viz., Order 41 Rule 27 (b) alone would be attracted which says: "the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined." 9. By going through the documents, which I will discuss infra also, in my considered opinion, some of the documents are essentially required, to enable this Court to pronounce judgment, considering the rival contentions of the parties. In this view, as well as considering the fact, no objection has been filed in C.M.P.No.17855/2004, I am inclined to allow this petition and the documents filed along with this petition are to be exhibited as Exs.B1-B5. 10. In this view, as well as considering the fact, no objection has been filed in C.M.P.No.17855/2004, I am inclined to allow this petition and the documents filed along with this petition are to be exhibited as Exs.B1-B5. 10. Unquestionably, undeniably and as declared by the Apex Court repeatedly, under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India: "All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice." It also provides, the State is incompetent to discriminate against any educational institution as far as granting aid is concerned, on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether the institution is based on religion or language, as the case may be. 11. The Apex Court, in T.M.A. PAI FOUNDATION V. STATE OF KARNATAKA 2002(8) SCC 481 , has considered the scope of Article 30 of the Constitution, as well as the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institution, either on the basis of religion or language. In paragraphs 82 & 83 of the above judgment, the Apex Court has considered as to what extent, the rights of aided private minority institutions to administer be regulated, concluding, the limited jurisdiction granted by Article 25(2) relates to the making of law in relation to economic, financial, political or other secular activities associated with religious practice. In paragraph-88, it is stated that Article 26(a) gives the religious denomination the right to establish an educational institution, the religious denomination being either of the majority community or minority community. Then in paragraph-90 it is said, "The right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to the right conferred by Article 30. The right under Article 30 is not absolute." It is also held in the above decision, the minority institution, which is receiving aid from the Government cannot deny admission to a citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. It is also observed in paragraph 103 as follows: "It will be seen that the use of the expression "sprinkling of outsiders" in that case clearly implied the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30(1); the Court held that when a minority educational institution received aid, outsiders would have to be admitted. It is also observed in paragraph 103 as follows: "It will be seen that the use of the expression "sprinkling of outsiders" in that case clearly implied the applicability of Article 29(2) to Article 30(1); the Court held that when a minority educational institution received aid, outsiders would have to be admitted. This part of the State's contention was accepted, but what was rejected was the contention that by taking outsiders, a minority institution would cease to be an educational institution of the choice of the minority community that established it.", based upon a previous decision, thereby making it clear that if it is proved that an educational institution was established as minority institution, then it will not loose its character, even if it is shown that outsiders were taken into the institution. Therefore, on the ground in the schools maintained by the plaintiff society, the fact medium of instruction is also Tamil and some other community people were also admitted, it is not possible to take away the institution from the purview of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, provided it is otherwise established as minority schools. In para-107, it is stated, "It is, of course, true that government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law." In para 137, it is stated as follows: "It follows from the aforesaid decisions that even though the words of Article 30(1) are unqualified, this Court has held that at least certain other laws of the land pertaining to health, morality and standards of education apply. The right under Article 30(1) has, therefore, not been held to be absolute or above other provisions of the law, and we reiterate the same. By the same analogy, there is no reason why regulations or conditions concerning, generally, the welfare of students and teachers should not be made applicable in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere, as such provisions do not in any way interfere with the right of administration or management under Article 30(1)., thereby showing that a sort of guarantee or assurance to the linguistic and religious minority institutions of their right, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, subject to certain restrictions also. 12. In ISLAMIC ACADEMY OF EDUCATION VS. 12. In ISLAMIC ACADEMY OF EDUCATION VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA ( AIR 2003 (SC) 3724 ) discussing number of other decisions, the Apex Court has held as follows: "These cases have held that in the guise of regulations, rights under Article 30 cannot be abrogated. It has been held, even in respect of aided minority institutions that they must have full autonomy in administration of that institutions. It has been held that the right to administer includes the right to admit students of their own community/language. Thus an unaided minority professional college cannot be in a worse position than an aided minority professional college. It is for this reason that paragraph 68 provides that a different percentage can be fixed for unaided minority professional colleges. The expression "different percentage for minority professional institutions" carries different meaning than the expression "certain percentage for unaided professional colleges". In fixing percentage for unaided minority professional colleges the State must keep in mind, apart from local needs, the interest/need of that community in the State. The need of that community, in the State, would paramount vis-a-vis the local needs." 13. As early as in 1974 itself, the protection given under Article 30 of the Constitution was recognised by the Apex Court in ST. XAVIERS COLLEGE V. STATE OF GUJARAT ( AIR 1974 SC 1389 ), which is reiterated in the subsequent decision also. 14. The learned senior counsel, Mr. K. Chandru, who appeared for the appellant, when the case was taken for clarification, submitted that in view of the admitted position that the plaintiff society is minority one, based on linguistic and the linguistic minority alone is managing the schools, establishing the same, the plaintiff is entitled to declaration, which is protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution and in support of the above submission, number of decisions were brought to my notice. 15. In W. Proost v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1969 SC 465 ), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while considering the scope of Article 29(1) and 30(1), has ruled that a special right given to the minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice cannot be taken away, if the minority community had established an educational institution of its choice, though it had admitted members of other communities. There cannot be any quarrel in this regard. There cannot be any quarrel in this regard. But, the important factor, we have to consider is, though the plaintiff society is a minority based on linguistic, as far as this case is concerned, the question is whether they have established the educational institutions in question as minority institutions. For the reasons, which I am going to advert infra, the minority community had established the institutions of its choice, in this case as private schools i.e. non minority schools, as defined under Section 2(6) of the Act, which should follow conversion is not possible. 16. The other rulings relied on by the learned Senior Counsel reported in D.A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1971 SC 1737 ), Managing Board of the Milli Talimi Mission v. State of Bihar ( 1984 (4) SCC 500 ), Bihar S.M.E. Board v. M.H.A. College ( 1990 (1) SCC 428 ) Virendra Nath Gupta v. Delhi Administration ( 1990 2 SCC 307 ) are also authorities conferring the power upon the minorities a right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice, but the choice in this case is not minority school, whereas it is only non minority schools, for which there cannot be any declaration, as claimed. 17. From the above case laws, as decided by the Apex Court, there cannot be any doubt, that the plaintiff society being a minority one, has the right to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice. Therefore, the only question now arises for consideration in this case, must be, "whether the two institutions were established as minority institutions or non minority schools." In this context, we have to remember certain provisions of the Act. 18. Section 2(6) of the Act defines "minority school" as follows: ""minority school" means a private school of its choice established and administered, by any such minority whether based on religion or language and has the right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution.", thereby showing, while enacting law to regulate the private schools, including minority schools, the guarantee given under Article 30(1) of the Constitution was considered and protected to certain extent, making provisions. 19. From the reading of the above definition, one thing is clear that an educational institution should have the protection of Article 30(1), when it is shown that the minorities had established institution based on religion or language. 19. From the reading of the above definition, one thing is clear that an educational institution should have the protection of Article 30(1), when it is shown that the minorities had established institution based on religion or language. In paragraph-6 of the plaint, though it is stated that the plaintiff educational society was formed to mitigate the lake of sufficient facilities, for the education of the linguistic minorities of Kanyakumari District, the Memorandum of Association does not disclose the same, warranting to take a decision that the schools are established as linguistic minority based on language. 20. Section 2(7) of the Act defines 'private school' as: ""private school" means a pre-primary, primary, middle or high school [or higher secondary school] or any other institution imparting education or training, established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons, and recognised by the competent authority under this Act but does not include a school or an institution..." 21. From the reading of the definition for 'private school', one thing is clear and certain that school established or started by minority was not taken away from the purview of 'private school' or non minority schools. While defining 'private school', it is not stated that the 'minority school' defined under Section 2(6) of the Act, the school established by minority will not come within Section 2(7) i.e the private school or it is also not stated that the private schools are, other than the minority schools or apart from the school established by minority, whether it is minority school, or otherwise. From the above definition, it appears to my mind, that a school started by minority people also should come under the 'private school', since in the definition of 'private school', 'minority' is not excluded, whereas it is stated, 'established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons' which should embrace the minority also. Further when it is shown on facts that the linguistic minorities have not established the institutions based on language, whereas the choice was, to establish non minority school, the protection sought for under Article 30(1) may not be available. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel, Mr. Further when it is shown on facts that the linguistic minorities have not established the institutions based on language, whereas the choice was, to establish non minority school, the protection sought for under Article 30(1) may not be available. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Gandhi, assuming that these institutions were established by minority, it should come only under 'private school' or 'non-minority school' and not under 'minority school', since acceptable documents and other evidence are available to establish that the schools were not established on the basis of religion or language. In the plaint also, the claim of the plaintiff appears to be not on the basis of religion, but only on the basis of linguistic minority. 22. Chapter-II of the Act deals with the establishment, permission for establishment and management of private schools and under this Chapter alone, Section 9 comes. Section 4 mandates new private school to obtain permission i.e. Permission for the schools which are established after this Act came into force. Admittedly, the schools, the subject matter of the case, which seek declaration, came to be established only in the years 1977 and 1979 respectively, i.e. after the Act came into force, thereby it is coming under 'New School'. Section 5 mandates how the application for permission should be and Section 6 empowers the competent authority to grant permission. In the same manner, Section 8 gives power to competent authority for the approval of any change in the constitution of the educational agency. Then comes the important Section viz., Section 9 under the caption 'Minority school to be established without permission', which reads: "Any minority whether based on religion or language may establish and administer any private school without permission under Section 6., thereby recognising the right conferred under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. From the above chapter and the sections, it is crystal clear, that if any minority is (was) intended to establish any educational institution as minority institution, no permission is necessary as envisaged under Section 6, which should be remembered, while dealing with the facts in this case. 23. Chapter III deals with recognition of private school, thus making it clear, not only a permission should be obtained for the establishment of private school, but also it should be recognised under Section 11, whether it is private school or minority school. 23. Chapter III deals with recognition of private school, thus making it clear, not only a permission should be obtained for the establishment of private school, but also it should be recognised under Section 11, whether it is private school or minority school. In the case on hand, if the plaintiff society has not approached the competent authority under Section 5 as well as Section 6, but approached only under Section 11 for recognition, then they can claim that they are coming within the meaning of minority school, which is not the case here. Once permission granted followed by recognition as private school, which should come within the meaning of non minority institution, then automatically, other provisions viz., Section 12 withdrawal of recognition by competent authority as well as in the case of mismanagement or otherwise constitution of school committee, as contemplated under Section 5 would automatically follow. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim as a matter of right, that certain provisions of the Act are not applicable to the institutions, unless it is made out that the rules are not applicable, because of the minority status. It is also submitted, that in case of minority school, the society is not expected to deposit endowment amount, which is applicable to private school alone. It is also submitted on behalf of the third respondent, supported by respondents 1 & 2, that incase of minority institution, when the appointments are made, signing an agreement as provided under Form VII(a) and VII(b) also would not arise for consideration, not very much challenged. Having the above provisions of law under the Act, the facts in this case has to be seen, to certain extent, to decide the claim of the appellant. 24. The submission of the learned senior counsel Mr. Gandhi, that minority could establish non minority school not vis-à -vis, is to be accepted. Further, the submission of the learned senior counsel that the plaintiff society is estopped from claiming minority status also should be accepted, since deserves, under the principles of estoppel. 24. The submission of the learned senior counsel Mr. Gandhi, that minority could establish non minority school not vis-à -vis, is to be accepted. Further, the submission of the learned senior counsel that the plaintiff society is estopped from claiming minority status also should be accepted, since deserves, under the principles of estoppel. From the reading of the written statement, though no specific plea of estoppel has been taken, the cumulative effect of entire reading makes it clear that such a defence has been taken, since it is said, the plaintiff having obtained permission to establish the school as private school, not entitled to convert the same as minority school, which is sufficient to say that estoppel plea is also available. Further, plea of estoppel is not only a question of fact, but also a question of law and when the materials are available to decide the principle of estoppel, that may be permitted even in the stage of second appeal and in this way, the plea of estoppel has to be considered, to ascertain the right of the parties. 25. Certain sections of society, though they are linguistic minority or religious minority, for the benefit of the larger interest of the society, are competent to establish institutions, to develop that local area, for which there cannot be any bar. On the other hand, if the minority thought fit that their people, based upon linguistic or religion alone, should have the major benefit of the institution, as provided under Article 30(1), there is no bar to establish such institution. In this view, the primary thing that should be seen in this case is, whether the two schools were established as private schools or as minority schools. 26. When the plaintiff society was formed incorporating the purposes, memorandum of association was prepared and clause III of Memorandum of Association reads: "The objects of the Society shall be the following:- 1. To establish, conduct and manage Educational Institutions such as Girls' High School for the benefit of the inhabitants of Kollemcode and surrounding rural areas. 2. To promote knowledge and culture especially among rural women and to work for their all round development. 3. To establish, conduct and manage Educational Institutions such as Girls' High School for the benefit of the inhabitants of Kollemcode and surrounding rural areas. 2. To promote knowledge and culture especially among rural women and to work for their all round development. 3. To mitigate the lack of sufficient facilities for educational and cultural development of girls belonging to linguistic and other minority Communities of the Vilavancode Taluk." (emphasis supplied) The above quoted clauses of Memorandum of Association make it perfectly clear, without any shadow of doubt that the society itself was formed primarily, not based upon the religion or language, whereas it was formed with prime object of educating the inhabitants of Kollamcode and surrounding rural areas, among rural women, for their all round development, not restricting on the basis of religion or language. True, in clause III(3) of the Memorandum of Association, we find a phrase "cultural development of girls belonging to linguistic". It does not stop there. It further reads: "other minority communities" also, thereby showing the motive for the association was not restricted to religion or language, which is sought to be now restricted by the narrow minded, or self centred people who are in the helm of affairs. The linguistic minority, while starting or establishing the two educational institutions, has not at all stated that these institutions are based on linguistic minority and this being the position, it is futile on the part of the Management of the plaintiff society at present to seek protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The founders were of the view that all the people in and around Kollamcode, should have the benefit, which cannot be restricted now, as claimed by the present administrators of the society. This view is fortified by the conduct of the society people, and no other evidence is required to negative the claim of the plaintiff. 27. The plaintiff society filed an application before the competent authority on 15.5.1977 for opening of a new private girls' school, which was considered by the Joint Director of School Education, and favoured the opening of the private school as per the proceedings dated 17.6.1977, which shall come under the category of non minority institutions. The subject as per the proceedings is only for opening of a private school and not minority school. Clause 4 of the proceedings contemplates creation of endowment by depositing Rs.50,000/-. The subject as per the proceedings is only for opening of a private school and not minority school. Clause 4 of the proceedings contemplates creation of endowment by depositing Rs.50,000/-. The Annexure also says that it is only a private school, which is in accordance with the memorandum of association, as revealed under Ex.A1. Even after the filing of the suit, recognising the school only as non minority school, agreements were taken as seen from Exs.B2, B3, which is reiterated on 19.9.1992, though the document came into existence, during the pendency of the suit, as seen from Ex.B.4. Therefore, it is futile at this stage to contend, that the schools were established as minority schools and the defendants have no authority to interfere, as if the institutions are minority in nature. From the above documents, as well as from the circumstances available, it is made clear undoubtedly that minority had established private schools, not as minority institutions and this being the position, these two institutions will not come within the meaning of Article 30(1), which was properly considered by the first appellate Court, whereas it was not at all considered by the trial Court. 28. In paragraph-5 of the plaint, it is conceded that as per the Directors' Proceedings No.Rc.No.10631/G3/77 dated 17.6.1977, the school was originally started as High School and it was upgraded with effect from 25.6.1979 as per the Directors' Proceedings No.Rc.No.173253/W15/79 dated 2.6.1979. It is also further stated that Sri Devi Primary School was started as per CEO's proceedings No.Rc.No.C1/16031/79 dated 31.7.1979. The above averments make it clear that the plaintiff society was aware of the fact, that permission was granted by the competent authorities for the establishment of the schools, as well as for starting the schools, which were recognised also. No where in the plaint, it is stated, that by mistake or under the wrong impression, even for starting the minority school, permission is necessary, they have applied for permission. Thus, we find no explanation under what circumstances, the plaintiff educational society had moved the authorities concerned by filing applications, seeking permission to establish the schools. The only inference, by the conduct of the plaintiff society that could be deduced is that though they are the minority, they had started the schools, having broad mind, at least at that time, private schools to uplift the people in and around, especially the women folk. The only inference, by the conduct of the plaintiff society that could be deduced is that though they are the minority, they had started the schools, having broad mind, at least at that time, private schools to uplift the people in and around, especially the women folk. Otherwise, if the society had the intention, to promote the minority alone, not worried or not concerned about the other Sections of the people living in and around, nothing would have prevented the society to establish the school so, since the Act itself contemplates under Section 9, no permission is necessary to establish a minority school. It is also not the case of the plaintiff society, that they were not aware of the specific provision. Having these established as well as admitted facts in mind, Section 115 of the Evidence Act should be seen, in order to decide, whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming minority right over the educational institutions, by their conduct. 29. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with question of facts and not of rights. It is repeatedly held that there cannot be estoppel against statutes. Here no right conferred under any statute is claimed as of right, where the conduct of the person could be ignored on the well known principle that there could be no estoppel against statutes. The right claimed by the plaintiff in this suit is that as minority, the plaintiff educational society is entitled to establish educational institutions of their choice and the institutions are established so and therefore, they are entitled to declaration. Constitution does not say that minority is estopped or barred from establishing non minority institutions. Therefore, in this case, it cannot be said, that the plaintiff is claiming a statutory right and in this view, Section 115 has no force. On the basis of the establishment of two institutions, based on facts alone, right is claimed and this being the position, the principles underlined under estoppel could be invoked. 30. In this case, if the plaintiff is to be estopped or to bring its case within the scope of estoppel as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, especially four conditions have to be fulfilled and they are: (1) the plaintiff should have made representation. (2) The representation must have been made with an intention to be acted upon. In this case, if the plaintiff is to be estopped or to bring its case within the scope of estoppel as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, especially four conditions have to be fulfilled and they are: (1) the plaintiff should have made representation. (2) The representation must have been made with an intention to be acted upon. (3) The representation must have been acted upon and (4) such action should have been detrimental to the persons so acting. As seen from Ex.B1, there was representation by way of application, seeking permission to establish only private school, that too with an intention to be acted upon. Only on the basis of the representation made by the plaintiff educational society, the competent authorities have acted and granted permission to establish private schools. If the plaintiff society had not represented that they are going to establish private school or in other words, if they have claimed that they are going to establish a minority school, detrimental to the authority concerned, they would not have acted, while granting permission for private school under the hope they are giving permission only for private school. From the documents now marked, it is made clear that the procedure to be followed for the private schools was adopted by the plaintiff society. It is also admitted that they have deposited the amount as endowment, which is not applicable to the minority school. Thus by their conduct also, subsequent to obtaining permission, the plaintiff society treated these two institutions only as private schools and at no point of time, these two schools were treated as minority schools, thereby making an impression in and around, that the schools are functioning only as private schools i.e. non minority institutions, governed under the Act. Thus, all the ingredients required to apply the principle of estoppel are well available in this case, because of the representation made by the plaintiff society and its subsequent conduct in accepting the rules and regulations of the Act for more than a decade. 31. The learned senior counsel, Mr. K. Chandru submitted that there cannot be any estoppel against the plaintiff society, since they are claiming the right, which was conferred upon them under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. True, if the right claimed is available under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, on established facts, there cannot be estoppel. 31. The learned senior counsel, Mr. K. Chandru submitted that there cannot be any estoppel against the plaintiff society, since they are claiming the right, which was conferred upon them under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. True, if the right claimed is available under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, on established facts, there cannot be estoppel. But in this case, it is proved by facts, that such right was not claimed in the inception i.e. while establishing the institutions of the plaintiff choice, whereas it is proved otherwise. Based upon facts alone, I am constrained to say that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming minority status for the schools, which have not been established based on language or religion. In this view, as rightly claimed by the learned counsel for the third respondent, supported by respondents 1 & 2 on the basis of the principles of estoppel also by the conduct of this plaintiff, the right now claimed, in a way converting the private school or changing the character of private school as that of minority school, should be negatived. If the procedure adopted by the plaintiff is recognised and accepted, then there may not be effective control over the educational institutions, which will be detrimental to the society also, including the students and the staff, which should not be allowed to happen. True the inconvenience caused either to staff or students may not be a ground to derecognize a minority school or to negative the right claimed, if the school had been established as minority institutions. In this case, since it is established that the schools are meant for all, not based on linguistic minority, I am constrained to observe as above, not for any other reasons. 32. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiff also failed to bring any provisions of law or any other authority, that minority is entitled to convert the institutions started by them as private school or non minority institutions, as minority school, because of the fact that the entire administration, management vested only with the minority people. 32. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiff also failed to bring any provisions of law or any other authority, that minority is entitled to convert the institutions started by them as private school or non minority institutions, as minority school, because of the fact that the entire administration, management vested only with the minority people. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered opinion that though the reasoning’s assigned by the lower appellate Court may not be correct to the entire extent, the conclusion is perfectly correct, in the sense, that the schools are not established as minority schools, whereas they are private schools, not entitled to any declaration under Section 30(1). Thus answering this point, I conclude there is no merit in the appeal and the appeal deserves dismissal, confirming the judgment of the first appellate Court. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs through out. C.M.P.No.17855/2004 is allowed and C.M.P.No.4243/2000 is dismissed.