S. B. MAJAGE, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER in C. R. P. No. 4832 of 2001, who is decree-holder in execution Case No. 45 of 1999 before the Court of Principle Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Gadag, has challenged the order dated 29-10-2001 by which the execution has been held as not maintainable to the extent of half of the suit property of O. S. No. 81 of 1971. The petitioners in C. R. P. No. 541 of 2002, who are judgment-debtors 5 and 6 in the said execution, have challenged that part of the order, by which execution is held maintainable to the extent of remaining half of the suit property of O. S. No. 81 of 1971. Since both petitions arise out of same order, they are taken together for consideration. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as shown in the impugned order i. e. , as decree-holder judgment-debtors 5 and 6. ( 3 ) BRIEF facts, giving rise to these petitions, are: There was a sale agreement on 26-5-1971 between the decree-holder and one Smt. Kotravva in respect of land Sy. No. 127/1 measuring 5 acres situated at gadag. Based on said agreement, O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was filed by decree-holder in the Court of Civil Judge at Gadag on 11-10-1971. After contest, said suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed, but decreed for the alternative relief claimed for refund of the amount paid by the decree-holder. Against that, R. A. No. 36 of 1973 was filed by the decree-holder and that was allowed on 9-4-1975 by granting a decree for specific performance. Challenging the same, Smt. Kotravva filed R. S. A. No. 604 of 1975 before this Court. During the pendency of that appeal, she died and her L. Rs namely, Gangadharayya, Devavva, Basavannevva and Ningavva were brought on record and, ultimately, it was dismissed by this Court on 15-2-1982. So, on 13-12-1982, the decree-holder filed e. P. No. 53 of 1982 for the execution of the decree passed in his favour for specific performance. Thereafter, Gangadharayya filed a suit in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 for declaration in respect of decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and for injunction on 14-12-1983 and in that, further proceedings in E. P. No. 53 of 1982 were stayed by order dated 2-1-1984. Thereafter, Gangadharayya filed a suit in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 for declaration in respect of decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and for injunction on 14-12-1983 and in that, further proceedings in E. P. No. 53 of 1982 were stayed by order dated 2-1-1984. Said suit came to be decreed in part on 21-1-1986 to the extent of half of the suit land. So, E. P. No. 53 of 1982 was closed on 20-2-1986 for the present. Challenging the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983, R. F. A. No. 284 of 1986 was filed before this Court on 3-3-1986 and that came to be transferred to the court of II Additional District Judge at Dharwad and renumbered as r. A. No. 41 of 1991. However, under registered sale deed dated 4-8-1993, Gangadharayya sold entire land to one Shivayya Hiremath who, in turn, sold it in favour of 5th and 6th judgment-debtors, by separate sale deeds dated 2-8-1994. Thereafter, on 11-9-1997 R. A. No. 41 of 1991 was allowed and judgment and decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 were set aside. So, on 1-4-1998, E. P. No. 45 of 1999 was filed for executing the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 as modified in R. A. No. 36 of 1973 against the L. Rs of deceased Kotravva brought on record already besides subsequent purchasers of suit land i. e. , judgment-debtors 5 and 6. In that, maintainability of the execution was challenged by the 5th and 6th judgment-debtors and impugned order came to be passed by the executing Court, holding it as maintainable for half of the land and not maintainable for the remaining half of the land Sy. No. 147/1. Thus, decree-holder, judgment-debtors 5 and 6 are before this Court, as noted already. In that, maintainability of the execution was challenged by the 5th and 6th judgment-debtors and impugned order came to be passed by the executing Court, holding it as maintainable for half of the land and not maintainable for the remaining half of the land Sy. No. 147/1. Thus, decree-holder, judgment-debtors 5 and 6 are before this Court, as noted already. ( 4 ) IT was vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the decree-holder that the period from 2-1-1984 to 11-9-1997 has to be excluded while computing the limitation period of 12 years for executing the decree as there was stay of the proceedings in E. P. No. 53 of 1982 between the period from 2-1-1984 to 21-1-1986 and thereafter, there was a decree of permanent injunctions from 21-1-1986 to 11-9-1997 in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 for half of the suit land till the appeal came to be allowed on 11-9-1997 by setting aside that judgment and decree. According to him, the execution petition was well-within time and maintainable, as limitation started when the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 became enforceable after 11-9-1997 and as such, the period from 2-1-1984 to 11-9-1997 requires to be excluded while computing the period of limitation of 12 years. It was submitted that even if there was partial stay or injunction against the execution of a decree, that applied to the entire decree and as such, said period could be excluded. In that connection, reliance v/as placed on Section 15 (1) and Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') besides certain authorities. On the other hand, it was submitted for judgment-debtors 5 and 6 that since R. A. No. 36 of 1973 was allowed on 9-4-1975, the period of limitation of 12 years has to be computed from 9-4-1975, but the execution petition was filed on 1-4-1998 and hence, the execution was barred by time. On the other hand, it was submitted for judgment-debtors 5 and 6 that since R. A. No. 36 of 1973 was allowed on 9-4-1975, the period of limitation of 12 years has to be computed from 9-4-1975, but the execution petition was filed on 1-4-1998 and hence, the execution was barred by time. It was also submitted for them that the permanent injunction granted in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 was for riot proceeding with e. P. No. 53 of 1982 and not against decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and as such, there was no injunction or stay from 20-2-1986, on which date E. P. No. 53 of 1982 was closed and hence, the decree-holder could have executed the decree passed in O. S. No. 81 of 1971. According to them, even if the period of stay of E. P. No. 53 of 1982 during two years one month and 18 days calculated from 2-1-1984 to 20-2-1986 is excluded while computing the period of limitation, the last date for filing execution petition was 26-6-1989, but the execution petition was filed on 1-4-1998 and hence, the execution was clearly barred by time. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if the date 15-2-1982, on which date R. S. A. No. 604 of 1975 was dismissed by this Court, is considered, then also, the last date to file execution was 2-5-1996 and in that view also, the execution taken was beyond the period of 12 years provided under Article 136 of the Act and thus, barred by time. Perused the records carefully. ( 5 ) THE point for consideration is: "whether a decree could be said to be enforceable when a part of such decree could not be executed?" ( 6 ) AS noted already, the present proceedings are in connection with the execution of decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 for specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of land Sy. No. 127/1 measuring 5 acres agricultural land. So, the period of limitation to execute it is 12 years as provided in Article 136 of the Act 1963 and the time from which that period began to run was, when it became enforceable. No. 127/1 measuring 5 acres agricultural land. So, the period of limitation to execute it is 12 years as provided in Article 136 of the Act 1963 and the time from which that period began to run was, when it became enforceable. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the decree-holder, the decree became enforceable only after R. A. No. 41 of 1991 was allowed on 11-9-1997 when the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 were set aside and not earlier to that and as such, the execution is in time and maintainable. On the other hand, the contention of the judgment-debtors is that as there was no stay or injunction after 20-2-1986 (on which date E. P. was closed) for enforcing the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and, as E. P. No. 53 of 1982 was not pending, the execution started on 31-3-1998 was clearly barred by time. So, the point in controversy is, whether the period from 20-2-1986 to 11-9-1997 could be excluded under law or not? ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute that O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was decreed for entire 5 acres of land in favour of decree-holder and thereafter, when O. S. No. 135 of 1983 was filed, seeking declaration regarding decree O. S. No. 81 of 1971, it was partly decreed and, to the extent of half of the said land, decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 obtained by the decree-holder against deceased Kotrawa had been declared as not binding on Gangadharayya and the decree-holder had been permanently restrained from proceeding with the Execution No. 53 of 1983 to the extent of that half land. ( 9 ) ADMITTEDLY, there was no stay or injunction order against O. S. No. 81 of 1971. But, the injunction was against the Execution No. 53 of 1983 and the injunction granted in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 was the consequential relief to the declaration made in the first part of the decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983. In other words, the injunction granted was relating to half of the land for which the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was declared as not binding. In the said context, Section 15 (1) of the Act is relied on for the decree-holder. It reads thus: "15. In other words, the injunction granted was relating to half of the land for which the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was declared as not binding. In the said context, Section 15 (1) of the Act is relied on for the decree-holder. It reads thus: "15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded". According to said provision, while computing the period of limitation for execution of a decree, the period of the injunction or stay order could be excluded. ( 10 ) SO, it was submitted for the judgment-debtors that as there was no stay or injunction order for execution of the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and as the injunction was not for proceeding with E. P. No. 53 of 1982, said provision does not come to the said of decree-holder. ( 11 ) FURTHER, placing reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v Suresh Chandra Dey and a Full Bench decision of Madras High Court in the case of Bala Tripura Sundaramma v Abdul Khader, it was submitted for judgment-debtors that equitable consideration cannot be introduced into the very clear provisions of section 15 (1 ). So also, on a decision of Supreme Court in the case of siraj-ul-Haq Khan and Others v Sunni Central Board of Wakf, Uttar pradesh and Others, wherein it is observed thus: "it is true that rules on limitation are to some extent arbitrary and may frequently lead to hardship; but there could be no doubt that, in construing provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are immaterial and irrelevant, and in applying them effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them". Further, strongly relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. S. K. Krishnappa Chettiar and Others v S. V. V. Somiah alias navniappa Chettiar and Another, wherein it was held that Section 15 (1) is restricted to a case where execution is stayed by injunction or order. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the judgment-debtors, the decree-holder cannot invoke general principles of suspension of limitation and relied on a decision in the case of Inayat All and Another v Natthu Khan5 and a decision in the case of Somshikharaswami Shidlingswami v Shivappa mallappa Hosmani and Others. ( 13 ) THUS, it was submitted for the judgment-debtors that as there was no stay or injunction order in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 against the execution of the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 either in part or in full, section 15 (1) of the Act does not help the decree-holder. ( 14 ) THERE can be no dispute with what has been held in the said decisions but, it may be noted that, in none of the decisions, part of a decree had been declared as not binding or unenforceable and Article 136 of the Act was under consideration and as such, they are not applicable to the case on hand. ( 15 ) IT is true that the decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 does not say that execution of decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 has been stayed either in part or in full by any order of stay or injunction. But, in O. S. No. 135 of 1983, decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 had been declared as not binding on gangadharayya to the extent of half of the land Sy. No. 127/1 (though sought for entire land) and an injunction order had been passed against e. P. No. 53 of 1982. As the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was sought to be executed in E. P. No. 53 of 1982, proceedings in said E. P. No. 53 of 1982 had been sought to be stayed by way of injunction order and accordingly it was stayed by an order of injunction, but it was to the extent of half of the suit land, for which the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 had been declared as not binding on Gangadharayya. ( 16 ) IT is trite that for the purpose of interpreting a decree, when its terms are not clear, the Court would certainly be entitled to look into the pleadings and the judgment, as held in the case of Seth Manakchand v chaube Manoharlal and Another. So, in the facts and circumstances and nature of decree passed in O. S. No. 135 of 1983, it is necessary to read the decree as a whole to fit in the two parts in an integrated scheme. If done so, the reasonable interpretation would be that the second part of the decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 is an order of injunction against executing the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 to the extent of half of the suit land, for which that decree (in O. S. No. 81 of 1971) had been declared as not binding on Gangadharayya by the first part of the decree (in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 ). ( 17 ) IN the case of P. S. Subramanian v S. S. Venkitadri Iyer, it was held that if there is an order of stay or injunction, it would be correct to say that execution of entire decree has been stayed, no matter whether such an order of stay or injunction is restricted to a part of it. So also, in the case of Ramnarayan Dhan Singh v Anandilal Ratanlal Mahajan and Others, Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has held thus:"33. . . . We read the word "execution" in Section 15 in this broad sense so as to embrace the various processes of execution, and any of them. We are further of the view that the words "has been stayed by an injunction or order" are clearly relatable to the factual position. An order or injunction staying execution of a decree may either be in general or unspecified terms (such as 'execution is stayed' or 'the decree-holder is restrained from executing the decree' ). It may be in limited or specified terms (such as "the sale of property 'a' is stayed" or "the decree-holder is restrained from taking possession of property 'b', etc. " ). In the latter case also, it will be said that execution has been stayed because a certain specified process in execution is also 'execution'. It may be in limited or specified terms (such as "the sale of property 'a' is stayed" or "the decree-holder is restrained from taking possession of property 'b', etc. " ). In the latter case also, it will be said that execution has been stayed because a certain specified process in execution is also 'execution'. If we are right in this interpretation of the word "execution", as we think we are, we are not adding any words to the section. 34. In short, if further progress of an execution of the decree is stayed by an injunction or order, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application for execution of that decree. The word "any" is of emphatic import and the exclusion will be available for any application for execution of the decree by whatever process the decree-holder likes to enforce it. It was, however, contended that some anomalies are also involved in accepting the second view such as those pointed out in Lala Baijnath Prosad v Nursingdas guzrati, AIR 1958 Cal. 1 . It is argued that where sale of property 'a' is stayed, it is not reasonable that limitation should be saved against the sale of property 'b'. This criticism, in our opinion, loses sight of the very purpose of providing limitation. The whole object and purpose of limitation is to create and bar to the decree as a whole being executed after the prescribed time, and not to protect a particular property of the judgment-debtor or to prevent a particular mode of execution after the prescribed time. What has to be seen is whether the decree is executable or not. If it is, then there is no restriction on the decree-holder's right to enforce it as best as he can. The effect of Section 15 of the Limitation Act is to arrest the running of limitation when its execution remained stayed by an injunction or order and thus extend the life of the decree beyond the prescribed time. It is in that light that we have to read the section". It was also held further as under:"37. We, therefore, answer the question thus: (1) "execution" in section 15 of the Limitation Act embraces all the appropriate means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all processes and proceedings in aid of or supplemental to execution. It is in that light that we have to read the section". It was also held further as under:"37. We, therefore, answer the question thus: (1) "execution" in section 15 of the Limitation Act embraces all the appropriate means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all processes and proceedings in aid of or supplemental to execution. (2) Stay of any process of execution is stay of execution within the meaning of the section. (3) Where any injunction or order has prevented the decree-holder from executing the decree, then, irrespective of the particular stage of execution, or the particular property against, which, or the particular judgment-debtor against whom, execution was stayed, the effect of such injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree itself by the same period during which the injunction or order remained in force. In other words, the period of stay shall be excluded from computation of the period of limitation for further execution without creating any restriction on the rights of the decree-holder to execute the decree as he chooses". Said view has been confirmed by the Supreme Court when challenged in appeal, as could be seen from the decision Anandilal and Another v ram Narain and Others. ( 18 ) IN the above view and as Section 15 (1) of the Act does not speak of absolute or partial stay or injunction order, it could be said that if there is an order of stay or injunction, it would be correct to say that execution of entire decree has been stayed, no matter whether such an order of stay or injunction is restricted to a part of it. So, when there is an order of stay or injunction even against a part of decree, that period of stay or injunction order shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Hence, the benefit of the said injunction order in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 goes to the decree-holder, extending it to decree. ( 19 ) THAT apart, it was submitted for the decree-holder that decree in o. S. No. 135 of 1983, declaring the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 as not binding on Gangadharayya to the extent of half of the land Sy. ( 19 ) THAT apart, it was submitted for the decree-holder that decree in o. S. No. 135 of 1983, declaring the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 as not binding on Gangadharayya to the extent of half of the land Sy. No. 127/1, had not specified that (half of) land by giving particulars or in any other manner to say that for which half of the land in Sy. No. 127/1, the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was held executable and not executable. So, it was argued for the decree-holder that in such a situation, the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was not enforceable as the extent of half of the land in Sy. No. 127/1 was not specific to proceed with execution of decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 and consequently, the only course open to the decree-holder was to file a suit for partition and separate possession to get demarcated that remaining half of the land Sy. No. 127/1 before proceeding to execute the decree passed in O. S. No. 81 of 1971. Thus, according to decree-holder, viewed from any angle, the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was not enforceable even though declaration given in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 was relating to half of the land Sy. No. 127/1 covered by the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971. In other words, according to the learned Counsel for decree-holder, even if Section 15 (1) of the Act is not applicable to the case on hand, then also, decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was not enforceable immediately after decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 was passed and as such, it could be said that decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was not enforceable then and because enforceable when R. A. No. 41 of 1991 was allowed on 11-9-1997 and set aside the decree in O. S. No. 135 of 1983 and as such, under article 136 of the Act, the time began to run then, after it had stopped on 2-1-1984 when stay was granted. ( 20 ) BUT, the judgment-debtors have placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal Essential Commodities supply Corporation v Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Private limited and Another , wherein it was held that the period of limitation for execution of the decree under Article 136 of the Act runs from the date of decree and not from the date when the decree was actually drawn up and signed by the Judge. ( 21 ) HOWEVER, said decision has no application to the present case, as the point under consideration is, whether or not a decree could be said to be executable/enforceable when a part of decree was held to be not binding on judgment-debtor. In my opinion, since the decree was not enforceable either in part or in full even on/after 20-2-1986, the period from 20-2-1986 to 11-9-1997 (on which aate R. A. No. 41 of 1991 came to be decided) be excluded in computing the period of limitation of 12 years provided in Article 136 of the Act. In the above view, there is no force in the submissions made for the judgment-debtors that the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was enforceable after 20-2-1986 to till 11-9-1997 or, that the execution of a part of entire decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 was barred by time. ( 22 ) LASTLY, it was submitted for the judgment-debtors that as there was no stay after 9-4-1975 (on which date R. A. No. 36 of 1973 was allowed) and stay was only on 2-1-1984 (on which date further proceedings in E. P. No. 53 of 1982 came to be stayed), if the period from 9-4-1975 to 2-1- 1984 is considered while computing the period of 12 years' limitation, the execution was barred by time. But, even if the period from 9-4-1975 to 2-1-1984 is taken while computing the period of limitation as the period from 20-2-1986 to 11-9-1997 could be excluded while computing the period of limitation, the execution taken on 1-4-1998 was well-within time. But, even if the period from 9-4-1975 to 2-1-1984 is taken while computing the period of limitation as the period from 20-2-1986 to 11-9-1997 could be excluded while computing the period of limitation, the execution taken on 1-4-1998 was well-within time. However, the Trial Court failed to consider the said aspects of the matter and consequently committed error in holding that the execution was not maintainable for half of the suit land while holding execution as maintainable for the remaining half of the suit land to execute the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971. Hence, the petition filed by the judgment-debtors challenging maintainability of the execution requires to be dismissed and the petition filed by the decree-holder has to be allowed. In the result, C. R. P. No. 541 of 2002 is dismissed and C. R. P. No. 4832 of 2001 is allowed, holding that the execution was well-within time to execute the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1971 passed for 5 acres in Sy. No. 127/1 and set aside that part of the impugned order, by which said decree was held not executable and barred for half of the said land. Parties to bear their respective cost. Send back the LCR immediately and at any rate before 15-3-2005. --- *** --- .