Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-By this criminal revision petition under Section 397/401, CrPC, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 210.2004 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, Bar (for short, “the trial Court” hereinafter) in Criminal Original Case No. 175/2003, by which the learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC, against the accused-petitioners. 2. The facts relevant and necessary for the disposal of this criminal revision petition, in a succinct, are that non-petitioner No. 2 filed an FIR stating therein that by the agreement dated 05.09.1997, accused-petitioner Mitha Lal agreed to sell the agricultural land of Khasra Nos. 168, 278, 279, 280, 274/1, 281 and 284 measuring 47 Bighas and 15 Biswas for a consideration of Rs.5,11,001/-and received the earnest money of Rs.5,500/-from non-petitioner No. 2. On 15.05.1997, the agreement was executed by petitioner Mitha Lal in favour of non-petitioner No. 2, wherein the above-noticed Khasras were agreed to be sold to the non-petitioner No. 2 by accused-petitioner Mitha Lal and received Rs.53,000/-. On 18.05.1997, petitioner No. 2 Gyan Chand alias Genaram, who is the son of petitioner No. 1 Mitha Lal, received Rs.80,000/-from non-petitioner No. 2 towards the cost of the land alleged to have been agreed to be sold to the non-petitioner No. 2. Thereafter, a sum of Rs.22,000/-was also received by petitioner Mitha Lal from non-petitioner No. 2 as interest on the delayed payment. As such, the petitioners had received Rs.1,60,000/-from the non-petitioner No. 2. Non-petitioner No. 2 requested petitioner Mitha Lal for getting the documents of sale registered and to give physical possession of the land. The petitioner had been assuring the non-petitioner No. 2 to get the sale registered, whereas out of the above-noticed Khasras, certain land is neither in possession of the petitioners nor it is in their cultivation. This fact was not brought to the notice of the non-petitioner No. 2 by the petitioners. Non-petitioner No. 2 went on the site and he was informed by one Shri Nayak that the petitioners have no right over the land. On this, accused-petitioner Mitha Lal told that he would return the amount paid by non-petitioner No. 2 alongwith interest. Again, on 12.2000, petitioner Mitha Lal met non-petitioner No. 2 and assured that he would return the amount alongwith interest. On this, accused-petitioner Mitha Lal told that he would return the amount paid by non-petitioner No. 2 alongwith interest. Again, on 12.2000, petitioner Mitha Lal met non-petitioner No. 2 and assured that he would return the amount alongwith interest. Thereafter, petitioner Gyan Chand alias Genaram met non-petitioner No. 2 at Jaitaran and agreed that non-petitioner No. 2 owes the amount from his father but neither his father Mitha Lal nor he was in a position to return the amount. After investigation, the police filed challan against the petitioners for the offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B, IPC. On 14.02.2002, petitioner filed an application under Section 190, CrPC, before the trial Court, which stood dismissed by the trial Court. After hearing the arguments, the learned trial Court, vide impugned order dated 210.2004, held that no offence under Section 406, IPC, is made out against the petitioners; however, the trial Court framed charges for the offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC, against the petitioners. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 4. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the land bearing Khasra Nos. 168, 278, 279 and 280 are in the exclusive Khatedari of petitioner Mitha Lal and he had 1/3rd share in Khasra No. 274/1. It has also been contended that Noratmal had 1/3rd share, about which he had executed a will in favour of petitioner Mitha Lal. Likewise, Gautam Chand had 1/3rd share, about which he had executed a Mukhtyarnama in favour of petitioner Mitha Lal. It has further been contended that petitioner Gyan Chand had ½ share in Khasra No. 284 and Khasra No. 281 is in the Khatedari of wife of petitioner No. 1 Mitha Lal. Thus, the petitioners had right to sell the land shown in the agreement but the sale deed could not be executed as the non-petitioner No. 2 did not pay the full consideration. It has further been contended that petitioner Mitha Lal filed a revenue suit in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaitaran against non-petitioner No. 2 and the learned Executive Magistrate, vide Judgment dated 20.03.2001, restrained the non-petitioner No. 2 from interfering in any way with the possession of petitioner Mitha Lal. It has further been contended that petitioner Mitha Lal filed a revenue suit in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaitaran against non-petitioner No. 2 and the learned Executive Magistrate, vide Judgment dated 20.03.2001, restrained the non-petitioner No. 2 from interfering in any way with the possession of petitioner Mitha Lal. It has further been contended that there was no intention of the petitioners to deceive the non-petitioner or fraudulently or dishonestly inducing him to enter with an agreement and as such the said offences are not made against them and the matter is of a civil nature and the remedy was available with the non-petitioner No. 2 to file a suit for specific performance of a contract. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nageshwar Prasad Singh alias Sinha vs. Narayan Singh & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1480 ; Ajay Mitra vs. State of MP & Ors., 2003 (2) Apex Court Judgment s 77 (SC); and The State of Kerala vs. A. Pareed Pillai & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 326 . 5. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 have opposed the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and stressed that the petitioners fraudulently and dishonestly induced the non-petitioner No. 2 to purchase the land whereas actually some portion thereof was neither in their exclusive possession nor owned by him and, therefore, the impugned order does not require any interference. 6. It is settled proposition of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused committed an offence so as to proceed against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then the charges have to be framed, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of MP vs. S.B. Johari & Ors., 2000 CrLR 407 (SC). 7. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then the charges have to be framed, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of MP vs. S.B. Johari & Ors., 2000 CrLR 407 (SC). 7. In State of Delhi vs. Gyan Devi & Ors., 2000 (8) SCC 239 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the High Court’s power to quash the charges should not be exercised except for strong reasons like interest of justice and avoiding abuse of process of the Court. In Smt. Omwati vs. State, AIR 2001 SC 1507 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court should not interfere at the initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and farfetched reasons. In Ram Kumar Laharia vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 2001 (2) SC 79, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing the charge, the evidence cannot be weighed. 8. In State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, JT 2004 (10) SC 303, a Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the time of framing the charge or taking cognizance, the accused has no right to produce any material. The Apex Court further observed that the only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond it. The Apex Court further held as under :- “As the stage of framing the charge, roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and nothing more. The expression ‘hearing the submissions of the accused’ cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing the charge, hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” 9. Taking the facts of the instant case, the agreement was executed for sell of agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 168, 278, 270, 280, 274/1, 281 and 284. Out of the aforesaid Khasra, the land bearing Khasra No. 274/1 is in the Khatedari of Shri Noratmal and Gautam Chand who are the brothers of petitioner Mitha Lal. Taking the facts of the instant case, the agreement was executed for sell of agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 168, 278, 270, 280, 274/1, 281 and 284. Out of the aforesaid Khasra, the land bearing Khasra No. 274/1 is in the Khatedari of Shri Noratmal and Gautam Chand who are the brothers of petitioner Mitha Lal. Khasra No.281 is in the Khatedari of Smt. Shanti Devi, who is wife of petitioner Mitha Lal. Khasra No. 284 belongs to petitioner No. 2 Gyan Chand. The petitioners were well knowing that all the Khasra numbers shown in the agreement were not in the exclusive Khatedari of petitioner No. 1 Mitha Lal, still they hatched a criminal conspiracy with an intention to deceive the non-petitioner No. 2 and fraudulently or dishonestly induced him to part with money. Thus, prima facie it has come on record that they have committed the offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Debendra Nath Padhi’s case (Supra), at the stage of framing the charge, the defence of the accused-petitioners cannot be putforth. 10. Now, we deal with the decisions cited by the petitioners. In Nageshwar Prasad Singh’s case (Supra), after payment of part of consideration under an agreement to sell, possession was handed over to the complainant and suit for specific performance filed by the complainant was pending before civil Court. In those factual-matrix, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that liability, if any, arising by breach of contract is civil in nature and not criminal. In Ajay Mitra’s case (Supra) and A. Pareed Pillai’s case (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that to constitute the offence of cheating, intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. In the instant case, the petitioners agreed to sell the land in question to the complainant konwing it well that some portion thereof was actually not in their ownership and possession and received a sum of R.1.6 lac from non-petitioner No. 2. As such, the petitioner’s fraudulent and dishonest intention since inception is apparent. In the instant case, the petitioners agreed to sell the land in question to the complainant konwing it well that some portion thereof was actually not in their ownership and possession and received a sum of R.1.6 lac from non-petitioner No. 2. As such, the petitioner’s fraudulent and dishonest intention since inception is apparent. Therefore, the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners do not come to their rescue because the facts on record prima facie suggest that the matter is not of a pure civil nature, rather the facts on record, discussed above, prima facie indulge the petitioners in the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC. 11.In this view of the matter, the learned trial Court was justified in framing the charges against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC and issuing process. I do not find any illegality, error or perversity in the order impugned requiring interference under revisional jurisdiction. 12. Consequently, the revision petition lacks merit and it is dismissed accordingly. The stay petition also stands dismissed