( 1 ) THE 1st defendant in O. S. No. 585 of 1996 on the file of the learned principal Junior Civil Judge, Khammam is the appellant. The 2nd respondent is his brother. ( 2 ) THE 1st respondent filed the suit against the appellant and the 2nd respondent, for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of Ac. 1. 33 guntas of land in Survey Nos. 95 and 109 of Raghunadhapalem village of Khammam Urban Mandal and District. She pleaded that she is the daughter of one V. Mangaiah through his second wife and that during his life time, he executed a will, dated 13. 09. 1990, bequeathing the suit schedule property in her favour. She pleaded that the appellant and the 2nd respondent, who are the sons of Mangaiah through his fist wife, started interfering with her possession of the property. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the appellant alone. The 2nd respondent remained ex parte. He pleaded that his mother late Ramulamma alone was married to his father-Mangaiah and that the 1st respondent has no concern with their family. He denied any relationship between his family and the 1st respondent. The trial court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 16. 08. 1999. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed A. S. No. 26 of 2002 in the Court of the learned II Additional district Judge (Fast Tract Court-I), Khammam. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal on 28. 01. 2004. Hence, this Second Appeal. ( 4 ) SRI M. R. S. Srinivas, learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the trial Court held that the 1st respondent is the daughter of late Mangaiah, the lower appellate Court reversed the same and still maintained the decree. He further contends that the 1st respondent failed to prove the Will, dated 13. 09. 1990, as required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Indian evidence Act, 1872, and that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is hardly of any use, in this regard. Learned counsel submits that the 1st respondent failed to explain the suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. 09. 1990, as required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Indian evidence Act, 1872, and that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is hardly of any use, in this regard. Learned counsel submits that the 1st respondent failed to explain the suspicious circumstances surrounding the will. ( 5 ) SRI G. L. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that after the death of the mother of the appellant by name ramulamma, Mangaiah married another women by name Ananthamma and through her, he begot four sons and two daughters including the 1st respondent. He submits that the will was executed by Mangaiah, since the 1st respondent alone remained unmarried and necessary provision was made for all his children. He further submits that the attestors of Ex. A. 1 were examined as P. Ws. 2 and 3 and they have categorically stated that they attested the will. Learned counsel contends that hardly there existed any suspicious circumstances, inasmuch as the 1st respondent was none other than the daughter of the executant. ( 6 ) WHILE the 1st respondent claimed to be the daughter of late Mangaiah through his 2nd wife-Smt. Ananthamma, the appellant denied such relationship. The 1st respondent claimed the property, on the strength of a will, Ex. A. 1, and sought for declaration of title and perpetual injunction. The trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is daughter of late Mangaiah through the alleged second wife of Vipperla Ananthamma? 2. Whether the late Mangaiah had executed will Deed on 13. 09. 1990 in favour of the plaintiff. If so, whether same is genuine valid and free from forgery? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as owner and possessor of suit schedule property by way of will dated 13. 09. 1990? ( 7 ) TO prove her case, the 1st respondent deposed as P. W. 1 and examined P. Ws. 2 and 3, the attestors. Ex. A. 1 is the Will Deed and Ex. A. 2 is the Record of rights evidencing the name of Mangaiah. Exs. A. 3 to A. 5 are the voters lists for the year 1995. The appellant deposed as D. W. 1. He did not examine any other witnesses. Exs. B. 1, B. 2 and B. 4 and B. 5 are the documents relating to the land ceiling proceedings. Exs. Exs. A. 3 to A. 5 are the voters lists for the year 1995. The appellant deposed as D. W. 1. He did not examine any other witnesses. Exs. B. 1, B. 2 and B. 4 and B. 5 are the documents relating to the land ceiling proceedings. Exs. B. 6 to B. 9 are the pleadings and the other documents relating to O. S. No. 102 of 1991, and Ex. B. 3 is the registered settlement deed of the year 1971. ( 8 ) ON an appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court answered all the issues in favour of the 1st respondent. In A. S. No. 26 of 2002, the lower appellate Court formulated the points, which are almost on par with the issues framed by the trial Court. It was held that the marriage between mangaiah and the mother of the 1st respondent is not established. On point no. 2, it was held that Ex. A. 1 was validly executed by late Mangaiah. On that basis, the relief of declaration and injunction was sustained. ( 9 ) IN this Second Appeal, the 1st respondent did not seriously challenge the finding of the lower appellate Court as to her relationship with late Mangaiah. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with that question. The only point that falls for consideration in this Second Appeal is as to whether Ex. A. 1 is valid and proved. In this regard, the 1st respondent is under obligation to prove the document, as provided for under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 and 66 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. She is also under obligation to explain the suspicious circumstances, if any, that surround the will. ( 10 ) THE capacity of late Mangaiah to execute the Will, in respect of the suit schedule property, is not in doubt. The controversy is as to whether he has executed it at all. The 1st respondent examined P. Ws. 2 and 3, the attestors. Both of them narrated the sequence of events at the time of executing the will. Learned counsel for the appellant also points out that P. Ws. 2 and 3 did not speak about the three ingredients provided for under Section 66 (c) of the succession Act viz. The 1st respondent examined P. Ws. 2 and 3, the attestors. Both of them narrated the sequence of events at the time of executing the will. Learned counsel for the appellant also points out that P. Ws. 2 and 3 did not speak about the three ingredients provided for under Section 66 (c) of the succession Act viz. ,a) that the executor signed the will in their presence; b) that the witness signed the document in the presence of the testator; and c) that the other witnesses have seen the first witness and the testator signing the will. In this context, it is necessary to extract the relevant provision:"66 (c) If the instrument purporting to be a will is written wholly or in part by another person and is not signed by the testator, it shall be deemed to be his will, if it is shown that it was written by the testator s directions or that he recognized it as his will. "apart from this, Section 68 of the Evidence Act mandates that wherever a document is required to be attested in law, it can be proved only by examining at least one of the attesting witnesses, if alive. P. W. 2 categorically stated that he attested the will, after it was signed by late Mangaiah. It was strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that such a statement would not constitute the proof under Section 68 (c) of the Indian succession Act. But, it needs to be seen that nothing was elicited from this witness in the cross-examination on any of the aspects referred to above. When the witness had consciously used the expression attestation in his evidence, he is presumed to have known all the ingredients of attestation. If the appellant entertained any doubt in this regard, it was for him to put necessary suggestion in his cross-examination. At any rate, P. W. 3 has categorically narrated the events, such as his seeing the testator signing the will and his subscribing the signature on the Will as attestor. He has also spoken to the presence of P. W. 2. The limited objection, which the appellant had, as regards the evidence of P. W. 2, is not available vis--vis the deposition of P. W. 3. He has also spoken to the presence of P. W. 2. The limited objection, which the appellant had, as regards the evidence of P. W. 2, is not available vis--vis the deposition of P. W. 3. Even if the evidence of P. W. 2 is ignored, that of P. W. 3 would be sufficient under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Hence, the Will can be safely taken to have been proved. ( 11 ) NOW, remains the question as to whether there existed any suspicious circumstances and whether they were properly explained. A perusal of Ex. A. 1 discloses that the executant extensively referred to his kinship with the respondent. It recites that the 1st respondent is the daughter of the executant through his second wife-Ananthamma and that he made the arrangement under the will in favour of the 1st respondent, since she alone was yet to be married. If these recitals are taken as true, and there is no reason as to why they should not be so taken, there hardly exists any suspicious circumstances. Exclusion of natural descendants is recognized as one of the suspicious circumstances. Even if there is any doubt as to the legality of marriage of Ananthamma with mangaiah, the latter recognized his obligation towards the 1st respondent. Therefore, it cannot be said that there exists any extraordinary or suspicious circumstances. Ex. A. 1 is self explanatory and discloses the circumstances, under which it came to be executed. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.