Judgment ( 1. ) BY filing this writ under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the revisionary order, dated March 30, 1998 passed by the Commissioner, Commercial Tax (annexure E) in revision No. 147/indore/97/prantiya, which in turn arises out of an assessment order, dated June 30, 1997 (annexure D) in case No. 88/92/1/96/19-1 (Prantiya) passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore. ( 2. ) IN short and in substance, the question that arises for consideration in this case is, whether the petitioner is entitled to claim set-off on the tax-paid goods purchased by the petitioner during the period in question as contemplated in Section 8 (1) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, when petitioner was holding a recognition certificate under Section 16c of the Act? ( 3. ) FACTS of the case are very short and involve no dispute on them. ( 4. ) THE petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of aluminium utensils/circles, etc. They are the registered dealer as defined under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and on its repeal under the Madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act, 1994. They have been granted recognition certificate as per Section 16-C of the Act. It is in force with effect from December 11, 1990. ( 5. ) FOR the period in question, i. e. , April 1,1991 to March 31,1992, the petitioner claimed set-off on certain tax-paid goods purchased by them from other registered dealer as per Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act amounting to Rs. 2,79,493. By assessment order dated July 15, 1994 (annexure C), it was granted. However, later it was revealed that benefit of set-off could not have been granted in the light of recognition certificate issued in favour of the petitioner by the department under Section 19 of the Act. It is in these re-assessment proceedings (Assessment Case No. 88 of 1992), the assessing officer after granting an opportunity to the petitioner withdrew the benefit of set-off granted to the petitioner by his order dated July 15, 1994 (annexure C ). This order was upheld in revision by the Commissioner by passing the impugned order (annexure E), giving rise to its challenge in this writ by the petitioner. Notice of this writ was issued to the petitioner. They are served and duly represented. This order was upheld in revision by the Commissioner by passing the impugned order (annexure E), giving rise to its challenge in this writ by the petitioner. Notice of this writ was issued to the petitioner. They are served and duly represented. Return is filed defending the impugned order. ( 6. ) HEARD Shri G. M. Chafekar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri C. R. Pan-cholia for the petitioner and Shri Umesh Gajankush, learned Government Advocate, for the respondents. ( 7. ) IN substance, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the recognition certificate as contemplated under Section 16-C was granted on September 5, 1992, i. e. , much subsequent to the period in question (April 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992) and hence, petitioner was eligible to claim set-off during that period. In other words, the submission was that if at the time of claiming set-off, the eligibility certificate was not issued by the department (see the dates) then the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of set-off in respect of the tax-paid goods purchased by them. In reply, learned Counsel for the State while defending the impugned orders contended that since the certificate was admittedly in force for the period in question though issued at a later date, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any benefit of set-off. ( 8. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, I find no merit in this writ. As a consequence, the petition fails and is dismissed. ( 9. ) IT is not in dispute that the period mentioned in the recognition certificate is with effect from December 11, 1990. In other words, the benefit of recognition certificate is extended to the petitioner with effect from December 11,1990. In these circumstances, when petitioner is enjoying the benefits, wherever they are available, with effect from December 11, 1990, then it necessarily follows that the concession of set-off which is not available to those holding the certificate should also be incurred by the petitioner. In other words, the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. If they are enjoying the benefits flowing from the certificate with effect from December 11,1990 in all other matters then they are liable to forgo the benefits which certificate holders are not entitled to claim during the period mentioned in the certificate. In other words, the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. If they are enjoying the benefits flowing from the certificate with effect from December 11,1990 in all other matters then they are liable to forgo the benefits which certificate holders are not entitled to claim during the period mentioned in the certificate. It is not the case of the petitioner that since the certificate was issued on September 5, 1992 though making it applicable retrospectively with effect from December 11, 1990 they claimed all benefits flowing from the certificate only with effect from September 5, 1992 onwards and not with effect from December 11, 1990. On the other hand, the petitioner did claim benefits arising out of the grant of the certificate with effect from December 11, 1990 itself. ( 10. ) IN my opinion, therefore, when the petitioner claimed set-off, i. e. , for the period when the petitioner claimed set-off under Section 8 (1) in respect of tax-paid goods, the recognition certificate was holding the field and hence that disentitled the petitioner to enjoy the benefit of set-off. It is not the case of petitioner that notwithstanding the recognition certificate issued in favour of the petitioner under Section 16-C of the Act for the period in question or independent of the certificate, the petitioner was eligible to claim set-off. In other words, the petitioner did not come to the court with this plea that irrespective of the certificate whether granted earlier or later, the petitioner had the right to claim set-off. I, therefore, need not examine this plea. ( 11. ) ACCORDINGLY and in view of aforesaid discussion, it is of hardly any consequence that the certificate in question was issued at a later date and hence that made the petitioner entitled to claim the benefit of set-off. In such cases, what is significant is the period mentioned in the certificate. If, therefore, it is found that set-off was claimed during the period when certificate was in force, the same has to be withdrawn by holding that it could not have been allowed. ( 12. ) IN view of foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the writ. It is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.