ORDER 1. WP No. 13599/2000 is filed by the West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., seeking for a writ of declaration declaring that Regulation 40 of the ESI (General) Regulations, 1950, framed by the Employees State Insurance Corporation as ultra vires of the Act and to declare the same as null and void. Petitioner also seeks for refund of a sum of Rs. 10,31,344.40, which is erroneously contributed by the petitioner on behalf of its employees. 2. Facts in brief are as under : Petitioner-Mill is engaged in the manufacture of paper and paper products. It has employed about 4000 employees. The Mills is liable to pay contribution under the provisions of the ESI Act for the benefit of their employees. The petitioner mill entered into settlement with its employees union, whereby the petitioner is required to pay the production bonus to its employees at the specified rates, linked with the production. Petitioner treated the production bonus and attendance bonus as not wages. In view of this about 1361 employees out of the 3058 employees got covered under the provisions of the ESI Act and about Rs.10,31,344.40 was paid as contributions. In fact the production bonus and attendance bonus which are payable by the petitioner in view of the settlement arrived between the petitioner mill and the union, are formed part of the wages. Petitioner mill on coming to know of this erroneous contribution made an application for refund. The same was rejected. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application under Sec. 75 of the ESI Act seeking for refund of the excess contribution. Objections were filed. After hearing, the Court has chosen to reject the petition. The said rejection is challenged by way of an appeal in MFA No. 3879/99. The above referred facts are applicable to this appeal as well. 3. Notice was issued and respondents have entered appearance. A detailed statement of objections is filed opposing the appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner would invite our attention to Sec. 97 of the ESI Act and Art. 14 of the Constitution of India to say that the Regulation 40 requires to be declared as null and void. He would say that erroneous payment has to be refunded as otherwise it would amount to enrichment. 6. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner would invite our attention to Sec. 97 of the ESI Act and Art. 14 of the Constitution of India to say that the Regulation 40 requires to be declared as null and void. He would say that erroneous payment has to be refunded as otherwise it would amount to enrichment. 6. Per contra, Smt. Geetha, learned Standing counsel for the Corporation would say that Regulation 40 has been considered by several Courts. She further says that Regulation 40 has to be declared as a valid piece of legislation. She says that the appeal has to be rejected. 7. In the light of submission of the learned counsel for the parties, we have carefully perused the material on record. Validity of Regulation 40. 8. Employees State Insurance Act is a beneficial piece of social legislation in the interest of labour in factories at the first instance and with power to extend to other establishments. Provisions of the Act will have to be construed with that end in view to promote the scheme and avoid the mischief (Ref. 1974 (4) SCC 365 ) : ( AIR 1974 SC 759 ). 9. Regulation 40 deals with refund of contribution erroneously paid. Regulation 40(2) states where any contribution has been paid by a person at a rate higher than that at which it was payable the excess of the amount so paid over the amount payable may be refunded without interest by the Corporation to that person, if application to that effect is made before the commencement of the benefit period corresponding to the contribution period in which such contribution was paid. Admittedly, in the case on hand, application was not made in terms of Regn. 40(2) of the Act. It was for this reason, the petitioner has chosen to challenge Regulation 40 by way of writ petition. There is a reference in Regn. 40 to limitation with regard to an application being made before the commencement of the benefit period corresponding to the contribution period in which such contribution was paid. This condition has some relevance in the light of the scheme of the Act itself. 10. It is to be seen that the scheme under the Act for insuring the workmen for conferring on them benefits in case of accident, disablement, sickness, maternity etc., is distinct from the contract of insurance in general. This condition has some relevance in the light of the scheme of the Act itself. 10. It is to be seen that the scheme under the Act for insuring the workmen for conferring on them benefits in case of accident, disablement, sickness, maternity etc., is distinct from the contract of insurance in general. Under the Act, the scheme is more akin to group insurance. The contribution paid entitles workman insured to the benefit under the Act. However, he does not get any part of contribution back if during the benefit period, he does not qualify for any of the benefits. The contribution made by him and by his employer is credited to the insurance fund created under the Act and it becomes available for others or for himself, during other benefit periods, if he continues in employment. What is more, there is no relation between contribution made and the benefit availed of. The contribution is uniform for all workmen and is a percentage of the wages earned by them. It has no relation to the risks against which the workman stands statutorily insured. It is for this reason that the Act envisages automatic obligation to pay the contribution once the factory or the establishment is covered by the Act, and the obligation to pay the contribution commences from the date of the application of the Act to such factory or establishment. The obligation to make contribution does not depend upon whether the particular employee or employees cease to be employee/employees after the contribution period and the benefit period expire. (Ref. AIR 1993 SC 2655 ). This being the scheme in term of the Act there is nothing wrong in the regulation providing for an embargo in rejecting the claim being made before commencement of the benefit period corresponding to the contribution period in which contribution was paid. The amount collected by way of contribution is not identifiable to an employee but it is identifiable to the fund in terms of the scheme. Hence, we do not find any unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the light of the laudable object in terms of the Act. Therefore we are unable to accept the argument that the condition in terms of Regn. 40(2) is arbitrary or irrelevant. The contribution period and the benefit period has some relevance with regard to the contribution amount in terms of the scheme itself. Therefore we are unable to accept the argument that the condition in terms of Regn. 40(2) is arbitrary or irrelevant. The contribution period and the benefit period has some relevance with regard to the contribution amount in terms of the scheme itself. Taking into consideration the object of the scheme in terms of the Act, we are firmly of the view that Regn. 40(2) cannot be declared to be in any way arbitrary in terms of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 11. At this stage, we have to notice a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1993 SC 2655 . The Supreme Court in the said case as referred to earlier has noticed the object of the scheme and accepted the plea of the corporation. 12. We also see that the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the same plea of refund in terms of Kerala Fisherman Welfare Fund Act, 1985. The Supreme Court in (2002) (2) SCC 459 : ( AIR 2002 SC 973 ) has noticed the object of the scheme and thereafter has chosen to reject the request for the refund. 13. A Division Bench of this Court has considered the same argument with regard to refund in the case of M/s. Rajashree Cements v. ESI (ILR 2004 Kar 2460) : (2004 AIR Kant HCR 1863) and has noticed in para 7 that the amount contributed by the Management has been transferred to the fund and even made use of for the benefit of the employees covered by the scheme. No application in the manner prescribed having been filed within the time permissible under Regulation 40 for refund, prayer for refund was rightly declined by the Courts below. 14. In the light of the facts of this case and in the light of the laudable object of the scheme with reference to the benefit period and the contribution period, we are unable to accept the unsustainable argument in terms of the pleadings. 15. In so far as the argument with regard to Sec. 97 is concerned, we are afraid that this argument is not available to the petitioner. Section 97 provides for a power to the Corporation to make regulations with regard to various matters pertaining to the working of the scheme. 15. In so far as the argument with regard to Sec. 97 is concerned, we are afraid that this argument is not available to the petitioner. Section 97 provides for a power to the Corporation to make regulations with regard to various matters pertaining to the working of the scheme. A careful reading of Sec. 97 would show that the prescription in terms of Regulation 40 with regard to erroneous payment cannot be said to be outside the power of the Corporation to make regulations. This argument is rejected. 16. MFA No. 3879/99 is filed seeking for refund by way of application. Learned Judge has noticed Regulation 40 and thereafter he has chosen to reject the claim. As we mentioned earlier a Division Bench of this Court in somewhat same or similar circumstances, has chosen to reject the claim in ILR 2004 Kar 2460 : (2004 AIR Kant HCR 1863) (Rajashri Cements v. ESI Corporation). In the given facts and circumstances and in the light of the judgment of this Court, it cannot be said that the ESI Court has committed any error whatsoever in rejecting the application. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration in terms of Sec. 82 of the ESI Act. 17. In the result, we dismiss both the writ petition No. 13599/2000 and the MFA No. 3879/1999. No costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.