Judgment :- The appellant is the first defendant in O.S.No.130 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Chidambaram. The appellant succeeded his case before the trial Court in the suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit lane, but lost his case before the first appellate Court. 2. The parties are referred to as per their rankings in the suit. 3. The first respondent as plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit lane measuring about 4 feet north-south and 160 feet east-west and shown as "C D E F" in the plaint plan in Natham R.S.No.24/9A/1A/1 in Rettai Agraharam village. 4. The case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint is as follows:- The suit property, which is a vacant site shown as "C D E F" in the plaint plan, absolutely belongs to the plaintiff-Joint Hindu Family, and it is the southern part of the entire property shown as "A B C D", which was originally purchased by Parthasarathy Pillai as per sale deed dated 15.3.1937 and as such Parthasarathy Pillai became the owner of 52 feet north-south and was in enjoyment and possession. The suit vacant site is specifically mentioned in the sale deed dated 15.3.1937 and it was kept vacant for using it as a lane. On the death of Parthasarathy Pillai, his son Vijayarangam became entitled to the entire property including the suit property and on the death of Vijayarangam, the joint family consisting of the plaintiff as Manager became entitled to the said property. The other co-parceners are the brothers of the plaintiff, viz., Pandarinathan and Yayathirajan. The house to the south of the suit property is owned by Ramalingam Pillai and his property situate only to the south of "D C" and he has no title to the suit property. The first defendant claims that he purchased the suit property from the legal representatives of Ramalingam Pillai. The plaintiff also prescribed title to the suit property by having been in adverse possession for more than 43 years and kept under lock and key of the plaintiff. On 17.3.1982, the first defendant and her husband requested the plaintiff to open the vacant site for the purpose of putting construction and attempted to trespass. The plaintiff also prescribed title to the suit property by having been in adverse possession for more than 43 years and kept under lock and key of the plaintiff. On 17.3.1982, the first defendant and her husband requested the plaintiff to open the vacant site for the purpose of putting construction and attempted to trespass. The first defendant had leased the house bearing door No.24 to the second defendant and so, the second defendant also impleaded for effective adjudication. Since both the defendants tried to trespass into the suit property, the suit is filed. 5. The appellant as first defendant in the suit resisted the suit in the written statement denying the title of the suit property to the plaintiff and that the entire property including the suit vacant site kept for the purpose of using as lane was purchased by Parthasarathy Pillai as per sale deed dated 15.3.1937. It is also denied that Parthasarathy Pillai's vendor had title to 52 feet North-South and more particularly the portion shown as "C D E F" in the plaint plan. The plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title were never in possession of the suit lane. The house on the south of the suit property belongs to Ramalingam Pillai bearing door No.24 as his ancestral property and he had a lane on the north of his tiled house for access to the garden portion of door No.24 from the street, situated on the west. The entrance of the lane on the street side has an iron gate under the lock and key of Ramalingam Pillai. The northern mother wall of door No.24 is protected by eves (thiu) extended towards north nearly 3-1/2 feet to the entire length of the lane. The rain water is drained through the suit property. The tiled house of the plaintiff bearing door No.23 has its southern mother wall. The superstructure covering the southern main wall of door No.23 does not extend beyond the southern mother wall of that house, throughout the entire east-west length of the lane. The southern side eves of door No.23 stop with the southern main wall of that house and a brick-built construction called "Koranaas" (bfhueh!;) is raised to the entire east-west length from the southern main wall to see that the water does not fall into the suit lane from door No.23. The southern side eves of door No.23 stop with the southern main wall of that house and a brick-built construction called "Koranaas" (bfhueh!;) is raised to the entire east-west length from the southern main wall to see that the water does not fall into the suit lane from door No.23. The plaintiff has extended his varai towards south beyond the lane portion on the eastern side. The house bearing door No.24 was constructed even prior to the year 1919, whereas door No.23 was constructed only in 1937. The suit property is only a lane about 4-1/2 feet in breadth and not vacant site as claimed by the plaintiff as enjoyed by him and his predecessors-in-title as vacant site. The lane is intended for the purpose of ingress and egress to the garden portion of door No.24. Ramalingam Pillai and his predecessors have also prescribed title to the suit lane situate north of door No.24. It is denied that the first defendant attempted to trespass into the suit property. The plaintiff recently extended the varai over his southern mother wall to the east of the lane to a larger extent. The first defendant and his predecessors have been in enjoyment of the suit lane for more than 60 years and as such, prescribed title by adverse possession. The plaint plan is incorrect. 6. The second defendant, who is the tenant under the first defendant has filed written statement separately supporting the case of the first defendant. 7. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 besides one Damodhara Kannan as P.W.2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-6. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and one Somasundaram Pillai as D.W.2 and marked Exs.B-1 to B-6. The reports and rough plans of the advocate-commissioner have been marked as Exs.C-1 to C-4. The trial Court in considering such evidence let in on either side in refusing to accept the case of the plaintiff and finding that the plaintiff has no title to the suit property and the plaintiff's predecessors have also not prescribed title by adverse possession and instead it is only the first defendant and his predecessors prescribed title by adverse possession, in view of such findings, ultimately dismissed the suit. The judgment was challenged in the first Appeal. The judgment was challenged in the first Appeal. The first Appellate Court, viz., Sub Court, Chidambaram by considering the additional documents marked as Exs.A-7 to A-9 received as per order in I.A.No.243 of 1993 by allowing the appeal, decreed the suit. The first defendant is challenging the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court in this appeal. 8. The following substantial questions of law have been framed at the time of admission of this Second Appeal:- (1) Is the lower appellate Court correct in receiving the additional evidence which has been marked as Exs.A-7 to A-9 without assigning any reason for the same and if so, whether Order 41 Rules 27 to 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not directly hit the finding of the lower appellate Court? (2) Whether the Court below was correct in reversing the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge by having considered and marked the documents without giving any opportunity to the concerned parties to cross-examine and produce the rebuttal evidence? 9. Heard the learned counsel for appellant/first defendant and the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant by referring to the judgment of the trial Court and also the judgment of the first appellate Court and in taking through the Exhibits and oral evidence of both parties argued that the plaintiff has not proved the title to the suit property as he had perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession, which according to the first defendant is only a lane used for the purpose of ingress and egress to reach the garden of the first defendant bearing door No.24 from the street. With regard to the order of the first appellate Court in I.A.No.243 of 1993 to receive the additional documents which have been marked as Exs.A-7 to A-9, the learned counsel submitted that the order has been passed without assigning any reason and against the principles enunciated under Order 41 Rules 27 to 29 C.P.C. The learned counsel further submitted that the first appellant has proved his case that the suit property is only lane which served as ingress and egress to reach the garden portion of the first defendant's house bearing door No.24 from the street and since the first defendant and his predecessors have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit lane for more than 60 years, the first defendant also perfected title to the suit lane by adverse possession. The learned counsel by referring the reports and plans of the advocate-commissioner Exs.C-1 to C-4 also argued that the physical features, such as the eves from the house of the first defendant almost to the entire length of the suit lane about 3-1/2 feet and the fact that the northern mother wall of the first defendant's house bearing door No.24 is protected by such eves, support the case of the first defendant that it is the first defendant, who is entitled to the suit lane. The learned counsel in support of his argument relied on the following decisions:- (1) Arjan Singh – vs. - Kartar Singh & others reported in A.I.R.(38)1951 Supreme Court 193, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:- "The discretion given to the appellate Court by Order 41, Rule 27 to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in that rule. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion, and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored and the case decided as if it is non-existent." (2) R.C.R. Institution – vs. - State reported in A.I.R. 1976 Karnataka 75 in which, since the certified copy sought to be admitted in evidence was obtained in 1915 and since there is no explanation as to why it was not produced in the trial Court, and the application filed to receive the document being highly belated, it is held that it is an attempt to fill up a lacuna. (3) City Improvement Trust, Bangalore – vs. - H.Narayanaiah reported in A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2403, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court remitted the matter to the High Court in admitting evidence without recording reasons why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary nor giving any opportunity to the party affected to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence. 11. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted that inasmuch as the documents have been ordered to be received in I.A.No.243 of 1993 by the first appellate Court, viz., Exs.A-7 to A-9 and mainly relying on the said documents, the first appellate Court came to a conclusion that even before the first defendant's house bearing door No.24 was constructed, it is only the house bearing door Nos.22 and 23 of the plaintiff were constructed and also arrived at the conclusion that the suit property exclusively belongs to the plaintiff. It is further argued by the learned counsel that relying on the documents Exs.A-7 to A-9 and the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff, it has been decided by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession. It is further argued by the learned counsel that relying on the documents Exs.A-7 to A-9 and the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff, it has been decided by the first appellate Court that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession. In support of the contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision in Kamala Ranjan – vs. - Baijnath reported in A.I.R.(38) 1951 Supreme Court 1, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- "Where the appeal Court allows the additional evidence to be given in order to clear up certain matter and for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision on the point, the matter is fully covered by Order 41, Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code, and no objection can be taken to the course adopted by the appellate Court in second appeal as there is no reason to interfere in the exercise of the Court's discretion." 12. The plaintiff claims that he is the owner of the suit property which according to him is only a vacant site and measuring 4 feet north-south and 160 feet east-west in Natham R.S.No.24/9A/1A/1 in Rettai Agraharam village and according to him, his grandfather Parthasarathy Pillai became the owner of the property, in view of the purchase as per sale deed Ex.A-1 dated 15.3.1937, in which the suit vacant site is specifically mentioned, and that it was kept vacant for using it as lane and on the death of Parthasarathy Pillai, his only son Vijayarangam, who is the father of the plaintiff became entitled to the property inclusive of the suit property and on the death of Vijayarangam, the joint family consisting of the plaintiff and his brothers, viz., Pandarinathan and Yayathirajan have become owners of the joint family property and the plaintiff is the manager. Therefore, the definite case is set out in the plaint claiming right in the suit property in view of the purchase under the sale deed Ex.A-1 by the grandfather of the plaintiff, viz., Parthasarathy Pillai. 13. As per sale deed Ex.A-1, Parthasarathy Pillai, the grandfather of the plaintiff purchased north-south 52 feet and east-west 160 feet including northern mother wall and southern mother wall and the southern boundary is mentioned as north of Ramalingam Pillai's house and thottam. 13. As per sale deed Ex.A-1, Parthasarathy Pillai, the grandfather of the plaintiff purchased north-south 52 feet and east-west 160 feet including northern mother wall and southern mother wall and the southern boundary is mentioned as north of Ramalingam Pillai's house and thottam. Therefore, it is clear that on the south of the property purchased under Ex.A-1, the house and thottam belonged to one Ramalingam Pillai, who is the father-in-law of the first defendant's vendor Vasanthi Ammal, were situated. The sale deed, as per which the first defendant purchased, is Ex.B-6 dated 7.2.1982. As per sale deed Ex.B-6, the first defendant purchased 8-1/2 cents in Grama Natham R.S.No.24/9A1A1 measuring north-south 26 feet, east-west 142 feet vacant site with tiled house including northern lane. The northern lane is referred to as the house and thottam of the plaintiff Krishnamoorthy vagairah. In the sale deed Ex.B-6, it is mentioned that the vendor, viz., Vasanthi Ammal and her minor son Suvethakumar through guardian mother became entitled to the property conveyed as per the partition. 14. The first defendant as D.W.1 in his evidence has stated that including the suit lane, he is entitled to north-south 28 feet and the tiled house bearing door No.24 was constructed 100 years before. It is admitted by him that there is no reference about the suit lane in the parent document Ex.B-1, Sale Certificate dated 17.1.1915 issued by the Court. The property sold in Court auction is the property conveyed under the sale deed Ex.B-5 dated 25.10.1911. 15. The property purchased by the first defendant under Ex.B-6 dated 7.2.1982, was mortgaged to Muthukumara Pillai, husband of the vendor Vasanthi Ammal by the previous owner Thirukameswara Iyar as per mortgage deed Ex.A-6 dated 13.3.1910. In Ex.A-6, the north-south measurement is given as 24 feet. Therefore, it is clear that only the house bearing door No.24 alone was mortgaged under Ex.A-6 leaving the suit property of 4 feet in breadth. If really Thirukameswara Iyar was the owner of the southern property measuring north-south 28 feet, certainly, the entire said property could have been mortgaged under Ex.A-6. Therefore, it is clear that only the house bearing door No.24 alone was mortgaged under Ex.A-6 leaving the suit property of 4 feet in breadth. If really Thirukameswara Iyar was the owner of the southern property measuring north-south 28 feet, certainly, the entire said property could have been mortgaged under Ex.A-6. Inasmuch as in the mortgage deed Ex.A-6, the north-south measurement is given as 24 feet, it clinches the issue that the first defendant is not the owner of the suit property, which, according to the plaintiff, is vacant site, whereas according to the first defendant, is the lane to reach the thottam on the eastern side from the street. The advocate-commissioner has found the north-south measurement as 24 feet as also mentioned in the mortgage deed Ex.A-6. But, however, the first defendant purchased under Ex.B-6 as if the north-south measurement is 26 feet including the lane. Though it is claimed in the sale deed Ex.B-6 that the vendor Vasanthi Ammal became entitled to properties as per partition, the said document has not been filed to accept the case of the first defendant that she is entitled to the suit lane in view of the purchase as per the sale deed Ex.B-6 mentioning north-south measurement as 26 feet including the suit lane. It is not explained as to why the said document has not been filed. 16. The property, sold in the Court auction, as per Sale Certificate Ex.B-1 dated 17.1.1915, is the property of Thirukameswara Iyer, which is the house bearing door No.24 owned by the first defendant in view of the purchase under the sale deed Ex.B-6. No doubt, in the Sale Certificate Ex.B-1 dated 17.1.1915, the north-south measurement is mentioned as 28 feet and the same property was sold under sale deed Ex.B-5 dated 25.10.1911 by Thirukameswara Iyer to Krishnasamy Iyyangar. It is not known as to how after such sale under Ex.B-5, again the same property of Thirukameswara Iyer was brought in the Court auction sale, in which the property was purchased by the Court auction purchaser Chinnathambi. But as regards the ownership of southern house bearing door No.24 to the first defendant in view of the purchase under sale deed Ex.B-6 is not in dispute. Therefore, the north-south measurement mentioned in Exs.B-5 and B-1 as 28 feet cannot be taken as correct measurement. But as regards the ownership of southern house bearing door No.24 to the first defendant in view of the purchase under sale deed Ex.B-6 is not in dispute. Therefore, the north-south measurement mentioned in Exs.B-5 and B-1 as 28 feet cannot be taken as correct measurement. If the Sale Certificate Ex.B-1 and the sale deed Ex.B-5 have dealt with the suit property, the same north-south measurement should have been recited in the sale deed Ex.B-6. But, however, it is mentioned as 26 feet including the lane for the first time in the year 1982. Merely because, the northern mother wall of house bearing door No.24 is protected by eves(thiu) and extended towards north 3-1/2 feet to the entire length of the lane and the rain water is drained through the suit property, it cannot be said that the first defendant is entitled to the suit lane. It is also the case of the first defendant that her house was constructed 90 years before whereas the house of the plaintiff was constructed 50 years before. If that be so, it does not stand to reason as to why the house bearing door No.24 was constructed excluding the suit lane and the supporting wall was also put up leaving the suit lane. The advocate-commissioner has found the north-south measurement of the plaintiff house as 45-6½ feet and the breadth of the suit lane is 3.6 feet and if both is added it comes to 49 feet. The measurement of the property purchased by the plaintiff under Ex.A-1 is north-south 52 feet. In the field map prepared on 17.5.1920 issued by the Kattumannarkoil Town Panchayat, it is shown that Muthukumara Pillai, husband of Vasanthi Ammal, who is the vendor of the first defendant is shown as owning north-south 24 feet and Rangasamy Iyyengar north of that property as owning two houses north-south measurement 29 feet and also 21 feet. The vendor under Ex.A-1 is Rengacharry Iyyengar, from whom Parthasarathy Pillai, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff purchased the property. The name could have been mentioned as Rangasamy Iyyengar in the Field Map Ex.P-8 instead of Rangacharry Iyyengar. Therefore, it is clear, that it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to the suit property. 17. The vendor under Ex.A-1 is Rengacharry Iyyengar, from whom Parthasarathy Pillai, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff purchased the property. The name could have been mentioned as Rangasamy Iyyengar in the Field Map Ex.P-8 instead of Rangacharry Iyyengar. Therefore, it is clear, that it is only the plaintiff who is entitled to the suit property. 17. The first appellate Court as per order in I.A.No.243 of 1993 received the documents Exs.A-7 to A-9 inasmuch as the said documents are necessary to decide the issue between the parties. Therefore, such discretion exercised by the first appellate Court in receiving the said documents cannot be interfered with. 18. The first defendant has not proved his title to the suit property by adverse possession. The first appellate Court considering all these aspects has rightly decided and recorded finding that it is only the plaintiff, who has got title to the suit property. 19. In the light of the discussions made above, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. The judgment dated 9.3.1994 in A.S.No.8 of 1993 by the Sub Court, Chidambaram, is confirmed.