Judgment P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.—The appellant along with seven others were charged by the Additional Sessions Judge, Madhubani under Section 396 IPC for committing dacoity on the night of 28.5.1994 in the course of which one of them fired at and killed one of the inmates of the house, namely, Rajendra Thakur. Four were acquitted by the trial Court and on appeal by the remaining four accused, three were acquitted by the High Court. The appellant alone was convicted under Section 396 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. It appears that the appellant has so far undergone imprisonment for about six years. 2. PW1 - a neighbor, PW3— the minor daughter of the deceased, PW4 — the brother of the deceased who was also injured by the marauders and PW5 — the sister-in-law of the deceased are the eye-witnesses. Though the information in regard to the incident was supposed to have been conveyed to the police station by PW1, the FIR was not recorded on that basis. However, the police arrived at the scene at about 2 a.m. and then recorded the statement of PW5 i.e. the sister-in-law of the deceased, which was treated as First Information Report. 3. According to the statement of PW5 as incorporated in the FIR, at about 11 p.m., she and other inmates of the house were sleeping and on hearing the voice of his elder brother — PW4 who was sleeping beyond the main doorway, Rajendra Thakur — the deceased opened the main door and the informant — PW5 and PW3 also went behind him. She saw four persons in full pants and half shirts standing at the gate and another wearing a black full pant and full shirt with checks. Soon after Rajendra Thakur opened the door, the person wearing the black full pant fired at him as a result of which Rajendra Thakur collapsed instantaneously. Thereafter, she beseeched the miscreants not to harm and to take away whatever articles they wanted. Still, they inflicted injuries with dagger on the body of Rajendra Thakur even after he fell down and one of them also attacked her with a lathi. They also injured her husband Laxman Thakur — PW4 with lathi and rod as a result of which he became unconscious. Four/Five dacoits entered the house and went on a looting spree for about 15 minutes. They also injured her husband Laxman Thakur — PW4 with lathi and rod as a result of which he became unconscious. Four/Five dacoits entered the house and went on a looting spree for about 15 minutes. On the alarm raised by the villagers, dacoits who were 20 in number fled away with looted articles. Rajendra Thakur succumbed to the injuries then and there. She stated that the details of looted articles will be furnished by the wife of Rajendra Thakur and other family members who had gone to the hospital. According to her, the dacoits were young men wearing dhothi, full pant, half shirt etc. and they had fire arms, dagger, lathi and torches with them and were speaking Hindi and Mithili languages. She also stated that her husband would disclose the identity of the dacoits on coming to senses and her other family members will identify the looted articles if recovered. Informant also stated that three dacoits have covered their faces with ‘galmocha’. The statement was recorded in the presence of her son-in-law and sambandhi. 4. PW10 is the main investigating officer. He stated that after coming to know of the dacoity, he went to the place of occurrence with armed police at about 12.15 a.m. He noticed the dead body of Rajendra Thakur and he could not record the statement of Laxman Thakur as he was senseless and therefore he recorded the statement of the wife of Laxman Thakur — PW5. He found cash box and wooden almirah in broken condition and the articles therein lying helter-skelter. He also found the Godrej almirah in broken condition and found the articles therein on the ground in a disturbed condition. He held the inquest over the dead body and took steps to have the postmortem conducted. The injured Laxman Thakur — PW4 was sent to hospital. On the basis of information collected during investigation, he arrested four accused, the appellant being one of them. Then he took steps to have the test identification parade done by the judicial Magistrate. He submitted the charge-sheet against the four persons while showing others as absconders. The further investigation was handed over to his successor after his retirement. 5. The factum of homicidal death of the deceased as a result of firing is not in dispute. It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant herein was a known person. He submitted the charge-sheet against the four persons while showing others as absconders. The further investigation was handed over to his successor after his retirement. 5. The factum of homicidal death of the deceased as a result of firing is not in dispute. It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant herein was a known person. The whole case of the prosecution rests on the credibility of identification, said to have been made by the four witnesses in the course of test identification parade held by the Magistrate. In the case of the appellant and three others, the identification parade was held after seven weeks i.e. on 19.7.1994 and in the case of others it was held much later i.e. after 6 to 10 months. In view of the long time gap, the High Court was not inclined to believe the version as regards the identification of three appellants before it and therefore they were acquitted. As far as the appellant is concerned, the High Court agreeing with the trial Court relied on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses 1, 3 & 4 and held that the identification of appellant could not be doubted. 6. One important fact to be noticed at this juncture is that PWs 1 to 4 claimed in the course of their evidence that they identified the three accused (who were acquitted by the trial Court itself) at the time of occurrence because they belonged to the same village but the Investigating Officer maintained that none of the names of the accused were disclosed by the witnesses whom he examined. A comment was made that the I.O. did not record the statements properly with a view to help the accused but the trial Court did not accept this plea. The learned trial Judge commented that the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 that they could identify the three accused (other than the appellant) was “either an improvement or an embellishment and perhaps the aforesaid persons have been made accused due to previous enmity and the groups in the village”. The trial Court also referred to the statement of the I.O. — PW10 that initially he was not willing to put the three accused who were the residents of the village in the test identification parade but on the direction of the Addl. S.P., the three accused persons were also presented for identification. 7. The trial Court also referred to the statement of the I.O. — PW10 that initially he was not willing to put the three accused who were the residents of the village in the test identification parade but on the direction of the Addl. S.P., the three accused persons were also presented for identification. 7. Another fact to be noticed at this stage is that there are discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses regarding the number of persons holding the gun. The Judicial Magistrate examined as PW6 stated that PW1 pointed out to him that the appellant Umesh Kamat was one of those having gun in his hand. The Magistrate also stated that in the second identification parade, PW1 identified the suspect person Dinesh Mohato as the person who had fired the shot on the deceased. However, PW4 attributed this role to the suspect Rajeshwar Singh who was identified in the third identification parade. As already noticed, both of them were acquitted. However, we need not dilate further on this aspect as it need not be proved by the prosecution that the appellant himself caused death. Section 396 enjoins that if any one of the five or more persons ‘conjointly committing dacoity’ commits murder in the course of the same transaction, every one of the persons who participated in the dacoity will be guilty of the offence of dacoity with murder. Each one of the dacoits is liable to be punished under Section 396 irrespective of the fact whether he is the actual assailant or whether he had shared the common intention to kill anyone. 8. Then there is a controversy on the question whether the number of persons who committed the offence was five or more or less than that. It is pointed out that all the prosecution witnesses spoke about the presence and participation of only four and there was only a vague statement by some of the witnesses that a number of others (nearly 20) were also outside the house. There is also a controversy on the question whether any property was plundered at all, because no details of the properties lost were furnished and no recoveries were made. In the view we are taking as regards the identification, there is no need to delve further into these aspects. There is also a controversy on the question whether any property was plundered at all, because no details of the properties lost were furnished and no recoveries were made. In the view we are taking as regards the identification, there is no need to delve further into these aspects. However, one striking feature of the case which we would like to mention is that investigation was most perfunctory and inadequacies on the part of the prosecution are writ large in the case. 9. We now turn our attention to the most crucial aspect of the case in regard to the identification of the appellant. The High Court relied on the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 4. Neither PW5 — the informant nor PW2 (who identified three other accused) identify the appellant. Hence, their evidence need not detain us. How far the two Courts were justified in acting on their testimony on the point of identification is the question. The appellant, as already noticed, is not a person known to the prosecution witnesses. As far as PW 3 is concerned, she did not identify the appellant in the Court as he was not present. Though the trial Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the four accused including the appellant were identified in the Court by PW3, in fact there was no such identification, as is clear from her deposition at Para 6. As pointed out in Malkhansingh and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2003) 5 SCC 746 ] the identification parades belong to the stage of investigation and they do not constitute substantive evidence. The substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in Court because the facts which establish the identity of the accused persons are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. This Court further observed that failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. Thus, in the absence of identification in the Court at the time of tendering evidence the results of test identification parade will be of little value. With reference to the evidence of PW3, the High Court committed another factual error in observing that PW3 gave a description of the general appearance of the appellant. Therefore the testimony of PW3 does not advance the prosecution case. 10. With reference to the evidence of PW3, the High Court committed another factual error in observing that PW3 gave a description of the general appearance of the appellant. Therefore the testimony of PW3 does not advance the prosecution case. 10. We may now turn our attention to the evidence of the other two witnesses on which the High Court relied. It is seen from the evidence of PW5 that the “dacoits had covered their face with clothes at the time of incident”. PW1 also stated that the dacoits were covering their faces except eyes and nose, with black cloth. PW 4 did not say specifically whether or not the marauders were having masks on their face. Assuming that eyes and nose could be seen to some extent despite the mask, the question is whether any of the crucial witnesses could have identified the unknown masked dacoit. PW1— the neighbour who was living in the adjacent house, came forward with the version that after hearing the noise, he put on his torch and in that light, he saw the dacoits killing Rajendra Thakur at the courtyard of his house. PW1 further stated that thereafter, he went towards the doorway of the house of Rajendra Thakur and when one of the dacoits flashed the torch on him, he noticed Rajendra Thakur lying in an injured condition while one person was attacking him with knife. The witness then claimed in the cross-examination that he had flashed the torch 5 to 7 times at the dacoits from a distance of 20-30 feet. Therefore, his version is that he was able to identify the accused by flashing the torch light now and then. He claimed to have remained at the place of occurrence for 2-3 minutes. It seems to us that the evidence of PW1 is not credible. Leaving apart the probabilities and the natural course of conduct, the version of PW1 is belied by his own version in the cross-examination. While at one point of time he said that he did not get scared, at paragraph 24 of the deposition, he clearly stated as follows: “When I went to the place of occurrence for the first time, then I saw the assault. Accused had also run to assault me. I ran towards my house in order to save my life. I was having an Eveready torch in my hand”. Accused had also run to assault me. I ran towards my house in order to save my life. I was having an Eveready torch in my hand”. In the next para, he stated that after the dacoits left the place of occurrence, he and his family members went to the spot and stayed for about 10-15 minutes. It is unbelievable that he would go and remain at the place of occurrence even for a short-while when the attack and dacoity by armed persons was going on and that he dared to flash the torch light on them more than once in order to get an idea of the miscreants. On his own showing, he was concerned about his own safety. Moreover, this witness stated that there was no electricity or lantern light at the house of the deceased. On the face to it, we need not say anything more to discredit this witness on the aspect of identification of the appellant which was done after a lapse of about seven weeks. As the dacoits covered their faces, we do not think that it was reasonably possible for the witness (PW1) to identify each of the criminals, some of whom including the appellant were unknown to him with the help of the light flashed by him intermittently, even if that version is accepted. The High Court described PW1 as an ‘independent’ and natural witness and believed him without testing the veracity of evidence in the light of various circumstances. 11. Amongst the eye-witnesses, it is the evidence of PW4 which assumes more importance because he was the injured and he would have had the opportunity to notice the offenders from close range and there was a reasonable possibility of PW4 having in his mind the imprint of the image of criminals who attacked him and his brother. PW4 identified the accused in the course of evidence. However, even his evidence does not inspire confidence in ultimate analysis. Contrary to what PW1 stated, he took the stand that there was a lantern at the place (baithak) where he was sleeping. Of course, that lantern which was described as ‘old’ was not even seized by the police. Assuming there was a lantern, in all probability, it would have been quite dim as it is common knowledge that while going to sleep, normally the lamp is kept at the minimum level in rural areas. Of course, that lantern which was described as ‘old’ was not even seized by the police. Assuming there was a lantern, in all probability, it would have been quite dim as it is common knowledge that while going to sleep, normally the lamp is kept at the minimum level in rural areas. PW4 further stated in the chief-examination that he could identify the four dacoits in the light emanating from the torch (flashed by the dacoits) and the moon-light. The High Court observed that it was not a moon-light day as per the admission of some of the witnesses. According to PW4, the appellant herein is not the person who aimed the gun at his brother. The question is whether at that juncture when he was being subjected to blows soon after he woke up and his brother was being simultaneously attacked by the armed miscreants, he would have really observed each one of the four persons with covered faces so keenly and minutely as to identify them by the uncovered portion of the nose and eyes. The answer could only be in the negative. It is pertinent to note that PW4 did not spell out the distinctive features of the appellant (who was admittedly a stranger to him) on the basis of which he could identify him despite the mask. 12. Thus, there is any amount of doubt on the point whether PW4, in the situation in which he was placed, could closely observe the identifiable features of the appellant in mask that too in the glow of dim lantern and in the light emitted by the torches flashed at him or other inmates of the house. This doubt has to be viewed in the context of two things, firstly — there was no recovery of property, nor any other corroborating evidence linking the appellant to the crime. The second aspect is that the trial Court was not inclined to believe the evidence of the identification of three other accused at the same identification parade held on 19.7.1994 and commented that they were falsely implicated. If so, the evidence of PW4 should have been scrutinized with greater caution instead of proceeding on a premise that he was a truthful witness. One more aspect which deserves notice is that PW4 did not have the occasion to observe the dacoits’ operations inside the house. If so, the evidence of PW4 should have been scrutinized with greater caution instead of proceeding on a premise that he was a truthful witness. One more aspect which deserves notice is that PW4 did not have the occasion to observe the dacoits’ operations inside the house. He would have noticed them only initially for a short-while before they entered the house. It is his case that he became unconscious a little later as a result of injury inflicted on him. There are all the various doubts which loom large over the prosecution story of identification of the appellant. Unfortunately, the High Court did not analyze the evidence of prosecution witnesses so as to test the credibility of their evidence in the light of admitted or undeniable facts apparent from the record. 13. The only reason given by the High Court in believing the evidence of PW4 is that the incident must have left a deep impression in his mind, especially in view of the injuries which he and his wife received at the hands of the dacoits and such impression would not be easily fade out within a few weeks or months. This observation of the High Court was based on the hypothesis that PW4 was in a position to clearly notice the physical features and ­appearance of the appellant. There was no warrant for such ready assumption. The trial Court as well as the High Court should not have taken the version of the PW4 on its face value ­without testing its credibility. The relevant aspects adverted to above which give room for reasonable doubt, were not at all noticed by the trial Court or the High Court. Under these circumstances, the interference with the finding recorded by the both the Courts, is called for. 14. We may before parting with the case refer to the decision Tahir Mohammad Vs. State of M.P. [1993 Supp. (2) SCC 697]. That was a case of dacoity by armed men with covered faces. The passengers of a bus were robbed at night time. The prosecution witnesses identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade and in the court too. There were also recoveries of the looted articles from two of the accused. This court set aside the conviction under Section 395 to 397 while holding one of the accused guilty under Section 412 IPC. The prosecution witnesses identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade and in the court too. There were also recoveries of the looted articles from two of the accused. This court set aside the conviction under Section 395 to 397 while holding one of the accused guilty under Section 412 IPC. The main reason which weighed with this court in excluding the evidence of identification was that the accused was placed in the Test Identification Parade with fetters on their legs. This court gave additional reason for not believing the witnesses on the point of identification in the following words: “In the instant case the witnesses who were the inmates of the bus both in their earlier statements and in their oral evidence before the court have not given any description of the dacoits whom they have alleged to have identified in the dacoity, nor have they given any identification marks such as the statute, complexion, height of the accused. Further under the stress and strain of such a serious incident as the present one, it would have not been possible for the witnesses to identify the culprits especially when the culprits were under masks.” The features pointed out by this court in the passage extracted above are also present in the instant case. 15. The appeal is therefore allowed and the conviction and sentence against the appellant is set aside. He shall be set at liberty forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case. Appeal allowed. 29. In the State of Maharashtra as far as lower judiciary is concerned, the original civil jurisdiction is vested in (a) Civil Judge, Junior Division and (b) Civil Judge, Senior Division. Civil Judges, Senior Division, are appointed for almost all the towns and the cities in Maharashtra State excluding Greater Bombay. They have unlimited jurisdiction. The Civil Judges, Junior Division, have got pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs. 25,000/-. The District Courts are having appellate jurisdiction upto Rs. 50,000/- and beyond Rs. 50,000/-, an appeal is provided to the High Court. Civil Judges, Senior Division, in cities like Thane, Pune, Nagpur, Nasik, Aurangabad etc. are having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Only the city civil court which has been established for Greater Bombay was having limited jurisdiction upto Rs. 25,000/-. The District Courts are having appellate jurisdiction upto Rs. 50,000/- and beyond Rs. 50,000/-, an appeal is provided to the High Court. Civil Judges, Senior Division, in cities like Thane, Pune, Nagpur, Nasik, Aurangabad etc. are having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Only the city civil court which has been established for Greater Bombay was having limited jurisdiction upto Rs. 50,000/- and under the 1987 Act, the disparity has been removed by conferring unlimited jurisdiction on city civil court like its counterparts in other cities and towns. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court is enhanced from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- like Civil Judge, Junior Division in other cities. 1987 Act is prospective. Therefore, all the suits filed prior to the implementation of it shall continue to remain with High Court. 30. By the Maharashtra Act 46 of 1977, the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was raised to Rs. 50,000/- in value arising within Greater Bombay. By 1987 Act, Section 3 of the ­Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 was amended deleting the words “not exceeding Rs. 50,000/- in value.” As a result of the same, the City Civil Court could exercise unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Although 1987 Act was passed in 1987, the State Government did not issue notification to enforce it till August 20, 1991 appointing the 1st May, 1992 to be the date on which the provisions of the 1987 Act shall come into force. By virtue of the said notification, all suits and other proceedings of civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay subject to exceptions contained in Section 3 were required to be filed in the City Civil Court at Bombay. This resulted in the position that suits and other civil proceedings of civil nature filed in the High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent would not be received and tried on the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In the Transferred Cases (C) 8-11/89, constitutional validity of 1986 Act i.e. “Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 was challenged as being beyond the competence of the State Legislature and also violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In the Transferred Cases (C) 8-11/89, constitutional validity of 1986 Act i.e. “Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 was challenged as being beyond the competence of the State Legislature and also violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to this Act, it is clearly stated that the Act is “on the lines of Madhya Pradesh Uchaha Nayalaya (Letters Patent Appeals Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981”. Under clause 15, except in certain cases specified in the said clause, appeals lie from judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court. By the Notification dated 27th May, 1987, 1st July, 1987 was notified as appointed day from which the 1986 Act would come into force. 1986 Act was enacted considering it expedient to provide for hearing of writ petitions by Division Bench and for abolition of Letters Patent Appeals in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Section 3 of the 1986 Act reads:— “3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent for the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated the 28th December, 1865 and in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, no appeal, arising from a suit or other proceeding (including the applications referred to in Section 2) instituted or commenced, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of a single Judge of the High Court made on or after the commencement of this Act, whether in the exercise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), all such appeals pending before the High Court, on the date immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued and disposed of by that Court, as if this Act had not been passed.” 31. By virtue of Section 3, appeals from orders of Single Judge to Division Bench from original or appellate jurisdiction were abolished. By virtue of Section 3, appeals from orders of Single Judge to Division Bench from original or appellate jurisdiction were abolished. In this regard, the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners were that the provisions of the Act are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; provisions contained in 1986 Act are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature; that a right of appeal is a substantive right and one appeal on facts of law is a necessary ingredient of a system of justice; one appeal is provided in various State or Central enactments; in case even one appeal is not provided, it would result in serious consequences leading to unreasonable denial of justice. 32. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that right of appeal is not a substantive right; merely because appeal is not provided, an enactment otherwise having legislative competence cannot be rendered invalid; right of appeal is a statutory right which may or may not be provided by a statute. In other words, it is not a constitutional right. 33. Para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 1987 Act reads:— “4. After having sufficient experience of the working of the various Courts in the State and having regard to the increase in the value of property, and in the trading and commercial activities, in all urban areas, Government considers that the administration of justice in Greater Bombay as well as in the mofussil should now follow a uniform pattern. There appears no reason why every litigant in Greater Bombay, whose suit or other proceeding is above a certain pecuniary limit, should be made to go to the High Court in the first instance. The High Court, as in most other States in India, should ordinarily be a Court of Appeal, and the time of its highly paid and specialized Judges should not be consumed in hearing original cases, some of which may be of a small value compared with the enormous increase in the value of property or may be of an unimportant nature.” 34. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 1986 Act, inter alia it is stated thus:— “2. ........ In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 1986 Act, inter alia it is stated thus:— “2. ........ The second part is really in the nature of an exception to the first, inasmuch as it provides, by way of relaxation, appeals under the above clause even in cases of Second Appeals, provided the Judge concerned declares or certifies that the case is fit one for appeal. The appeal provided by way of exception in the second part of the clause has now been barred by section 100-A inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Central Act 104 of 1976 and there is as such no further right of appeal against the decision of a single Judge in Second Appeal with certificate of fitness. But in view of mounting arrears in the High Court, to discourage further litigation in the same Court and to give finality to the decision of the High Court, even though given by a single Judge, it is necessary to abolish appeals in the same Court from judgments or orders of a single Judge, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, on the lines of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeals Samapti) Adhiniyam, 1981 (M.P. XXIX of 1981) enacted in Madhya Pradesh”. 35. In relation to Entry in List I relating to constitution and organization of Supreme Court and High Courts, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constitutional Debate stated thus :— “I do not wish to interrupt the debate, but I would like to point out that we have already passed Articles 295A, 193, 197, 201 and 207 which deal with the constitution of the High Courts. Under those articles, except for pecuniary jurisdiction, the whole of the High Courts are placed, so far as their constitution, organization and territorial jurisdiction are concerned, in the Centre. It seems to me, therefore, that this amendment is out of order.” (emphasis supplied) 36. In considering the legislative competence of Maharashtra State in enacting the 1987 Act and 1986 Act primarily we have to look to the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. List I – Union of List “77. Constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court. 78. List I – Union of List “77. Constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court. 78. Constitution and Organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts; persons entitled to practice before the High Courts. 79. Extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court to, and exclusion of the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any union territory.” “95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction.” List II - State List “3. Administration of justice, Constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts” (prior to 3.1.1977.) “65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list.” List III - (Concurrent List) “11A. Administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts.” “13. Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration.” “46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.” 37. As is clear from the Entries extracted above, Entry 77 in List I deals with the constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 78 relates to only constitution and organization of the High Courts and not with the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts unlike in Entry 77 dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of Supreme Court in addition to constitution and organization. Jurisdiction and powers of High Court are dealt with as a separate topic under Entry 11A of List III, which was in Entry 3 of List II prior to 42nd Constitution Amendment Act. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts falls in ‘administration of justice’, i.e., under Entry 11A in the Concurrent List. Entry 95 of the Union List, Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List refer to special jurisdictions of the courts relating to the matters contained in the respective lists. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts falls in ‘administration of justice’, i.e., under Entry 11A in the Concurrent List. Entry 95 of the Union List, Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List refer to special jurisdictions of the courts relating to the matters contained in the respective lists. Entry 95 deals with the power of Parliament to confer jurisdiction and powers of all the courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in List I. Similarly, Entry 65 of the List II deals with the power of State Legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers on all the courts except the Supreme Court with respect to the matters contained in the said list. Entry 46 in the Concurrent List refers to the power and jurisdiction of all the courts except the Supreme Court with respect to all the matters contained in the Concurrent List. It may be noted here that one of the items in the Concurrent List is Civil Procedure Code under Entry 13. 38. In our view, the State Legislature has power to confer general jurisdiction on all the courts except the Supreme Court under Entry 11A in the Concurrent List falling within the meaning of ‘administration of justice’. Hence, the 1987 Act is within the competence of the State Legislature in the light of the discussion and reasons to follow. 39. The State Legislature was the sole repository of power to confer jurisdiction on all the courts except the Supreme Court and High Court under Entry 3 of the State List prior to Forty-second Amendment) of 1976 and thereafter the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures have power to confer general jurisdiction on all the courts including the High Courts under Entry 11A of the Concurrent List. Entry 46 of the Concurrent List deals with the special jurisdiction in respect of the matters in the Concurrent List. One of the matters in the Concurrent List is the Civil Procedure Code. The combined reading of Entry 11A, Entry 13 and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List makes the position clear that the 1987 Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature when it deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts. 40. One of the matters in the Concurrent List is the Civil Procedure Code. The combined reading of Entry 11A, Entry 13 and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List makes the position clear that the 1987 Act is not beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature when it deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts. 40. From careful reading of Entries 77 and 78 of the Union List it is clear that Entry 77 not only deals with the ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ but also with ‘jurisdiction’ and powers’ in respect of Supreme Court falling within the exclusive domain of the Parliament. Entry 11A in the Concurrent List deals with the ‘administration of justice’ in all the courts and the ‘constitution and organization’ of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Thus, it is clear that the Parliament is the sole repository of powers as far as the ‘constitution’, ‘organisation’, ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘powers’ of the Supreme Court is concerned. Conscious omissions of the words ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘powers’ in Entry 78, looking to the said words included in Entry 77, it is clear that the ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘power’ of the High Courts are dealt with as a separate topic under the caption ‘administration of justice’ under Entry 11A of the Concurrent List. The exclusion of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘powers’ from Entry 78 appears to be meaningful and intended to serve a definite purpose in relation to bifurcation or division of legislative powers relating to conferment of general jurisdiction of High Courts. 41. Entries 77 and 78 of the Union List deal with ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of the Supreme Court and the High Courts because after coming into force of the Constitution, the Supreme Court was required to be set up and so also the High Courts were required to be established and/or reconstituted. The expressions ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of the High Courts in Entry 78 are referable to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution. Article 2 empowers the Parliament to admit into the Union or establish new States, Article 3 deals with the formation of new States and alterations of areas, boundaries or names of the existing States and Article 4 provides that laws made under Articles 2 and 3 may provide for amendment of the First and Fourth Schedules and supplemental, incidental and consequential matters. The words ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ have their own meaning as against expressions ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘powers’, but in the scheme of the Constitution the subject ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of Supreme Court and High Courts rests with the Union. 42. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt with in Entry 11A under caption ‘administration of justice’, which has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice. The expression ‘administration of justice’ has been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to include the ‘powers’ and ‘jurisdiction’ of all the courts except the Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words ‘administration of justice’ in Entry 11A has significance and meaning. The other words in the same Entry after ‘administration of justice’ only speak in relation to ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of all the courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that under Entry 11A State Legislature has no power to constitute and organize Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an accepted principle of construction of a constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. The State Legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of ‘administration of justice’ and to invest all courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters, civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest the High Court with such general jurisdiction and powers including the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court except those, which are specifically conferred under the Constitution on the High Courts. It is not possible to say that investing the city civil court with unlimited jurisdiction taking away the same from the High Court amounts to dealing with ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of the High Court. It is not possible to say that investing the city civil court with unlimited jurisdiction taking away the same from the High Court amounts to dealing with ‘constitution’ and ‘organisation’ of the High Court. Under Entry 11A of List III the State Legislature is empowered to constitute and organize city civil court and while constituting such court the State Legislature is also empowered to confer jurisdiction and powers upon such courts inasmuch as ‘administration of justice’ of all the courts including the High Court is covered by Entry 11A of List III, so long as Parliament does not enact law in that regard under Entry 11-A. Entry 46 of the Concurrent List speaks of the special jurisdiction in respect of the matters in List III. Entry 13 in List III is ‘...Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution.....’. From Entry 13 it follows that in respect of the matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure and generally in the matter of civil procedure the Parliament or the State Legislature, as provided by Article 246(2) of the Constitution, acquire the concurrent legislative competence. The 1987 Act deals with pecuniary jurisdiction of the courts as envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the State Legislature was competent to legislate under Entry 13 of List III for enacting 1987 Act. 43. This view gets support from the various decisions in which entries in Lists, I, II and III are interpreted touching the question as to the legislative competence of a State. 44. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the words “constitution and organisation of the High Courts” used in Entry 78 of List I are wide enough to take within its ambit, not only the constitution and organization, but, also the “general jurisdiction” of the High Courts. In contrast, it is contended that Entry 95 in List I pertains to the legislative power of Parliament to invest special jurisdiction in all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I. Correspondingly, Entry 46 of the Concurrent List vests power in Parliament as well as the State legislature to confer special jurisdiction and powers on all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in List III. Similarly, Entry 65 of List II enables the State legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers on all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in List II. 45. Strong reliance is placed on certain observations of this Court in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai & Anr. (supra), which dealt with the interpretation of Entries 1 & 2 of List II (Provincial List) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Entry 1 of List II read: “.... the administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts except the Federal Court.....”. Entry 2 of List II read: “Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List......”. The contention urged before this Court was that the words “admi­nistration of justice and constitution and ­organization of courts” occurring in Entry 1 of the Provincial List should be read as exclusive of any matter relating to jurisdiction of courts. Rejecting the arguments, the Court observed:— “It is to be noted that the right to set up courts and to provide for the whole machinery of administration of justice has been given exclusively to the Provincial Legislature. Under Section 101 of the North America Act, the Parliament of Canada has a reserve of power to create additional courts for better administration of the laws of Canada but the Indian Constitution Act of 1935 does not give any such power to the Central Legislature. Courts are to be established by the Provincial Legislature alone. The word `court’ certainly means a place where justice is judicially administered. The appointment of Judges and officers or the mere setting apart of a place where the Judges are to meet, are not sufficient to constitute a court. A court cannot administer justice unless it is vested with jurisdiction to decide cases and “the constitution of a court necessarily includes its jurisdiction.” (vide Clement’s Canadian Constitution, 3rd End., p. 527).” (Per Mukherjea, J.) It was also observed :— “Entry 1 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935 uses the expressions “administration of justice and constitution of all courts” in a perfectly general manner. No particular subject is specified to which the administration of justice might relate or for which a court might be constituted. No particular subject is specified to which the administration of justice might relate or for which a court might be constituted. It can, therefore, be legitimately interpreted to refer to a general jurisdiction to decide cases not limited to any particular subject..... The distinction between general and particular jurisdiction has always been recognized in the legislative practice of this country prior to the passing of the Constitution Act of 1935 and also after that.” (Per Mukerjea, J.) 46. It was also observed that “the contents of general jurisdiction are always indeterminate and are not susceptible of any specific enumeration.” The words “administration of justice” and “constitution and organization of courts” occurring in entry 1 of the Provincial List were construed in a restricted sense so as to exclude the scope of “jurisdiction and powers of courts” dealt with specifically in entry 2, (Per Patanjali Sastri, J.). Taking notice of the fact that on the date when the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed, there were in existence in the different Provinces a large number of courts of law and the administration of justice throughout the Provinces was in the hands of these provincial courts, that the civil courts in the Province used to try all suits and proceedings of a civil nature which were triable under the Civil Procedure Code, and the criminal courts used to try all criminal cases triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was pointed out that the jurisdiction and power of the courts were not confined to cases in regard to the subjects stated in List II, nor were they debarred from dealing with cases relating to matters which had been assigned to List I. The jurisdiction of the courts depended in civil cases on a “cause of action” giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on the provisions made in the Code of Criminal Procedure as to the venue of the trial and other relevant matters. Fazal Ali, J. observed :— “It seems to me that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contemplate any drastic change in the existing system of administration of justice, but what it contemplated was that that system should continue subject to future legislation by the proper Legislature, Central or Provincial, barring the jurisdiction of courts or conferring jurisdiction or power on special courts with regard to the matters included in the appropriate Legislative Lists, should there be any occasion for such special legislation.” He further observed: “in my opinion, there is nothing in the Act of 1935 to show that there was any intention on the part of its framers to affect the machinery so drastically as to confine it to the administration of a mere partial or truncated kind of justice relating only to matters specified in List II.” 47. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, attempts to distinguish this judgment by pointing out that when the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed, the scheme of distribution of legislative powers relating to the constitution and organization of the High Courts was exclusively left with the Provincial Legislature. The Provincial Legislature was fully empowered to make laws relating to the “constitution and organization of all courts except the Federal Court” (vide Entry 1 of the Provincial List). In view of this position, the Bombay Provincial Legislature was held to have legislative competence to enact the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948 which incidentally trenched upon the jurisdiction of the High Court, and it was essentially an exercise of power within the competence of the Provincial Legislature relatable to Entry 1 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. 48. It is not possible to accept that Narothamdas Jethabai (supra) lays down that the words “constitution and organization of courts” necessarily mean, throughout the Constitution, a situation where the appropriate legislature which is empowered to constitute and organize a court is necessarily invested with “general jurisdiction”, as contended. 49. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Ama­rendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Ghose and Anr.7, on which reliance was placed before this Court, has put the matter in proper perspective. 49. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Ama­rendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Ghose and Anr.7, on which reliance was placed before this Court, has put the matter in proper perspective. This was also a case where the petitioner before the High Court of Calcutta challenged the validity of the City Civil Court Act, being West Bengal Act XXI of 1953, on the ground of legislative competence. It was urged before the court that, while under the Government of India Act, 1935, the constitution and organization of a High Court as also its powers were Provincial subjects, under the Constitution these subjects were expressly taken away from the legislative competence of the State Legislature and were made Union subjects. Thus, it was contended that the State Legislature had no competence to make any law touching upon the constitution and organization of the High Court, which necessarily included the “general jurisdiction” of the High Court. The judgment of this Court in Narothamdas Jethabai (supra) was also cited by the petitioner. After carefully considering the observations of all the learned Judges who comprised the Bench in Narothamdas Jetha­bai, and after considering the speech made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, the learned Single Judge summarized the resultant legal position thus, in our opinion correctly, in Paragraph 24 : “24. In my opinion the present position may be summarized as follows:— (1) The ‘constitution and organization, jurisdiction and powers’ of the Supreme Court, are Union subjects, (2) While ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of the Supreme Court have been expressly included in Entry 77 of List I, these words have been deliberately left out in Entry 78 of the same List, in respect of the High Courts. This omission is not supplied by Entry 95 because that Entry only enables jurisdiction and powers to be given in respect of the matters enumerated in List I. To speak of ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of the High Courts in ­respect of ‘constitution and organization’ of the High Courts would be meanine­less. This omission is not supplied by Entry 95 because that Entry only enables jurisdiction and powers to be given in respect of the matters enumerated in List I. To speak of ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of the High Courts in ­respect of ‘constitution and organization’ of the High Courts would be meanine­less. (3) If nothing else was to be found relating to the subject, in any other part of the Constitution, then it might have been necessary to imply that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the concept of ‘jurisdiction and powers’ within the phrase ‘constitution and organisation’ of the High Courts in Entry 78. In that event, the result would be that if a High Court was constituted or organized by a Parliamentary Statute, it would automatically be vested with general jurisdiction to administer justice. (4) This construction, however, is not permissible because it is in conflict with Entry 3 in List II or Entry 3 read with Entry 65. It is only the State Legislature that can vest a High Court with general jurisdiction to administer justice. (5) While it is controversial as to whether Entry 78 in List I includes ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of the High Court, it is clear that under Entry 3 of List II or Entry 3 read with Entry 65, ‘administration of justice’ is a State subject and the ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of all Courts in the State including the High Court in respect of administration of justice, which must include general jurisdiction, is a State subject. (6) This construction does give rise to a curious result, namely, that Parliament is given under Entry 78 a power to set up a High Court but not to vest it with jurisdiction excepting in a limited way under Entry 95. Ordinarily, and in so far as legislative practice is concerned, this state of things should not happen, but it has in fact happened under our Constitution. Ordinarily, and in so far as legislative practice is concerned, this state of things should not happen, but it has in fact happened under our Constitution. (7) But the evil effects inherent in such an unusual provision in the Constitution is mitigated by the fact that: (a) for the most part, the ‘constitution and organisation’ of the High Courts have already been provided for in the body of the Constitution, and (b) in the case of the formation of new States or reorganization of existing States, there is ample power under Art. 4 of the Constitution to clothe Parliament with the power to invest High Courts with the necessary ‘jurisdiction and powers’ of every description. (8) The State Legislature being the appropriate body to legislate in respect of ‘administration of justice’, and to invest all Courts within the State including the High Court, with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters civil and criminal, it must follow that it can invest a High Court with general jurisdiction and powers (including territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction), and also take away such jurisdiction and powers from the High Court. (9) So far as the Calcutta City Civil Court is concerned, there can be no question that the State Legislature is competent to constitute such a Court and vest it with general jurisdiction, since that comes specifically and plainly within the scope of Entry No. 3 or Entry No. 3 read with Entry 65 in List II. The question is as to whether it can at the same time take away any part of the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court. (10) It has been argued that the setting up of the City Civil Court, with a specified jurisdiction, and the taking away of the same jurisdiction from the High Court, was nothing more or less than doing something which affected the ‘constitution and organisation’ of the High Court. This again depends on the answer to the question as to whether the words ‘constitution and organization’ necessarily include the concept of ‘jurisdiction and powers’ meaning thereby, general jurisdiction and powers relating to the administration of justice. So far as these words are used in Entry 78 of List I, the answer must clearly be in the negative. This again depends on the answer to the question as to whether the words ‘constitution and organization’ necessarily include the concept of ‘jurisdiction and powers’ meaning thereby, general jurisdiction and powers relating to the administration of justice. So far as these words are used in Entry 78 of List I, the answer must clearly be in the negative. The constitution and organization of High Courts has been made a Central subject in this limited sense because: (a) It was necessary to have uniformity in the organization of all High Courts and this could only be effected by Parliament. (b) The Constitution provides for extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court beyond the State where it has its principal seat and also for a common High Court in two States or two States and a Union territory. This can only be effected by Parliament. But beyond this, no necessity was felt of granting to Parliament the power to invest High Courts with general jurisdiction for the administration of justice, which was a provincial subject before and continues to be a State subject. (11) It follows that the taking away of some of the general jurisdiction and powers of the High Court and vesting the same in the City Civil Court would not necessarily mean that the State ­Legislature was doing anything which could be said to be an infringement of Entry 78 in List I. It was doing what it had power to do under Entry 3, or under Entry 3 read with Entry 65, of List II.” 50. Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant to Page 774 of the Constituent Assembly Debates and also to some other parts of the speech made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Shri Alladi Krishna­swami Ayyar during the debates in the Constituent Assembly, when Entry 52 of the Draft Constitution was being debated upon. He drew our attention to the passage "...the only matter that is left to the Provincial Legislatures is to fix jurisdiction of the High Courts in a pecuniary way or with regard to the subject matter. The rest of the High Court is placed, within the jurisdiction of the Centre. He drew our attention to the passage "...the only matter that is left to the Provincial Legislatures is to fix jurisdiction of the High Courts in a pecuniary way or with regard to the subject matter. The rest of the High Court is placed, within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Obviously when considering entries in the Union List which are meant to give complete power to the Centre, we were bound to make good this lacuna and to bring in the High Courts which, as I said, by virtue of these articles excepting for two cases have been completely placed within the purview of the Parliament.” 51. In our view, the portion of the speech of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the floor of the Constituent Assembly referred to on Page 543 of the Calcutta High Court’s judgment is more appropriate one which, in effect, throws light on the issue. Thus, the only purpose of the amendment was to bring uniformity as far as the ‘constitution and organization of the High Courts’ in the different States were concerned. Particularly taking notice of the fact that the High Courts in different Provinces had been functioning for several years and there was no consistency in their established practices, it was proposed to bring all the High Courts in the States under the jurisdiction of Parliament so that there was some uniformity in the organization of the different High Courts in India. As the judgment of the Calcutta High Court correctly points out, Entry 3 (prior to 3.1.1977) (or Entry 11A after 3.1.1977) read with Entry 65 of List II (“administration of justice”) is a State subject and the jurisdiction and powers of all courts in the State, including the High Courts, in respect of administration of justice, which must include “general jurisdiction” is a State subject. 52. It is true that the Calcutta High Court noticed the curious result that followed from the Constitutional entries as were available at the material time. 52. It is true that the Calcutta High Court noticed the curious result that followed from the Constitutional entries as were available at the material time. It noticed that while under Entry 78 of List I, Parliament was given power to set up the High Courts, but did not have power to invest them with general jurisdiction, but had power to invest them with special jurisdiction under Entry 95 of List I. The State Legislature would have the jurisdiction to invest the High Courts, set up by Parliament, with the necessary general jurisdiction under Entry 3 (at the material time) of List II (“Administration of Justice”); both Parliament and the State legislature also had the competence to make laws to invest the High Courts with special jurisdiction under Entry 65 of List III. Perhaps, the situation then was somewhat anomalous and led to the curious result noticed by the High Court of Calcutta at the material time. However, Entry 3 of List II was amended by the Constitution (42nd Amendment Act of 1976) with effect from 3.1.1977. The words “administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts” were removed from Entry 3 and inserted as Entry 11 A in the Concurrent List. Consequently, on and after 3.1.1977 both Parliament and State Legislature are competent to legislate with respect to the subject “administration of justice” which would be wide enough to invest the High Court “constituted and re-organised” by Parliament with the general jurisdiction. We have already noticed the power of both the Parliament and State Legislature to legislate within their respective spheres so as to invest the High Court with special jurisdiction. 53. Thus, on and after 3.1.1977 the situation appears to be as under:— a) Parliament alone has the competence to legislate with respect to Entry 78 of List I to ‘constitute and organize’ the High Court; b) Both Parliament and State Legislature can invest such a High Court with general jurisdiction by enacting an appropriate legislation referable to ‘administration of justice’ under Entry 11A of List III. c) Parliament may under Entry 95 of List I invest the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I. d) State Legislature may invest the High Court with the jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II. c) Parliament may under Entry 95 of List I invest the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I. d) State Legislature may invest the High Court with the jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II. e) Both Parliament and State Legislature may by appropriate legislation referable to Entry 46 of List III invest the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III. 54. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention that Parliament alone has the exclusive competence to invest the High Court with the “general jurisdiction” referable to “constitution and organization of the High Court”. 55. It is true that there are several provisions in Articles 216, 217, 221, 222, 223 and 224 wherein the President of India and the Government of India alone have been given powers, in the matters stated therein. This by itself does not militate against the view that we are inclined to take. 56. The observations in State of Maharashtra v. Kusum Charudutt Bharma Upadhye8, (Para 7) were pressed in service in support. All that the Bombay High Court said is: “....under the Constitution, Parliament has by ordinary law the power to constitute and organize, that is, to create, new High Courts as also to enlarge or abridge the jurisdiction of all High Courts, including the High Courts which were in existence at the commencement of the Constitution.” 57. These observations were made in connection with the questions before the Special Bench of the Bombay High Court, whether an appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in a petition filed on the Original Side or the Appellate Side of the High Court; and, whether such an appeal would lie from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and also, whether an appeal would lie from an interlocutory order made by a single Judge of the High Court appointing a receiver in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Bombay High Court did not express its view that Parliament alone had such powers, nor about the meaning to be given to the expression “administration of justice”, which is now placed in the Concurrent List on and after 3.1.1977. The contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. 58. Reference was made to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Geetika Panwar v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.4. The learned counsel contended that the submissions of the learned Attorney General made before the Delhi High Court, as noticed in this judgment, were indicative of the stand of the Government of India in the matter. Placing reliance on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio the learned counsel urged that the constitutional interpretation as understood by the executive should be accepted by us. We are afraid, when it comes to interpretation of the Constitution, it is not permissible to place reliance on contemporanea exposition to the extent urged. Interpretation of the Constitution is the sole prerogative of the Constitutional Courts and the stand taken by the executive in a particular case cannot determine the true interpretation of the Constitution. The learned counsel urged that, as a result of judgment of the full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Geetika Panwar case (supra) and striking down of Delhi High Court Amendment Act 2001 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi, Parliament stepped in by enacting Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2003. According to the learned counsel this was also indicative of the fact that the Parliament had recognized and accepted the construction put on the constitutional provisions in Geetika Panwar as correct and responded by a curative legislation. The fact the Parliament responded to the situation by enacting Delhi High Court Amendment Act, 2003 also cannot by itself show that the view taken by the High Court of Delhi in Geetika Panwar was correct. It is possible that the executive might have taken the shorter course of amending the legislation instead of challenging the view taken by the Delhi High Court before this Court. 59. The reference to Section 30 of the Andhra Act, 1953 or to the provisions of Section 49 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 is of no avail. It is possible that the executive might have taken the shorter course of amending the legislation instead of challenging the view taken by the Delhi High Court before this Court. 59. The reference to Section 30 of the Andhra Act, 1953 or to the provisions of Section 49 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 is of no avail. The investment of power in such cases, where a High Court is set up in a reorganized State, is referable to Article 4 of the Constitution, which is an independent power not referable to Entry 78 of List I. 60. In O.N. Mohindroo v. The Bar Council of Delhi & Ors.9 after analyzing Entries 77, 78, and 95 of List I, Entry 65 of List II and Entry 46 of List III, this Court observed: “The scheme for conferring jurisdiction and powers on courts is (a) to avoid duplication of Courts. Federal and State Courts as in the Constitution of the United States, (b) to enable Parliament and the State Legislatures to confer juris­diction on courts in respect of matters in their respective lists except in the case of the Supreme Court where the legislative authority to confer jurisdiction and powers is exclusively vested in Parliament. In the case of the Concurrent List both the legislatures can confer jurisdiction and powers on courts except of course the Supreme Court depending upon whether the Act is enacted by one or the other. Entry 3 in List II confers legislative powers on the States in the matter of “Administration of Justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts: officers and servants of the High Courts: procedure in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court.” It is clear that except for the constitution and the organization of the Supreme Court and the High Courts the legislative power in the matter of administration of justice has been vested in the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures can, therefore enact laws, providing for the constitution and organization of courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts, and confer jurisdiction and powers on them in all matters, civil and criminal, except the admiralty jurisdiction. The State Legislatures can, therefore enact laws, providing for the constitution and organization of courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts, and confer jurisdiction and powers on them in all matters, civil and criminal, except the admiralty jurisdiction. It would, of course, be open to Parliament to bar the jurisdiction of any such court by special enactment in matters provided in Lists I and III where it has made a law but so long as that is not done the courts established by the State Legislatures would have jurisdiction to try all suits and proceedings relating even to matters in Lists I and III. Thus, so far as the constitution and organization of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are concerned, the power is with Parliament. As regards the other courts, Entry 3 of the List II confers such a power on the State Legislatures. As regards jurisdiction and powers, it is Parliament which can deal with the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and the admiralty jurisdiction. Parliament can confer jurisdiction and powers on all courts in matters set out in List I and List III where it has passed any laws. But under the power given to it under entry 3 in List II, a State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers on any of the courts except the Supreme Court in respect of any statute whether enacted by it or by Parliament except where a Central Act dealing with matters in Lists I and III otherwise provides. But under the power given to it under entry 3 in List II, a State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers on any of the courts except the Supreme Court in respect of any statute whether enacted by it or by Parliament except where a Central Act dealing with matters in Lists I and III otherwise provides. That these entries contemplate such a scheme was brought out in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas, where it was contended that the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 40 of 1948, constituting the said Civil Court as an additional court was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature as it conferred jurisdiction on the new court not only in respect of matters in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 but also in regard to matters in List I such as promissory notes in item 8 of List I. Rejecting the contention it was held that the impugned Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra vires as the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws with respect to “administration of justice” and “constitution and organization of all courts” under item 1 of List II was wide enough to include the power to make laws with regard to the jurisdiction of courts established by the Provincial Legislature; that the object of item 53 of List I, item 2 of List II and item 15 of List III was to confer such powers on the Central and the Provincial Legislatures to make laws relating to the jurisdiction of courts with respect to the particular matters that are referred to in List I and II respectively and the Concurrent List, and that these provisions did not in any way curtail the power of the Provincial Legislature under item 1 of List II to make laws with regard to jurisdiction of courts and to confer jurisdiction on courts established by it to try all causes of a civil nature subject to the power of the Central and Provincial Legislatures to make special provisions relating to particular subjects referred to in the Lists. It may be mentioned that item 53 in List I, item 1 and 2 in List II and item 15 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the 1935 Act more or less correspond to entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, entries 3 and 65 in List II and entry 46 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.” 61. The constitutional validity of the City Civil Court Act of Calcutta being West Bengal Act No. XXI of 1953 which had received the assent of the President under which the pecuniary jurisdiction was conferred on the city civil court above Rs. 5,000/- but not exceeding Rs. 10,000/- was challenged on various grounds similar to the grounds raised challenging the validity of the 1987 Act. Sinha J. learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that the West Bengal Act No. XXI of 1953 was intra vires in Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury vs. Bikash Chandra Ghosh & Anr.7. The pecuniary jurisdiction was enhanced from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- and again to rs. 1,00,000/-. The validity of the Act as well as the amendment of increasing the jurisdiction to Rs. 1,00,000/- was again challenged before the Calcutta High Court in Indu Bhushan De & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.10. The Division Bench upheld the validity of the Act including the amendments. The matter reached this Court with a contention that the Parliament alone had legislative competence to make the law affecting the original side jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, the State Legislature had no power to pass any law dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court. This Court in Indu Bhushan De and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal and others11 dealing with the aforementioned contention, after setting out Entries 77, 78 and 95 in List I, Entries 3 (new Entry No. 11-A in the Concurrent List) and Entry 65 in List II and Entry 46 in List III, and reiterating the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Narothamdas (supra), observed that “this decision (Narothamdas) of the Constitution Bench clearly negatives the claim of the appellant that the impugned Act was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the West Bengal Legislature. Admittedly, the Act received Presidential assent and was, therefore, competent to bring about a change in the prevailing position obtaining under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court.” In the same judgment, this Court further observed thus: “A similar challenge as in the present dispute had also been raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhary vs. Bikash Chandra Ghosh [AIR 1957 Cal. 535] and a learned Single Judge relying on the decision of Constitution Bench referred to above had held that the Act was intra vires the State Legislature. We are of the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench is a clear and binding precedent against the appellant’s stand.” (emphasis supplied) 62. Having observed thus, this Court approved the aforementioned judgment in Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhary (supra). 63. This Court in Narothamdas and Indu Bhushan De (supra) clearly laid down that power of legislature to confer or take away general jurisdiction of all courts excepting the Supreme Court is a separate topic and forms part of the “administration of justice” and not part of `constitution’ and `organisation’ of High Courts. 64. In first round in Mulchand Kundanmal Jagtiani vs. Raman Hiralal Shah5 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld the validity of the 1948 Act. Thereafter, on 20.1.1950, the Provincial Government issued a notification conferring on the city civil court jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of civil nature not exceeding Rs. 25,000/- in value arising within Greater Bombay. In Narothamdas vs. A.P. Phillips6, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court declared the said notification as invalid on the ground that notification amounted to delegation of legislative function. In the appeal filed by the State, this Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay vs. Narothamdas2 holding that Section 4 of 1948 Act did not amount to delegation of legislative power and that the notification dated 20.1.1951 was intra vires. The respondents had challenged the validity of the 1948 Act before this Court on the ground that the Act was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature by reason of encroachment upon the field of legislation reserved for Centre under List I of Seventh Schedule of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 which was negatived as already stated above. Madras High Court in Ahmed Moideen Khan & Ors. of India Act, 1935 which was negatived as already stated above. Madras High Court in Ahmed Moideen Khan & Ors. vs. Inspector of ‘D’ Division12 dealt with challenge to the Act No. XXXIV of 1955 under which the State Legislature divested criminal jurisdiction of Madras High Court and vested it in the sessions court. There also challenge was on the ground that the Act was not within the competence of State Legislature inasmuch as it amounted to re-constitution or re-organisation of the High Court within the meaning of Entry 78 of List I. The Division Bench, overruling all the contentions, held that the State Legislature was competent to enact the Act No. XXXIV of 1955 under Entry 3 of List II (administration of justice). The Division Bench also stated that the State Legislature has power to pass legislation under Entries 1, 2 and 46 of List III i.e. (i) criminal law including matters included in Indian Penal Code; (ii) Criminal Procedure Code .... and Entry 46 of List III which confers power on the State to legislate in respect of the subjects contained in the Concurrent List. 65. When the State Legislature of Kerala enacted law conferring power on the Division Bench of the High Court to hear appeals against the orders of Single Judge passed ­under Article 226, it was challenged on the ground that the subject was covered by Entry 78 of List I. In Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Quilon Municipality13, the Kerala High Court held that the State Legislature was fully competent to pass the Act by virtue of its powers under Articles 225, 246(3) read with Seventh Schedule List II Entry 3 of the Constitution. 66. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Shivarudrappa Girimallappa Saboji & Anr. vs. Kapurchand Meghaji Marwadi & Ors.14 held that Sections 19 and 29(2)(c) of the Mysore Civil Court Act, 1964 were constitutionally valid as the same were within the competence of the State Legislature under Entry 3 of List II i.e. “Administration of Justice” observing thus:— “...If the core of Administration of justice is the exercise of judicial power which is also understood as the exercise of jurisdiction, any legislation on the exercise of such judicial power or jurisdiction is legislation on “administration of justice” and is therefore, what is authorized by the 3rd Entry of the said List. If Legislation on “administration of justice” in the High Court is as already explained also within the field of that Entry then Article 246(3) of the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to make Legislation on that subject, just as Parliament has powers within the field of the 77 Entry of the Union list to make legislation among other matters on the jurisdiction and power to the Supreme Court. It is of course plain that that legislative power which the State Legislature may exercise under clause (3) of Article 246 of the Constitution is subject to clauses (1) and (2) of the said Article and also two other provisions of the Constitution as stated in Article 245(1). It is for the Legislature of the State to define the frontier of the powers or jurisdiction exercisable by its High Court.” 67. In the same judgment, the High Court in regard to Entry 78 of List I, went on to say that “...the subject relating to `constitution and organization of High Courts’ is not a subject relating to jurisdiction and powers of the High Court but subject which has reference only to the establishment or the constitution of the High Court while the third Entry of the State List is what authorizes legislation on such jurisdiction and powers”. 68. A Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rajinder Singh etc. vs. Kultar Singh & Ors.15 touching the same topic stated thus:— “So far as the High Courts are concerned, the topics of jurisdiction and powers in general is not separately mentioned in any of the Entries of the List I but administration of justice as a distinct topic finds place in Entry 3 of List II (Now Entry 11-A of the List III). The expression ‘administration of justice’ occurring in Entry 3 of List II of the VIIth Schedule has to be construed in its widest sense so as to give power to the State Legislature to legislate on all the matters relating to ‘administration of justice’. After the words ‘administration of justice’ in Entry 3 there is a semi colon and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. After the words ‘administration of justice’ in Entry 3 there is a semi colon and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. Under Entry 78 of List I, the topic of ‘jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts’, is not deal with. Under Entry 3 of List II the State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and power or restrict or withdraw jurisdiction and powers already conferred on any courts except the Supreme Court in respect of any statute. Therefore, the State legislature has the power to make law with respect to jurisdiction and powers of the High Court.” 69. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. vs. Arabinda Bose & Anr.16, Mukherjea, J. in para 57 has observed that “....Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. ... When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.” 70. In our view Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court was right in giving emphasis and meaning to semi colon in Entry 3 of the List after the words ‘administration of justice’ in Rajinder Singh (supra). Semi colon after the words ‘administration of justice’ in Entry 11-A, in our view, has significance in dealing with the topic whether ‘administration of justice’ includes conferring general jurisdiction on High Court in addition to the subordinate courts within the State. 71. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K. Kumarswamy Kumandan & Bros. vs. Premier Electric Co.17 has proceeded on similar lines observing thus:— “The words `administration of justice’ `constitution’ and `organization of courts’ have been used in Entry 3 of List II without any qualification or limitation and they imply the power and jurisdiction of Courts. The jurisdiction to entertain suits and to dispose of them is certainly the branch of administration of justice. So it must necessarily include the power to entertain the suits or proceedings of a civil or criminal nature irrespective of the value of the subject matter. This power necessarily implies the authority to enhance, alter, amend or diminish the jurisdiction of courts territorially and pecuniarily.” 72. So it must necessarily include the power to entertain the suits or proceedings of a civil or criminal nature irrespective of the value of the subject matter. This power necessarily implies the authority to enhance, alter, amend or diminish the jurisdiction of courts territorially and pecuniarily.” 72. In the light of the various decisions referred to above, the position is clear that the expression “Administration of Justice” has wide amplitude covering conferment of general jurisdiction on all courts including High Court except the Supreme Court under Entry 11-A of List III. It may be also noticed that some of the decisions rendered dealing with Entry 3 of List II prior to 3.1.1977 touching “Administration of Justice” support the view that conferment of general jurisdiction is covered ­under the topic “Administration of Justice”. After 3.1.1977 a part of Entry 3 namely “Administration of Justice” is shifted to List III under Entry 11-A. This only shows that topic “Administration of Justice” can now be legislated both by the Union as well as the State Legislatures. As long as there is no Union Legislation touching the same topic, and there is no inconsistency between the Central legislation and State legislation on this topic, it cannot be said that State Legislature had no competence to pass 1987 Act and 1986 Act. 73. It may be added that the State Legislature was also competent to enact the 1987 Act under Entry 13 read with Entry 46 of List III. Entry 13 of List III relates to Civil Procedure Code. The jurisdiction of civil court, particularly pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts, was specially covered by the Civil Procedure Code on the date of commencement of the Constitution. Entry 46 of List III relates to jurisdiction and power of all courts except the Supreme Court i.e. including the city civil court and High Court with respect to any matter in List III including Civil Procedure Code in Entry 13. The contention that merely constituting and organizing High Courts without conferring jurisdiction to deal with the matters on them does not serve any purpose, cannot be accepted. The Constitution itself has conferred jurisdiction on High Courts, for instance, under Articles 226 and 227. This apart, under various enactments both of Central and State, certain jurisdiction is conferred on High Courts. The contention that merely constituting and organizing High Courts without conferring jurisdiction to deal with the matters on them does not serve any purpose, cannot be accepted. The Constitution itself has conferred jurisdiction on High Courts, for instance, under Articles 226 and 227. This apart, under various enactments both of Central and State, certain jurisdiction is conferred on High Courts. The High Courts have power and jurisdiction to deal with such matters as are conferred by the Constitution and other statutes. This power of “Administration of Justice” has been included in the Concurrent List after 3.1.1977 possibly to enable both Centre as well as States to confer jurisdiction on High Courts under various enactments passed by the Centre or the State to meet the needs of the respective States in relation to specific subjects. Thus, viewed from any angle, it is not possible to agree that the 1987 Act and 1986 Act are beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 74. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no merit in the contention that the State Legislature did not have competence to enact the two legislations, the constitutionality of which has been challenged before us. 75. Two other subsidiary contentions urged on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2452/92 are required to be examined - (i) in the absence of necessary infrastructure and the requisite number of judges in the city civil court, the action of the State Government in issuing notification dated 20.8.1991 was arbitrary and unreasonable and (ii) the said notification was issued unfairly due to pressure on account of agitation by a section of lawyers and for other extraneous consideration. 76. Before the High Court, it was contended that the impugned Act was brought into force by the notification exercising statutory power unreasonably and arbitrarily in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; there was no infrastructure in the city civil court to cope with the additional burden of new civil suits and other proceedings of civil nature which would be filed on or after 1.5.1992. In that regard, deficiencies were pointed out as to the court rooms, required number of Judges and other infrastructure by giving details. 77. In that regard, deficiencies were pointed out as to the court rooms, required number of Judges and other infrastructure by giving details. 77. In opposition, it was contended that in implementing the Act, there were bound to be some inevitable problems having regard to the magnitude of required infrastructure, court rooms and required number of Judges etc.; such problems were inevitable; they can be worked out in due course of time; but, on that ground itself, the impugned notification need not be struck down. 78. The High Court, after consideration opined that the State Government had taken somewhat hasty step without application of mind to implement the impugned Act without providing infrastructure and without meeting other requirements in relation to appointment of judges as recommended by the High Court. The High Court further observed thus:— “...The High Court exercises judicial and administrative control over the subordinate courts in the State of Maharashtra. It would be a matter of concern for the High Court to see that the litigants in Courts do not suffer hardship due to want of adequate infrastructure. Under the constitutional scheme, the High Court has to perform its vital role and duties in respect of the administration of justice and, therefore, if infrastructure is not provided till this date, result would certainly be violation of fundamental rights of the litigants under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. We may usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India18 in which the Supreme Court has referred to the duty of the State to provide infrastructure which includes residential accommodation to the judicial officers in the subordinate judiciary. The said judgment refers to this aspect as duty cast upon the State Government to give suitable residential accommodation to the Judges.” 79. Dealing with the contention that a writ could not be issued to the Government to bring or not to bring the law into force, relying on the decision in A.K. Roy vs. Union of India19, the High Court noticed the facts in that case. That was a case in which one of the questions considered with regard to Central Government issuing a notification for bringing the provisions of Section 3 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 into force. That was a case in which one of the questions considered with regard to Central Government issuing a notification for bringing the provisions of Section 3 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 into force. This Court on the facts of that case observed, “The Parliament having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government the question as regards the time for bringing the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force, it is not for the Court to compel the Government to do that which according to the mandate of the Parliament lies in its discretion to do when it considers it opportune to do it”. There, the writ of mandamus was sought to the Central Government to issue a notification to bring into force the provisions of Section 3 of the 44th Amendment Act. In the case on hand the position is entirely different. Here is a case pursuant to statutory provisions the State Government has acted and issued the Notification dated 20th August, 1991 for implementation of the provisions of the 1987 Act. 80. The decision in the case of R.K. Porwal vs. State of Maharashtra20 was cited before the High Court in support of the impugned notification to contend that it was not permissible for the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to decide as to whether sufficient and adequate reasons existed for bringing the law into operation. That was a case which related to shifting of market of ­agricultural produce from Greater Bombay to New Bombay. It was in that context this Court observed that since adequate facilities were provided at New Bombay, no interference was called for. Para 15 of the said judgment reads:— 15. It was also said that neither the Gultakdi market not the Turbhe Market had any convenience or facility or was ready for use on the date on which it was notified as the Principal Market for the concerned market area. On the material placed before us we are satisfied that all reasonable conveniences and facilities are now available in both the markets, whatever might have been the situation on the respective dates of notification. We refrain from embarking into an enquiry as to the situation obtaining on the dates of notification. On the material placed before us we are satisfied that all reasonable conveniences and facilities are now available in both the markets, whatever might have been the situation on the respective dates of notification. We refrain from embarking into an enquiry as to the situation obtaining on the dates of notification. We do say that a place ought not to be notified as a market unless it is ready for use as a market with all reasonable facilities and conveniences but we do not conceive it to be our duty to pursue the matter to the extreme limit of quashing the notification when we find that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now available. While a notification may be quashed if nothing has been done beyond publishing the notification, in cases where some facilities and conveniences have been provided but not some others which are necessary, the Court may instead of quashing the notification give appropriate time-bound directions for providing necessary ­facilities and conveniences. On the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now provided. We are also satisfied that the traders have been making one desperate attempt after another to avoid moving into the new markets and they have been successful in stalling the notification from becoming effective for quite a number of years.” (Emphasis supplied) 81. It is clear from para 15 extracted above that if the facilities were not to be provided at New Bombay then the Court could have certainly interfered with and they would have passed appropriate orders as demanded by the situation. Further, in the same paragraph, it is clearly stated that in cases where some facilities are conveniences have been provided, but not some others, which are necessary, the court may, instead of quashing the notification, give appropriate time-bound directions for providing necessary facilities and conveniences. The High Court on facts in the present case found inadequacy in infrastructure and shortcomings in meeting the requirement as to court rooms and number of Judges to deal with the transfer of jurisdiction to city civil court. In this regard, the High Court in paras 44 and 45 has stated thus:— “44. Mr. The High Court on facts in the present case found inadequacy in infrastructure and shortcomings in meeting the requirement as to court rooms and number of Judges to deal with the transfer of jurisdiction to city civil court. In this regard, the High Court in paras 44 and 45 has stated thus:— “44. Mr. Singhvi submitted that the above observations clearly indicate that it is not permissible for the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to decide as to whether sufficient and adequate reasons existed for bringing the law into operation. In that case, issue was with regard to shifting of market agricultural produce from Greater Bombay to New Bombay. It was in this context that the Supreme Court observed that since adequate facilities were provided at New Bombay, no interference was called for. However, in para 15 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that if the said facilities were not to be provided at New Bombay, then the Court could have certainly interfered with and they would have passed appropriate orders as demanded by the situation. This passage has been relied upon heavily by Mr. Andhyarujina to content that even in matters of conditional legislation, this Court can give appropriate directions if facts before the Court clearly indicate that adequate infrastructure has not been provided. 45. In the present case, we are not dealing with only case of traders but also the State Government’s decision to implement the impugned Act by the impugned notification in which the High Court also has to play an important role. As mentioned hereinabove, we are dealing with the topic of administration of justice. The High Court exercises judicial and administrative control over subordinate Courts in the State of Maharashtra and having regard to the interest of the litigants in the city of Bombay and having regard to the fact that there is already an institution which is working for the last 125 years, it would not be appropriate to rush through the implementation of the impugned Act without providing adequate infrastructure. It cannot be overlooked that from 1987 till this day, the State Government has not implemented the impugned Act and one of the reasons for non-implementation appears to us that the State Government was unable to provide the infrastructure including appointment of new Judges as per the recommendation of the High Court. It cannot be overlooked that from 1987 till this day, the State Government has not implemented the impugned Act and one of the reasons for non-implementation appears to us that the State Government was unable to provide the infrastructure including appointment of new Judges as per the recommendation of the High Court. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances which are existing in Bombay, in our opinion, it would not be in the interest of administration of justice as also in the interest of ­litigants or the institution to rush through in such a haste and implement the impugned Act by impugned notification dated 20th August, 1991 from 1st May, 1992." 82. Looking to what is found by the High Court on facts in relation to infrastructure, and keeping in view the position of law as stated in the judgments of this Court aforementioned, we have no good reason to take a different view. In other words, in this regard we concur with the view expressed by the High Court in deferring the implementation of the impugned Notification to a future date and giving liberty to the State Government to apply. The High Court deferred the implementation of the impugned Notification till 2.10.1992. 83. This Court on 23.9.1992 passed the following order :— “An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government to show the infrastructural facilities for the new courts intended to deal with fresh cases. In certain essential aspects, facilities are in the form of proposals for action. The appointment of the requisite minimum number of judicial officers is also said to be under process. Admittedly, there are no extant facilities for the functional operation of even the sixteen new courts proposed by the State Government. The question of implementation of the amendments would arise only after these infra-structural facilities are completed. After bringing into existence the requisite infra-structure, the State Government is at liberty to file an affidavit indicating that all the requirements have been made available and that at least sixteen courts have become functional with the appointment and posting of Presiding Officers, arrangements of court halls; posting of the court staff etc. The affidavit may be filed within six weeks from today. Liberty to mention. 2. The 2nd October, 1992 fixed by the High Court for commencement of the operation of the amended provisions is in the circumstances extended till 30th November, 1992. The affidavit may be filed within six weeks from today. Liberty to mention. 2. The 2nd October, 1992 fixed by the High Court for commencement of the operation of the amended provisions is in the circumstances extended till 30th November, 1992. Printing of the records is dispensed with. Additional documents, if any, may be filed by both sides within four weeks from today. Written submissions from both sides to be filed before 30th November, 1992. Subject to appellants filing their written submissions before 30th November 1992, the matter shall be listed for final hearing on the 9th, 10th and 11th December, 1992 to be heard on day-to-day basis. It is expected that the appellants would complete the submissions on their side in one and half days and the respondents in one day and reply in the remaining half a day. The schedule of hearing shall be within this time frame and the arguments to be completed within three days so limited.” 84. Again on 27.11.1992, this Court passed the order which reads:— “From the report of the High Court and the omission on the part of the State to place on affidavit the requisite infrastructure to be provided, we gather that things are not very different from where we left matters on the last occasion. The matters will now be listed for final hearing on 27th, 28th and 29th January, 1993. Stay to continue till further orders. The State shall in the meanwhile expedite arrangements for providing requisite infrastructure and report to Court on affidavit.” 85. The said order is operating till now i.e. for more than 12 years. During this period,­ what steps have been taken by the State Government, what is the existing situation, and whether all the requirements are satisfied before liberty can be given to the State Government to implement the impugned notification, are the matters to be ascertained. In this view, the implementation of the impugned Notification is to be deferred. It is open to the State Government to apply to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said Notification placing on record necessary material to show that there is adequacy of infrastructure and the requirements as to number of judges and court rooms etc. are satisfied. In this view, the implementation of the impugned Notification is to be deferred. It is open to the State Government to apply to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said Notification placing on record necessary material to show that there is adequacy of infrastructure and the requirements as to number of judges and court rooms etc. are satisfied. In this regard a report from the High Court is also required to be called as and when the State Government applies to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said notification dated 20th August, 1991. As indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment, it is open to the State of Maharashtra to make necessary steps to amend Section 3 of the 1986 Act for providing an appeal. 86. Merely because an appeal is not provided in any statute, that by itself does not render a statute constitutionally invalid. It is well settled that the right of appeal is to be ­provided by a statute. In other words, right of appeal is statutory and not a constitutional right. This apart, if a statute does not provide an appeal in respect of certain matter, the party still will have remedy in approaching the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, in exercise of power of judicial review including under Article 136 of the Constitution. Moreover the difficulty in the case only relates to a class of cases as indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment to such decrees, which may be passed after the commencement of the 1987 Act and 1986 Act in any suit or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the said Acts. This apart, as stated in paragraph 18, the State of Maharash­tra is willing to take steps to provide an appeal by amending Section 3 of the 1986 Act. 87. As regards the other contention that the Notification has been issued due to pressure brought about by a section of lawyers and for extraneous considerations, it may be stated that no particulars were given and no material was placed on record before the High Court and even before us except repeating this ground. We do not find any good ground to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. Hence, it is rejected. 88. We do not find any good ground to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. Hence, it is rejected. 88. The argument that the 1986 Act or Adhiniyam encroaches upon the legislative power of Parliament, cannot be accepted, in the view we have taken that it was competent of the State Legislatures to pass law relating to general jurisdiction of the High Courts dealing with the topic ‘administration of justice’ under Entry 11A of List III. Assuming that incidentally 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam touch upon the Letters Patent, the 1986 Act and Adhiniyam cannot be declared either as unconstitutional or invalid applying doctrine of pith and substance having due regard to the discussion already made above while dealing with the legislative competence of the State in passing the 1987 Act. 89. Para 35 in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee & Ors. vs. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna21 reads thus :— “Moreover, the British Parliament when enacting the Indian Constitution Act had a long experience of the working of the British North America Act and the Australian Commonwealth Act and must have known that it is not in practice possible to ensure that the powers ­entrusted to the several legislatures will never overlap. As Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. said in 1940 F.C.R. 188 (supra) at. 201 : “It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely interwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid ­because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a fore-bidden sphere. Hence, the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that.” 90. In para 37 of the same judgment, it is stated that “Subjects must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. In para 37 of the same judgment, it is stated that “Subjects must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial Legislation could never effectively be dealt with.” 91. This Court yet in another judgment in Bharat Hydro Power Corpon. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Anr.22, touching the same question, in para 18 has observed thus:— “18. It is likely to happen from time to time that enactment though purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also on a subject in another list and prima facie looks as if one legislature is impinging on the legislative field of another legislature. This may result in a large number of statutes being declared unconditional because the legislature enacting law may appear to have legislated in a field reserved for the other legislature. To examine whether a legislation has impinged on the field of other legislatures, in fact or in substance, or is incidental, keeping in view the true nature of the enactment, the courts have evolved the doctrine of “pith and substance” for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in one list or the other. Where the question for determination is whether a particular law relates to a particular subject mentioned in one list or the other, the courts look into the substance of the enactment. Thus, if the substance of the enactment falls within the Union List then the incidental encroachment by the enactment on the State List would not make it invalid. This principle came to be established by the Privy Council when it determined appeals from Canada or Australia involving the question of legislative competence of the federation or the States in those countries. This doctrine came to be established in India and derives its genesis from the approach adopted by the courts including the Privy Council in dealing with controversies arising in other federations. This doctrine came to be established in India and derives its genesis from the approach adopted by the courts including the Privy Council in dealing with controversies arising in other federations. For applying the principle of “pith and substance” regard is to be had (i) to enactment as a whole, (ii) to its main objects, and (iii) to the scope and effect of its provisions. For this see Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals vs. State of Kerala23, State of Rajasthan vs. G. Chawla24, Thakur Amar Singhji vs. State of Rajasthan25, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India26 and Vijay Kumar Sharma vs. State of Karnataka27. In the last-mentioned case it was held : (SCC p. 576, para 15) “15. (3) Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provision of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrechment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.” 92. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Association of Natural Gas & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.28 has observed that “Entries in the List are themselves not powers of legislation, but fields of legislation. An Entry in one List cannot be interpreted so as to annul or obliterate another Entry or make another Entry meaningless and that in case of apparent conflict or any Entry overlapping the other, every attempt shall be made to harmonise the same”. Para 15 of the judgment reads:— “15. Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially dealing with the subject coming within the purview of the entry in the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislature also while making legislation may incidentally trench upon the subject covered in the Union List. Such incidental encroachment in either event need not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the Central legislation shall prevail. Such incidental encroachment in either event need not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the Central legislation shall prevail. However, every attempt would be made to reconcile the conflict.” 93. In view of the discussion made and reasons recorded above, we uphold the constitutional validity of 1987 Act, 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam. The Notification dated 20.8.1991 issued by the State of Maharashtra shall not be implemented without further orders from this Court in the light of what is stated in para 85. 94. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 2452 of 1992 is dismissed subject to above observations as to the implementation of the impugned notification. Civil Appeal Nos. 2529 of 1992 and 2530 of 1992 are dismissed in terms of this judgment. Transfer Case (C) Nos. 8-11/89 (i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 1953/87 and 1960, 1974 & 2054/87) are dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos. 1222-1224 of 1985 are allowed, the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed. No Costs. Appeals disposed of accordingly.