Judgment N.N. Mathur, J.-The special appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.1.2003, dismissing the writ petition with a direction to the respondents to expeditiously conclude the departmental enquiry against the appellant, preferably within a period of six months. 2. The question arises for consideration in the instant special appeal is whether disciplinary proceedings against the appellant can be quashed on the ground of delay? In this context, we may refer to the sequence of events. 3. The appellant a Teacher Grade II posted in the Senior Secondary Girls School, Banswara was transferred to the Government Girls Middle School, Chokhla by order dated 30.7.1991. After joining the duties, she made a representation to the Director, Department of Education, Bikaner to accommodate her in a school near Banswara. The Deputy Director, Education, Udaipur Range, Udaipur issued an order dated 10.1991, whereby, she was transferred to Government Girls Secondary School, Thikaria by way of adjustment (samayojan). The order reads as follows:- Þdk;kZasy; fk{kk mi&funskd ¼efgyk;½ mn;iqj e.My] mn;iqj dk;kZy; & vknsk Jhefr lqjthr dkSj ofj"B v/;kfidk jk-ck-m-ek-fo-ckalokM+k dk ftyk fk{kk vf /kdkjh Nk=k, ckalokM+k ds vknsk ´ekad 3091&311 fnukad 30-7-1991 }kjk iz/kkuk/;kfidk jk-ck-m-izk-fo- pks[kyk ÙckalokM+kÛ esa LFkkukUrj.k fd;k x;k FkkA qla;Dr funskd ¼dkfeZd½ izkFkfed ,oa ek/;fed fk{kk jktLFkku chdkusj ds funsZk fnukad 28-9-1991 dh vuqikyuk esj dk lek;ksa Jherh dkStu jktdh; ckfydk ek/;fed fo|ky;] Bhdfj;k ¼ckalokM+k½ esa fd;k tkrk gSA bUgsa ;k=k O;; ,oa ;ksxdky ns; ugha gksxkA ,l@Mh fk{kk mi&funskd ¼ek/;fed½ mn;iqj] e.My mn;iqj ¼jkt-½ Øekad % 2¼2½ f kmu ¼e½@mn;@laLFkk@1@91&92@821 fnukad 4-10-1991 izfrfyfi lwpukFkZ ,oa ikyukFkZ%& 1-la; qDr funskd ¼dkfeZd izk- ,oa ek-fk-jk- chdkusj½ 2-ftyk fk{kk vf /kdkjh Nk=k,a ckalokM+k dks Hkst dj ys[k gS fd budk osru ftys ds fdlh Hkh fjDr in ls mBkus dh O;oLFkk djsA 3-iz/kkukpk;kZ jk-ck-m-ek-fo-ckalokMkA 4-iz/kkuk/;kfidk jk-ck-ek-fo-Bhdfj;k ¼ckalokM+k½ +Jherh lqjthr dkSj ekQZr Mk- eueksguflag Ñf "k vuqla/kku dsUnz ckalokM5 k ¼jkt-½A 6-O;fDrxr iaftdkA Jherh dkSjA 7. iz-m- jk-ck-m-izk-fo-pkS[kyk ¼ckalokM+k½A fk{kk mifunskd ¼efgyk,a½ mn;iqj e.My mn;iqj ¼jkt-½ 4. The appellant joined her duties at the new place of posting i.e. Government Girls Secondary School, Thikaria on 110.1991. While working as a Teacher Grade II at Thikaria, she proceeded on medical leave from 18.4.1992 to 30.4.1992. iz-m- jk-ck-m-izk-fo-pkS[kyk ¼ckalokM+k½A fk{kk mifunskd ¼efgyk,a½ mn;iqj e.My mn;iqj ¼jkt-½ 4. The appellant joined her duties at the new place of posting i.e. Government Girls Secondary School, Thikaria on 110.1991. While working as a Teacher Grade II at Thikaria, she proceeded on medical leave from 18.4.1992 to 30.4.1992. On return from the leave, she was told that she has been relieved w.e.f. 18.4.1992 in pursuance of the order of the District Education Officer (Women), Banswara dated 27.3.1992, whereby, a decision was taken to cancel all the postings made by way of deputations. Since, the appellant was on leave, the order was sent to her under U.P.C. She was asked to join at Zolana. 5. The appellant filed a civil suit in the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Banswara. The arguments were heard on application for temporary injunction. The respondents took a plea that the appellant was on leave on 18.4.1992. The learned Magistrate having found a prima facie case, directed to maintain status quo. The appellant was not allowed to join her duties even after the order of the learned Civil Judge, as such, a contempt petition was filed. While hearing the Contempt Petition, a statement was made on behalf of respondents to the effect that the appellant shall be paid salary for the period 18.4.1992 to 30.4.1992. In view of the said statement, the suit was withdrawn. Still the District Education Officer was not prepared to allow the appellant to continue at Thikaria. The matter was taken to the Deputy Director of Education, who in turn, by order dated 211.1992, directed the appellant to continue at Thikaria. The Joint Director, Education by order dated 310.1992 also directed the appellant to continue at Thikaria. The appellant made repeated representations for payment of salary for the period 18.4.1992 to 12.1992. The District Education Officer (Women), Banswara being satisfied that the appellant had attended her duties at Thikaria from 18.4.1992 to 12.1992, made a recommendation to the Deputy Director (Women), Range Udaipur for payment of salary for the said period. The Deputy Director, Secondary Education (Women), Range Udaipur under communication dated 110.1998 directed the appellant to appear before the District Education Officer, Banswara on 110.1998 to present her case. However, subsequently the Joint Director, Primary School, Bikaner directed that the matter to be heard by the Deputy Director, Secondary School, Range Udaipur. The Deputy Director, Secondary Education (Women), Range Udaipur under communication dated 110.1998 directed the appellant to appear before the District Education Officer, Banswara on 110.1998 to present her case. However, subsequently the Joint Director, Primary School, Bikaner directed that the matter to be heard by the Deputy Director, Secondary School, Range Udaipur. The Deputy Director found that the Head Mistress by her letter dated 11.1992 admitted that the appellant had attended the school during the period 18.4.1992 to 12.1992. The said admission was made while the civil suit was pending in the Court of Munsif Magistrate. Considering the material on record, the Deputy Director directed the Head Mistress, Secondary School, Thikaria to make payment to the appellant for the period 18.4.1992 to 12.1992. A further direction was given to treat the said period as period on leave. Strangely, the matter was re-opened by the succeeding Deputy Director. He took a view that the appellant had remained absent during the subject period. He further directed to initiate a departmental enquiry against the appellant. Accordingly, an enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 has been initiated against the appellant and a memo dated 27.6.2000 has been served upon the appellant. 6. The learned Single Judge by a brief order dismissed the writ petition on the ground of seriousness of charges i.e. the appellant remained absent from duty for a period of more than 8 months. It is contended by the learned Counsel that there is a gross delay of 8 years in initiating the enquiry against the appellant, which itself is sufficient to vitiate the enquiry. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Honble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh & Anr., reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738. He has also placed reliance on an another decision of the Honble Apex Court in State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan, reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154 . It is held therein that the Court is required to take into consideration all the relevant factors including the delay in initiation of an enquiry while considering the question of quashing of charge. It is held therein that the Court is required to take into consideration all the relevant factors including the delay in initiation of an enquiry while considering the question of quashing of charge. The Court also observed that delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. It would be convenient to extract para 19 of the Judgment , which reads as follows:-"It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that discilinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the fact of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basis principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations." 7. In the present case, the Head Mistress, Secondary School, Thikaria had taken an adamant posture and at a later stage, the Deputy Director, Education, Range Udaipur, ignoring the directions given by its predecessor, took a decision to initiate an enquiry. There is no justifiable reason for the delay in initiation of an enquiry. The delay is prejudicial for the appellant in as much that at a belated stage, it may not be possible for her to show that she had actually attended the school. Thus, the enquiry against the appellant deserves to be quashed on the ground of delay. 8. Now, it is well established that if the charges are found to be groundless or void ab initio or on baseless grounds or without iota of evidence to frame such charges or there is non-application of mind of the disciplinary authority to the admitted facts, the High Court can intervene and quash the charges. Reference be made to Sukhraj Singh vs. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, reported in 1988 (2) RLW 432. In the instant case, as per the case of respondents, the appellant was relieved on 18.4.1992, in pursuance of the order of the District Education Officer, withdrawing the officers posted on deputation. Thus, the question arises, whether the appellant was posted on deputation in the school at Thikaria? The posting order extracted in the earlier part of the order clearly shows that she was posted in the school at Thikaria by `samayojan i.e. by accommodation. It may not be said that she was in the said school by way of deputation. A civil suit was filed in that regard in the Court of Munsif Magistrate. A specific plea was taken that she could not have been relieved as she was not in the school at Thikaria on deputation. However, the suit was withdrawn on the assurance given by the department that she will be paid salary for the subject period. A civil suit was filed in that regard in the Court of Munsif Magistrate. A specific plea was taken that she could not have been relieved as she was not in the school at Thikaria on deputation. However, the suit was withdrawn on the assurance given by the department that she will be paid salary for the subject period. It is unfair on the part of the department to take a somersault and instead of paying dues to the appellant, initiated a departmental enquiry. The appellant was arbitrarily relieved in her absence on the ground that she was on deputation. In fact she was transferred to a school at Thikaria, by way of accommodation and not deputation. Thus, there is no purpose to continue with the enquiry as there is no material worth the name, even to say prima facie case against her. On the contrary she has suffered because of unreasonable attitude adopted by the officers concerned. 9. Consequently, the Special Appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The departmental proceedings initiated against the appellant by serving a memo dated 27.6.2000 is quashed and set aside. The appellant shall be paid salary for the subject period within a period of two months. A compliance report be submitted to this Court. No order as to costs.