ORDER 1. Heard Ms Madhusmita Bora, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr Ajay Siwach, learned counsel for the respondents, at length. 2. The appellant was recruited as Constable to the Haryana Police Service on 31-7-1985. He was promoted as Head Constable on 11-7-1992. At the relevant time, he was posted in the Executive Clerical Branch at Gurgaon. On the basis of a complaint said to have been lodged by one Japanese national, Mr Kenichi Tanaka, an investigation was carried out by Deputy Superintendent of police and on that basis, the services of the appellant were a terminated by resorting to the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, dispensing with the inquiry. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the disciplinary authority, which was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, he filed an appeal before the disciplinary appellate authority which was also dismissed. The High Court, by the impugned order, also dismissed the writ petition preferred by him. Hence, this appeal by special leave. 3. The sole contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that no reasons much less sufficient reasons have been disclosed in the impugned order as to why the authority was satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. 4. The services of the appellant were terminated by order dated 27-12-1999. The order speaks for itself and is extracted: "A news item appeared in a Hindi daily (Punjab Kesri) on 1-12-1999 wherein reference was made to an allegation made by one Japanese national Shri Kenichi Tanaka, Country Manager, Nikkyo Corporation, India Branch resident of House No. 1545, Sector 17-C, Gurgaon regarding bribe money paid by him for securing extension of his visa in Gurgaon. The Deputy Superintendent of police, Shri Yoginder Nehra, HPS was asked to conduct an enquiry into the matter and to fix responsibility. The enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report dated 17-12-1999 in which he held the dealing hand HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN guilty of accepting a bribe of Rs 2840 (Rs two thousand eight hundred and forty) from Mr Kenichi Tanaka. The visa of Mr Kenichi Tanaka was to expire on 21-12-1999 and he applied for extension of visa for a period of one year from 22-12-1999 to 21-12-2000 on 1-10-1999. The visa of Mr Kenichi Tanaka was to expire on 21-12-1999 and he applied for extension of visa for a period of one year from 22-12-1999 to 21-12-2000 on 1-10-1999. He was made to pay a total of Rs 5000 to the dealing clerk, out of which Rs 2160 was the extension fee and rest of money was pocket (pocketed?) by HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN. Mr Kenichi Tanaka was also threatened by the delinquent official that in case of non-payment of bribe money he (foreign national) would face difficulty and his case would not be favourably recommended. Only on the payment of the bribe money the case of Mr Kenichi Tanaka was processed and forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon vide this Office Memo No. 16760-63/Security Branch dated 4-10-1999. The enquiry officer stated in his report that the foreign national Mr Kenichi Tanaka refused to nake (name?) the dealing clerk as he feared harassment. But the statement of ASI Shiv Dutt, In-charge, Security Branch and ASI Lal Singh, OA SI clearly reveals that it was HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN who was posted as Foreign Registration Clerk in the District police Office, Gurgaon on 1-10-1999 and he had processed the visa extension case of Shri Kenichi Tanaka and that he had also deposited the extension fee of Rs 2160 in State Bank of Patiala, Mini Secretariat Branch, Gurgaon on behalf of Shri Kenichi Tanaka. Therefore, there is no doubt whatsoever about the identity of the delinquent official, HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN who accepted illegal gratification in this case. The fact that the delinquent official HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN himself went to the bank branch situated about half a kilometre away from this office to deposit the extension fee also points towards ulterior motive on his part. Otherwise, the extension fee could have been deposited by the applicant himself. A perusal of the file reveals that even though Mr Tanaka refused to name the dealing hand, yet he sent a letter dated 6-12-1999 written on the official letter pad of Nikkyo Corporation and addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon in which he clearly wrote that he had to pay bribes for getting his visa extension case processed in the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon but he did not want to name the person. The averments made by the enquiry officer in his report, thus, are corroborated by the .contents of this letter. The report of the enquiry officer, statements of AS! Shiv Dutt, ASI Lal Singh, HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN and the abovementioned letter written by Mr Kenichi Tanaka dated 6-12-1999 clearly establish the fact that HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN, Foreigner Registration Clerk demanded and extorted bribe money of Rs 2840 from Mr Kenichi Tanaka for getting his visa extension case processed in the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon. But this foreign national does not wish to name him out of fear of harassment. HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN extorted Rs 2840 as illegal gratification and brought bad name to the Nation. But in this case in the opinion of the undersigned, judicial proceeding against the delinquent official are not likely to succeed as the main prosecution witness refuses to name him. Further, he being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country also. Therefore, the undersigned wrote to the District Magistrate, Gurgaon vide this Office Memo No. 51007 dated 20-12-1999 for concurrence under PPR 16.38(1) to take action against the delinquent official as per service law and rules. The District Magistrate, Gurgaon concurred with the opinion of the undersigned and conveyed the same vide his Office Memo No. 1932/PB dated 22-12-1999. Further conducting a regular departmental enquiry in this case is not reasonably practicable because the main prosecution witness Mr Kenichi Tanaka is a foreigner and he may leave the country in the midst of the departmental proceedings. He is also not likely to name the delinquent official even during the regular departmental proceedings which is evident from his letter dated 6-12-1999 and report of the enquiry officer. Therefore, conducting regular departmental enquiry against this delinquent official is not going to be reasonably practicable and it is my considered opinion that it is a fit case to proceed against this corrupt official namely HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. It is sad but a bitter reality that corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politic, social fabric of efficiency in the public services and demoralizing the honest officers. The corrupt officials manipulate the system in such a way that no traceable evidence is left on the record. It is sad but a bitter reality that corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politic, social fabric of efficiency in the public services and demoralizing the honest officers. The corrupt officials manipulate the system in such a way that no traceable evidence is left on the record. Even though corruption is widely prevalent in our country, yet very few cases come out in the open and the culprits are awarded punishment in even fewer cases because of lack of evidence or relunctance on the part of prosecution witnesses to name the guilty. Apart from indulging in corruption, the delinquent official HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN has also brought bad name to the nation and it is the duty of the undersigned to punish the likes of him to set an example for others. Hence, the delinquent HC Sudesh Kumar No. 36/GGN is hereby dismissed from service under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India with immediate effect. Order be booked and a copy of this order be delivered to the delinquent free of cost. True copy sd/- Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon 27-12-1999." (Quoted from the paper-book) 5. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry under Article 311 (2) is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is an exception. The authority dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. A reading of the termination order by invoking Article 311(2)(b), as extracted above, would clearly show that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons disclosed in the termination order are that the complainant refused to name the accused out of fear of harassment; the complainant, being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country and once he left the country, it may not be reasonably practicable to bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated 23-12-1999, the visa of the complainant was extended up to 22-12-2000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated 23-12-1999, the visa of the complainant was extended up to 22-12-2000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing enshrined in Article 311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. This he can 9 do only if inquiry is held where he has been informed of the charges levelled against him. In the instant case, the mandate of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has been violated depriving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant. 7. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the order terminating the services of the appellant is not sustainable in law. It is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. However, the respondents are at liberty, if so advised, to hold an inquiry against the appellant by affording him a reasonable opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass any order as it may deem fit and a proper in accordance with law. 8. The civil appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 9. No costs.