Judgment Surya Kant, J. 1. The appellants, who are brother and sister, are in appeal against the judgment and order dated January 16, 1988 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur whereby they were held guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A/34, 304/34 and 304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Whereas, appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) was sentenced to undergo RI for ten years under Section 304-B, IPC, RI for five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default whereof to undergo further RI for two years under Section 306/34, IPC and RI for two years and a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default whereof to undergo further RI for six months under Section 498-A/34, IPC, his sister-appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari), was sentenced to undergo RI for seven years under Section 304-B/34, IPC, RI for three years and a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default whereof to undergo further RI. for nine months under Sections 306/34, IPC and RI for one year as also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 in default whereof to undergo further RI for three months under Section 498-A/34, IPC. All the substantive sentences imposed upon the appellants were, however, directed to run concurrently. 2. The factual premise upon which the prosecution case rests is that appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) was married to the deceased (Usha Rani) about three and half years before the date of occurrence which took place on May 16, 1987. However, the date of marriage has not been brought on record by either of the parties. It was alleged that no scooter and video were given to appellant No. 1 in the marriage, though father (Jagan Nath) of the deceased (Usha Rani) had spent about Rs. 70,000 on the marriage of his daughter. Appellant No. 1, therefore, started making demands for a scooter and video from the very next day of the marriage and started maltreating the deceased on that count. About eight months before the occurrence Jagan Nath, father of the deceased (PW-3), Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) and Om Prakash (PW-4), etc, visited Fazilka to persuade the appellants not to maltreat Usha Rani by demanding scooter and video for which Jagan Nath, father of the deceased, had no means to provide. About eight months before the occurrence Jagan Nath, father of the deceased (PW-3), Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) and Om Prakash (PW-4), etc, visited Fazilka to persuade the appellants not to maltreat Usha Rani by demanding scooter and video for which Jagan Nath, father of the deceased, had no means to provide. About five months before the occurrence, a male child was born to Usha Rani at her parental house and when the child was about two months old that Usha Rani went along with her brother-Sandip Kumar to her in-laws house at Fazilka, Usha Rani, however, returned to Abohar, i.e. at her parental place on the very next day and told that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) had taunted her for not bringing the scooter and video and that she was given beatings by appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan). Her family members accordingly decided not to send her to Fazilka. However, about six days before the occurrence, appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) came to Abohar on a Sunday to take the deceased-Usha Rani to Fazilka, Appellant No. 1 was advised by Jagan Nath, Ramesh Kumar and Om Prakash not to harass Usha Rani and upon his assurance that Usha Rani was sent to Fazilka along with appellant No. 1. On May 16, 1987, Ramesh Kumar (PW-2), who is son of maternal uncle of deceased, had gone to Fazilka in connection with some challan case under the Shops Act and at about 10 a.m. he went to his cousin sister-Usha Rani. He found that some portion of the house of Usha Rani was on fire. He, therefore, immediately went to inform the fire brigade. The fire brigade extinguished the fire, upon which he found the burnt body of his sister-Usha Rani and thereupon got lodged the FIR. The appellants were put to trial under Sections 306/304-B/498-A/34, IPC, which culminated into their conviction and sentence, reference to which has already been made. 3. It may be mentioned here that the present appeal was admitted on January 20, 1988 and after notice to the State, sentence imposed upon the appellants was suspended till the disposal of the appeal vide an order dated January 25, 1988. During the interregnum, it is stated that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari), who was aged about 20 years at the time of occurrence, has been married. During the interregnum, it is stated that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari), who was aged about 20 years at the time of occurrence, has been married. Five months old male child of the deceased and appellant No. 1 is also grown up and is now about 18 years of age. 4. In order to establish the charges, the prosecution examined 8 witnesses including father of the deceased (PW-3), her cousin brother and author of the FIR (PW-2) and deceaseds fathers neighbour, Om Prakash (PW-4), apart from Dr. Pradeep Kumar (PW-1), who had conducted post-mortem of deceased Usha Rani and submitted the report Ex. PA/1 in that regard. The appellants also led defence evidence which included the documentary evidence, Ex. DA to Ex. DQ, apart from six defence witnesses. Their primary defence has been that the deceased Usha Rani died an accidental death as the house caught fire. Alternatively, they have suggested that the deceased Usha Rani might have committed suicide on account of being under depression by the fact that both unmarried sisters of appellant No. 1 (including appellant No. 2) were working as teachers in a private school and it was the deceased who was required to do the entire household work, due to which she had been insisting upon appellant No. 1 to live separately from his parents and other family members, but the said demand was turned down by appellant No. 1 on the plea that unless his sisters are married, he cannot live separately from his parents. 5. Harping upon the same defence, learned Counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the evidence on record clearly establishes that a part of the house of the appellants caught fire and was completely burnt. Unfortunately, deceased Usha Rani was in the room which caught fire and thus died an accidental death. To substantiate this plea, it has been argued that the Investigating Officer, who reached and immediately inspected the post, did not find any material, like, kerosene oil, as is evident from the recovery memos (Exs. PE and PF) nor any kind of inflammatory item was detected on the body of the deceased by Dr. Pradeep Kumar (PW-1) at the time when he conducted the post-mortem. PE and PF) nor any kind of inflammatory item was detected on the body of the deceased by Dr. Pradeep Kumar (PW-1) at the time when he conducted the post-mortem. It has been contended that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellants either by demanding dowry or otherwise and, thus, no case under Section 304-B. IPC is made out. It is then contended that the documents on record, especially the letters allegedly written by the younger sister of the deceased, Ex. DW 6/1, Ex. DW 6/2 and Ex. DW 6/7, apart from photographs, Ex. DC to Ex. DF belie the prosecution case regarding the demand of dowry and/or causing harassment to the deceased by the appellants to such an extent which would have compelled her to commit suicide and, thus, no case under Section 306, IPC is also made out. Learned Counsel for the appellants, relying upon the documents, Ex. DH to Ex. DQ, strenuously argued that the story put by up the prosecution as if the child was born to the deceased at her parental house or that when she came to her in-laws house, after about two months of the birth of the child, she was sent back on the very next day, is nothing but a cooked up story inasmuch as from the aforementioned documents it stands established beyond doubt that the pre-delivery medical check up of the deceased was regularly got done at Fazilka, i.e., the place of her in-laws, the child was born there only and all possible care was provided to the mother as well as the newly born baby. It has been suggested that Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) is a chance witness, who being resident of Abohar, has been merely planted by the prosecution. It has been highlighted that the oral evidence in relation to the visit by a group of respectables from the girls side to the house of the appellants, is self-contradictory and at variance. Relying upon some oral evidence on record which indicates that the father of the deceased is a financially poor person, it has been argued that the allegation of demand of scooter or video from such person is otherwise absurd. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants then submitted that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) has been implicated on the basis of inflated prosecution version. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants then submitted that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) has been implicated on the basis of inflated prosecution version. It is contended that the prosecution evidence on record does suggest that she refused to get married to brother of Ramesh Kumar (PW-2), therefore, out of vengeance that she has been implicated. It is also contended that from the defence evidence led by the appellants, it is clearly established that she was working as a teacher in a private school and was on duty on the date of occurrence. A case of contradictory version by PW-2 and PW-4 on the one hand and PW-3 on the other hand in relation to the allegations pertaining to the demand of dowry by appellant No. 2, is also sought to be made out. It is then argued that appellant No. 2 was an unmarried girl at that time, therefore, demand of scooter or video by her is ridiculous, especially when the prosecutions own case is that these dowry items were demanded by appellant No. 1. 7. Alternatively and only in the event of non-acceptance of his aforementioned submissions, learned Counsel in order to implore compassion for the appellants, has submitted that the occurrence had taken place in the year 1987; appellant No. 1 did not remarry and completely devoted himself to the welfare and future of his then five months old child, who is now a grown up boy of about 18 years of age; appellant No. 2 was a young unmarried girl of about 20 years at that time, who has now got married and is fastened with family responsibilities; her children are in such a tender-age that without the company of their mother, their academic and future career will be completely ruined and subjecting the appellants to undergo actual sentence after allowing them to remain on bail for a period of more than 17 years, especially when they never ever misused the concession of bail, will cause extreme hardship to them and their families. 8. 8. On the other hand, learned State Counsel has vehemently argued that the contention of the defence as if the deceased died an accidental death due to the alleged fire in a part of the house, has no factual basis inasmuch as if it was a case of accidental fire, how could a five months old baby and/or the aged parents of the appellants would have escaped unhurt. She has made a pointed reference to the specific allegations regarding demand of dowry and/or causing harassment to the deceased, which have been established beyond any doubt by the prosecution. 9. In order to find out as to whether or not the prosecution has established its case under Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC beyond shadow of doubt, there are two admitted and undisputed circumstances on record, namely, the deceased died an unnatural death caused by burns and the death has taken place within seven years of her marriage. If the prosecution had led evidence, worth inspiring confidence, to show that soon before her death, the deceased Usha Rani was subjected to cruelty or harassment by appellant No. 1, i.e., her husband or any of his relatives, by demanding dowry, all the ingredients of Section 304-B, IPC shall stand established. As a necessary corollary thereof, appellant No. 1, namely, husband of the deceased or any of his such relatives will have to be held guilty of subjecting the deceased-Usha Rani to cruelty, thereby inviting rigors of Section 498-A, IPC as well. The legislative intent behind Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, in terms whereof, if soon before the death of a woman, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry, the Court shall have to presume that the person, who subjected her to such cruelty or harassment had caused the dowry death, has also to be kept in view. The recent observations made by the Apex Court in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. III (2005) CCR 43 (SC) : 2005 (3) RCR (Criminal) 745, that the Courts should be extra cautious while dealing with the allegations of demand of dowry so that possibility of false accusation of an innocent person is ruled out but, at the same time, the legislative object of striking at the roots of the dowry menace is also successfully achieved, are also the apposite guidelines. 10. 10. In order to separate the grain from chaff, it will be expedient to segregate the common evidence led by prosecution against both the appellants in support of its allegations that there was a demand for dowry by them and the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for that reason and thereafter to consider it against them individually. 11. Appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) is the husband of the deceased. The occurrence, in which his wife (deceased Usha Rani) died on account of burn injuries is alleged to have taken place on May 16, 1987 at about 10 a.m. The FIR was got registered at 11.50 a.m. on that very day on the basis of the statement (Ex. PD) of Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) in which he alleged that after the marriage, his brother-in-law (Kewal Krishan) used to maltreat his sister Usha Rani to bring scooter and video on being tutored by Vijay Kumari, sister-in- law of his sister. He further alleged that these facts were narrated by the deceased-Usha Rani whenever she came to Abohar. The complainant-Ramesh Kumar also appeared as PW-2. In his deposition, Ramesh Kumar has categorically stated that "Kewal Krishan demanded a scooter and video. My uncle Jagan Nath has no means to meet the demand". He, however, has further stated that Vijay Kumari (appellant No. 2) used to taunt the deceased for that purpose. He further deposed that Kewal Krishan (appellant No. 1) gave beatings to Usha Rani and about six days before the occurrence, he (Kewal Krishan) brought the deceased back to Abohar where the witness, his maternal uncle-Jagan Nath and one Om Parkash had asked appellant No. 1 not to harass and maltreat the deceased. In his cross-examination, PW-2 has denied that he wanted Vijay Kumari (appellant No. 2) to marry his brother Surender but appellant No. 2 refused the same. The father of the deceased, namely, Jagan Nath has also stepped into the witness box as PW-3. Though he says that appellant No. 2 was making demand for scooter and video, he further deposed that six days before the occurrence it was appellant No. 1 who was advised not to harass Usha Rani as the witness was not in position to give a scooter and video. Though he says that appellant No. 2 was making demand for scooter and video, he further deposed that six days before the occurrence it was appellant No. 1 who was advised not to harass Usha Rani as the witness was not in position to give a scooter and video. He has, however, denied the suggestion that his deceased daughter was required to do all the household work, therefore, she wanted her husband to live separately from his family and upon his not agreeing to it that the deceased was under depression. 12. PW-4 (Om Prakash) is known to the family of the deceased. He has stated that "Kewal Krishan was demanding scooter and video but he told him that father of the deceased was not in position to provide the same". He further deposed that Kewal Krishan accused had come to take the deceased and that they had advised him while sending the deceased with him to Fazilka that she should not be harassed for dowry. 13. From the oral evidence on record, it is, thus, apparent that while all the witnesses are consistent in levelling allegations against appellant No. 1 for demanding dowry and/or causing harassment to the deceased on that count, they are discrepant in that regard so far as appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) is concerned. 14. On a critical analysis of the evidence led by the prosecution, it stands concluded that the demand for dowry was for two specific items, namely, scooter and video. If the said demand, as alleged by PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4, had been made by appellant No. 1, namely, husband of the deceased, it appears inconceivable as to why appellant No. 2 would also demand the same items from her sister-in-law. Normally, if appellant No. 2 too had a greed for dowry, she could have demanded such items as were for her own use like jewellery, dresses or other gifts etc. It is not the case of the prosecution that appellant No. 2 caused any harassment or cruelty to the deceased "for not fulfilling the demand for dowry made by her brother". The allegation for demand for dowry has been levelled independently and separately against appellant No. 2. Any young unmarried girl, about whom the evidence on record suggests that talks for marriage were going on, in my view, would have neither demanded nor expected a scooter or video from her sister-in-law. The allegation for demand for dowry has been levelled independently and separately against appellant No. 2. Any young unmarried girl, about whom the evidence on record suggests that talks for marriage were going on, in my view, would have neither demanded nor expected a scooter or video from her sister-in-law. While allegations against appellant No. 2 made by PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 are on the basis of what the deceased had allegedly told them, they had directly confronted appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) and allegedly told him that his demand for scooter and video could not be fulfilled by Jagan Nath (PW-3) for want of means. Thus, the evidence in relation to the demand for dowry and of causing cruelty and harassment to the deceased for non-fulfilment of such demand, in the case of appellant No. 1 on one hand and appellant No. 2 on the other hand, is not the same in terms of credibility, admissibility and acceptability. While there is direct and convincing evidence on record in that regard against appellant No. 1, the same, in the case of appellant No. 2, suffers from legal and factual infirmities leading to a needle of suspicion towards the prosecution case against her. 15. So far as the defence evidence is concerned, from the statements of Dr. Inder Mohan Chalana (DW-1) and Dr. (Mrs.) Harsh Chhabra (DW-2), no inference, much less strong enough, to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, can be drawn. Even if the deceased was taken for medical check-up at the pre-delivery stage on few occasions, it does not belie the allegations regarding demand of dowry. Similarly, from the statement of DW-3 (Vinod Kumar) a shop-keeper or the bills issued by him, no adverse inference against the case set up by the prosecution can be drawn. DW-4 (Ajit Singh) is Manager of Guru Teg Bahadur School, Fazilka. From his statement, it appears that the school was being run by a Society of repute and on the basis of the office record including Attendance Register brought by him in the Court, he deposed that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) had been working as a teacher in the school since July, 1985 and was present in the school on May 16, 1987 from 7.15 a.m. onwards. He has further deposed that appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) and her sister (Asha Rani), who was also working as Head Mistress, attended the school upto 10.30 a.m. on May 16, 1987 and left the same on receipt of a message that their house had caught fire. His cross-examination does not cause any dent to what he has deposed in the examination-in-chief. However, appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) has not been tried for an offence under Section 302, IPC, therefore, her presence in the school at the time of occurrence has no material bearing in the context of the charges under Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC. 16. Similarly, it will be too far-fatched to infer from the letters, Exs. DW6/1, DW 6/2 and DW 6/7 purported to be written by the unmarried younger sister of the deceased that there was no demand for dowry and/or the deceased was not subjected to any cruelty and harassment for not bringing the same. It is not expected that a young unmarried girl of 17-18 years of age was made aware of the cause of matrimonial discord of her elder sister and she might have written these two-three letters out of her emotional attachment to her sister and brother-in-law. Had there been some letters written by the deceased with no direct or indirect allegation against her husband or in-laws, the same could have lent support of the defence version. 17. Coming to the contention of learned Counsel that the deceased died an accidental death as a part of the house had caught fire, I have gone through the statement of the Investigating Officer - SI Harbans Lal (PW-7) and have minutely seen the site plan, Ex. PG. The statement of Dr. Pardeep Kumar (PW- 1) and the post-mortem report (Ex. PA) too have a direct bearing on this aspect of the case, In my view, had it been a case of accidental fire in the store/room marked as "A" in the site plan Ex. PG, it could not have caused 100% burn injuries to the deceased even if she was engulfed in fire unaware. The said store/room opens in two directions, one towards another room and the other towards the verandah which adjoins the open courtyard. PG, it could not have caused 100% burn injuries to the deceased even if she was engulfed in fire unaware. The said store/room opens in two directions, one towards another room and the other towards the verandah which adjoins the open courtyard. In her efforts to save herself, the deceased could have run towards the verandah and then in the open courtyard which would have undoubtedly saved her from suffering 100% bum injuries. On the contrary, from the statements of the Investigating Officer (PW-7) and Ramesh Kumar (PW-2), it stands established that the occurrence had taken place in the room marked "A" in the site plan (Ex. PG) and it was from that spot that a burnt cot and some ash were taken into possession by the police vide memos Ex. PF. The fact that no kerosene oil was detected on the body of the deceased during the course of post-mortem or such an item was not taken into possession by the police at the time of preparing recovery memos, has no material bearing in view of the fact that the deceased had died on account of 100% burn injuries. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the aforementioned submission of learned Counsel for the appellants. 18. In the light of my above discussion, I am of the view that while the prosecution has proved its case against appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan), husband of the deceased, beyond any shadow of doubt, the evidence led by it against appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) falls short of holding her guilty of subjecting the deceased to cruelty and harassment. Appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari), therefore, deserves the benefit of doubt and her conviction and consequent sentence, thus, cannot sustain. 19. Coming to the third submission made by learned Counsel for the appellants, namely, compassion on account of the mitigating circumstances, referred to above, 1 am of the view that though having regard to the fact that appellant No. 1 has been found guilty of committing an offence not only against the victim but it being a case of dowry menace against the society as well, however, the fact remains that the occurrence had taken place in the year 1987 and for 17 long years he has remained on bail, which, according to learned State Counsel also, has not been misused by him in any manner. The fact that the appellant No. 1 did not remarry but spent all these years in nursing the then five months old baby left behind by the deceased is another mitigating circumstance which prompts the Court to show some leniency towards him. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the sentence awarded to appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan) under Section 304-B, IPC is reduced from ten years to seven years RI. However, the sentence awarded to him under Sections 306 and 498-A, IPC by the learned Trial Court shall remain intact. 20. For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to appellant No. 2 (Vijay Kumari) by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, vide his judgment and order dated January 16, 1988 is set aside and she is acquitted of the charges. In the case of appellant No. 1 (Kewal Krishan), his conviction under Sections, 304-B, 306 and 498-A, IPC as directed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur vide judgment and order dated January 16, 1988 is upheld, however, the aforesaid judgment and order is modified only to the extent of reduction of his sentence from ten years to seven years under Section 304-B, IPC. All the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. His bail bonds are accordingly cancelled and he is directed to surrender so as to undergo remainder of the sentence.