JUDGMENT The only question of law that arises for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether the Courts below were right in holding that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, particularly when there is a pleading that the respondents-defendants have created mortgage on the plaint schedule property in favour of the Bank and the same has not been discharged and the Bank had filed the suit against the respondents-defendants? 2. The appellant presented plaint in O.S.No.Nil/98 (G.L.No.5492/Dt.12-10-1998) before the learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandigama seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992. Along with the plaint, the agreement of sale and legal notices dated 5-7 -1995 and 30-10-1995 were also filed. The notice dated 30-10-1995 is said to have been returned on 13-11-1995. However, the plaint was rejected on 27-10-1998 passing the following Order: "This plaint filed for numbering of the suit on the objections raised by the Court. In this plaint, the plaintiff filed the plaint against the defendants for specific performance of the contract and in respect of the sale of land by the defendants. Thissale agreement entered by the plaintiff and the two defendants and another person on 21-10-92 for Rs.1,69,500/- and on the same day, the plaintiff paid Rs.50, 000/- to the defendants and another person on a condition the transaction shall be completed by 30-1-93. The other person received money from the plaintiff and performed his part of contract. The plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 5-7-95 to the defendants in respect of the contract, and thereon the defendants approached the plaintiff and requested the plaintiff more months for the performance of the contract. Again the plaintiff got issued another legal notice on 30-10-95 of which the defendants have not given any reply; as such the plaintiff came to know that the defendants refused to perform their part of contract. The plaint was filed on the date of 12-10-98. The objections for numbering of the plaint are whether the suit is filed within the period of limitation and whether the suit is maintainable on the basis of the agreement is partly performed. The counsel argued that the defendants though received the first legal notice dated 5-7-95 and requested 3 more months for the performance of their part of contract. Thereafter, the plaintiff got issued another legal notice dated 30-10-95 for which they refused. The counsel argued that the defendants though received the first legal notice dated 5-7-95 and requested 3 more months for the performance of their part of contract. Thereafter, the plaintiff got issued another legal notice dated 30-10-95 for which they refused. Hence, the limitation for the plaint arises only from the date of the refusal of the performance of the contract. Hence, this plaint is having tiled within a limitation period and argued that u/s.12 (3)(b)(ii) of Specific Relief Act. As the plaintiff has relinquished his right over the specific performance of remaining property mentioned in the agreement, since one of the vendors has already performed his part to that extent so this suit is maintainable. Perused the records and the original sale agreement and the legal notices and other record. The sale agreement was entered on 21-10-92 with a condition to perform the transaction by 30-1-93. The date of performance is clearly mentioned as 30-1-93. The counsel argued that the limitation starts from the date of the refusal to perform the contract that arose on 30-10-93 (sic.30-1-93). The suit is filed for specific performance of the contract. As Article 54 of the Limitation Act the limitation for the specific performance starts from the date fixed for the performance only. When the date is fixed for the specific performance and there must be refusal to perform part of contract. Here the date for performance of the contract is clearly mentioned as 30-1-93, where as the plaint is filed on 12-10-98. Hence, the plaint is tiled after limitation. Hence, it is rejected." 3. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant carried the matter in A. S. No. 98 of 1999 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nandigama. The appellate Court framed the point "Whether the relief sought for by the appellant can be considered or not?" for consideration and held as under: "....When once the specific date was mentioned in the agreement, stating that the plaintiff has to perform her contract and sale cannot linkup the act of the defendants. If at all the plaintiff wants to take the plea that the defendants have to perform their contract, only after performance made by the plaintiff. It is also not the case that the defendants have approached the plaintiff seeking three months time to perform their contract i.e., there is no documentary proof on this aspect at prima facie stage. If at all the plaintiff wants to take the plea that the defendants have to perform their contract, only after performance made by the plaintiff. It is also not the case that the defendants have approached the plaintiff seeking three months time to perform their contract i.e., there is no documentary proof on this aspect at prima facie stage. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot take the issuance of notices on which she relied upon to consider the limitation aspect. Therefore, Article 54 of the Limitation Act applied to this case in land (sic. on hand). Hence, I come to conclusion that the suit is not filed within limitation i.e. she violates the conditions stipulated in the agreement. Hence, the lower Court has courtesy (sic. correctly) rejected the plaint and there is no necessity of this Court to interfere with the lower Court order." Holding thus, the appeal was dismissed confirming the Order passed by the trial Court. Challenging the same, the present Second Appeal is filed. 4. Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously contended that unless and until the averments in the plaint are opposed by the other side, merely on a plain reading of the agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992, the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not cannot be decided. Both the Courts below have erred in just considering the agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992 and holding that its recitals would show that the sale deed should be got executed before 30-1-1993 and, therefore, the provisions of Article 54 of the Limitation Act are attracted and the limitation runs from 30-1-1993; thus, the suit is barred by limitation. Further, the Courts below have nottaken into consideration the entire recitals of agreement of sale; the English translation of which reads as under: "Chanumolu Radha Rani, wife of Venkata Narayana Rao, Resident of Gannavaram, Gannavaram Mandai, Krishna District. Vendors: 01. Chavata Janardhan Rao, son of Narasimham, Anasagarm village of Nandigama Mandai, Krishna District. 02. Thota Vishnu Rao, son of Venkatadri. 03. Thota Rama Chandra Rao, son of Venkatadri, Residents of Gowravaram village of Jaggaiahpet Mandai, Krishna District. The schedule property is the self-acquired property of No.1 of us and ancestral property of Nos.2 and 3 of us. The schedule property is in our possession and enjoyment with absolute rights, which is (sic. 02. Thota Vishnu Rao, son of Venkatadri. 03. Thota Rama Chandra Rao, son of Venkatadri, Residents of Gowravaram village of Jaggaiahpet Mandai, Krishna District. The schedule property is the self-acquired property of No.1 of us and ancestral property of Nos.2 and 3 of us. The schedule property is in our possession and enjoyment with absolute rights, which is (sic. un) encumbered to anyone and the same is sold to you at the rate of Rs.7,500/- per acre is seven thousand five hundred only and the total consideration of the total property of AC.22.60 cents is RS.1,69,500/- and the sale is confirmed for the same. In token of the same, you have paid advance amount of Rs.50,000/- to us today and receipt of the same is hereby acknowledged. It is agreed that the remaining balance of consideration of Rs.1,19,500/- has to be paid before 30-01-1993. We hereby undertake that any loans availed on this property and litigations, if any, will be cleared by us with our own money and we will see that this agreement is enforced without any troubles. It is agreed that the account will be settled as per the measurements of the land. We undertake to furnish you E.C. before the date of registration. With the above terms and conditions, after receiving the consideration in full, we will register the document either in your favour or any person(s) nominated by you with your expenses." 5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant further contended that a plain reading of the above recitals would indicate that the respondents have undertaken that they would clear any loan availed by them on the property in question and litigation, if any, with their own money and they would see that this agreement is enforced without any trouble. In fact, the suit schedule property was mortgaged to the Bank and the Bank had filed a suit for recovery of the loan amount. Therefore, the agreement of sale and its further performance was depending upon this contingency of clearing the loan by the respondents. In fact, the suit schedule property was mortgaged to the Bank and the Bank had filed a suit for recovery of the loan amount. Therefore, the agreement of sale and its further performance was depending upon this contingency of clearing the loan by the respondents. The Courts below have simply taken the recital "it is agreed that the remaining balance consideration of Rs.1,19,500/- has to be paid before 30-01-1993" and construed that since the appellant-plaintiff has not paid consideration by 30-1-1993 the limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act runs from that date i.e. 30-1-1993 and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation irrespective of the fact that there was some exchange of notices between the parties in the year 1995, which is contrary to law. The Courts below ought not to have taken such a stand without inviting objections from the respondent-defendants, since the subsequent and varied events to the agreement of sale are necessary to be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding as to whether the suit was barred by limitation or not. Such as exercise was not done by the Courts below. Even otherwise, after the written statements are filed, a preliminary issue could have been framed and decided as per law. Whereas, the appellant is thrown out at the threshold and the Courts below have taken up on their own as to the bar of limitation, which is not permissible under the law. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel brought to the notice of this Court, a Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in C.C.C.A. No.104 of 2004, dated 29-4-2004, which was confirmed by the Apex Court in S.L.P. (Civil) NO.11327 of 2004, dated 1-8-2005. In the said CCCA, it was observed thus: "28. A bare reading of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated so many facts and the same have to be decided by adducing sufficient evidence and the truth fullness or otherwise of the same cannot be decided at the stage of numbering the plaint in the absence of any material placed before the learned Judge by either of the parties. A bare reading of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated so many facts and the same have to be decided by adducing sufficient evidence and the truth fullness or otherwise of the same cannot be decided at the stage of numbering the plaint in the absence of any material placed before the learned Judge by either of the parties. In view of the fact that the learned Judge has gone into the merits of the case and has dealt with the matter so extensively by relying on the material, which was not pleaded either in the plaint or canvassed before him and in view of the fact that no opportunity was afforded to the appellant with regard to the point of limitation etc., the order of the learned Judge is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Chief Judge...." 6. He has also brought to the attention of this Court, a recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association1 wherein it was held as under: "In the present case, the respondent has relied upon clause (d) of Rule 11. Before dealing with the factual scenario, the spectrum of Order VII Rule 11 in the legal ambit needs to be noted. In Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (2003) 1 SCC 557 , it was held with reference to Order VII Rule 11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are the germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code states the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the pleading has to state material facts and not the evidence. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code states the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the pleading has to state material facts and not the evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeos case (2004 Indlaw SC 87), the inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the non-execution of lease deed was the basic issue.... The statement in the plaint without addition or subtraction must show that is barred by any law to attract application of Order VII Rule 11. This is not so in the present case." 7. Sir G. Dharma Rao, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that in all Ac.22.60 cts of land was purchased from three vendors, namely, Chavata Janardhan Rao, Thota Vishnu Rao and Thota Ramachandra Rao and they executed a regular sale deed for Ac.11.00 of land, whereas insofar as the rest of the land i.e. AC.11.60 gts of land is concerned, it was got cancelled thereafter and the respondents have returned the money paid therefor and entered into such an agreement. 8. Be that as it may, the only question that remains to be answered as noticed above is whether the suit was barred by limitation or not? 9. In a case like this whether the agreement of sale was conditional or it depends upon any contingency has to be seen. 8. Be that as it may, the only question that remains to be answered as noticed above is whether the suit was barred by limitation or not? 9. In a case like this whether the agreement of sale was conditional or it depends upon any contingency has to be seen. One thing is clear from the agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992 that the respondents are supposed to pay the remaining balance consideration of Rs.1,19,500/- on or before 30-1-1993.lt is an admitted fact that the appellant-plaintiff did not perform her part of paying Rs.1 ,19,500/before 30-1-1993, nor she has addressed any letter to the respondents-defendants seeking extension of time for payment of money etc., nor she has issued any notice before 30-1-1993 stating that the property in question was mortgaged to a Bank and as such, they should get it redeemed and get ready for registration of sale deed and she is ready to perform her part of contract. No such thing had happened. May be, she got issued legal notices on 5-7-1995 and 30-10-1995, but that itself does not improve the situation for the purpose of getting over Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under: Description of suit Period limitation Time from which period begins to run 54. For specific Three years The date fixed for the performance of a contract performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. The case of the appellant squarely falls into the first limb of the said Article 54 i.e. ‘the date fixed for the performance. In this case, the date fixed for payment of balance sale consideration is 30-1-1993. The mere recital of undertaking that the respondents would clear the debts, liabilities and encumbrances, if any, must be construed that they would complete their performance before 30-1-1993. This is in the nature of a general recital. In this case, admittedly no specific encumbrance is mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992, which is required to be cleared before 30-1-1993. Therefore, the date fixed for performance of the contract on the part of the appellant-plaintiff assumes importance i.e. 30-1-1993. Thus, the limitation runs from that date. The mere issuing of notices in the year 1995 has no effect whatsoever. The date of filing of the plaint is important for the purpose of deciding the limitation. Therefore, the date fixed for performance of the contract on the part of the appellant-plaintiff assumes importance i.e. 30-1-1993. Thus, the limitation runs from that date. The mere issuing of notices in the year 1995 has no effect whatsoever. The date of filing of the plaint is important for the purpose of deciding the limitation. In this case, admittedly, the plaint was presented on 12-10-1998 and the same was rejected on 27-10-1998. Therefore, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. 10. The Judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant have no relevance to the facts of this case, for the reason that whether on a plain reading of the agreement of sale it was conditional or time was the essence of the contract, was not the question involved therein. In this case, as noted above, undoubtedly, time was the essence of the contract. Apart from the above two Judgments, the learned counsel also relied upon an unreported Judgment in C.MA No.4601 of 2004, dated 18-1-2005 and submitted that none of the recitals in the agreement of sale dated 21-10-1992 merit rejection of the plaint without issuing summons to the defendants and without there being any trial. If the defendants, after issuing summons, raise any objection as regards the maintainability of the suit, that will form the subject matter of issue under Order XIV Rule 1 of CPC and could be a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2 of CPC. In the absence of any specific provision in law barring a suit for such relief of specific performance, the presumption of jurisdiction of a Civil Court to try the suit of civil nature under Section 9 of CPC cannot be taken to have been ousted. There cannot be any dispute as to the ratio laid down in the said case. It is only to be seen, whether the suit appears from the statement in the plaint, to be barred by any law. In this case, admittedly, though the cause of action arose on or after 30-1-1993, except exchange of notices, suit was not filed immediately and it was filed only on 12-10-1998. Therefore, no necessity arose for the Court to register the plaint and issue summons to the defendants for deciding the matter as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. In this case, admittedly, though the cause of action arose on or after 30-1-1993, except exchange of notices, suit was not filed immediately and it was filed only on 12-10-1998. Therefore, no necessity arose for the Court to register the plaint and issue summons to the defendants for deciding the matter as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. In fact, Order VII Rule 11 of CPC contemplates rejection of plaint under certain circumstances and clause (d) thereof stipulates ‘where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law but it does not contemplate issue of any summons to the defendants for such consideration as to rejection of the plaint. A plain reading of the agreement of sale and the averments of the plaint do not inspire the confidence of the Court to come to a different conclusion than what was reached by the Courts below. That part, a duty is cast on the Court entertaining a plaint to look into the averments in the plaint in proper perspective and consider the plaint as a whole to scan the essence of cause of action and arrive at a conclusion whether the cause of action as indicated and understood as a bundle of facts giving rise to a grievance of the plaintiff saves the limitation or not. Tested by this touchstone, it cannot be said that the Court below has not looked into the facts as a whole and came to the conclusion that the suit is barred by limitation. In fact, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court have passed fairly a good reasoned order for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to barring of the suit by limitation. It would have been altogether a different case had there been a plea that the time for payment of the balance consideration was extended by the parties on their mutual understanding. 11. For all the above reasons, the substantial question of law raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant pales into insignificance and the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed; but without any order as to costs.