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2005 DIGILAW 9 (MP)

Steel Ingots Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Assessment)

2005-01-03

A.M.SAPRE, ASHOK KUMAR TIWARI

body2005
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal filed by the assessee under Section 260a of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against an order dated February 29, 2000, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), in I. T. A. No. 268/ind of 1995. This appeal was admitted for final hearing by passing the following order on July 20, 2000. This is what the order sheet of July 20, 2000 records : "july 20, 2000. Shri R. L. Jain, L. C. for the appellant. Shri J. W. Mahajan, L. C. for the respondent. Heard on admission. The appeal is admitted on the following substantial question of law : whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honble Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in observing that since the very basis of assessment order dated December 3, 1987, no longer exists the appeal by the Revenue is of no substance? No notice is necessary to the other side as Shri Mahajan represents the respondent. (R. D. Vyas J.) (Shambhoo Singh J.)" ( 2. ) HEARD Shri M. Phadke, learned counsel for the appellant/assessee, and Shri R. L. Jain, learned senior counsel with Ku. V. Mandlik, learned counsel for the Revenue. ( 3. ) WE may at this stage mention that the names of the lawyers who appeared in the case on July 20, 2000 do not appear to be properly mentioned in the aforementioned order dated July 20, 2000. This is an appeal filed by the assessee. Shri Mahajan (since no more) was counsel for the assessee whereas Shri R. L. Jain was counsel for the Revenue. This fact was admitted by lawyers who appeared today at the hearing of this appeal. We, therefore, rectify the mistake in the order dated July 20, 2000, and direct that the name of Mr. Mahajan be read as lawyer appearing for the assessee on July 20, 2000 and the name of Mr. R. L. Jain be read as lawyer appearing for the Revenue, i. e. , (Commissioner of Income-tax ). ( 4. ) WHEN we perused the aforementioned substantial question of law framed by this court on July 20, 2000, with that of the substantial questions of law proposed by the appellant/assessee in their memo of appeal, we find that they do not match and tally with each other. ( 4. ) WHEN we perused the aforementioned substantial question of law framed by this court on July 20, 2000, with that of the substantial questions of law proposed by the appellant/assessee in their memo of appeal, we find that they do not match and tally with each other. This is what was proposed by the appellant in their memo of appeal in para. 7 : "i. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 68 of the Act can be applied in the case of the appellant for the assessment year 1991-92? ii. Whether the learned Tribunal is not applying Section 69 of the Income-tax Act to the facts of the case and erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant to prove the genuineness of the transactions specially when the Revenue had no material? iii. Whether the order of the learned Tribunal holding that the liability was bogus is perverse?" ( 5. ) IN sum and substance, the questions of law actually framed by this court on July 20, 2000, do not even remotely arise out of this case nor does it relate to this case at all. It is as if it has got absolutely no relation/connection with this appeal. The question proposed by the appellant in their appeal was regarding applicability of Sections 68 and 69 of the Act for the assessment year 1991-92. Whereas the question of law framed deals with some assessment order dated December 3, 1987. Obviously, it does not arise out of the case because in the case in hand, the assessment year is 1991-92 whereas the question refers to assessment order of 1987. ( 6. ) WHEN this was pointed out to learned counsel for the appellant as also to counsel appearing for the Revenue, he too fairly conceded that what is pointed out by this court at the threshold of the hearing of the appeal is correct. Learned counsel only regretted what had transpired on July 20, 2000, at the time of hearing of the appeal on admission and what has now been pointed out to them. Even then no application was made by the appellant for framing proper substantial question of law which according to the appellant really arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Learned counsel only regretted what had transpired on July 20, 2000, at the time of hearing of the appeal on admission and what has now been pointed out to them. Even then no application was made by the appellant for framing proper substantial question of law which according to the appellant really arises out of the order of the Tribunal. No oral prayer was also made at the hearing for invoking the powers under Section 260a (4) of the Act by this court for refraining the question by deleting what is framed and substituting the correct one in place of the wrongly framed question. ( 7. ) SECTION 260a of the Act is very clear. It only empowers this court to hear the appeal on the question framed by this court at the time of admission of appeal. It cannot be heard and decided on any other question not framed. Admittedly, what is framed in this appeal does not relate to this appeal nor does it arise out of the order of the Tribunal. In substance, it has got no relevance with this appeal. It is in other words, entirely foreign to the factual and legal controversy decided by the Tribunal by the impugned order. It cannot be answered by us because it does not arise and secondly even if it is answered which we are afraid is not permissible, the appeal cannot be disposed of on the merits. ( 8. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed involving no question of law within the meaning of Section 260a ibid. ( 9. ) NO costs.