Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal, filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (for brevity the Code), challenging the view taken by the learned Lower Appellate Court, Kurukshetra, holding that the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990 passed in civil suit No. 381 of 1990, in favour of defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur (now represented by respondent Nos. 1 and 2) did not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same could not be set aside. It has further been held that the plaintiff-appellant was absolute owner of the suit land and in his hand, the suit land was not ancestral in character qua the other co-parceners. The learned Lower Appellate Court has also held that the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990 passed in Civil Suit No. 381 of 1990 did not require registration, as the same was based on pre-existing rights of defendant No. l. 2. The dispute raised in the present proceedings is related to the property of one Ram Kishan @ Shiv Charan Singh. A small pedigree table would render assistance in understanding the controversy:- Bhagwan Singh | I Ram Kishan alias Shiv Charan Singh | __________________________________________________ | | | Banta Singh Rattan Singh Ujjagar Singh (Plaintiff) (Defendant No. 2) 3 The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of permanent injunction against defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur, to the effect that the judgment and decree obtained by defendant No. 1 from his brother Rattan Singh-defendant-respondent No. 3 is null and void and was not binding on his rights.The plaintiff-appellant Banta Singh has two brothers namely Rattan Singh and Ujjagar Singh. All of them had inherited the property from their fore-father Bhagwan Singh. The property was claimed to be ancestral in the hands of plaintiff-appellant as well as his brothers. It was claimed that they were co-parceners to the extent of 1/3rd share each. Ujjagar Singh, one of the brothers, had expired being unmarried and issueless and his share is alleged to have been transferred to the plaintiff-appellant. The other brother Rattan Singh-defen-dant-respondent No. 3 was also unmarried and issueless. It was claimed that they were co-parceners to the extent of 1/3rd share each. Ujjagar Singh, one of the brothers, had expired being unmarried and issueless and his share is alleged to have been transferred to the plaintiff-appellant. The other brother Rattan Singh-defen-dant-respondent No. 3 was also unmarried and issueless. Alleging that defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur played a fraud with Rattan Singh and obtained a judgment and a collusive decree dated 2.6.1990, passed in civil suit No. 381 of 1990, it has been asserted that Rattan Singh -respondent-defendant No. 3 had in fact never appeared before the Court and a fraud was played. The plaintiff-appellant also asserted that Rattan Singh-defendant-re-spondent No. 3 had no right to alienate the property being unmarried and issueless, because after his death, the ancestral property is liable to fall to his share. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the property in question is ancestral property and thus the judgment and decree obtained by defendant No. 1 was null and void. It was further held that, in any case the aforementioned judgment and decree was required to be registered, in accordance with provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1980. Reliance in this regard was also placed on a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major (1996-1)112 P.L.R. 559 (S.C.). 4. On appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code, learned Lower Appellate Court reserved the findings by holding that there is no cogent evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant to record a conclusion that the character of the suit property was ancestral. After close analysis of the documentary evidence like copies of jamabandies, copies of mutation, copy of khasra girdwaris, aksh-shizra and copies of judgments and decrees dated 2.6.1990 and 18.2.1997, which have been placed on record as Ex.Pl to Ex.P14, the trial Court found that all the three brothers namely Rattan Singh, Banta Singh and Ujjagar Singh became owner in possession of the land after the death of their father Shri Ram Kishan. Ujjagar Singh, brother of the plaintiff-appellant transferred his 1/3rd share in his favour by suffering a decree dated 5.3.1987 passed in civil suit No. 147 of 1987. Accordingly, mutation No. 926 (Ex.P15) was sanctioned in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. As a result, the plaintiff-appellant became owner of 2/3rd share, as is evident from mutation No. 927 (Ex.6). Ujjagar Singh, brother of the plaintiff-appellant transferred his 1/3rd share in his favour by suffering a decree dated 5.3.1987 passed in civil suit No. 147 of 1987. Accordingly, mutation No. 926 (Ex.P15) was sanctioned in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. As a result, the plaintiff-appellant became owner of 2/3rd share, as is evident from mutation No. 927 (Ex.6). With regard to 1/3rd share, owned and possessed by Rattan Singh, it was found that the property was mortgaged with one Amar Singh and Mutation No. 936 was sanctioned after redemption of mortgage. 5. A reference has also been made to jamabandies for the years 1989-90 and 1994-95 (Ex.P7 and Ex.PS respectively), wherein all the three brothers have been shown to be in possession over the suit land, in equal shares. However, one Hardev Singh was recorded as cultivator in the cultivating column of land measuring 7 kanal 1 marla on batai tehai. Ex.P9 is the mutation No. 966 sanctioned in favour of defendant No. 1 Kar-tar Kaur, showing that 1/3rd share of the land belonging to defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh was transferred in favour of Smt. Kartar Kaur-defendant No. 1, on the basis of judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990, passed in civil suit No. 381 of 1990. Accordingly, defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur has become owner in possession of the suit land, as per the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990, suffered by defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh in her favour, by admitting her adverse possession. It is also pertinent to notice that Hardev Singh, who claims himself to be tenant, also filed a suit for pre-emption being civil suit No. 641 of 1994, but the same was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 18.2.1997 (Ex. P14 and Ex.P15 respectively). Even first appeal filed by aforementioned Hardev Singh was dismissed and the R.S.A. No. 2247 of 1999 has also been dismissed by this Court, on 12.8.2003. 6. The learned Lower Appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court by observing that it had ignored the earlier suit filed by defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh against defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur itself, wherein he had failed. 6. The learned Lower Appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court by observing that it had ignored the earlier suit filed by defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh against defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur itself, wherein he had failed. The observation of the learned Lower Appellate Court, in this regard, reads as under:- ...The learned trial Court did not take into consideration the fact that Rattan Singh, who himself suffered a decree in favour of Kartar Kaur, had challenged the same by filing a civil suit No. 470 of 1991 titled Rattan Singh v. Kartar Kaur, wherein also he has taken all the pleas and the said civil suit was dismissed by the Court of Shri Kuldip Jain, the then learned Additional Senior Sub Judge, Kurukshetra, vide his judgment dated 8.11.1993, copies of the said judgment and decree-sheet are Exs.D8 and D9. Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1993 titled Rattan Singh v. Kartar Kaur against the said judgment and decree dated 8.11.1993 was also dismissed by the Appellate Court of Shri R.C. Kathuria, the then learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, on 7.2.1994 vide his judgment and decree, Exs.Dl and D2. Regular Second Appeal against the judgment dated 7.2.1994 of the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, was also dismissed in the Hon ble High Court in limine. In all these documents, the decree suffered by Rattan Singh in favour of Kartar Kaur with regard to the suit property was upheld. 7. The learned Lower Appellate Court also made a reference to the pre-emption suit No. 115 of 1997 filed by one Hardev Singh claiming his right of pre-emption as a tenant, which was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 25.10.1997 (Ex.D4 and Ex.D5 respectively). The civil appeal No. 377 of 1997, against the aforementioned judgment and decree has also failed vide judgment and decree dated 20.8.1998. The view taken by both the Courts has been upheld by this Court in R.S.A. No. 2247 of 1999, decided on 12.8.2003. After the failure of Rattan Singh in his own suit No. 470 of 1991 and thereafter the failure of suit filed by Hardev Singh, the plaintiff-appellant filed civil suit No. 910 of 1996, which has led to the filing of instant appeal. 8. After the failure of Rattan Singh in his own suit No. 470 of 1991 and thereafter the failure of suit filed by Hardev Singh, the plaintiff-appellant filed civil suit No. 910 of 1996, which has led to the filing of instant appeal. 8. The learned Lower Appellate Court, on the basis of close analysis of evidence, has found that the plaintiff-appellant has miserably failed to establish that the suit property was ancestral in character, as he has failed to place on record the excerpts of the jamabandies, khatoni pamaish, khatoni istemal naksha etc. Apart from lack of evidence, the learned Lower Appellate Court has also concluded in law that if defendant-respondent No. 3 was issueless, then he has to be considered as a last male-holder of the property, as there was no male issue to inherit that property. In that regard reliance has been placed on a judgment of Dipo v. Wassan Singh and Ors. The learned Lower Appellate Court has also placed reliance on page No. 289 of Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (15th Edition). 9. The learned Lower Appellate Court also held that the plaintiff-appellant had no locus standi to file the suit or to challenge the decree dated 2.6.1990, obviously because Rattan Singh-defendant No. 3, who had himself suffered a decree, has failed in a suit and the aforementioned judgment and decree was upheld in appeal, on 7.2.1994, vide Ex.Dl and Ex.D2 and even second appeal was dismissed by this Court. It has further been held that the decree did not require any registration, as per the requirement of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and the judgment of Supreme Court in Bhoop Singhs case (supra) did not apply. 10. Mr. G.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that there is ample evidence on record to show that the character of the property was ancestral and the findings of the trial Court have been illegally reversed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. Learned counsel has referred to documentary evidence pertaining to the revenue record showing that the property in hands of Rattan Singh-defendant No. 3 has to be recorded as ancestral because it has come to him from his fore-father Bhagwan Singh, through his father Ram Kishan @ Shiv Charan Singh. Learned counsel has referred to documentary evidence pertaining to the revenue record showing that the property in hands of Rattan Singh-defendant No. 3 has to be recorded as ancestral because it has come to him from his fore-father Bhagwan Singh, through his father Ram Kishan @ Shiv Charan Singh. Learned counsel has then argued that the consent decree dated 2.6.1990 was required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 because defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur had no pre-existing right in the property, which was obviously worth more than Rs. 100/-. With regard to the suit for pre-emption, learned counsel has argued that while disposing R.S.A. No. 2247 of 1999, filed by Hardev Singh, against defendant No. l, this Court has clarified in its order dated 12.8.2003 that no other findings, except the question of limitation for filing the suit for pre-emption, would be treated as resjudicata in any subsequent proceedings. 11. Having heard learned counsel at a considerable length and perusing the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, I am of the considered view that there is no room to interfere in the findings recorded by the learned Lower Appellate Court. It has rightly been held by the learned Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff-appellant has firstly allowed the suit to be filed by defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh wherein the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990 suffered by Rattan Singh in favour of defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur was challenged. The suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 8.11.1993 (Ex.D8 and Ex.D9 respectively). Even the first appeal was dismissed being civil appeal No. 145 of 1993 by the learned Additional District Judge, Ku-rukshetra. Thereafter, another litigation was got initiated and one Hardev Singh @ Sukhdev Singh claimed pre-emption by filing a civil suit. That civil suit has also been dismissed and the judgment and decree has been upheld till this Court. Once Rattan Singh-defendant No. 3 himself has filed the suit, which has failed and. the judgment and decree have attained finality, then another co-sharer, in absence of any legal right in the property of defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh, would not have any locus standi to file another suit against defendant No. 1. Once Rattan Singh-defendant No. 3 himself has filed the suit, which has failed and. the judgment and decree have attained finality, then another co-sharer, in absence of any legal right in the property of defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh, would not have any locus standi to file another suit against defendant No. 1. It is well settled that any property, inherited from the father or his ancestor by a Hindu male, would be recorded as ancestral property as regards his male issue, but if such a person has no son, sons son or sons son, in existence at the time when he inherits the property, then he holds the property as an absolute owner. In this regard, reliance has rightly been placed by the learned Lower Appellate Court on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Smt. Dipo (supra). The relevant observations from the aforementioned judgment, in so far as, they are applicable to the facts of present case, read as under- ...No doubt the properties which have been found by the lower Courts to be ancestral properties in the hands of Bua Singh are properties which originally belonged to Bua Singhs ancestors. But Bua Singh was the last male holder of the property and he had no male issue. There was no surviving member of a joint family, be it a descendant or otherwise, who could take the property by survivorship. Property inherited from paternal ancestors is, of course, ancestral property as regards the male issue of the propositus, but it is his absolute property and not ancestral property as regard other relations. For the aforementioned view, their Lordships also placed reliance on Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (15th Edition) at page Nos. 289 and 291, which reads as under: - ...If a inherits property, whether movable or immovable, from his father or father fathers, fathers fathers, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. If A has no son, sons son, or sons sons son inexistence at he time when he inherits the property, he holds the property as absolute owner thereof and he can deal with it as he pleases....A person inheriting property from his three immediate paternal ancestors holds it and must hold it, in coparcenary with his sons, sons son and sons sons son, but as regards other relations he holds it and is entitled to hold it, as his absolute property. Page 291:- The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate property and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession. From the above enunciation of law by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the property in the hands of defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh was not ancestral because he had no male issue at the time when he inherited the same. It is the case of the plaintiff-appellant himself that defendant-respondent No. 3 has remained unmarried and obviously he is issueless. Therefore, plaintiff-appellant, being the brother of defendant-respondent No. 3 would have no surviving right in the property of defendant-respondent No. 3. Therefore, he would not have any locus standi to file the suit. In any case, the rights of defendant-respondent No. 3, in relation to the rights of defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur had crystalised in the previous litigation. All questions including question of registration of decree ought to have been raised in those proceedings. If no such question was raised, then by virtue of Explanation appended to Section 11 of the Code, such a question would be deemed to have been raised and decided against defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh. 12 The question of registration of judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990 would pale into insignificance and would not require any detailed and serious consideration. All the same, it is evident that before the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1990 was suffered by defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh in favour of defendant No. 1 Kartar Kaur, she had pre-existing right as defendant-respondent No. 3 had received an amount of Rs. l lac, as consideration. It has also come on record that there was an agreement to sell dated 9.2.1990, which shows pre-existing right. In any case, in these proceedings, no final view on that aspect is required to be expressed because defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh has himself lost the litigation in civil suit No. 470 of 1991, titled as Rattan Singh v. Kartarl decided on 8.11.1993 vide judgment and decree Ex.D8 and Ex.D9. In any case, in these proceedings, no final view on that aspect is required to be expressed because defendant-respondent No. 3 Rattan Singh has himself lost the litigation in civil suit No. 470 of 1991, titled as Rattan Singh v. Kartarl decided on 8.11.1993 vide judgment and decree Ex.D8 and Ex.D9. All these issues are supposed to have been settled between defendant-respondent Nos. l and 2 and defendant-respondent No. 3, in those proceedings. In view of above, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.