( 1 ) SINCE one and the same issue between the same parties arises for adjudication in both these matters, they are heard together and are being disposed of through a common Judgment. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS in O. S. No. 91 of 1990 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, narsapur filed this appeal, aggrieved by the Judgment, dated 22. 10. 1998, dismissing the suit in so far as it relates to the relief of recovery of possession of the property and cancellation of lease deeds, Exs. B1 and 02, though it is declared that they got title to the plaint a schedule property. ( 3 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as under: the father of the plaintiffs viz. late Tholeti Sambha Raju was a political sufferer and hence was granted patta, Ex. A1, in respect of the plaint a schedule property by the Tahasildar, Narsapur through the proceedings in Roc. No. C2-8/ld/72 of K. P. Palem on 20. 11. 1962. The fourth respondent, who is none other than the wife s brother of late Sambha raju, played fraud on him and obtained a deed of lease, dated 14. 11. 1962, ex. 132, in respect of the said property for 99 years, on an annual rent of rs. 75/ -. As the said Sambha Raju refused to register the lease deed, the fourth respondent applied for its compulsory registration and accordingly the same was registered compulsorily. Subsequently, the fourth respondent sub-leased the property to respondents 1 to 3, under Ex. Bl, for the remaining period of original lease i. e. 84 years from 26. 08. 1978 to 13. 11. 2061. Later, on the death of Sambha Raju in 1976, the appellants who are his daughters, succeeded to the said property. Despite the persistent demands made by the appellants, respondents 1 to 3 failed to pay the rents, and accordingly the lease was determined. Therefore, the appellants got issued a legal notice, dated 27. 03. 1989, demanding the respondents to vacate the property. As the respondents failed to do so, the appellants filed the suit seeking a declaration and to cancel the lease in favour of the fourth respondent and the sub-lease in favour of respondents I to 3. Therefore, the appellants got issued a legal notice, dated 27. 03. 1989, demanding the respondents to vacate the property. As the respondents failed to do so, the appellants filed the suit seeking a declaration and to cancel the lease in favour of the fourth respondent and the sub-lease in favour of respondents I to 3. ( 4 ) THE appellants contend that the lease in favour of the fourth respondent and sub-lease in favour of respondents 1 to 3 is void being opposed to public policy and violation of terms and conditions of the patta. The fourth respondent was set ex pane. Subsequently, on his death, his legal representatives were brought on record. However, they also remained exparte. ( 5 ) THE first respondent filed a written statement and respondents 2 and 3 adopted the same. They admitted the patta granted in favour of late sambha Raju, lease in favour of the fourth respondent and sub-lease in favour of respondents 1 to 3. It has been stated that the appellants have no right, title over the suit schedule property and as such they have no right to terminate the lease, to recover the possession of the plaint a schedule property or to recover the alleged arrears of rents. In the additional written interment, it has been stated that the appellants have no right to claim cancellation of two lease deeds also. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issue for trial:- (1) Whether the plaintiffs have title to the plaint a schedule property? (2) If so, whether the defendants 1 to 3 being the sub-lessees denied the title of the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the lease in favour of 4th defendant determined by his default in payment of rents? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the property from the defendants 1 o 3? (5) Whether and if so, what amount of past mesne profits are the plaintiffs entitled to? (6) Whether the plaintiffs arc entitled to any future profits and if so, from whom and at what rate? (7) To what relief? additional Issue: whether the lease in favour of D4 and sub-lease in favour of D1 to d3 is valid, if so, the plaintiffs 1 to 3 are not entitled to the declaiation, possession of the suit schedule property as prayed for? (7) To what relief? additional Issue: whether the lease in favour of D4 and sub-lease in favour of D1 to d3 is valid, if so, the plaintiffs 1 to 3 are not entitled to the declaiation, possession of the suit schedule property as prayed for? ( 6 ) ON behalf of the appellants, the first appellant was examined as p. W. 1 and P. W. 2, who was also a political sufferer, was examined and exs. A1 to A14 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, D. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. Bl to B9 were marked. ( 7 ) THE trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence, both oral and documentary, partly decreed the suit declaring that the appellants have title to the suit schedule properly, but dismissed the same in respect of the claim for recovery of possession, holding that in the absence of any notice terminating the lease, as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, the appellants are not entitled to recover possession of the same. The trial Court also negatived the relief for cancellation of lease deeds, under Exs. Bl and B2, as they are governed by Article 59 of the limitation Act. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree to the extent the trial Court refused the relief, the appellants preferred this appeal. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants contends that once the respondents denied the title and their right over the suit schedule property, there is forfeiture of lease under Section 11 l (g ) of the Transfer of Property act, therefore, no notice is required to be issued terminating the lease. He further contends that under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, the appellants can recover the possession of the property without issuing any notice determining the lease. According to him, the trial Court, having declared the title of the appellants over the suit schedule property on the ground that they are the only legal heirs of Sambha Raju, ought to have ordered recovery of possession also. He further contends that on the date the lease deed was obtained, the father of the appellants was not even granted patta in respect of the suit schedule property. He further contends that on the date the lease deed was obtained, the father of the appellants was not even granted patta in respect of the suit schedule property. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that in view of the admission of P. W. 1 that she was present at the time of execution of lease deed by her late father, it cannot be said that the fourth respondent obtained the property on lease by playing fraud. He further contends that in the absence of any notice terminating the lease, as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the appellants are not entitled to seek recovery of possession. According to him, without filing the alleged notice and the reply in to the Court, it is not open for the appellants to plead forfeiture of lease. He contends that late sambha Raju, who is the father of the appellants, has no title to the suit schedule property at the time of execution of lease deed, however, in view of Section 13 (l) (a) of the Specific Relief Act, if Sambha Raju, subsequent to the contract, acquired any interest in the property, the respondents may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest and accordingly the lease deed was presented for compulsory registration. He further contends that if there is any violation of terms and conditions of the patta, the appellants can approach the revenue authorities seeking appropriate relief, but they cannot seek recovery of possession. He submits that in the absence of any pleading and evidence in regard to the fraud played by the fourth respondent in obtaining lease, the case will not fall under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, and the trial Court rightly declined the relief to the said extent, therefore no interference need be warranted in the Judgment under appeal. ( 10 ) IN the light of the above said submissions made on behalf of both the parties, the moot question that emerges for consideration in this appeal is whether the fourth respondent played any fraud in obtaining the permanent lease deed from the father of the appellants and validly transferred the leasehold rights in favour of respondents 1 to 3. ( 11 ) ADMITTEDLY, the title of the appellants over the suit schedule property has already been declared and has become final, since no appeal is preferred against the said declaration. The contention of the appellants is that the permanent lease deed obtained by the fourth defendant is a fraudulent transaction, opposed to public policy and is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. It is not in dispute that the property was originally assigned in favour of late Sambha Raju, in due recognition of his services rendered as a freedom fighter, and the sacrifices made in liberating the country from the clutches of British rule, with an awesome object that they should live in honour out of the income derived from the lands assigned and their family should not be suffered in penury. A crop has been raised even before the patta was granted to Sambha Raju. The case of the appellants is that the fourth respondent, who is none other than their maternal uncle, by playing fraud, obtained a lease deed, under Ex. B2, for 99 years, for an annual maktha of Rs. 75/- and he, in turn, sub-leased the same to respondents 1 to 3, under Ex. B1. Since then, respondents 1 to 3 have been in possession and enjoyment of the said property, depriving the family members of late Sambha Raju of their right to enjoy the same. , Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act defines fraud as under: "fraud: Fraud means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the conlract.- (1) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. " section 23 of the said Act defines "what considerations and objects are lawful, and what not- The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent, or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy in each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. livery agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. " the contract Act does not define the expression public policy or opposed to public policy . From the very nature of things, the expressions are incapable of precise definition. public policy is the principle of law, which declares that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodos Maiya, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 781 summarized public policy as under: "public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept; it has been described as "untrustworthy guide", "variable quality", "uncertain one" "unruly horse", etc. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodos Maiya, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 781 summarized public policy as under: "public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept; it has been described as "untrustworthy guide", "variable quality", "uncertain one" "unruly horse", etc. the primary duty of a Court of law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to uphold the sanctity of contracts which form the basis of society, but in certain cases, the Court may relive them of their duty on a rule founded on what is called the public policy, for want of better words lord Atk in describes that something done contrary to public policy is a harmful thing, but the doctrine is extended not only to harmful cases but also to harmful tendencies; this doctrine of public policy is only a branch of common law, and, just like any other branch of common law, it is governed by precedents; the principles have been crystallized under different heads and though it is permissible for courts to expound and apply them to different situations, it should only be invoked in clear and incontestable cases of harm to the public; though the heads are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances of a changing world, it is advisable in the interest of stability of society or to make any attempt to discover new heads in these days. " the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation ltd. V. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1571 held that public policy is not the policy of a particular Government. It connotes some matter, which concerns the public good and the public interest. ( 13 ) THE Bombay High Court in Bhagwant Genuji v. Gangabisan ramgopal, AIR 1940 Bombay 369 held that a contract, which has the tendency to injure the public interests or public welfare, is one against public policy. What constitutes an injury to public interests or welfare would depend upon the times and climes. The social milieu in which the contract is sought to be enforced would decide the factum, the nature and the degree of the injury. It is contrary to the concept of public policy to contend that it is immutable, since it must vary with the varying needs of the Society. The social milieu in which the contract is sought to be enforced would decide the factum, the nature and the degree of the injury. It is contrary to the concept of public policy to contend that it is immutable, since it must vary with the varying needs of the Society. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court further in Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar nawaz Jung, (1991) 3 Supreme Court Cases 67 held that the Legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the Courts to step in to fill the lacuna. ( 15 ) IN the light of the law laid down supra, it has to be seen whether the perpetual lease agreement obtained by the fourth respondent from late sambha Raju is opposed to public policy or not. If the answer lies in affirmative, the fourth respondent cannot enforce the same in a Court of law nor he can transfer the right of any possession, which was obtained by him in a fraudulent manner. Condition No. 1 of Ex. A1, patta, authorizes late sambha Raju only to mortgage the said property for obtaining any loan from the nationalized banks and cooperative banks for its development and to enjoy the same by way of inheritance. He cannot alienate the same to any third parties. Under Condition No. 2, the property, which has been assigned, shall be brought into cultivation within three years and the same shall not be leased out. Condition No. 15 authorizes the Tahasildar to resume the land if any of the conditions in the patta has been violated. ( 16 ) THE object of the policy in imposing the above conditions is for the maintenance of public order and for the protection of the persons dealing with the conditions imposed and violation of conditions may entail resumption of land by the Government and restore the possession to the assignce or to assign the same to the eligible freedom fighter. In the light of the same, it has to be seen that the permanent lease agreement entered into by the fourth respondent is forbidden by law and the transfer of land under the assigned policy which has the force of law cannot be enforceable under section 23 of the Act and the fourth respondent will not have any authority or right to transfer the said property. Once the permanent lease agreement entered into by the fourth respondent, if forbidden by law, cannot be enforceable under Section 23 of the Contract Act, the fourth respondent will not have any authority or right to transfer the said property by way of sub-lease under the agreement to respondents 1 to 3. The conditions of the patta impose an obligation on the grantee to bring the land under cultivation and enjoy the usufruct thereof through out his life time and his family members thereafter by succession, but not by a third party by way of transfer or granting leasehold rights. In the event of any violation of the conditions, it is open for the Government to resume the land, without payment of any compensation, as per condition No. 15 of the patta, and any such transfer made in violation of the above conditions is forbidden by law. This view of mine is fortified by the Judgment of the Division Bench of himachal Pradesh High Court in Chet Ram v. Sawami Ram, AIR 1985 Himachal Pradesh 97. ( 17 ) FURTHER, it is to be seen that under G. O. Ms. No. 2382, dated 22. 08. 1952, the Government decided to assign the lands to the freedom fighters and political sufferers, with the usual conditions in g. O. Ms. No. 1743, dated 28. 08. 1959, however, under G. O. Ms. No. 185, dated 11. 03. 1997 it is made clear that the freedom fighters are not entitled to alienate the lands assigned to them. In the light of the above discussion, it is to be held that the lease deed, Ex. B2, obtained by the fourth respondent is opposed to public policy and the same is a fraudulent transaction to defeat the very conditions of the assignment, prohibiting such alienation. Once it is a fraudulent transaction, the same satisfies the definition of fraud under section 17 of the Indian Contract Act. B2, obtained by the fourth respondent is opposed to public policy and the same is a fraudulent transaction to defeat the very conditions of the assignment, prohibiting such alienation. Once it is a fraudulent transaction, the same satisfies the definition of fraud under section 17 of the Indian Contract Act. ( 18 ) ONCE the appellants, who are the legal heirs of late Sambha Raju, succeeded to the property by way of inheritance, respondents 1 to 3, who came in to possession of the said property under the void lease, cannot plead that they can enforce the lease deed in view of Section 13 (1) of the specific Relief Act. In view of the fact that the appellants are declared as the owners of the property, and the lease deed executed is held to be opposed to public policy it can safely be held that respondents 1 to 3 are in wrongful possession of the suit schedule property and hence they cannot be protected under law. Therefore, respondents 1 to 3 are entitled to be evicted from the suit schedule property. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the trial Court is not justified in holding that as per the conditions of the patta, lease is not prohibited, hence late Sambha Raju, original assignee of the property under Ex. A1, leased out the property, under Ex. B2, to the fourth respondent, and also authorized him to sub-lease the same. The Judgment under appeal, to the extent the trial Court rejected the relief to the appellants, is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. ( 19 ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs for the relief of recovery of possession also. ( 20 ) THE case of the petitioners-defendants is that during pendency of o. S. No. 91 of 1990 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Narsapur, respondents 4 to 6 submitted a petition, dated 20. 07. 1993, before the Sub-Collector, narsapur bringing all the facts, which were averred in the suit, to his notice. After conducting an elaborate enquiry into the matter, the Sub-Collector while issuing proceedings in ROC. No. D/4532/93, dated 26. 04. 07. 1993, before the Sub-Collector, narsapur bringing all the facts, which were averred in the suit, to his notice. After conducting an elaborate enquiry into the matter, the Sub-Collector while issuing proceedings in ROC. No. D/4532/93, dated 26. 04. 1997, ordered eviction of the petitioners treating them as encroachers and ordered restoration of the land in favour of respondents 4 to 6, as they are the only legal heirs of political sufferer, late Sambha Raju, to whom the land was originally assigned. Challenging the legality and validity of the said proceedings, the petitioners filed this writ petition. ( 21 ) THIS Court, through its order, dated 13. 05. 1997, stayed the operation of the said proceedings. ( 22 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners contends that late Tholeti sambha Raju was assigned the land in his capacity as political sufferer, but not as a landless poor person, hence the provisions of the A. P. Assigned lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (Act 9 of 1977) has no application. According to him, under the Andhra Pradesh Board Standing orders, it is the Tahasildar, who can resume the land, but not the Sub-Collector and hence the order passed by the second respondent directing eviction of the petitioners from the land cannot be sustained. ( 23 ) ADMITTEDLY, one Tholeti Sambha Raju is a political sufferer, who was granted assignment of land, under B. S. O. 15 para 11 (3 ). Condition no. 15 of the patta, Ex. A1, itself envisages resumption of the land in the event of the assignee violated the terms and conditions of the assignment. The submission made by the learned counsel that it is only the Tahasildar, who can resume the lands, but not the Sub-Collector, appears to be a fallacy. Under B. S. O. 15 para 12, for breach of any of the conditions (a)assigned lands shall be heritable but not alienable; (b) lands assigned shall be brought under cultivation within three years; and (c) water rate shall, however, be charged if the lands are irrigated with Government water; the Government is at liberty to resume the land. Under G. O. Ms. No. 1611, revenue, dated 19/9/1963 and G. O. Ms. No. l 118, Revenue, dated 12/7/1973, the assigning authorities arc competent to order resumption in case of breach of conditions of the grant. Under G. O. Ms. No. 1611, revenue, dated 19/9/1963 and G. O. Ms. No. l 118, Revenue, dated 12/7/1973, the assigning authorities arc competent to order resumption in case of breach of conditions of the grant. In regard to appeals and revisions against such orders, the provisions of B. S. O. 15 relating to the orders of the assignment shall apply also to the orders relating to resumption. ( 24 ) UNDISPUTCDLY, on the proposals submitted by the assignee, the tahasildar forwarded the same to the higher officer for sanction, and only on such sanction, the patta has been issued in favour of the original assignee. It is the competent authority, which sanctioned the assignment, can always have the right to cancel the same and resume the land. As evident from the conditions of the Assignment, the Sub-Collector is the sanctioning authority, who granted assignment in favour of the original assignee. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Sub-Collector will not have any power to resume the land cannot be accepted. Once it is evident that the conditions of assignment are violated, the Sub-Collector, who is the competent authority to assign the lands, can always have the power to resume the land and restore possession of the same to the original assignee or his legal heirs. ( 25 ) IN view of the same, I see no legal infirmity in the order impugned warranting interference of this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.