( 1 ) THIS application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for short the Limitation Act ) is filed by M/s. Serum Institute of India ltd. (for short referred to as m/s. Serum Institute ) praying to condone to the delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001 passed by this Court in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 against M/s. Transgene Vaccine Limited (for short referred to as m/s. Transgene ). ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant had neither the knowledge nor was aware of the proceedings in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 and the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001 passed therein by this Court. He submitted that by the date the ex parte order of winding up came to be passed, M/s. Transgene already stood merged with M/s. Serum Institute, by reason of an order of amalgamation dated 31. 01. 2001 passed by the Mumbai High Court in c. P. Nos. 1205 and 1206 of 2000, and as M/s. Transgene stood dissolved and merged with the applicant and was not in existence, no order of winding could have been passed against M/s. Transgene. In support of his submission that decree passed against a dead person is a nullity, the learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Jangli v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 1 SCC 478. and of this court in Golla Krishna Murthy v. Golla Yellaiah, 2001 5 ALD 484 . and Immadi Laxmi v. Sreyabhilashi Chit Funds, 2002 Suppl. (1) ALD 126. ( 3 ) HE submitted that the applicant came to know of the ex parte order of winding up passed by this Court against M/s. Transgene only when they received the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, praying to substitute M/s. Serum institute in the place of M/s. Transgene on 21. 01. 2003, and in support of his argument that limitation would run from the date of knowledge of the decree, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in gauhati University v. Niharlal Bhattacharjee, 1995 6 SCC 731 . 1 and 2, praying to substitute M/s. Serum institute in the place of M/s. Transgene on 21. 01. 2003, and in support of his argument that limitation would run from the date of knowledge of the decree, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in gauhati University v. Niharlal Bhattacharjee, 1995 6 SCC 731 . As M/s. Transgene was not in existence by reason of its merger with the applicant, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant immediately upon receipt of the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, the applicant filed counter on 23. 07. 2003, to which respondent no. 1 filed reply-affidavit on 12. 09. 2003. Thereafter, on 15. 10. 2001 respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application in C. A. No. 1436 of 2003 praying this Court not to substitute the name of M/s. Transgene with that of M/s. Serum Institute in the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001. As the ex parte order of winding up passed by this Court against M/s. Transgene would adversely affect the interests of the applicant in view of its merger, the applicant on 17. 11. 2003 filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001, which the Registry refused to number on the ground that there is delay in filing the said application. Therefore, the applicant filled the present application to condone the delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 11. 2001. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in fact, there is no delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up, and merely to satisfy the objection raised by the Registry, the present application to condone the delay of 665 in preferring the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up was filed. He submitted that even assuming there is delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up, yet the same has to be condoned for the reason that the applicant obtained the ex parte order of winding up by playing fraud upon the Court. He submitted that Exs. A1, namely confirmatory letter issued by sri. He submitted that even assuming there is delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up, yet the same has to be condoned for the reason that the applicant obtained the ex parte order of winding up by playing fraud upon the Court. He submitted that Exs. A1, namely confirmatory letter issued by sri. K. K. Rao, which is a fundamental document, and based on which respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed company petition and obtained ex parte order of winding up, is a forged and fabricated document, which can easily be made out by comparing the signatures of Sri. K. K. Rao on other documents, which are altogether different and do not match with each other. Likewise, he submitted that the alleged notices Ex. A26 dated 02. 06. 2000 and Ex. A28 dated 16. 06. 2000 under Section 434 of the companies Act, 1956, sent by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the Managing director of M/s. Transgene at their Madhuranagar address under exs. A27 and A29, certificates of posting dated 02. 06. 2000 and 16. 06. 2000, are also forged and fabricated documents. At any rate sri. K. K. Rao, who is alleged to have issued Ex. A1 ceased to be the managing Director of M/s. Transgene from 18. 07. 2000. The plea of fraud, as stated above, according to the applicant is sufficient cause and in the interest of justice and to ensure that an illegality is not perpetrated, he prayed that the delay of 665 days in filing application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up has to be condoned. He, placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987 2 SCC 107 . O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, 1984 4 SCC 66 . S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1994 1 SCC 1 . Balkar Singh v. Jagdish Kumar, 2005 3 SCC 186 . and MCD v. State of Delhi, 2005 4 SCC 605 . and of this Court in M/s. Madhava Hytech engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2003 1 ALT 321 . ( 5 ) HE submitted that from 18. 07. 2000, the Registered Office of m/s. Transsene was shifted from Madhuranagar to Himayatnagar. Inasmuch as Ex. A30 notice dated 16. 08. 2000, said to have been issued by the Advocate of respondent Nos. ( 5 ) HE submitted that from 18. 07. 2000, the Registered Office of m/s. Transsene was shifted from Madhuranagar to Himayatnagar. Inasmuch as Ex. A30 notice dated 16. 08. 2000, said to have been issued by the Advocate of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 434 of the companies Act, 1956 was sent to Managing Director at Madhuranagar address, and not to M/s. Transgene at their Himayatnagar address, they cannot be treated as notices served on the company, and more so when they do not reflect the earlier notices issued under Exs. A26 and A28. He submitted that the Registered Office of M/s. Transsene was shifted from Hyderabad In Andhra Pradesh to Pune in Maharashtra from 01. 12. 2000, and this is evident from the Certificate of Registration issued by the Registrar of Companies, Pune on 01. 12. 2000, and the correspondence that preceded its issuance, and as such, as on 04. 12. 2000, when the company petition was filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and pass an order, much less an ex parte order of winding up. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand contended that the applicant leave alone explaining each day s delay, has neither shown sufficient cause nor cited a single reason to in the affidavit filed in support of the application to condone the long and inordinate delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up. The affidavit also does not speak as to under what provision of law the applicant is entitled to maintain an application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up, which admittedly is not passed against it. ( 7 ) DENYING the submission of the applicant that it had no knowledge of the proceedings of the company petition before this Court, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that one sri. Deshpande, who was one of the Directors of M/s. Transgene and who is presently one of the Directors of the applicant, is aware of the proceedings in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 and also the ex parte order of winding up passed by this Court on 18. 12. 1 and 2 submitted that one sri. Deshpande, who was one of the Directors of M/s. Transgene and who is presently one of the Directors of the applicant, is aware of the proceedings in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 and also the ex parte order of winding up passed by this Court on 18. 12. 2001 against M/s. Transgene, and to substantiate this plea, he brought to the notice of the Court the events that preceded the passing of ex parte order of winding up by this Court. ( 8 ) HE submitted that this Court ordered notice before admission in the company petition on 16. 01. 2001, and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had taken out notice to the Himayatnagar address of M/s. Transgene, and m/s. Eagle Poonawalla Industry Ltd. , the sister concern of M/s. Serum institute, redirected the same to Pune, and Sri. Deshpande, who happened to be one of the ex-Directors of M/s. Transgene having received the notice on 15. 02. 2001 executed a vakalat before a notary at pune in favour of Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, Advocate, for appearing in the matter, which is also signed by one other Director as authorized signatory of M/s. Transsene. Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, Advocate, appeared in the matter on 19. 02. 2001 and took time. Later he withdrew and another Advocate, Sri. C. Kodandaram filed vakalat on 04. 04. 2001, which was also executed by Sri. Deshpande. The said Advocate took time for filing counter, and thereafter, the matter was adjourned on five occasions. The company petition was admitted by this Court on 28. 08. 2001, and proof of paper publication was filed on 08. 11. 2001, and ultimately, after recording the evidence of respondent No. 1, this Court passed ex parts order of winding up on 18. 12. 2001 as there was no representation on behalf of M/s. Transgene. Though the Mumbai High court is said to have passed order of amalgamation on 31. 01. 2001, sri. Deshpande and another Director of the applicant, who signed the vakalats for and on behalf of M/s. Transsene, did not bring the same tp, the notice of this Court at any point of time. Though the Mumbai High court is said to have passed order of amalgamation on 31. 01. 2001, sri. Deshpande and another Director of the applicant, who signed the vakalats for and on behalf of M/s. Transsene, did not bring the same tp, the notice of this Court at any point of time. ( 9 ) HE submitted that even assuming that the applicant was not aware of the proceedings in the company petition, and they came to know about the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 012. 2001 only when the notice in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 was served on them on 21. 01. 2003, yet the applicant is liable to explain the delay in not filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up at least from that date. He submitted that though the applicant is said to received the notice in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 on 21. 01. 2003, they filed counter contesting the said application only on 15. 10. 2003, and later they filed another application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up on 17. 11. 2003, which was declined to be numbered by the Registry as it was not supported by any condone delay application, and ultimately, the applicant filed the present application on 22. 11. 2003. He thus submitted that the applicant having failed to show sufficient cause, the long and inordinate delay of 665 days in filing application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up, cannot be condoned. In support of his contention that atleast sufficient cause has to be shown for condoning the delay, he placed reliance on the judgments of this court in sree Jagannath Steels v. Globe Detective Agencies, 1999 2 Comp LJ 44 (AP ). VIF Airways v. Anand Trading Corpn. , 2000 5 Comp LJ 130 (AP ). Annavaram Spg. Mills Ltd. v. A. P. State Financial corporation, 2000 5 Comp LJ 54 (AP ). Md. Ismail v. V. Suryanarayana Rao, 2002 Suppl. (2) ALD 388. and Boddupally China Venkanna v. Edulla Narayana Reddy, 2003 1 ALT 35 (AP ). ( 10 ) HE submitted that the Company Petition in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 was filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against M/s. Transgene on 04. 12. Md. Ismail v. V. Suryanarayana Rao, 2002 Suppl. (2) ALD 388. and Boddupally China Venkanna v. Edulla Narayana Reddy, 2003 1 ALT 35 (AP ). ( 10 ) HE submitted that the Company Petition in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 was filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 against M/s. Transgene on 04. 12. 2000, and as on the date of filing the company petition, the registered Office of M/s. Transgene was at Hyderabad, and this is evident from the Certificate of Registration, issued by the Registrar of companies, Hyderabad, for shifting of M/s. Transgene from Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh to Pune in Maharashtra on 27. 12. 2000, and as such, this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Company Petition. He denied the contention of the applicant that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 played fraud upon the Court and contended that it is M/s. Transgene and its directors, who have played fraud upon the Court. ( 11 ) HE thus submitted that the applicant though had knowledge of the proceedings before this Court through one of its Directors, yet having entered appearance did not contest the matter, and as such, prayed that the condone delay application be dismissed, and more so when the applicant failed to show sufficient cause. ( 12 ) REPLYING to the stand taken by the counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that respondent nos. 1 and 2 were aware of the orders of winding up passed by the mumbai High Court, and yet they proceeded with the company petition as if they do not know anything about the amalgamation of m/s. Transgene with the applicant. He submitted that Sri. Deshpande had filed the vakalat under a mistaken impression, and as he was advised that M/s. Transgene was no more in existence, he did not give any instructions to the counsel. In fact, no notice was issued to the applicant under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956. The fact that one of the Directors of the applicant had knowledge of the proceedings before this Court, cannot be taken to say that the applicant had the knowledge of the proceedings. At any rate, he submitted that since both the parties are alleging playing of fraud against each other, it is appropriate that the delay be condoned. The fact that one of the Directors of the applicant had knowledge of the proceedings before this Court, cannot be taken to say that the applicant had the knowledge of the proceedings. At any rate, he submitted that since both the parties are alleging playing of fraud against each other, it is appropriate that the delay be condoned. ( 13 ) ADMITTEDLY, this is an application filed under Section 5 of the limitation Act for condoning the delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up passed by this court on 18. 12. 2001. Though varied submissions were made touching the merits of the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up also, but having regard to the limited scope of this application, namely whether or not the delay can be condoned, I am not inclined to go into the whether respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had obtained the ex parte order of winding up by playing fraud upon the Court or whether m/s. Transgene or the applicant had played fraud upon the Mumbai High court in the matter of obtaining an order of amalgamation. Before proceeding to consider whether or not the long and inordinate delay of 665 days, as prayed for in the application, can be condoned, it would be apposite, if a reference to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation act, is made. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus: 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. ( 14 ) A bare reading of the above provision of law, would make it clear that except an application under the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, any appeal or any application, may be admitted by the Court after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period prescribed. ( 15 ) THE provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are discretionary in nature. In that, in order to condone the delay for making an application beyond the period prescribed, the party making the application has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application in time, and unless and until the Court is satisfied that the party making application had sufficient cause for not making the application in time, the delay would not be condoned. There are dual line of cases, one line of cases insisting that each day s delay must be explained and the other line of cases insisting that a liberal approach should be adopted in the matters of condoning the delay. There is no doubt that "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made, and more so when Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself says that the party making the application beyond the prescribed time should have had sufficient cause for not filing the application in time. It may be noticed whether in the instant case the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the period prescribed, with reference to the arguments advanced before the Court and the pleadings made by the applicant in the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay application. ( 16 ) RESPONDENT Nos. 1 and 2 filed company petition in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 before this Court praying to passing an order of winding up against m/s. Transgene before on 04. 12. 2000 based on Ex. A1, confirmatory letter, said to have been issued by Sri. K. K. Rao, Managing Director of m/s. Transgene and Exs. A26 and A28, notices dated 02. 06. 2000 and 16. 06. 2000 said to have been issued by them to M/s. Transgene under section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, and Exs. A27 and A29, certificates of posting dated 02. 06. 2000 and 16. 06. 2000. When the company petition came up for admission on 16. 01. 2001, notice before admission was ordered, and in pursuance thereof, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 took out notice to M/s. Transsene at their Himayatnagar address. By the time, the notice was taken to M/s. Transgene, it appears that they have shifted their Registered Office to Pune. The notice taken out by respondent Nos. 01. 2001, notice before admission was ordered, and in pursuance thereof, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 took out notice to M/s. Transsene at their Himayatnagar address. By the time, the notice was taken to M/s. Transgene, it appears that they have shifted their Registered Office to Pune. The notice taken out by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, was redirected to M/s. Transgene at their pune address by M/s. Eagle Poonawalla Industry Ltd. , a sister concern of M/s. Serum Institute, whose Registered Office is also located at the said address. By the time the notice was received on behalf of m/s. Transgene at their Pune address, the Mumbai High Court in C. P. Nos. 1205 and 1206 of 2000 had passed an order of amalgamation on 31. 01. 2001, whereby M/s. Transgene stood merged with M/s. Serum institute, the applicant herein. ( 17 ) THOUGH an order of amalgamation was passed by the Mumbai High court on 31. 01. 2001, whereby M/s. Transgene merged with M/s. Serum institute, the undisputed fact remains that one Sri. Deshpande, who was director in M/s. Transgene and who is presently a Director in m/s. Serum Institute, upon receipt of notice in the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, on 15. 02. 2001 on behalf of M/s. Transgene, executed a vakalat before a notary at Pune in favour of Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, advocate, to represent M/s. Transgene in the company petition before this Court. Apart from Sri. Deshpande, one other Director as authorized signatory of M/s. Transgene also singed the said vakalat. On the. strength of the said vakalat, Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, Advocate represented M/s. Transgene in the company petition on 19. 02. 2001, and took some time for filing counter. However, for the reasons best known to them, Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, had withdrawn his vakalat. Thereafter, Sri. Deshpande, once again executed another vakalat in favour of another Advocate, namely Sri. C. Kodandaram, for representing on behalf of M/s. Transgene. The said Advocate, filed vakalat on 04. 04. 2001 and sought some time for filing counter, and at his request the matter was adjourned to 18. 04. 2001, and thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time on 19. 06. 2001, 26. 06. 2001, 24. 07. 2001 and 14. 08. 2001, and as there was no representation on their behalf of M/s. Transgene, this Court by order dated 28. 04. 2001, and thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time on 19. 06. 2001, 26. 06. 2001, 24. 07. 2001 and 14. 08. 2001, and as there was no representation on their behalf of M/s. Transgene, this Court by order dated 28. 08. 2001 admitted the company petition, and in terms of the said order, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had also taken out paper publication on 14. 09. 2001. The proof of paper publication was filed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 on 08. 11. 2001. Thereafter, evidence was let in by them on 23. 11. 2001. Though M/s. Transgene was represented by a counsel, as there was no representation on their behalf despite granting several adjournments, this Court by order dated 18. 12. 2001, set m/s. Transgene ex parte and passed an order of winding up. ( 18 ) THE ex parte order of winding up having been passed by this Court on 18. 12. 2001, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application in C. A. No. 122 of 2001 on 22. 02. 2002 for causing paper publication in Lok Satta at Pune instead of in Eenadu and Indian Express as during the pendency of the company petition M/s. Transgene shifted its Registered Office from Hyderabad to Pune, and the same was ordered on 25. 02. 2002. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 for substitution of M/s. Serum Institute in the place of m/s. Transgene. This Court ordered notice of the said application. The notice of the said application was received by M/s. Serum Institute on 21. 02. 2003. ( 19 ) THOUGH the applicant contends that they came to know about the passing of ex parte order of winding dated 18. 12. 2001 by this court against M/s. Transgene, which stood merged with them by reason of an order of amalgamation passed by Mumbai High Court on 31. 01. 2001 in c. P. Nos. 1205 and 1206 of 2000, only on 21. 01. 2003 when they received the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, the fact remains that at least Sri. 01. 2001 in c. P. Nos. 1205 and 1206 of 2000, only on 21. 01. 2003 when they received the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, the fact remains that at least Sri. Deshpande, who is one of the present Directors of m/s. Serum Institute and who was one of the Directors of m/s. Transgene, and one other Director, were aware of the proceedings in C. P. No. 161 of 2000 as also the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001 passed therein by this Court, for they having received the notice of the company petition as far back as on 15. 02. 2001, executed one vakalat in favour of Sri. G. Venkateswara Rao, and later after he withdrew, executed another vakalat in favour of Sri. C. Kodandaram, for representing on behalf of M/s. Transgene. Be it noted, that though m/s. Transgene is a body corporate and it has a legal entity of its own, the fact remains that its affairs and business are managed and carried on by its Board of Directors. Since Mr. Deshpande and one other person, who happen to be present Directors of M/s. Serum Institute, and sri. Deshpande in particular, who happened to be one of the Directors of m/s. Transgene, having executed vakalats in favour of two Advocates to represent and defend M/s. Transgene in the company petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and they being aware of the proceedings in the company petition, the applicant now cannot be allowed to contend that they are not aware of the proceedings in the company petition and the ex parte order of winding up passed by this Court therein on 18. 12. 2001. As a company is run and managed by its Board of Directors, the fact that one or two of its Directors are aware of the proceedings itself is sufficient to say that the applicant was aware of the proceedings in company petition and the ex parte order of winding up passed therein by this Court on 18. 12. 2001, and more so, having regard to the actions taken by the said Directors in prosecuting the company petition, as stated above. 12. 2001, and more so, having regard to the actions taken by the said Directors in prosecuting the company petition, as stated above. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the applicant was aware of the proceedings in the company petition as also the ex parte order of winding up passed therein by this Court on 18. 12. 2001. ( 20 ) EVEN assuming that the applicant came to know of the company petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the ex parte order of winding up passed therein by this Court on 18. 1. 2001 only when they received the notice in the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 on 21. 01. 2003, it may be noticed as to what expeditious steps the applicant had taken to contest the application or to get the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001 set aside, and whether the steps taken by him justify the condonation of delay. Though the applicant claims that they came to know of the ex parte order of winding up when they received the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 on 21. 01. 2003, the fact remains, according to the own admission of the applicant, they have filed the counter on 23. 07. 2003 i. e. after lapse of nearly six months. The said counter was filed only opposing the application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, seeking substitution of M/s. Serum Institute in the place of M/s. Transgene, and it is only after lapse of nearly three months and twenty days, from the date of filing the counter in C. A. No. 23 of 2003, the applicant filed an application on 17. 11. 2003 seeking to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 11. 2001, which obviously was not numbered by the registry as it was not supported by any condone delay application, and therefore, the applicant filed the present application on 22. 11. 2003, to condone the delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up. Thus, the applicant failed to show that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 11. 2003, to condone the delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up. Thus, the applicant failed to show that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001, at least from the date when the said came to their knowledge. ( 21 ) EVEN in the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay application, the applicant has not cited any reason for condonation of the long and inordinate delay. One Sri. Purushottam Ramdas Adep, filed the affidavit in support of the condone delay petition without indicating his designation as if he is the company. Para 2 of the affidavit reads thus: 2. I say that I have filed application in Company Petition No. 161 of 2001 to set aside the winding up order dated 18. 12. 2001 passed in Company Petition No. 161 of 2001. I say that the said application for setting aside the winding up order was filed on 17. 11. 2003 and an advance copy was served on the Advocate of the respondent on 15. 11. 2003. I say that the Court Registry is not numbering my application stating that there is a delay in filing the said application. I say that there is no delay in filing the application as the said application has been filed immediately after Serum Institute of india Ltd. , was served with notice of this Hon ble Court praying for substitution of serum Institute of India Ltd. , in place of Transgene Vaccine Limited. I say that as and by way of abundant caution and so as to avoid further delay I am filing this application that delay if any in filing the application may kindly be condone. ( 22 ) THEREAFTER, the applicant though in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit pleaded that the applicant was not a party to the aforesaid proceedings in the company petition, that the applicant is sought to be adversely affected by the ex parte order of winding up, that respondent nos. ( 22 ) THEREAFTER, the applicant though in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit pleaded that the applicant was not a party to the aforesaid proceedings in the company petition, that the applicant is sought to be adversely affected by the ex parte order of winding up, that respondent nos. 1 and 2 failed to comply with the statutory Rules 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 as framed by the Central government (wrongly mentioned in the affidavit as Hon blse Supreme court of India), and that the application filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is likely to evoke serious civil consequences for the applicant and that its rights are being adversely affected, yet pleaded that there is no delay. ( 23 ) EVEN though there is long and inordinate delay of 665 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up dated 18. 12. 2001, the applicant leave alone explaining each day s delay, has not been able to show sufficient cause for the delay, atleast from the date the ex parte order of winding up came to their knowledge when they received the notice of the application in C. A. No. 23 of 2003 on 23. 02. 2003, for even though the ex parte order came to their knowledge on 23. 02. 2003, they filed only counter to the said application only on 23. 07. 2003 i. e. after lapse of nearly six months, and thereafter, an application to set aside the ex parte order of winding up on 17. 11. 2003, and the present application for condoning the delay on 25. 11. 2003. There is no reason explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application, as noted above, to condone the long and inordinate delay of 665 days, except stating that there is no delay. ( 24 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in the condone delay application, and the same is dismissed.