Judgment S.N.Hussain, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite parties. 2. This revision has been filed by the defendant (petitioner) of Eviction Suit No. 28 of 1998, which was filed by the plaintiffs (opposite parties) for eviction of the defendant on the ground of personal necessity. 3. This revision under the proviso to sub-section 8 of Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity) is directed against the order of petitioners eviction dated 31.7.2003 by which the learned Munsif-I, Gaya, decreed the aforesaid Eviction Suit. 4. Plaintiffs had claimed that they were the owners of the western portion of Holding No. 15A (Old 15) of Ward No. 3, situated in Mohalla Krishna Prakash Road, in the town of Gaya, which they had purchased by sale-deed dated 15.4.1994. Plaintrffs had further stated that the subject matter of the suit is a shop room measuring 8 ft. X 5 ft. which is part of the said purchased premises and is in occupation of the defendant as tenant since the time of plaintiffs vendor and after the sale-deed of 1994, the defendant accepted the plaintiffs as his landlords and paid rent to them for sometime. Plaintiffs had also asserted that at the time of purchase they were students, but now they want to start cloth business in the suit premises and employ themselves gainfully to get settled in their lives, but when they requested the defendant to vacate the premises, the defendant refused and hence the said suit was filed. 5. On the other hand, the claim of the defendant inter alia was that original owner of the entire property was one Sheikh Mosaheb All who created a Wakf-Alal-Aulad and dedicated the entire property to it and after his death his son became motawalli. He had further submitted that since the suit property was part of Wakf-Alal-Aulad, the motawalli or any one else had no right or title over the same and he had no authority to transfer or sell the same to anyone and hence the alleged sale-deed dated 15.4.1994 was illegal and conferred no title upon the plaintiffs. He had further submitted that since the suit property was part of Wakf-Alal-Aulad, the motawalli or any one else had no right or title over the same and he had no authority to transfer or sell the same to anyone and hence the alleged sale-deed dated 15.4.1994 was illegal and conferred no title upon the plaintiffs. It was also claimed by the defendant that since the Wakf in question was a Wakf-Alal-Aulad, Wakf Board had no authority over the building in question and that he was tenant in the disputed shop since last 40-45 years and prior to that his father and grandfather were also tenants of the same shop. He had also stated that he was paying rent which was only Rs. 60/- per month and not Rs. 300/- per month, none of which was ever paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs, who were not his landlords. The defendant denied any necessity of the plaintiffs, as according to him, plaintiffs father owned a most busy cloth shop and the plaintiffs are assisting him in his business. Hence, both the points of relationship of landlord and tenant as well as the personal necessity of the plaintiffs have been controverted by the defendant. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned court below framed eight issues out of which Issue Nos. 5 and 6 were as to whether the defendant was tenant of the plaintiffs and as to whether the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises was bona fide, reasonable and for personal use. 7. After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced by them, which included ten witnesses of the plaintiffs and fourteen witnesses of the defendant as well as Exhibits 1 to 4 series produced by the plaintiffs and Exhibits A to C series produced by the defendant, the learned court below in its impugned judgment came to definite findings that the defendant was the tenant of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs require the suit premises bona fidely and reasonably for their personal requirement and accordingly the Eviction Suit was decreed. 8. 8. The said judgment has been challenged by learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner in this Court on the ground that Exhibit A is the deed of Wakf, in Paragraph-10 of which it was specifically mentioned that sale of any part of the Wakf property by a motawalli will be illegal and on that ground he shall be removed, hence he submitted that the said motawalli had no right to sell the property to the plaintiffs and furthermore Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board for the sake of brevity) also had no authority to grant permission to the motawalli to sell any Wakf property as the Wakf was a Wakf-Alal-Aulad and the Board had no authority therein. He further averred that the Board had granted approval to the motawalli, namely, Zahiruddin to sell the demolished portion measuring three decimals towards the western side of Holding No. 15 of Ward No. 3, but he sold the suit premises to the plaintiffs, who were earlier tenants of the Wakf Estate, by fraud and collusion and thus Sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was attracted and the brother of the said motawalli has already challenged the same in Title Suit No. 99/1999 which is pending. Thus, he claimed that neither the plaintiffs were owner of the suit premises nor they were landlords of the defendant as he never paid rent to them. Learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner also claimed that the father of the plaintiffs has got a very big cloth business in the town which he cannot manage alone and hence the plaintiffs-opposite parties are assisting him in the said business and thus they have got no genuine or bona fide personal requirement in the suit shop. 9. However, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties submitted that title of any person over any property cannot be decided in an Eviction Suit and furthermore the question as to whether the sale-deed was void or voidable cannot be considered or decided in such case and the same can be challenged only by a person claiming title in a duly filed suit before a court of appropriate jurisdiction and not by a tenant in an Eviction Suit in which he was a defendant. He also stated that the deed in question was of 1994 and hence it cannot be challenged now and even Title Suit No. 99 of 1999 filed by some other person is time barred and has not been decided and hence he submitted that neither the trial court hearing the Eviction Suit nor this Court in its revisional jurisdiction can see such matter. So far the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties asserted that Exhibit 1 series were the rent receipts issued by the plaintiffs-opposite parties which were duly signed by the defendant-petitioner, which exhibits were never challenged by the defendant in the court below, and hence he clearly accepted the plaintiffs as his landlords. So far personal requirement of plaintiffs was concerned, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that it is not disputed that plaintiffs had completed their studies and had no independent business of their own, which clearly proved that there was genuine personal requirement of the suit premises of the plaintiffs. He also averred that the defence of the defendant (petitioner) had already been struck off in the year 2000 and he is fighting litigation without paying any rent. Hence, legally he is barred from challenging their personal necessity for the suit premises entirely, without any partial eviction. 10. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the materials on record, it is quite apparent that the main contest of the defendant-petitioner is now confined only to the question as to whether the plaintiffs (opposite parties) were the owners of the suit premises and as to whether they were the landlords of the defendant (petitioner). It is not denied that the suit premises was earlier a part of the property of Sheikh Mosaheb Ali Wakf Estate (hereinafter referred to as the Estate for the sake of brevity) which was a Wakf-Alal-Aulad. Section 3(L) of the Wakf Act, 1954 , which was applicable at least till 1.1.1996, when the new Wakf Act of 1995 came into force, specifically provided that Wakf under the Act included Wakf-Alal-Aulad and hence the Wakf Act was applicable to such Wakfs and the Board had the authority to take steps and to pass orders with respect thereto in accordance with the provisions of the Act. So far the statements made in the Wakf deed dated 27.6.1935 with respect to the Estate are concerned, they would always be subject to the provisions of the Act, Section 36(A) of which provided that the Board had the authority to allow a motawalli to sell any part of such Wakf properties as it deemed fit for the welfare of the Wakf Estate. 11. Hence, when after the approval of the Board the Chairman vide order dated 29.9.2003 granted sanction of such sale, there was no illegality or irregularity therein and the motawalli, namely, Md. Zahiruddin was fully entitled and justified to execute the sale-deed dated 15.4.1994 with respect to the delapidated suit premises in favour of the plaintiffs-opposite parties. Furthermore, the defendant-petitioner has also failed to show by any valid material that the portion of the property for which permission to sell was granted by the Board was different to the portion which was sold to the plaintiffs-opposite parties. In any view of the matter, Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was not at all attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. Thus, prima facie the plaintiffs appear to be the bona fide purchasers of the suit premises for the purposes of this case, however, this issue may be the subject matter of any other suit, but no order passed in the said suit has been produced in this case and hence the said suit will be decided in accordance with law on its own merit as title cannot be decided in an Eviction Suit as has been held by Hon ble Apex Court in case of Rajendra Tiwary V/s. Basudeo Prasad and Another, 2002 1 SCC 90 . Furthermore, title of the plaintiffs cannot be challenged by the defendant who is admittedly a tenant in the suit property as has been decided in case of Bihar State Sales Representative Union and Another V/s. Amrit Lal Seth and Others, 2000 4 PLJR 678 , as also in case of Champa Lai Sharma V/s. Smt. Sunita Maitra, 1989 0 PLJR 381. 12. So far the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned, Ex-hibit-1 series which are rent receipts issued by the plaintiffs and duly signed by the defendant, fully prove that he had himself accepted the plaintiffs as his land-lords. 12. So far the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned, Ex-hibit-1 series which are rent receipts issued by the plaintiffs and duly signed by the defendant, fully prove that he had himself accepted the plaintiffs as his land-lords. Furthermore, the defendant did not challenge the said rent receipts in the court below and it was admitted in evidence without any contest and hence the defendant-petitioner cannot challenge the same in this Court. There is also no other valid material produced by the defendant-petitioner to nullify the effect of the said rent receipts and hence the learned court below after considering the evidence on record was fully justified in holding that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 13. So far the questions of personal necessity and partial eviction are concerned, admittedly the defence of the defendant had been struck off in the year 2000 and hence he was barred by law from challenging the personal necessity claimed by the plaintiffs for the entire suit premises. Furthermore, the suit premises is a shop room measuring 8 ft. X 5 ft. and the plaintiffs want to open their cloth business in the same as they had no other independent business. In the said circumstances, the learned court below was also justified in holding that the plaintiffs had genuine and bona fide personal requirement of the entire suit premises. 14. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned judgment and decree with respect to the eviction of the defendant-petitioner is hereby affirmed and this Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed.