Judgment :- This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 04.02.2000 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Kallakurichi in I.A.No.329 of 1998 in O.S.No.115 of 1996, dismissing the Petition filed under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and declining to condone the delay of 525 days in filing the Application to set aside the exparte decree. The Defendant is the Revision Petitioner. 2. O.S.No.565 of 1994:- Vellaiya Achari is the Son of the Plaintiffs. The First Defendant – Selvi is the Wife of Deceased – Vellaiya Achari. Both the First Plaintiff and Vellaiya Achari have jointly purchased the Suit Property. From out of their joint income, they have constructed the terraced house in the Suit Property. Vellaiya Achari died in an Accident on 10.06.1993. From out of his half share, D-1 -Wife and Second Plaintiff – Selvambal – Mother are entitled to equal share. The house has been let out to the Second Defendant, who is impleaded as a necessary party to the Suit. Alleging that D-1 is attempting to sell the Suit Property and house thereon to third party, the Plaintiffs have filed the Suit for partition of their 3/4th share alternatively claiming half share to the Second Plaintiff. 3. The First Defendant has filed the Written Statement contending that her Husband – Vellaiya Achari purchased the Suit Property from out of his own income. He has constructed the house from his self-earnings and the First Plaintiff has no right in the Suit Property. Even during the lifetime of Vellaiya Achari, Partition was effected between the Father and Son and the Plaintiffs were allotted the land and the house in Karunkuzhi Village. Hence, the Plaintiffs cannot claim any share in the Suit Property. 4. I.A.No.329 of 1998:- After filing Written Statement, the First Defendant did not appear in Court. For her non-appearance, the Suit was decreed exparte on 14.02.1997. The First Defendant has filed this Application to set aside the exparte decree along with the Application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 525 days. In the supporting affidavit, it is averred that the First Defendant underwent an eye operation in Trichy and that as per medical advice, she was staying in Trichy and when she came back to the village, she learnt about the further proceedings in the Suit. In the supporting affidavit, it is averred that the First Defendant underwent an eye operation in Trichy and that as per medical advice, she was staying in Trichy and when she came back to the village, she learnt about the further proceedings in the Suit. Further, it is alleged that when she met her counsel, he has informed her about the exparte decree dated 14.02.1997. The First Defendant seeks to condone the delay of 525 days in filing the Application to set aside the exparte decree. 5. Opposing the Application, the Plaintiffs filed the Counter Statement contending that the Application has been filed with a view to delay the Trial proceedings. The First Defendant has not produced any evidence showing that she had undergone eye operation. The First Defendant has no substantial defence to offer, but has filed the Application to drag on the proceedings. 6. In the enquiry in I.A.No.329 of 1998, the First Defendant examined herself as P.W.1. She has produced Ex.P.1-Medical Certificate issued by A.G.Eye Hospital, Trichy evidencing her treatment in the Eye Hospital. 7. Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence, declining to condone the delay, learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the Application interalia on the following findings:- i.though the First Defendant was taking treatment in the Eye Hospital, Trichy during November and December 1996, nothing prevented her from filing the Application within a short while after passing of the exparte decree ; ii. no sufficient cause has been shown for the inordinate delay of 554 days ; iii.the delay of 554 days has been incorrectly stated as 525 days. 8. Aggrieved over the dismissal of the Application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, the First Defendant has preferred this Civil Revision Petition. Contending that the delay has been properly explained, learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner has submitted that the Petitioner has adduced evidence by examining herself and also producing Medical Certificate issued by A.G.Eye Hospital, Trichy (Ex.A.1). Pointing out that the Trial Court ought to have elaborately considered the sufficiency of the explanation, learned counsel has relied upon the decision reported in N.BALAKRISHNAN ..VS.. M.KRISHNAMURTHY (1999 I L.W. 739). Submitting that the First Defendant has proved her bonafide by filing Written Statement, learned counsel prayed for setting aside the impugned order and to condone the delay. 9. Pointing out that the Trial Court ought to have elaborately considered the sufficiency of the explanation, learned counsel has relied upon the decision reported in N.BALAKRISHNAN ..VS.. M.KRISHNAMURTHY (1999 I L.W. 739). Submitting that the First Defendant has proved her bonafide by filing Written Statement, learned counsel prayed for setting aside the impugned order and to condone the delay. 9. Countering the arguments, learned counsel for the Respondent has drawn the attention of the Court to the averments in the Affidavit and submitted that no clear reasons have been stated in the Affidavit. Submitting that the medical treatment was only for the period from November to December 1996, which is prior to the exparte decree, he has submitted that nothing prevented the First Defendant from taking appropriate steps immediately after passing of the exparte decree. Supporting the findings of the Trial Court, learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the condonation of delay would seriously affect the right of the Plaintiffs accrued over the years and that the Court cannot condone the delay with a view to defeat such rights of the Plaintiffs. 10. Whether sufficient cause is shown for the delay of 554 days and whether the impugned order declining to condone the delay in filing the Application to set aside the exparte decree suffers from material irregularity warranting interference are the points that arise for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition. 11. After the death of Vellaiya Achari, the First Defendant has been living separately. In her evidence, P.W.1 has stated that on 01.11.1996, she went to Trichy for her Eye Treatment. She has undergone Eye Operation on 10.02.1997 and as per Medicial advice, she stayed back in Trichy in her relatives house and thereafter she came back to her parents’ house in Namagiripettai, Namakkal District. Later, she had come to know about the serving of summons regarding the further proceedings in the Suit. To show that she had taken treatment and undergone Eye Operation in Trichy on 10.02.1997, the First Defendant has produced Ex.P.1-Certificate issued by A.G.Eye Hospital, Trichy. She has filed the Application in September 1998 with a delay of 525 days (correct days of delay = 554 days). Since the Revision Petitioner was taking treatment in the Eye Hospital quite reasonably, she might have taken further rest as per the medical advice. She has filed the Application in September 1998 with a delay of 525 days (correct days of delay = 554 days). Since the Revision Petitioner was taking treatment in the Eye Hospital quite reasonably, she might have taken further rest as per the medical advice. The reason stated for non-appearance on 14.02.1997 and for non-filing of the Application within reasonable time is convincing. 12. The Trial Court dismissed the Application on the ground that the number of days in filing the Application has been wrongly stated as 525 days instead of 554 days. This is only a technical objection and cannot be sustained. We must always remember that the procedural law is only a servant and not an obstruction; but an aid to advance substantial justice. Calculating the days and incorrect statement of number of days in filing the Application cannot be made a ground for dismissal of the Application. After all, the Courts are to do justice and not to thwart rendering justice on such technicalities. 13. The Plaintiffs have filed the Suit for Partition claiming ¾ share in the property, including the house, alternatively claiming ½ share. According to the First Defendant, Partition has already been effected and that the Plaintiffs were allotted house and lands – 1 ½ Acres in Karunkuzhi Village. In view of the substantial defence plea set forth, the First Defendant is to be given an opportunity to put forth the defence. Primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute. By declining to condone the delay, the Court only would shut the opportunity to the First Defendant to put forth her defence. 14. The First Defendant has explained her position stating that she was taking treatment in the Eye Hospital at Trichy and underwent Eye Operation. Her version is supported by Medical Evidence. No doubt, had she been little more careful, she could have filed the Application within short time after 14.02.1997. Of course, it may be said that she should have been little more vigilant by visiting her Advocate after her treatment to check up the progress of the litigation. Being a widow, the First Defendant might not have had proper counseling and direction. Length of delay is no matter. Acceptability of the explanation is the only criteria. 15. It is well settled "Sufficient Cause” should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. Being a widow, the First Defendant might not have had proper counseling and direction. Length of delay is no matter. Acceptability of the explanation is the only criteria. 15. It is well settled "Sufficient Cause” should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. When there is no inaction or no negligence or want of bonafides, the delay ought to be condoned. Holding that the discretion is to be exercised liberally and length of delay is no matter and sufficiency of the explanation is the relevant criteria, in the decision reported in N.BALAKRISHNAN ..VS.. M.KRISHNAMURTHY (1999 (1) L.W. 739) the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "....8. Appellant’s conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But, during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But, it is a different matter when the first Court refused to condone the delay. But, it is a different matter when the first Court refused to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suit or from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide SHAKUNTALA DEVI JAIN ..VS.. KUNTAL KUMARI (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575) and STATE OF WEST BENGAL ..VS.. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide SHAKUNTALA DEVI JAIN ..VS.. KUNTAL KUMARI (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575) and STATE OF WEST BENGAL ..VS.. THE ADMINISTRATOR, HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 749).” 16. Only when the application is filed adopting a dilatory tactics, the Court may decline to condone the delay. Construing that mere lapse on the part of the litigant is not enough to decline to condone the delay, in the same decision, the Supreme Court has held "It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But, when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss”. 17. The First Defendant had undergone Eye Operation in Trichy Hospital. She has stated that she was in Hospital on 10.02.1997 for a period of six days. The exparte decree was passed on 14.02.1997. Learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that she was hospitalised only during November 1996 and February 1997 and nothing prevented her from filing the Petition immediately thereafter. It is further contended that the First Defendant has not acted with diligence in prosecuting the matter. There is no denial that the Revision Petitioner was hospitalised for some time. Further, she has stated that after the treatment, she was taking rest in her parents house at Namagiripettai in Namakkal District. It is further contended that the First Defendant has not acted with diligence in prosecuting the matter. There is no denial that the Revision Petitioner was hospitalised for some time. Further, she has stated that after the treatment, she was taking rest in her parents house at Namagiripettai in Namakkal District. Only when she returned to her house, she received the notice referring to the final decree proceedings and she came to know about the exparte decree. There is much force in the contention of the Revision Petitioner. The Revision Petitioner being a young widow and a coolie, may not have known the implication of the Notice and the necessity in filing the Application. The delay could have been avoided had she been little more careful. But, as the per the decision of the Supreme Court, mere omission to adopt such extra care need not be used as a ground in refusing to condone the delay. 18. As discussed earlier, the First Defendant had already filed the Written Statement putting forth substantial defence. An opportunity has to be afforded to her in contesting the Suit against their in-laws. Unless the delay is condoned, the First Defendant may not be in a position to put forth her defence, establishing her right. There is no proper exercise of discretion by the lower Court. The impugned order suffers from material irregularity and cannot be sustained. 19. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 04.02.2000 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Kallakurichi in I.A.No.329 of 1998 in O.S.No. 115 of 1996 is set aside and this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The Delay in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree could be condoned only by directing the Revision Petitioner to pay costs of Rs.1000/- payable to the Respondents/Plaintiffs in the Trial Court. On such payment of Costs, learned Subordinate Judge, Kallakurichi is directed to admit the application to set aside the exparte decree and dispose of the same in accordance with law. In this Civil Revision Petition, there is no order as to costs.