JAYANTA KUMAR BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THE four petitioners in this writ petition are aggrieved by the fact that because of the results of the check-off system published by the respondent insurance companies on May 31st, 2004, the first and second petitioners have lost the status of representative union; and consequently, the right of further participation in the ongoing wage negotiation. ( 2 ) IN exercise of powers conferred on it by provisions of the General Insurance business (Nationalization) Act, 1972, the Central Government established a government company, called General Insurance Corporation of India. In course of time it floated four subsidiaries (National Insurance Company Ltd. , new India Assurance Company Ltd. , Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and united India Insurance Company Ltd.), the third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents in this case. ( 3 ) FACING with the problem of claims made by the ever-increasing number of unions regarding right of representation in structured meetings and discussions on matters relating to employees of the industry, General Insurance corporation of India decided to introduce the check-off system; and consequently, issued a notice dated January 22nd, 1999 calling upon the unions to submit application in prescribed form by February 15th, 1999. But, for some reasons or other, the system was not actually introduced. ( 4 ) PRAYING for a writ of mandamus directing the companies to introduce the system, an association (the National Confederation of General Insurance officers' Association) moved the Madras High Court. By order dated August 29th, 2003 such writ petition was dismissed granting the companies six months' time to implement the system after full discussion with the unions. ( 5 ) AT around that time the first respondent (the association of the respondent insurance companies) took steps for initiating the wage negotiation with the unions for reaching a settlement for the period from 2002 to 2007. As a result, while the companies were taking steps for actually introducing the check-off system, their association, decided to hold the preliminary meetings regarding wage negotiation. It held such meetings on October 17th, 2003 and December 6th, 2003; and in these meetings, along with other unions, the first and second petitioners participated. As a result, while the companies were taking steps for actually introducing the check-off system, their association, decided to hold the preliminary meetings regarding wage negotiation. It held such meetings on October 17th, 2003 and December 6th, 2003; and in these meetings, along with other unions, the first and second petitioners participated. ( 6 ) THE steps taken by the companies for introducing the system made a union (All India SC/st General Insurance Employees' Welfare Association)aggrieved; and consequently, through its General Secretary it moved this Court by filing a writ petition [no. 846 (W) of 2004]. An interim order dated January 21st, 2004 was made in it to restrain the companies from giving effect to the system. Appeal [m. A. T. No. 373 of 2004] preferred against such interim order was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated February 25th, 2004; the interim order was modified to the effect that though, maintaining secrecy, the companies would be free to complete the preliminary works for introducing the system, they would not take the final decisions without permission from the Single Judge. All the unions, including the first and second petitioners herein, were added as respondents in that writ petition, which was finally disposed of by order dated April 3rd, 2004 directing that the petitioner union and the added respondents therein, who were not parties in the writ petition filed before the Madras High Court, would not be bound by the order dated August 29th, 2003 passed by that Court. ( 7 ) THE petitioners in this case duly participated in all the exercises carried out by the companies for introducing the system. The process came to an end with the publication of the results on May 31st, 2004; the system came into operation from June, 2004. Both the first and second petitioners failed to attract the requisite minimum twenty per cent membership for acquiring the status of a recognised representative union. This was the factual background on september 7th, 2004 when this writ petition was taken out. ( 8 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners has argued that in the midst of the on going wage negotiation the companies were not empowered or entitled to introduce the system, because for such introduction of the system the petitioning unions have lost their right of further participation in the negotiation. ( 8 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners has argued that in the midst of the on going wage negotiation the companies were not empowered or entitled to introduce the system, because for such introduction of the system the petitioning unions have lost their right of further participation in the negotiation. While arguing that the respondents, by their conduct, created his clients' right of further participation, he referred me to Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th edn.), and read (from p. 334):"the distinction between these two classes of vestitive facts may be variously expressed. We may make use, for example, of the contrasted expressions act of the party and act of the law. An act of the party is any expression of the Will or intention of the person concerned, directed to the creation, transfer, or extinction of a right, and effective in law for that purpose; such a contract or a deed of conveyance. " ( 9 ) COUNSEL for the respondents has argued that introduction of the system cannot be challenged without joining the representative unions, which are necessary parties. They contended that after participating in the process that brought, about the results, the petitioners were not entitled to challenge the introduction of the check-off system. ( 10 ) AS to these points, as against the two authorities cited by them Tewari and Ors. vs. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, AIR 1998 SC 331 and Khetrabasi biswal vs. Ajaya Kumar Baral and Ors. , 2004 (1) SCC 317 ; Counsel for the petitioners cited to me Prabodh Verma and Ors. vs. State of U. P. and Ors. , AIR 1985 SC 167 and C. Tulasi Priya vs. A. P. St. Council of Higher Education and ors. , 1998 (6) SCC 284 . ( 11 ) IT seems to me that though the unions which acquired the representative strength are not necessary parties, they should have been joined as respondents, since the petitioners have prayed for a declaration that the check-off results are bad. It is not that without them the issues raised cannot be adjudicated, but the decision on the declaration issue is likely to affect them. So, in my view, they are proper parties. ( 12 ) I agree with Counsel for the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the introduction of the check-off system. It is not that without them the issues raised cannot be adjudicated, but the decision on the declaration issue is likely to affect them. So, in my view, they are proper parties. ( 12 ) I agree with Counsel for the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the introduction of the check-off system. To my mind, once they participated, without any reservation, in the exercises carried out in furtherance of actual introduction of the system, they lost the right to challenge the decision taken to introduce the system; this is due to the principles of estoppel and waiver. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, because of the nature of the dominant issue, which I find after hearing the parties, and which really requires determination, I do not think purpose of justice will be served by deferring the final decision in the case for bringing the proper parties on record. The dominant issue is whether the first and second petitioners have right of further participation in the ongoing wage negotiation. ( 14 ) TO my mind, a right is either conferred or created; and it is always inseparably connected with a corresponding obligation, simultaneously created. When the source of the right is identifiable, there is no difficulty in locating the obligation. It means that without a source, there can be no right. It can, therefore, he logically said that the process through which a source of a right is born, does not confer or create a right. I think, if I am right in this proposition, then 1 can perhaps say that, in the context of labour laws, the process through which a settlement is readied and recorded, by and between the employer and his workmen, does not create any enforceable right in favour of either of them, though the settlement does. ( 15 ) I agree with Counsel for the companies that mere participation of the petitioning unions in the preliminary meetings of the ongoing wage negotiation did not create any vested right regarding their future participation in it. On the facts, I do not see any reason to say that introduction of the check-off system in the midst of the wage negotiation is unfair or unreasonable; everyone, including the petitioners, knew that this was bound to happen. ( 16 ) THE wage negotiation has been initiated for reaching a settlement with the workmen. On the facts, I do not see any reason to say that introduction of the check-off system in the midst of the wage negotiation is unfair or unreasonable; everyone, including the petitioners, knew that this was bound to happen. ( 16 ) THE wage negotiation has been initiated for reaching a settlement with the workmen. It is nobody's case that the companies are under any statutory obligation f o initiate the negotiation. It seems to me that instead of following the procedure of changing the conditions of service of their workmen unilaterally, which might have led to an industrial dispute, and hence disturbance in essential industrial peace and harmony, they decided to explore the possibility of reaching a settlement through negotiation. ( 17 ) THEY have a large number of unions and associations functioning in their establishments. They were free to enter into negotiation with the representative unions and reach a settlement. It is clear that they were not sun; about the representative strength of the unions for treating one or some of them as the representative unions. The picture became clear to them only after they got the results regarding membership through the check-off system. ( 18 ) SO till the results through the check-off system came to be known, it was not unnatural for the first respondent to call the first and second petitioners and other similar unions to participate in the negotiation; when a step to the contrary would have been vulnerable to a challenge on the ground of discrimination and breach of the rule of fairness. ( 19 ) BUT the moment the results came to be known to all concerned, the first respondent was no longer under the obligation to call the petitioning and other similarly placed unions to participate in the negotiation; the results of the check-off process created right of the unions which reached the prescribed percentage of strength for participating in the negotiation as representative unions; and simultaneously they created an obligation on the first respondent to call only such representative unions for participation. ( 20 ) ALL the parties that participated in the exercises of the check-off process are to remain bound by the results thereof during the period the results will remain in force in terms of provisions of the system. ( 20 ) ALL the parties that participated in the exercises of the check-off process are to remain bound by the results thereof during the period the results will remain in force in terms of provisions of the system. I, therefore, do not find any reason to say that the past participation of the first and second petitioners in the ongoing wage negotiation created their right of further participation in it. ( 21 ) I am unable to agree with Counsel for the petitioners that right of his clients to participate in the negotiation accrued from the orders passed in the previous Court proceedings, I have already noted. Counsel for the respondents, in my view, have rightly pointed out that no right of any nature was created or curtailed or taken away by any of the orders passed in any of the previous proceedings. The Madras High Court writ petition was dismissed, once the companies informed the Court that they needed some time to introduce the system. That order neither created any right in favour of anyone, nor took away any right that was being enjoyed or was to be enjoyed by anyone; though, for the statement they made in Court, it created a sort of obligation of the companies to introduce the system. ( 22 ) THE order passed in the previous writ petition by this Court once again did not create, curtail or take away any right of anyone. The Madras High court order did not give the power or right to the companies to take away any existing right of anyone. Hence the order passed in the previous writ petition filed in this Court, that the Madras High Court order would not be binding on the petitioner and the added respondents therein, in my judgment, does not create any right of the petitioners to participate in the ongoing negotiation. ( 23 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners has argued that since the negotiation is for settling the issues connected with wages of workmen and officers of the companies, every workman and officer has an inherent right to participate in it for representing his own case; and hence the first and second petitioners, representing a sizeable number of workmen and officers, have the right to participate in the negotiation along with others. ( 24 ) IN my view Counsel for the respondents are fully justified in saving that the contention is based on a wrong proposition of law. By citing to me A. I. 8. E. Assort, vs. N. I. Tribunal and Ors. , AIR 1962 SC 171 and Dharam Dutt and ors. vs. U. O. I. and Ors. , 2004 (1) SCC 712 , they have proposed that right to form association does not automatically lead to right of collective bargaining. I acknowledge the force of their submission. I should not be thought of unappreciative of their arguments for not referring to a few more cited authorities which decided how an industrial dispute is raised and what membership strength is reasonable for determining representative status. ( 25 ) THE concept of collective bargaining has withstood the test of time; and for maintaining industrial peace and avoiding industrial disputes, employers and workmen have successfully adhered to the concept for nearly a century. An employer, in ordinary course, is under no obligation to enter into negotiation with his workmen. Trade unions came to be formed to provide an employer a hassle free avenue to settle issues or disputes with his workmen through their representative unions. So once the representative unions are there, the employer does not need to negotiate issues or disputes with his workmen individually. ( 26 ) I, however, find that argument of Counsel for the petitioners that the results obtained on completion of the process of the check-off system are not entirely free from mistakes, is not totally meritless. By referring me to the relevant documents and statements, he has commented that objections raised by some of the persons, regarding their memberships on the basis of letters of authority submitted by them, did not receive the required attention from the companies, for taking the corrective measures. I am, however, unable to agree with him that the objections are sufficient to scrap the results lock, stock, and barrel. I also do not think that he is justified in criticizing the presence of representatives of the companies at the time of scrutiny of the letters of authority by the competent agency or authority. His comments about likely manipulation of the results are, in my view, entirely based on speculation. I also do not think that he is justified in criticizing the presence of representatives of the companies at the time of scrutiny of the letters of authority by the competent agency or authority. His comments about likely manipulation of the results are, in my view, entirely based on speculation. ( 27 ) COUNSEL for the respondents, though initially resisted, finally agreed to take steps for looking into the few objections of the persons concerned, as have been disclosed by the petitioners in their writ petition and reply. Their initial resistance was on the basis of the case made out by their clients that the letters of authority suffered rejection, since they were not complete in every respect. They have informed me that there may be some more cases of similar rejection. ( 28 ) AS to the rejection of the letters of authority by the companies, it seems to me that the procedure followed by them does not advance the purpose of the system. I think, it will be unjust to compare the situation (as done by Counsel for the respondents) with the one that may arise in case of elections held under representation of the People Act, 1951. The system has been introduced for the benefits of the workmen and officers of the companies. Any procedure that is likely to cause any undesired harm or disadvantage to any workman or officer, it seems to me, is not in conformity with the spirit and object of the system. ( 29 ) SO I think that while a workman or an officer who committed a fatal mistake in specifying the union or association of his choice, is not to be cajoled into making his choice known, the same should not be the case, where, though a workman or an officer unambiguously specified his choice of the union, his letter of authority suffered rejection for some inconsequential omissions or commissions. I, therefore, think that the rejection aspect needs a fresh look so that the workmen and officers whose letters of authority suffered rejection know the reasons for rejection, and those who committed insignificant mistakes get a chance to rectify such mistakes. In my opinion, such a course is necessary for the benefit of the persons for whom the system has been introduced. In my opinion, such a course is necessary for the benefit of the persons for whom the system has been introduced. ( 30 ) FOR these reasons, while I am not minded to interfere in the actual introduction of the check-off system by the companies, and though I find no reason to hold that at present the first and second petitioners are entitled to participate in the ongoing wage negotiation, I am of the view that suitable directions should be given regarding the cases of rejection of the letters of authority. Accordingly, I dispose of the writ petition by the following order: the companies shall take steps forthwith for informing the workmen and officers whose letters of authority suffered rejection. While the companies shall state the reasons for rejection, they shall give an opportunity to rectify mistakes only to those workmen and officers whose letters of authority were not rejected for not specifying clearly the choice of the union. If the persons who are given the chance to rectify their mistakes comply with the directions, then credit thereof shall be given to the unions concerned by issuing necessary corrigendum to the results published on May 31st, 2004. If because of such steps the first and second petitioners or any other union acquires the requisite representative strength for participating in the ongoing negotiation, then the respondents shall proceed with the negotiation after giving such union opportunity to participate. Till the exercises required to be carried out in terms of this order are completed, the respondents shall not hold any meeting regarding the wage negotiation in question. The meetings shall be held immediately after the exercises are completed, and the results published on May 31st, 2004 are rectified, if necessary. ( 31 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs in the writ petition. ( 32 ) URGENT certified xerox copy of this judgment and order shall be supplied to the parties if applied for. Writ petition disposed of with directions.