JUDGMENT: Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, passed in A.S.No.18 of 1993 dated 29.11.1993 reversing the judgment and decree of the District Munsif, Panruti passed in O.S.No.668 of 1989 dated 23.11.1992, the defendants have filed this second appeal. 2. The case of plaintiff-in-brief is as follows: Plaintiff is an agriculturist and is doing agricultural operations at Kiliruppu Village, Panruti Taluk. For irrigating the land, he obtained an electricity service connection bearing S.C.No.102 from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. He was regular in payment of electricity consumption charges to the Board without any default. That being the position, the plaintiff came to know about a complaint lodged by the Assistant Engineer, Rural South, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and the same was registered as a case in Crl.No.236 of 1989 on the file of Kadampuliyur police station for committing theft of electric energy by way of illegal tapping of energy from a main line. Thereafter, the second defendant issued a show-cause notice to the plaintiff by letter dated 26.6.1989, wherein, it has been stated that the plaintiff extracted energy by means of illegal tapping and also used 7.5 H.P. allotted for agricultural purpose. For that the plaintiff sent a reply stating that he has not committed any energy theft. Subsequently, the first defendant, Executive Engineer, Operation and Maintenance, TNEB, Panruti, issued a letter dated 21.8.1989 to the plaintiff, by which, the plaintiff was asked to pay extra levy for the stolen energy to the tune of Rs.66,166 on or before 5.9.1989 in one lump sum. The show-cause notice issued by the second defendant and the letter sent by the first defendant are vexatious and arbitrary. The plaintiff denied that he never committed any theft of energy. The orders of the first and second defendants and the calculation made therein are against law. The principles of natural justice have been violated by the defendants 1 and 2. Hence, the letters issued by the first and second defendants dated 26.6.1989 and 21.8.1989 are declared to be null and void and the same have to be set aside. 3. The orders of the first and second defendants and the calculation made therein are against law. The principles of natural justice have been violated by the defendants 1 and 2. Hence, the letters issued by the first and second defendants dated 26.6.1989 and 21.8.1989 are declared to be null and void and the same have to be set aside. 3. The averments made in the written statement filed by the second defendant, which was adopted by the defendants 1 and 3, are as follows: "On 24.5.1989, the theft of electrical energy by means of illegal tapping from L.T. lines pole location 1808 of Kiliruppu village by running a 7.5 H.P. motor, which was installed in the borewell in Survey 8/7 of Killiruppu village, which belongs to the plaintiff, was detected by the Assistant Executive Engineer, Anti-power-theft squad. At the time of inspection, the tapping of electricity energy from the main line by way of connecting a PVC wire was detected by the said squad. Thereafter, a complaint was lodged by Assistant Executive Engineer (Rural) about the tapping of electric energy by the plaintiff. A case was registered at Kadampuliyur police station against the plaintiff. In furtherance of the same, a show-cause notice was issued to the plaintiff as per the approved TNEB terms and conditions. The plaintiff gave a reply denying that he never committed any theft of electric energy. Since the reply given by the plaintiff was not convincing, the first defendant by virtue of power vested in him issued an assessment notice directing the plaintiff to pay a sum of Rs.66,166. There is no rule or provision in the Act to give notice to the plaintiff with regard to surprise inspection. The calculations made by the first defendant is a correct one and is binding on the plaintiff as per the TNEB Rules and Regulations. Further, there is an opportunity for the plaintiff to prefer an appeal to the Superintending Engineer, Cuddalore Electricity Distribution Circle after the payment of levy. But the plaintiff without exhausting the said remedy available under the Electricity Laws, he approached the Civil Court and therefore, the suit instituted by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed.‘ ‘ 4. Further, there is an opportunity for the plaintiff to prefer an appeal to the Superintending Engineer, Cuddalore Electricity Distribution Circle after the payment of levy. But the plaintiff without exhausting the said remedy available under the Electricity Laws, he approached the Civil Court and therefore, the suit instituted by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed.‘ ‘ 4. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, though the trial Court dismissed the suit, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence, the second appeal by defendants. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law for consideration: (a) Whether the suit filed by the consumer/respondent in the context of the provisional assessment of the consumption charge is maintainable in law and if so, the conditions of the supply agreed are not binding on the parties? (b) Was the lower appellate Court correct in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to decree in the context that he was not found guilty in the criminal proceedings initiated by and on behalf of the appellant herein. (c) In the context of the theft of energy from the service connection, is not the appellant entitled to initiate action to recovery of the proper consumption charges as well as penalty for the same in view of the contract entered into and the rules of the Indian Electricity Act? 6. The only point to be decided in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is maintainable or not. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that when there is a specific provision under the Act to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority to redress the grievance of the plaintiff, he ought not have by-passed such remedy. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that the suit by the plaintiff is not at all maintainable under law when there is a clear provision with regard to appellate remedy, the plaintiff can very well put forth his grievances if any in regard to the extra levy for committing the theft of electric energy to the tune of Rs. 66,166. 8. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants relied of the following decisions for deciding the second appeal. 9. 66,166. 8. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants relied of the following decisions for deciding the second appeal. 9. In Punjab State Electricity Board and another v. Ashwani Kumar, (1997)5 S.C.C. 120 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "8. The question then arises whether the Civil Court would be justified in entertaining the suit and issue injunction as prayed for? It is true, as contended by Shri.Goyal, learned senior counsel, that the objections were raised in the written statement as to the maintainability of the suit but the same were given up. Sec.9 of the C.P.C. provides that the civil court shall try all suits of civil nature, subject to pecuniary jurisdiction, unless their cognizance is expressly or by necessary implication barred. Such suit would not be maintainable. It is true that ordinarily, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into and try the disputed questions of civil nature, where the fundamental fairness of procedure has been violated. The statutory circulars adumbrated above do indicate that a fundamental fairness of the procedure has been prescribed in the rules and is being followed. By necessary implication, the cognizance of the civil cause has been excluded. As a consequence, the Civil Court shall not be justified in entertaining this suit and giving the declaration without directing the party to avail of the remedy provided under the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act and the instructions issued by the Board in that behalf from time to time as stated above. 9. Shri Goyal has contended that the authorities do not hear the parties, nor give a reasoned order. Therefore, the parties cannot be precluded to avail of the remedy of a suit. We cannot accept such a broad and generalized proposition. When the provision for appeal by way of review has been provided by the statutory instructions, and the parties are directed to avail of the remedy, the authorities are enjoined to consider all the objections raised by the consumer and to pass, after consideration, the reasoned order in that behalf, so that the aggrieved consumer, if not satisfied with the order passed by the Board/appellate authority, can avail of the remedy available under Art.226 of the Constitution. Therefore, by necessary implication, the appropriate competent authority should hear the parties, consider their objections and pass the reasoned order, either accepting or negativing the claim. Of course it is not like a judgment of a Civil Court. It is then contended that the respondent has been subjected to pay huge amount of bill in a short period; hence, it is a case for interference. We find no force in the contention. May be that due to the advice given by the counsel, the respondent obviously has availed of the remedy of the suit, instead of departmental appeal. In our view, by necessary implication the suit is not maintainable. Therefore, the respondent is at liberty to avail the remedy of appeal within six weeks from today and raise the factual objections before the Board and the Board/appellate authority would consider and dispose of them, as indicated earlier, on merits’‘. 10. Following the above decision of the Supreme Court, in The Superintending Engineer, Coimbatore and others v. S.N.Srinivasan, (2002)2 L.W.544, this Court, after discussing the relevant provisions of the Act, held as follows: “3. As stated already, the only one rather the substantial question of law to be decided in the case is as to the maintainability of the suit in respect of the demand made by the department for unauthorized excess connection. The terms and conditions of supply of electricity are framed by invoking the powers under Sec.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948). The terms and conditions are the Code by themselves in respect of requisition, supply of electricity, categories of supply, tariff, earnest money deposit, current consumption deposit, installation of capacitors, billing and payment, unauthorized supply of energy, violation of conditions of service connections and further providing for the appellate provisions. Para.6.01 provides that on detection of violation, the officer authorized to issue show-cause notice as per Clause 10 of this Schedule, will issue a notice to the consumer asking him to remove the violation within 24 hours or seven days as the case may be, failing which the supply will be disconnected and to show-cause why the compensation charges should not be levied for having committed the violation. Reply to show-cause notice shall be sent by the consumer within seven days from the date of receipt of notice. Para. Reply to show-cause notice shall be sent by the consumer within seven days from the date of receipt of notice. Para. 6.02 provides that if the consumer fails to send the explanation within the stipnlated time or if the explanation is not satisfactory, the officer authorized to issue the show-cause notice will send a report to the Assessing Officer. The officer authorized to make assessment will, if convinced that there has been a violation, assess the compensation charges payable and intimate it to the consumer directing him to pay the charges in four equal monthly instalments. Para.6.03 provides for an appellate remedy to the effect that if the consumer desires to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority, he may do so within 60 days from the date of receipt of the assessment notice issued to him, Thus a complete alternate machinery is available under the Act. It is now very well settled that when a special enactment creates rights and liabilities to the parties and the alternative machineries are provided therein, even if there is no explicit provision for bar of jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. This is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment in Dhulahbai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968)2 S.T.C.416, which has been reaffirmed by the nine Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Limited v. Union of India,(1998)3 S.T.C.467. The point in issue is also directly covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab State Electricity Board v. Ashwani Kumar,(1997)5 S.C.C.120, wherein the provisions of the Punjab Electricity Board Act has been considered by the Supreme Court and held that the suit is not maintainable.‘ ‘ 11. In yet another similar case in The Tamilnadu Electricity Board by its Chairman represented by its Superintending Engineer, Thanjavur and others v. Shanmuga Engineering College and Shanmuga Polytechnic, Vallam, Thanjavur , (1999)3 M.L.J. 566 , this Court held as follows: ”In the above circumstances, it cannot be contended that the appellants have no right to advance arguments on the question of jurisdiction of the Court In view of the latest judgment of the Apex Court referred to above, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration that the order of assessment made by the Electricity Board is not valid in law. The question whether the plaintiff is entitled to insist the defendants to fix the demand of supply meter to service connection 102 will not arise at this stage without exhausting the remedy before the appellate authority. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief in respect of prayer (b), (c) and (e). The plaintiff is at liberty to avail the remedy of appeal and after exhausting the said remedy, he is entitled to file the suit, if necessary.‘ ‘ 12.Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/appellant would submit that the show-cause notice issued by the second defendant to the plaintiff on 26.6.1989 and the letter sent by the first defendant, dated 21.8.1989 directing the plaintiff to pay extra levy for stolen energy to the tune of Rs.66,166 on or before 5.9.1989 in one lump sum are declared to be null and void for the reason that those notices were issued by the authorities arbitrarily. 13. Moreover, those two letters are against the principles of natural justice and therefore, the plaintiff has approached the Civil Court to declare the notice and the letter of the first and second defendants respectively as null and void. 14. During the course of argument, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on the following decisions: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Ajanta Iron and Steel Company (P) Limited, A.I.R. 1990, S.C.882. Firm Seth Radha Kishan (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and others v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1547 (V 50 C 226). 15. When considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the decisions referred to above by the learned counsel for the respondent are not applicable to the case on hand. 16. On a careful analysis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants and considering the valid reasons and legal position, this Court is of the view that there are sufficient reasons for allowing this appeal in favour of the appellants. 17. In view of the above settled position of law, the question of law framed as to the maintainability has to be answered in favour of the appellants herein and by necessary corollary, the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and therefore, the suit is dismissed as not maintainable and the consequontial judgment and decree of both the Courts below are set aside. 18. 18. In result, the second appeal is allowed. However, it is open to the respondent herein, if he is so advised to invoke the appellate remedy within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If the appeal is filed within the time granted, the Appellate Authority is directed to dispose of the appeal within a month thereafter. With this observation, the second appeal is allowed. No costs.