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2005 DIGILAW 941 (BOM)

Magarpansingh Pimple v. State of Maharashtra

2005-07-27

N.V.DABHOLKAR, S.B.DESHMUKH

body2005
Judgment N. V. DABHOLKAR, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petition invites this Court to exercise its plenary powers under Articles 226 read with 227 of the Constitution of India, and prays to quash and set aside detention order No d O 2005/mpda/det-1/cd-8, dated 24-2-2005, issued by respondent No 2 in exercise of powers conferred by section 3 (1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drugoffenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981. (henceforth, referred to as "mpda Act") ( 2 ) FACTUAL matrix essential for the purpose, can be stated as follows - by considering proposal sponsored by the Crime Branch, Aurangabad, the Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad, (henceforth referred to as "respondent No 2"), passed an order on 24-2-2005 in three parts as at Exhibits A and B to the petition. Observing that, it is necessary with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, respondent No. 2 has directed detention of the Petitioner. There is no dispute that, respondent No. 2 is delegated and empowered to exercise powers under section 3 (1) of the MPDA Act. A report as required under section 3 (3) of the said Act, was submitted to the State, by the Detaining Authority respondent No. 2, on 28-2- 2005 and the State Government has issued its approval to the said order, on 3-3-2005 within the limit of twelve days as prescribed by the said provision. A reference under section 10 to the Advisory Board was made on 4-3-2005 and the opinion of the Advisory Board was received by the Government, on 7-4-2005. Both the events had occurred within outer time limit prescribed by sections 10 and 11 respectively, i. e. within three weeks and seven weeks respectively, from the date of order of detention. The petitioner is under detention from the date of order i. e. 24-2-2005. The order of detention was served on the petitioner on the same day and information about his detention and place of detention was given to his wife, namely, Begabai, also on the same day. Grounds of detention and other relevant paper, along with marathi translation, were served on the petitioner, on 26-2-2005. The order of detention was served on the petitioner on the same day and information about his detention and place of detention was given to his wife, namely, Begabai, also on the same day. Grounds of detention and other relevant paper, along with marathi translation, were served on the petitioner, on 26-2-2005. The petitioner directed his representation dated 2-4-2005 to the Advisory Board constituted under section 9 of the MPDA Act, which was also received by the Government, along with report of the Advisory Board, on 11. 4. 2005. The report of the Advisory Board was processed after obtaining para-wise remarks from the detaining Authority (which were received on 15-4-2005) on 16th, 19th and 20th April, 2005. 17th, 18th April, and 22nd to 24th april, 2005 being holidays, rejection of representation was conveyed to the detenue vide Government communication dated 25-4-2005. On the same day, the Government has issued an order confirming the detention order passed by the Detaining authority (Exh. C ). Consequently, the petitioner is ordered to be continued under detention for a period of one year from the date of his initial detention, i. e. 24-2-2005. ( 3 ) SO far as material, upon which the order of detention is based, is concerned, it can be said that the Detaining Authority has placed reliance upon five offences registered against the petitioner under the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, mainly under section 66 (l) (b) and 65 (f) of the Act. Three offences were registered in the year 2001, by Cantonment Police Station and two by M. I. D. C. , Waluj police Station, in the year 2004. It seems that, the proceedings under section 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, are also initiated by police Station, M. I. D. C. , Waluj, which are numbered as Chapter Cases No. 7/2001, 15/2001 and 5/2003. All are pending before the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, aurangabad. Last two offences under Prohibition act, i. e. 6075 of 2004 and 6082 of 2004, are registered on 26-11-2004 and 30-12-2004 and on both the occasions quite a big haul of contraband i. e. material useful for distilling illicit liquor, is alleged to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner. In addition, there are four in-camera statements (Exh. D collectively ). The witnesses at A, B and C have threatened them in January, 2005, December, 2004 and december 2004, respectively. In addition, there are four in-camera statements (Exh. D collectively ). The witnesses at A, B and C have threatened them in January, 2005, December, 2004 and december 2004, respectively. The witnesses B and C also claim to have been beaten by the petitioner. Witness D has spoken about the state of affairs around location, from where the petitioner is dealing in illicit liquor. ( 4 ) ALTHOUGH writ petition contains grounds A to H for challenging the order, during the course of his arguments, Shri gorhe, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has limited his arguments to grounds B, D, f, G and H which can be summarized as follows :- (B) The conclusion drawn by the Detaining Authority that the petitioner is a bootlegger, is erroneous and baseless and consequently, the observation that the bootlegging activities of the petitioner are causing and calculating to cause harm, alarm and feeling of insecurity amongst the people, is also baseless. (D) The conclusion of the Detaining Authority that the petitioners activities are prejudicial to the public order in the area of pandharpur, M. I. D. C. , Waluj, of City of aurangabad, is baseless and without any supporting material and therefore, satisfaction expressed by the Detaining Authority, is bad in law. (F) Four in-camera statements recorded on 13th and 14th February, 2005, are not sufficient to conclude that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to public order and. therefore, section 3 (1) of the m. P. D. A. Act is not attracted. (G) In-camera statements are recorded, by sponsoring authority i. e. Crime Branch and the Detaining Authority has simply endorsed, "verified" upon the same. Thee is nothing to indicate that the Detaining authority has carried out its own confidential enquiry through independent agency and confirmed the truthfulness of the statements. (H) In-camera statements recorded on 13th and 14th February , 2005, so far as witnesses A, B and C are concerned, speak of instances, which are more than 1-1/2 months old and thus there is delay in recording the statements and, therefore, the statements cannot form the basis for such a detention. At the stage of reply, he was inclined to place reliance also on ground c which is as under : (C) That, report of chemical analyst has not reported that consumption of such illicit liquor is dangerous to public health. At the stage of reply, he was inclined to place reliance also on ground c which is as under : (C) That, report of chemical analyst has not reported that consumption of such illicit liquor is dangerous to public health. ( 5 ) HEARD Shri A. V. Gorhe, learned Advocate for the petitioner, and Shri P. C. Patel, learned A. P. P. for the respondent state. By mutual consent, we have heard the matter finally. Initially, reliance was placed by Advocate Shri Gorhe on the observations in a decision of another Division Bench at nagpur of this High Court, in the matter of (Anil Damcdhar Paumpagar v. State of Maharashtra), 2000 (Supp.) Bom. C. R. (N. B.)154 : 2000 All. M. R. (Crl) 28, and more particularly those in paragraph 11 of the judgment, based on couple of judicial pronouncements by the Honble the Supreme court, which read as follows :-"the Apex Court has taken a view that when the allegation is that there is no application of mind in the making of preventive detention, the return should come either from the Detaining Authority, or a person who was directly connected with the making of the order and not on the basis of the record of the case as otherwise it would vitiate the order. "this was because, initially reply was filed by Shri U. S. Kamble, present Commissioner of Police of Aurangabad. However, by seeking an adjournment, the State has now filed another reply in the form of affidavit by Shri R. N. Wagh, the then commissioner of Police of Aurangabad, who has passed the detention order. The ground, therefore, was not pressed into service by advocate Shri Gorhe. ( 6 ) RELIANCE was also placed on the observations of another Division Bench at nagpur, in the matter of (Sanjay Balaram kirale v. State of Maharashtra), 2002 bom. C. R. (Cri.) (N. B.)399 : 2001 All. M. R. (Cri.) 1616. This is mainly relied upon for the purpose of submitting that, there is delay in passing the detention order. So far as present matter is concerned, we may state that, in-camera statements are recorded on 13th and 14th February, 2005. The events narrated by witnesses A, B and c are of first week of January, 2005 and second week of December, 2004. In the matter before Nagpur Bench, the detention order was passed on 30-11-2000. So far as present matter is concerned, we may state that, in-camera statements are recorded on 13th and 14th February, 2005. The events narrated by witnesses A, B and c are of first week of January, 2005 and second week of December, 2004. In the matter before Nagpur Bench, the detention order was passed on 30-11-2000. The date of recording the statements is not available in the reported judgment, but in-camera statements of witnesses A and B narrated the incidents of June and august 2000 respectively. Thus, the order happened to be passed after more than five months and three months since the incidents referred to in the two in camera statements. Even the judgments of the Honble supreme Court referred to and relied upon by the Division Bench at Nagpur, do not lay down ratio that, delay in passing the order should be fatal. In fact, in the matter of (Hemalata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra), 1982 (2) Bom. C. R. 218 : A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 8, referred in paragraph 7 of the judgment relied upon, the Honble Supreme court has held that delay ipso facto in passing the order after the incident is not fatal to the detention of a person for, in certain cases, delay may be unavoidable or reasonable. What is required by law, is that the delay must be specifically explained by the detaining Authority. In the matter of (Hasan Khan Ibne haider Khan v. R. H. Mendonca), 2000 (5) bom. C. R. (S. C.)814 : 2000 All. M. R. (Cri.) 1070 (S. C.) : A. I. R. 2000 S. C. 1146, the honble Supreme Court held that there was no undue delay in passing the order of detention as the inquiry into the incident was completed in February and the order was passed in April after going through two stages. In the matter before the Nagpur bench, delay was much more than in the matter of Hasan Khan (supra ). On the contrary, in the matter before us, the time gap between recording of statements and passing of order by the Detaining Authority is comparatively less and, in fact, does not oblige the State to explain the delay. In the matter before the Nagpur bench, delay was much more than in the matter of Hasan Khan (supra ). On the contrary, in the matter before us, the time gap between recording of statements and passing of order by the Detaining Authority is comparatively less and, in fact, does not oblige the State to explain the delay. As already pointed out hereinabove, in-camera statements are recorded on 13th and 14th february, 2005 and the Detaining Authority has passed the order on 24-2-2005 and after having gone through the stage of report from the Advisory Board and consideration of representation of the petitioner detenue, the same is confirmed by the State on 25-4-2005. Our time gaps are more like those in the matter of Hasan Khan (supra) referred to, by Nagpur Bench in paragraph 10 of its judgment, and we will be justified in saying that the State is not obliged to explain the delay. Even considering the observations in the matter of Smt. Hemlata (supra) referred in paragraph 7 of the judgment of Nagpur Bench, the incidents referred to, in in-camera statements in that matter, were more than 3 months and 5 months old. In the matter at hands, when the statements are recorded on 13th and 14th February, 2005, the incidents were one or two months old. We are, therefore, of considered view that in this matter, the delay is neither unreasonable nor inordinate and there appears no necessity to explain the same. Delay is not of such a magnitude that the same can vitiate the detention order itself. We have on our own, referred to the judgment of the Honble the Apex Court, in the matter of (Pradip Paturkar v. S. Ramamurthi), A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 656. In this matter, the Supreme Court was pleased to quash the detention order, by taking into consideration unexplained delay. The detention order was passed on the basis of some criminal cases against the detenue, and also the statements of the witnesses. The detention order was passed after five months and eight days from the date of registration of last offence, and more than 4 months from the submission of the proposal. When the time gaps in the matter before us are compared with the time gaps in the reported matter, it is evident that the time gaps in the matter at hands, cannot be termed as delay. When the time gaps in the matter before us are compared with the time gaps in the reported matter, it is evident that the time gaps in the matter at hands, cannot be termed as delay. The things appears to have moved within reasonable time required in practical life. The last two offences registered against present petitioner, are of the incidents dated 26-11-2004 and 30-12-2004. The last offence registered is within less than two months from the order passed by the Detaining Authority on 24-2-2005. The same is within ten days from the proposal by the Crime Branch, which recorded the statements on 13th and 14th February, 2005. Viewed as above, we do not think that there is any unreasonable or unexplained delay which is required to be explained in the matter at hands. Consequently, we are unable to accept the submission of learned advocate Shri Gorhe that, the order deserves to be quashed on account of delay. We are fortified in taking such a view, in the light of decision in the matter of (Priyanka Fulore v. State of Maharashtra), 2002 (9) S. C. C. 714. In this matter, the material was collected against the detenue, in the month of July, 2000 and proposal for detention was initiated in August, 2000. The order of detention was passed in October, 2000. It was argued that the delay having not been properly explained by the respondent-State, the same should be accepted as ground for quashing the order of detention. The High Court upheld the detention order, by observing that the delay in the case was neither inordinate, nor unexplained. The Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court, by again rejecting the same contention. ( 7 ) BY relying upon a decision of a Division Bench at Nagpur of this High Court, in the matter of (Samsherali v. State of Maharashtra ), 2004 (1) Bom. C. R. (Cri.) (N. B.)124 : 2004 Cri. L. J. 207, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, since the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority on 24-2-2005 does not mention the period of detention, the same is vitiated and is, therefore required to be quashed and set aside. C. R. (Cri.) (N. B.)124 : 2004 Cri. L. J. 207, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, since the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority on 24-2-2005 does not mention the period of detention, the same is vitiated and is, therefore required to be quashed and set aside. In this matter, the Division Bench at nagpur has allowed the petition of the detenue, by relying upon the decision of the supreme Court in the matter of (Commissioner of Police and another v. Gurbux A. Bhiryani, 1988 (Supp.) S. C. C. 568. Eventually, as rightly pointed out by the learned A. P. P. , the case relied upon by nagpur Bench is overruled by the Supreme Court, while deciding the matter of (T. Devaki v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu), 1990 cri. L. J. 1140, by its observations in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment, which read as follows :"the Act nowhere requires the Detaining Authority to specify the period for which the detenue is required to be detained. The expression "the State Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order" occurring in sub-section (2) of section 3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. "the observations made by the Supreme Court in Gurbux Biryanis case, 1988 (Supp.) s. C. C. 568, that the scheme of the Maharashtra Act was different from the provisions contained in other similar Acts and that section 3 of the Act contemplated initial period of detention for three months at a time are not correct. The scheme as contained in other Acts providing for the detention of person without trial, is similar. Neither under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 nor under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act or COFEPOSA Act or National security Act is the Detaining Authority required to specify the period of detention while making the order of detention against a person. The scheme as contained in other Acts providing for the detention of person without trial, is similar. Neither under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 nor under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act or COFEPOSA Act or National security Act is the Detaining Authority required to specify the period of detention while making the order of detention against a person. In the absence of any period being specified in the order the detenue is required to be under detention for the maximum period prescribed under the Act, but it is always open to the State Government to modify or revoke the order even before the completion of the maximum period of detention. An order of detention is not rendered illegal on account of the Detaining authoritys failure to specify period of detention in the order. " (emphasis added) in view of the decision of the Supreme court in the matter of T. Devaki (supra), the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner does not survive. Following the view in the matter of T. Devaki, in a. I. R. 1992 S. C. 979, (Harpreet Kaur harvinder Singh Bedi v. State of Maharashtra and another), the Supreme Court held : -"it cannot, therefore, be said that, the order of detention in the instant case was vitiated because it was for a period of more than three months. " ( 8 ) COPIES of the reports of the Chemical analyst in both the matters, which are registered against the petitioner on 26-11-2004 and 30-12-2004, are available at paperbook pages 107 and 108, respectively. In both the matters, analyst has reported the percentage of ethyl alcohol V. by V. and the reports conclude, by saying that, the material can be used for distillation of intoxicated liquor and that it is not medicinal/ antiseptic/toilet preparation, nor a flavouring material. Advocates Shri Gorhe, by placing reliance on the observations of Division bench of this High Court at Bombay, in the matter of (Chandrakant alias Balav. Satish Sahany), 1996 (2) Bom. Cri. C. 15, urged that, since the sample of the matter sent to analyser has not been found to be harmful to cause danger to life and public health, this cannot be a valid ground for detention, as held in unreported judgment of the Bom- elusion. Satish Sahany), 1996 (2) Bom. Cri. C. 15, urged that, since the sample of the matter sent to analyser has not been found to be harmful to cause danger to life and public health, this cannot be a valid ground for detention, as held in unreported judgment of the Bom- elusion. As can be seen from paragraph 5 of the reply filed by Shri R. N. Wagh, the then Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad, there were three offences registered against the petitioner under the provisions of Bombay Prohibitions Act, 1949, more particularly under sections 66 (l) (b) and 65 (f) of the said Act, by Cantonment Police Station, aurangabad. Section 65 (f) is pertaining to use or keeping in possession any material still, utensils, or apparatus for the purpose of manufacturing any intoxicant. Section 66 (l) (b) is pertaining to consumption, use, possession or transport of any intoxicant. It appears that, the proceedings under section 93 are taken up against the petitioner bay High Court in the case of (Pandu Shetti in the years 2001 and 2003. These are the proceedings requiring the petitioner to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with sureties for his good behaviour for such period not exceeding three years. These are the preventive actions, if not preventive detention. During pendency of these proceedings initiated by M. I. D. C. , waluj, Police Station, the petitioner seems to have shifted his activities in the territorial jurisdiction of the said Police Station, as can be inferred from the fact that latest two offences under the same provisions of bombay Prohibitions Act, 1949, are registered against the petitioner by M. I. D. C. , waluj, Police Station, on the basis of raids effected on 26-11-2004 and 30-11-2004. The magnitude of the contraband recovered during the two raids may be stated in brief. In the raid dated 26-11-2004, the petitioner is allegedly found to be in possession of 11 earthern pots, each containing litres of wash (total quantity about 440 litres ). There was a running still, and 35 litres of ready liquor, collected in a plastic container was also seized. In the second raid dated 30-12-2004, six drums, each containing about 150 litres of wash (total quantity about 900 litres) , along with material of still, which then was not active, was recovered. There was a running still, and 35 litres of ready liquor, collected in a plastic container was also seized. In the second raid dated 30-12-2004, six drums, each containing about 150 litres of wash (total quantity about 900 litres) , along with material of still, which then was not active, was recovered. The report of the Analyser lends support to the prosecution case that, the material allegedly found in possession of the Petitioner, was useful for production of intoxicating liquor, v. Commissioner of Police), in Cri. W. P. No. 940 of 1988, decided on 6-10-1988. The argument is unsustainable for two reasons. Firstly, the report of the Analyser is not relied upon, for demonstrating that the preparation, which was found with the petitioner at the time of raids on 26-11-2004 and 30-12-2004, was dangerous to public health. The reports are relied upon to show that, the State has made out a prima facie case against the petitioner, regarding manufacturing of intoxicant material in breach of the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. As pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, by relying upon the observations of another Division Bench of Bombay High Court, in the matter of (Ramesh Ghanekar v. R. D. Tyagi), 1986 (2) bom. C. R. 537 : 1986 Cri. L. J. 1421, in order to justify the order of detention under section 3 of the MPDA Act, the Detaining authority is required to satisfy itself of two ingredients, (i) the petitioner is bootlegger within the meaning of Clause (b) of section 2 of the Act, and (ii) he is acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The reliance on the reports of the Chemical Analyser is mainly for the purpose of demonstrating that the Petitioner is a bootlegger. The reliance on the reports of the Chemical Analyser is mainly for the purpose of demonstrating that the Petitioner is a bootlegger. We may state here itself that, there was enough material before the Detaining Authority to arrive at such a con- since the sample shows quite a high percentage of alcohol contents on this counts, learned A P P has also placed reliance upon the wording of section 2 (a) (ii) of the M P D A Act, which reads as follows,"2 In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order means - 1) 11) in the case of bootlegger, when he is engaged, or he is making preparation for engaging, in his activities as bootlegger, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order , as rightly submitted by learned A P P even the apprehension of the activities affecting adversely the maintenance of public order, is sufficient for the Detaining Authority to order preventive detention of the petitioner in view of liberal wording in Clause (11) of section 2 (a), it can be debated, whether the proof that intoxicant material found with the petitioner is dangerous to health of public, is really necessary After all, the petitioner is not selling his illicit liquor with isi mark It is unauthorised and illegal production having no control over its quality, having no checks that it is not injurious for human consumption The courts cannot give deaf ears to the frequency of reports regarding mass fatalities, as a result of consumption of illicit liquor The observations of a Division Bench of this high Court, recorded in the year 1988 and followed in the year 1996, therefore, may not be applicable to the fact-situation, after lapse of 17 years the report of Chemical Analyst does not 1 ecord the sample matenal to be dangerous to public health, therefore, may not allow the escape to the petitioner, especially in the light of clause," or likely to affect adversely " ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel Shn Gorhe for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the observations in the couple of decisions of other division Benches of this High Court and propounded that, the Detaining Authority has a duty to examine the matenal presented before it, by the sponsoring authority and ascertain the truthfulness of the allegations in the matenal Since there is no law laid down that in order to arrive at a conclusion that the petitioner detenue is a bootlegger, the Detaining Authority must be so satisfied, by relying upon the convic tions imposed upon the petitioner, the fact that, there are cases registered against the petitioner for breach of provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act, was matenal sufficient to arrive at a conclusions that the petitioner is a bootlegger as defined by Clause (b) of section 2 of the M P D A Act The argument of Advocate Shn Gorhe is, therefore, required to be confined to in-camera statements which are relied upon by the State, as evidence of activities of the petitioner, being prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the matter of (Pankaj Mehta v State of Maharashtra), 2000 All M. R (Cn ) 773, there was only one crime registered against the petitioner and other material contained in m-camera statements It was a complaint by one Karan Singh for offence punishable under section 324, subsequently altered to section 326 of Indian Penal Code, (there was no record of prosecution under Bombay prohibition Act for bootlegging activities) So far as m-camera statements were concerned, those were venfied by ACP, by stating that what was stated by the witness was correct. In paragraph 18, the Division Bench observed this Court will have to scrutinize very closely m-camera statements particularly when it constitutes the only foundation of arriving at subjective satisfaction ot Detaining Authority, keeping in mind the social consequences that has been highlighted in the observations of the Supreme Court cited above, AIR 1981, S C 674, (Gopalanachan v State of Kerala) In this case, the ACP in his verification stated that the witnesses produced before him and found that what was stated by the witness was correct ACP did not sav that, the allegations contained m in-cameral statements verified by him through independent and confidential enquiry ACP did not even prima facie make an enquiry about veracity of the allegation of witness it was hence, held that, unless the court is satisfied that, such safeguard against misuse of power is provided, it is not at all safe for the Court to rely upon in-camera statements, which form the only basis for subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. We may point out that, in the matter at hands, in-camera statements, is not the only basis. We have material regarding bootlegging activities of the petitioner available on record, about which we are prima facie satisfied, to be reliable. Although the Court expected that there should be proper mechanism for check and balance, it also hastened to add that, it was not suggesting a machinery or procedure to ensure that in-camera statements are generally made, and it was for the police department to find out a machinery and method to ensure the credibility of the in-camera statements. We are of considered view that, the observations of earlier Division Bench do not bind us because of factual distinction. We have additional material and not only the in-camera statements. In the matter of (Vijaya Raju Gupta v. R. H. Mendonca), 2001 (Supp.) Bom. C. R. 24 : 2001 All. M. R. (Cri.) 48, by relying upon the observations of the Honble the Supreme court in (Phulawari Jagdambaprasad pathak v. R. H. Mendonca), 2000 all. M. R. (Cri.) 1503 (S. C.), this Court (Strength of coram two Hon. Judges) held that, the Detaining Authority has to apply his mind about the truthfulness of the assertions made in in-camera statements. M. R. (Cri.) 48, by relying upon the observations of the Honble the Supreme court in (Phulawari Jagdambaprasad pathak v. R. H. Mendonca), 2000 all. M. R. (Cri.) 1503 (S. C.), this Court (Strength of coram two Hon. Judges) held that, the Detaining Authority has to apply his mind about the truthfulness of the assertions made in in-camera statements. This was in the light of observations of the Supreme Court at the conclusion of paragraph 16 in the case of Phulawari, to the effect :-"it is neither possible nor advisable to catalogue the types of materials which can form the basis of a detention order under the Act. That will depend on the facts and situation of a case. Presumably, that is why the Parliament did not make any provision in the act in that regard and left the matter to the discretion of the Detaining Authority. However, the facts stated in the materials relied upon should be true and should have a reasonable sonable nexus with the purpose for which the order is passed. "the Supreme Court recorded two expectations (i) that the facts stated should have reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the order is passed and (ii) the material relied upon should be true. It has not been laid down that there ought to be an independent enquiry by the detaining Authority for the purpose of ascertaining the truthfulness of the assertions contained in in-camera statements. On this aspect, learned ACP has placed reliance upon the observations of the supreme Court judgment in the matter of (Borjahan Corey v. State of W. B.), strength of Coram : 3 Honble Judges, A. I. R. 1972 s. C. 2256. Although this was a matter under maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the observations of the Supreme court are required to be followed, because it was also a matter of preventive detention. In the matter, petitioner detenu had denied the truth of allegations contained in two grounds. The two grounds contained two incidents dated 7-7-1971 and 6-8-1971 on which the detenu was said to have terroized the members of the public. Regarding the challenge to the truthfulness of the allegations and, therefore, the grounds being insupportable to the detention order, the Supreme Court observed, thus, in para 6 :"6. We are unable to agree with this submission. The two grounds contained two incidents dated 7-7-1971 and 6-8-1971 on which the detenu was said to have terroized the members of the public. Regarding the challenge to the truthfulness of the allegations and, therefore, the grounds being insupportable to the detention order, the Supreme Court observed, thus, in para 6 :"6. We are unable to agree with this submission. The District Magistrate who made the impugned order has, in the counter-affidavit, sworn "that the detenu petitioner is one of the notorious rowdies and anti-social elements of P. S. Pudubalia, District Howrah". He has further added that after receiving reliable information relating to the alleged anti-social and prejudicial activities of the detenue petitioner relating to the maintenance of public order he passed the order f detention under the Act. In para 7 of the counter-affidavit he affirmed both the grounds in express language. We do not find any cogent ground for not accepting the facts affirmed in the counter-affidavit. The district Magistrate is expected to know the situation prevailing in the district and to take suitable action for the maintenance of public order. His assessment of facts and his opinion on the propriety of making a detention order must be given due consideration and respect by this Court. The petitioners representation was also duly considered by the State Government and rejected. The Advisory Board, after hearing the detenu petitioner in person also expressed the opinion that there was sufficient cause for his detention. In these circumstances it is not possible for us in habeas corpus proceedings to hold an independent enquiry into the question whether or not the grounds on which the impugned order of detention is passed are false or nonexistent. Nor can the impugned order be held to be mala fide as suggested by Shri jain. There being no legal infirmity in the order of the petitioners detention and, the facts affirmed by the District Magistrate, which must be accepted on the facts and circumstances of this case to be true, being relevant to the object of detention, this petition must fail and is dismissed. " (emphasis added) the larger Bench of the Supreme court has laid down that assessment of the facts and the opinion of the Detaining Authority on the propriety of making detention order must be given due consideration and respect. " (emphasis added) the larger Bench of the Supreme court has laid down that assessment of the facts and the opinion of the Detaining Authority on the propriety of making detention order must be given due consideration and respect. The Supreme Court refused to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the grounds on which the impugned order of detention was based. It could have been argued that the observations of the Supreme court do not absolve the Detaining Authority from ascertaining the truthfulness of the allegations. In the matter at hands, on reference to reply filed by Shri R. N. Wagh and more particularly para 15 of the reply, he has stated :"i say that the Detaining Authority personally and physically verified the confidential witnesses A, B, C and D in camera. "this statement on oath should explain the endorsement "verified" on all the statements by the Detaining Authority. It is evident that Detaining Authority had called the four witnesses, again examined them in camera and probably this was the process of ascertaining the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses as recorded by the crime branch. We have already pointed out that in the matter of Pankaj mehta (supra), although Division Bench of this High Court laid down that Detaining authority must find out its own method to ascertain the truthfulness of in-camera statements, it refused to lay down any particular procedure. In the matter at hands, the State has come with sufficient material to show that the petitioner is indulging the bootlegging activities. On considering the text of in-camera statements, witness A has said that neighbours inspite of having noticed presence of detenu at his place, nobody intervened and on the contrary, they closed their doors. The incident of witness a has occurred at his residence, but incident pertaining to witness B has occurred in a public place at Panharpur Oasis square. Witness B claims that he was slapped by the detenu. Witness has further asserted that he did not dealt to lodge complaint In the Police Station due to fear of retaliation by petitioner if he registered a complaint. Incident pertaining to witness c has occurred near the residence of petitioner, but in an open place. Witness C claims that after petitioner threatened him and also slapped him, he had shouted for help. Incident pertaining to witness c has occurred near the residence of petitioner, but in an open place. Witness C claims that after petitioner threatened him and also slapped him, he had shouted for help. But the people around them, instead of coming to his rescue, ran away from the location. When the deponents have clearly indicated that neither they had guts to record a complaint against the petitioner in the Police Station, although the} were victims of the incidents narrated and they have also asserted that the people surrounding them at the time of occurrence were happy to depart rather than to help them, we are unable to imagine that Detaining authority would be in a position to enquire the victim as to who were the persons around them, summon such persons and ascertain the truth of the assertions by four deponents. The Detaining Authority, if has summoned the deponents of in-camera statements before itself and ascertained from them of having made such statements before the sponsoring authority, it would be justified in believing in the truthfulness of the statements if so satisfied on the basis of observation of demeanour of the deponent before the Detaining Authority and the manner in which the deponent might have spoken to the Detaining Authority. Otherwise also, as observed by earlier Division Bench, no specific mode of enquiry to ascertain the truthfulness of in-cam-era statements can be laid down. In the matter at hands, although affiant Shri wagh has not said in so many words that he did it for the purpose of ascertaining the truth of assertions of in-camera statements, the process seems to have been followed for that purpose. After all, the orders passed by executive authorities or the affidavits sworn by them can not be expected to be meticulously worded as the judgments of the courts. In the matter of Smt. Phulawari, the honble Apex Court has observed that the material relied upon should have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the order is passed. According to the requirement of section 3 as also the order of the detention, such an order is passed in order to prevent the activities of the petitioner, which are either prejudicial or are likely to the prejudicial to maintenance of public order. According to the requirement of section 3 as also the order of the detention, such an order is passed in order to prevent the activities of the petitioner, which are either prejudicial or are likely to the prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Once again referring back to the statements of deponents A, B and C, and the threats accorded by the petitioner to them, witness A was threatened thus :- quite a number of things can be read as inherent between the lines of this threat. There is an implied admission that petitioner is running a still for illicit liquor. It appears that the deponent had some time expressed his displeasure to the petitioner about neighbourhood of the still. The petitioner desired that the deponent should not muster public opinion in his favour and against the petitioner. The incident in question, thus, has clear and direct nexus with the bootlegging activity of the petitioner and for that purpose, he is also willing to keep the inhabitants around his business activity under silence. In that sense, the threat also has a nexus with the purpose of detention order ie. prevention of actions of the petitioner, which are in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. We have already discussed hereinabove by referring to section 2 (a) (ii) of MPDA Art that phrase "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" is given a liberal meaning by incorporation of the clause "or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order". If a person is continuously indulging in bootlegging activity, he will be required to take certain steps to protect the activity and, therefore, the apprehension that he may keep a sword of threat hanging on the head of surrounding inhabitants is required to be believed as possible. Threat accorded to witness B reads : no doubt, the expression within itself does not indicate any nexus with the bootlegging business, but the deponent has further expressed his perception and belief that the threat is aimed at ensuring that nobody raises voice against bootlegging activities of the petitioner. So far as deponent C is concerned, he was threatened by saying : saying so, petitioner is said to have slapped on the face of the witness. So far as deponent C is concerned, he was threatened by saying : saying so, petitioner is said to have slapped on the face of the witness. It is evident from the threat that petitioner believed the deponent to be a person, who might have given intimation to the police about his activities. The statements, therefore, are such which have nexus with the bootlegging activity of the petitioner, as also the purpose for which the detention order is passed. On the background of registration of as many as 5 offences with the allegations of possession of material for manufacturing illicit liquor, the Detaining Authority would be justified in accepting the statements of these deponents to be true narrations, without being required to summon anybody else to corroborate. We may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in priyanka Fulore v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (9) S. C. C. 714. In this matter, in in- camera statements recorded by the subordinate officials were accepted by the Competently authority without verifying the truth or otherwise. The contention raised on behalf of the detenu relating to reliance placed on the in-camera statements alongwith other materials as the basis for subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order was not accepted by this High court. The High Court after rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the detenu confirmed the order of detention and dismissed the writ petition. While dismissing the appeal of the detenu, the Supreme Court observed :"on consideration of the facts of the case as appearing from the records and the nature of activities alleged against the detenu, in our view, the findings recorded by the High court that the detention order in the case was neither vitiated due to the delay nor on the ground of illegality in accepting the in- camera statements as materials for subjective satisfaction of the authority is unexceptionable. "from the judgment, it can be ascertained that in the reported matter also, the detaining Authority had not gone to verify the truthfulness of in-camera statements. This High Court, however, found the material to be sufficient for subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority. The observations of this High Court were upheld by the Supreme Court. "from the judgment, it can be ascertained that in the reported matter also, the detaining Authority had not gone to verify the truthfulness of in-camera statements. This High Court, however, found the material to be sufficient for subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority. The observations of this High Court were upheld by the Supreme Court. In the matter at hands, we have reason to believe that the Detaining Authority has tried to ascertain the truthfulness of the statements of deponent by summoning them before it and, therefore, it can not be said that detaining Authority has not ascertained the truth in the in-camera statements of the deponents. Not only that, but we are satisfied on the basis of material was before the Detaining Authority and which is also available before us that Detaining Authority was justified, in the facts and circumstances, to believe the statements to be true. ( 10 ) BY relying upon same judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court, learned app has tried to strike at the foundation of the writ petition. We may say that the cases were relied upon to apprise us of the scope of a writ petition challenging the detention order passed in exercise of powers conferred by a special statute and according to learned app, since the detention order is required to be passed on the basis of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, High court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not assume the role of Appellate Court nor it can intervene with the detention order lightly. (Bhim Sen v. State of Punjab) 1952 cri. L. J. 75, was a decision of the Supreme court of a Bench consisting of 3 Honble judges. No doubt, the decision was not one under MPDA Act. It was a matter of Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and section 3 of the said Act also spoke about "subjective satisfaction of Detaining Authority". The Supreme Court was dealing with 5 companion appeals from the judgments of High court of East Punjab. The appellants therein had suffered the detention order issued by district Magistrate of Jullundur on 19-6-1951. The Supreme Court observed, thus, in para 7 of the judgment:"the Legislature has made only the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order essential for passing the order. The appellants therein had suffered the detention order issued by district Magistrate of Jullundur on 19-6-1951. The Supreme Court observed, thus, in para 7 of the judgment:"the Legislature has made only the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order essential for passing the order. The contention that because in the Amending Act of 1951 an Advisory Board is constituted, which can supervise and override the decision taken by the executive authority, and therefore, the question whether the grounds are sufficient to give rise to the satisfaction has become a justiciable issue in Court, is clearly unsound. The satisfaction for making the initial order is and has always been under the Preventive Detention Act, that of the authority making the order. Because the amending Act of 1951 establishes a supervisory authority, that discretion and subjective test is not taken away and by the establishment of the Advisory Board, in our opinion, the Court is not given the jurisdiction to decide whether the subjective decision of the authority making the order was right or not. Proceeding on the footing, therefore, that the jurisdiction to decide whether the appellants should be detained under the preventive Detention Act on the grounds conveyed to the appellants is of the District magistrate. . . . " (emphasis added) smt. Hemalata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 8, relied upon by learned APP was a matter of detention under COFEPOSA Act and while considering the scope of challenge to such detention orders in the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution before High court and under Article 32 or 136 of the constitution before the Supreme Court, the supreme Court observed, thus, in para 15:"it is needless to say that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the supreme Court either under Article 32 or under Article 136 of the Constitution do not sit on appeal on the orders of preventive detention. The normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is r are committed, the offencer is to be prosecuted. The normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is r are committed, the offencer is to be prosecuted. But, if there be a law of preventive detention empowering the authority to detain a particular offender in order to disable him to repeat his offences, it can do so, but it will be obligatory on the part of the Detaining Authority to formally comply with the provisions of sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 has to see whether the formalities enjoined by Article 22 (5) have been complied with by the Detaining Authority. If the formalities have been complied with, the Court cannot examine the materials before it and find that the Detaining Authority should not have been satisfied on the materials before it and detained the detenu under the Preventive detention Act, for, that is the function of an Appellate Court. " (emphasis added) if the observations quoted herein- above and emphasized by us by underlining are to be followed in letter and spirit, the orders of preventive detention can be challenged only on the ground of non-observance of formalities on the part of Detaining Authority. The formalities such as not observing the time schedule prescribed by the statute, breach of principles of natural justice by denial of sufficient opportunity to represent etc. , the courts do not seem to be empowered to penetrate to the depth of the detention order and to arrive at a conclusion that the Detaining Authority ought not lo have been subjectively satisfied about necessity of detention of the petitioner for the purpose in the statute for preventive detention. The observations of brother Judge shri A. M. Khanwilkar in the matter of Division Bench decision reported at 2001 (5) bom. C. R. 537 : 2001 (2) Mh. L. J. 437 (Vinod v. R. H. Mendonca and others), regarding the approach of courts in the matters of detention under special statutes of preventive detention can usefully be borrowed. "maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug offenders Act is a special enactment for preventive detention of the specified persons and for matters connected therewith. L. J. 437 (Vinod v. R. H. Mendonca and others), regarding the approach of courts in the matters of detention under special statutes of preventive detention can usefully be borrowed. "maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug offenders Act is a special enactment for preventive detention of the specified persons and for matters connected therewith. Once a person qualifies the definition of a specified person under the Act 55 of 1981, then, inevitably, in the larger public interest, the said person will have to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act 55 of 1981 and in no other manner, provided the Detaining Authority records satisfaction regarding the necessity to detain that person to prevent him from indulging in any activity which would tend to prejudicially affect the maintenance of public order. If any other view is taken that would negate the object and purpose of the enactment of the Act 55 of 1981. Once the person fulfils the requirement of the definition of a specified person under Act 55 of 1981, then it would presuppose that the normal law of land has become ineffective or inadequate quay that person and that there is no other option but to take recourse to the powers under Act 55 of 1981. " (emphasis added) we have already observed that the state has brought enough material to establish that petitioner is indulging into bootlegging activities and the activities seem to have been continued over a period of about atleast 5 years. He is, therefore, a person, who fulfils the definition of a bootlegger as contained in section 2 (b) of MPDA Act. Consequently, the judgment of the authority that he is required to be dealt under special legislation can not be faulted with and even the subjective satisfaction as recorded by the Detaining Authority can not be subjected to challenge as if the matter is being considered by the Appellate Court in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Hemlata (supra ). ( 11 ) ADVOCATE Shri Gorhe, for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Lallan Prasad Yadav v. S. Ramamurthi and others), 1993 (1) Bom. ( 11 ) ADVOCATE Shri Gorhe, for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Lallan Prasad Yadav v. S. Ramamurthi and others), 1993 (1) Bom. C. R. 440 : 1992 (2) crimes 952, Coram : M. M. Punchhi, J. In this matter, four residents of the locality had told police during enquiries that the appellant was a bootlegger and the witnesses were afraid to depose against him for fear of reprisal at his end. The gist of statements where and when such men had been threatened on four individual occasions were detailed in ground Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 and some threatening words were attributed to the appellant besides having assaulted them with fists and kicks. There were couple of incidents wherein it was claimed that attempts on the part of petitioner to run away and avoid apprehension when he was in possession of contraband liquor. The Supreme Court observed :"it is obvious that the two cases under the bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, registered against the appellant could legitimately provide the subjective satisfaction to the Detaining authority that the appellant is a "bootlegger", but the instances afore-mentioned, spread over a time, in which the appellant is attributed to have threatened individuals by speaking words or giving them fists and kicks blows could in no event be summed up as activities prejudicial, to maintenance of "public order". Rather these are activities patently prejudicial to maintenance of "law and order". In the matter of (Babu Shetty v. MS. Kasbekar), 1982 Cri. L. J. 1303, a Division bench of this High Court at Bombay has observed that the in-camera statements, which were practically similar to those in the matter before us, were not the grounds sufficient for subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority regarding necessity to pass a detention order, in order to prevent the activities, being prejudicial to public order. Learned Counsel Shri Gorhe, has also placed reliance on the observations of the division Bench in para 12 of the judgment, which read as follows: "it is now a settled law that if any one of the grounds of detention were irrelevant or vague, the whole order is vitiated as violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. In this case, as pointed out above, since the said ground Nos. In this case, as pointed out above, since the said ground Nos. 5 to 9 being irrelevant, having no nexus to the object of the Ordinance, the order would stand vitiated. " in the reported matter, there were 9 grounds and because grounds 5 to 9 did not find favour of the High Court, the High court was pleased to hold that entire order was vitiated. Advocate Shri Gorhe, has not been able to furnish more details to support his argument while placing reliance on above quoted paragraph. He ought to have demonstrated as to on how many grounds the order is based, which grounds are irrelevant and, therefore, whole the order is vitiated. In any case, the view expressed in para 12 in this judgment delivered on 11-8-1981 does not stand as binding law in view of insertion of section 5-A in the Act by Amendment Act 24 of 1988. Section 5-A reads : "5-A. Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly :- (a) Such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are - (i) Vague, (ii) Non - existent, (iii) Not relevant, (iv) Not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or. . . . "as against the view by the Supreme court in the matter of Lallan Yadav and this High Court in the matter of Babu Shetty, we may refer to the case of Hasan Khan v, r. H. Mendonca, A. I. R. 2000 S. C. 1146, and more particular observations in para 10 of the judgment. In that matter, the grounds of detention indicated that Harishchandra gupta and his brother had sought for help and none came forward for their help out of fear of the appellant. This fact was held sufficient to show that the activities of the appellant disturbed the life of the people in area. This was inspite of the fact that criminal proceeding was started on the complaint of said Harishchandra Gupta under sections 341, 323, 334 r/w 34 of I. P. C. and petitioner was granted bail. This fact was held sufficient to show that the activities of the appellant disturbed the life of the people in area. This was inspite of the fact that criminal proceeding was started on the complaint of said Harishchandra Gupta under sections 341, 323, 334 r/w 34 of I. P. C. and petitioner was granted bail. In this matter, bombay High Court had rejected the contention of the petitioner that the alleged prejudicial activities of the detenu even if accepted on the face value, demonstrate a breach of law and order and not public order. The Supreme Court was pleased to dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of this High court. Otherwise also, whether such activities can be said to be prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order will have to be considered as a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances brought on record pertaining to each case. In the matter at hands, the state has not come only with the statements of threats accorded by the petitioner to witnesses, but the record of recent raids and registration of crimes under the Bombay prohibition Act against the petitioner provide a foundation for presumption that the statements by the deponents are true. If a person is indulging into bootlegging activities for considerably long period and (in the matter at hands this period can be said to be atleast of 5 years since there is registration of offences since 2001) courts will be justified in presuming that the person is bound to keep the inhabitants surrounding his business activities under the treat so that his bootlegging activities should continue unobstructed and without complaints from the inhabitants of the locality. To draw such a presumption, this Court has enough material and we have referred to the quantity of contraband allegedly recovered from the possession of petitioner in the last two raids on 26-11-2004 and 30-12-2004. In the matter of Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1992 S. C. 979, the supreme Court considered several earlier decisions, as an issue was raised whether the facts of the case describing the activities of the detenu could be said to be prejudicial only to the maintenance of law and order or to the maintenance of public order. In the matter of (Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal), 1970 Cri. In the matter of (Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal), 1970 Cri. L. J. 1136, it was held:-"the act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and community. His act makes all women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual action, which may be taken note by the criminal prosecution agency. "in the matter of (Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2486, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed:"in our judgment, the expression in the interest of public order in the Constitution is capable of taking within itself not only those acts which disturb the security of the State or act within order publique as described but also certain acts which disturb public tranquillity or are breaches of the peace. It is not necessary to give the expression a narrow meaning because, as has been observed, the expression, in the interest of public order is very wide. "in (Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal), 1972 (3) S. C. C. 831, it was held :"the test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of society undisturbed ?"even applying this test, we may question ourselves that if a person continues his bootlegging activities in the society, can it be said that the life of the inhabitants in the surrounding area will remain the same, unaffected, peaceful and without any disturbance? The answer is bound to be in the negative. The peace of the locality is likely to be disturbed not only by consumer/customer of the bootlegger, but also by occasions of raids by police and the activities those proceed for the purpose of prosecution. The answer is bound to be in the negative. The peace of the locality is likely to be disturbed not only by consumer/customer of the bootlegger, but also by occasions of raids by police and the activities those proceed for the purpose of prosecution. In (Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration), 1982 (2) S. C. C. 403, it was held :-"it is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. "from para 21 of the judgment, it is evident that in the matter before the Supreme Court, there was evidence regarding detenu being a bootlegger and in furtherance of his activities and to escape from the clutches of law, his having tried to run over by his speeding vehicle, the police party which tried to signal him to stop, the detenu exhorting all the time that he would kill any one who would come in his way, there was an incident that he continued to drive in a reckless speed and dashed against a pedestrian. There were statements of four witnesses, who had agreed to make statements on conditions of anonymity, who clearly stated that they would not depose against the detenu for fear of retaliation as the detenu had threatened to do away with any one, who would depose against him. Needless to say that argument before the Supreme Court that these were instances affecting the law and order was rejected and these were held to be instances prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the light of pronouncement of the Supreme Court in these two matters, the cases relied upon by Advocate Shri Gorhe can not be of any assistance to the petitioner. ( 12 ) FOR the reasons discussed hereinabove, we find that Sponsoring agency had presented sufficient material regarding bootlegging activities of the petitioner as also his activities, which were either prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Otherwise also, in the light of observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of St. Hemlata Kantilal Shah (supra), there is very limited scope for this Court to interfere with the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority or to find fault with the same. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. No orders as to costs. Petition dismissed.