Judgment NARESH. H. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 5-3-1999 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Osmanabad in sessions Case No, 21 /1996, convicting him for an offence punishable under section 302 of I. P. C. and sentencing to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, to suffer S. I. for one year and, for an offence punishable under section 307 of I. P. C. , to suffer R. I. for seven years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, to suffer S,i. for one year. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case, in brief, is as under : initially, there were there accused persons against whom the charge was framed and the case was tried. Original accused Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Umalabai w/o bhau Rathod and Malanbai w/o Shahu rathod were acquitted of the charges levelled against them and the present appellant (original accused No. 3) Shahu was convicted as aforesaid. The acquitted accused No. 1 Umalabai is mother of acquitted accused No. 2 Malanbai, who is wife of present appellant Shahu. The acquitted accused No. 1 was residing at jahagirdarwadi Laxman Tanda and the appellant and his wife Malanbai were residing together at Shingoli Laman Tanda, which is at about 4 furlong distance from jahagirdarwadi Laman Tanda. The eldest son of deceased Dhamabai was residing along with his Devidas at Osmanabad. The deceased Dhamabai was residing separate along with her youngest son Bala. It is alleged that after death of husband of dhamabai, illicit intimacy developed between the deceased and appellant Shahu. Shahu used to visit frequently the house of dhamabai. The in-laws and brother of dhamabia namely Devidas, did not like this relationship. They advised Dhamabai to sever her relations with Shahu. It is alleged that Malanbai wife of Shahu and Umalabai, mother-in-law of Shahu also did not like illicit relationship between deceased dhamabai and appellant Shahu and they were disliking deceased Dhamabai for this reason. It is alleged that four days prior to the incident, Umalabai and Malanbai had a quarrel with deceased Dhamabai and had given threats to her. They has cautioned sonabai to control Dhamabai. Shahu continued to visit the house of Dhamabai. It is alleged that four days prior to the incident, Umalabai and Malanbai had a quarrel with deceased Dhamabai and had given threats to her. They has cautioned sonabai to control Dhamabai. Shahu continued to visit the house of Dhamabai. It is alleged that in the night of 23rd May, 1995, dhamabai was sleeping in her house along with her younger son Balaji, by keeping the door of her house open. At about 2 a. m. , it is alleged that the appellant entered the house of Dhamabai and poured kerosene on the person of Dhamabai while she was sleeping and set her on fire. The reason was that she was not allowing him to maintain illicit relations. Dhamabai and her son received burn injuries. After hearing cries, mother-in-law of Dhamabai as well as other neighbours woke up and rushed to the house of Dhamabai. It is alleged that sonabai, mother-in-law of Dhamabai came out of house and she saw Shahu coming out of house of Dhamabai and running away. She asked Shahu as to why he was running away. Shahu fell down while he was running but, he got up and again started running. Before all could assemble at the spot, deceased Dhamabai and her son sustained severe burn injuries. The deceased was brought by auto rickshaw to Jahagirwadi Laman Tanda by devidas and both the injured were taken to civil Hospital, Osmanabad. Information was given to Osmanabad Rural Police Station. Statement of Dhamabai was recorded in the civil Hospital by A. S. I. Ghadge and on the basis of her complaint, crime was registered in the Police Station at Cri. No. 64/95 for offences punishable under section 307 r. w. 34 of I. P. C. on 23rd May, 1995. On the request of the Police, taluka Executive Magistrate Sayyad Ikbal Sahab recorded dying declaration of Dhamabai on 24th May, 1995. In the dying declaration, she narrated the incident to the Magistrate that accused shahu at about 2 a. m. entered her house and poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. ( 3 ) IT is further alleged that on 23rd May, 1995, the appellant Shahu also went to Civil hospital for medical treatment where Dr. Chavan examined him. The appellant had suffered to abrasions on right and left knees. Police started investigation. Statements of witnesses were recorded, spot Panchanama was drawn. ( 3 ) IT is further alleged that on 23rd May, 1995, the appellant Shahu also went to Civil hospital for medical treatment where Dr. Chavan examined him. The appellant had suffered to abrasions on right and left knees. Police started investigation. Statements of witnesses were recorded, spot Panchanama was drawn. Balu, son of deceased had suffered 40% burn injuries and deceased dhamabai had suffered 86% burn injuries. She succumbed to the injuries on 25-5-1995. Inquest was prepared and autopsy was conducted. The police seized sample for earth, partial burnt pieces of sari and sent for chemical analysis. Police collected post-mortem report, Chemical Analysers reported and after completion of the investigation, filed charge-sheet in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Osmanabad and case was tried thereafter, in the Sessions Court. ( 4 ) THE prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. The report of the Chemical Analyser is at Exh. 55, spot Panchanama is at exh. 22. Inquest Panchanama is at Exh. 19, post-mortem report is at Exh. 23. ( 5 ) P. W. 1 Sonabai Rathod is mother-in-law of deceased Dhamabai. She has stated that appellant had developed illicit relations with Dhamabai and he used to visit house of Dhamabai, on which relations and other persons raised a question. Dhamabai told her that appellant used to beat her and she was not willing to continue relationship with the appellant. She stated that when she heard noise, she came out of her house and saw the appellant running from the house of Dhamabai. While running, he fell down and thereafter, he ran away. She states that balaji had also sustained injuries. She further stated that Dhamabai told persons gathered at the spot that the appellant had set her on fire and ran away. In the cross- examination, defence has brought on record that one of the sons of the witness, namely babu is serving as Police Constable in the office of S. P. Osmanabad and she daily goes to Osmanabad for supplying milk. The defence has brought on record material omissions in the evidence of this witness. It would be necessary to reproduce paragraph 7 of her deposition for proper appreciation of the prosecution case :"7. I have three sons. My one son Kishan is dead. My son Girdhari works as Labourer. My other son Babu is serving as Police Constable. The defence has brought on record material omissions in the evidence of this witness. It would be necessary to reproduce paragraph 7 of her deposition for proper appreciation of the prosecution case :"7. I have three sons. My one son Kishan is dead. My son Girdhari works as Labourer. My other son Babu is serving as Police Constable. At present he is serving in S. P. Office, Osmanabad, I daily used to come to osmanabad for supplying milk. It is not true to say that I falsely stated that after the death of Kishan, Dhamabai developed illicit relations with accused Shahu and so, accused Shahu daily used to visit the house of Dhamabai. After the incident, my statement was recorded by the police. I had stated before police that accused Shahu daily used to visit house of Dhamabai. I cannot assign any reason as to why it is not mentioned in my statement that accused Shahu daily used to visit the house of Dhamabai. It is not true to say that I am falsely stating as Shahu has illicit relations with Dhamabai and he daily used to visit house of Dhamabai so other people were blaming us. It is not true to say that I am falsely saying that Dhamabai used to tell me that accused used to beat her and she was asking Shahu to cut of illicit relations. I have stated before police that Dhamabai used to tell me that accused Shahu used to beat her. I cannot assign any reason as to why above said fact is not mentioned in my statement before police. It is not true to say that I am falsely stating that dhamabai told me that accused Shahu told her that because of illicit relation with dhamabai he has left his wife Dhamabai and children. I have stated about said fact to the police. I cannot assign reason as to why above said fact is not mentioned in my statement before police. It is not true to say that I am falsely stating that 4 days prior to the incident accused Umalabai and malanbai asked me to control Dhamabai and gave threats 2 to 3 days prior to the incident, Dhamabai told me about the threats of murder given to her by accused. I did not tell anybody else about the threats given by accused Shahu to Dhamabai. I did not tell anybody else about the threats given by accused Shahu to Dhamabai. I have not reported the matter to the police. I have not given complaint application in the police Station against accused 1 to 3 prior to the incident on the ground of threats given by the accused. " ( 6 ) P. W. 2 Limba Balu Chavan and P. W. 3 Chatru Rathod were declared hostile. ( 7 ) P. W. 4 is Vithal Rathod, who is nephew of deceased Dhamabai. He stated before the Court regarding relationship of dhamabai and Shahu. He has supported the case of the prosecution that deceased and appellant had developed illicit relationship and others were objecting to the said relationship. ( 8 ) P. W. 5 Devidas Chavan is brother of deceased who also narrates the same story concerning the illicit relationship between the appellant and the deceased as narrated by the earlier witnesses. ( 9 ) P. W. 6 Sayed Ekbal was Taluka Executive Magistrate who had recorded dying declaration Exh. 34. He had stated that deceased deposed before him and he had taken down the declaration as narrated by the deceased in question and answer form. He got it certified from the doctor that patient was in a fit state to make a statement. She was conscious according to the doctor, and able to deliver her statement. ( 10 ) P. W. 7 is Babu @ Balu Rathod, neighbour of the deceased, who was declared hostile, P. W. 8 is Dr. Shobhana Chavan who had examined the appellant initially and issued certificate. She stated that Shahu suffered two abrasions which might have been caused by hard and blunt object. P. W. 9 is Dr. Chintaman Patil who had examined the deceased and issued certificate, accordingly. The doctor stated that the patient was conscious and was able to give statement to the Taluka Executive Magistrate, p. W. 10 is Satish Tukaram Pawar who was working as Medical Officer in the Civil Hospital. He had examined Balu Rathod who was son of deceased Dhamabai. He had sustained 40% burn injuries. He gave him treatment and issued medical certificate, accordingly. ( 11 ) P. W. 11 Fulchand Kakade was Special Judicial Magistrate, who had recorded statements of witnesses under section 164 of Cri. P. C. He recorded statement of Balu jaising Rathod. He had examined Balu Rathod who was son of deceased Dhamabai. He had sustained 40% burn injuries. He gave him treatment and issued medical certificate, accordingly. ( 11 ) P. W. 11 Fulchand Kakade was Special Judicial Magistrate, who had recorded statements of witnesses under section 164 of Cri. P. C. He recorded statement of Balu jaising Rathod. ( 12 ) P. W. 12 Anjum Shaikh, P. S. I, who conducted part of investigation of the case, p. W. is Abdul Sattar who identified the signature of A. S. I. Ghadge, who also had conducted investigation. ( 13 ) THE report of Chemical Analyser (Exh. 55) shows that results of the tests on article Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were positive as residue of kerosene was detected on the same. The articles include earth, bed-sheet, piece of blouse, piece of guilt and piece of sari of deceased Dhamabai. ( 14 ) IN the present case, we find two dying declarations of deceased Dhamabai, one was recorded on 23rd May, 1995 by A. S. I. Ghadge of Osmanabad Rural Police Station and another was recorded by the Taluka executive Magistrate on 24th May, 1995. A. S. I. Ghadge died during investigation and, therefore, his signature was identified by p. W. 13 Abdul Sattar, A. S. I. He was shown the statement of deceased Dhamabai recorded on 25th May, 1995. This witness had identified handwriting of D. V. Ghadge. ( 15 ) IN the first dying declaration recorded on 23rd May, 1995 Dhamabai stated that while she was sleeping in the night of 23rd may, 1995, her bed caught fire. Thereafter, she started shouting. Other persons gathered. Thereafter, she herself poured water on her person. She tried to save her son. Soon, Fulchand Chavan, Dhanaji Chavan and others came and brought her to hospital. In the said dying declaration, she stated that she has suspicion on the appellant due to past strained relationship and her illicit relationship with him. She categorically stated that she had not seen Shahu setting her on fire but, she suspects Shahu, his wife Malanbai and mother-in-law Umalabai. ( 16 ) IN the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 24th may, 1995, deceased stated that at about 2 a. m. on 23rd May, 1995, the appellant came to her house. There was a can of five litres of kerosene in her house. ( 16 ) IN the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 24th may, 1995, deceased stated that at about 2 a. m. on 23rd May, 1995, the appellant came to her house. There was a can of five litres of kerosene in her house. Half of it was poured on her person by the appellant and set her on fire with a match stick. She replied to a question that relationship between herself and appellant was four months old. She further stated that she was alone in the house and her mother-in-law and daughter were sleeping at the door step. The medical Officer had put an endorsement on this dying declaration that patient was fully conscious to deliver statement. ( 17 ) READING of both the dying declarations shows that there is variance in the dying declarations. In the first dying declaration recorded on 23rd May, 1995, she expressed suspicion on the appellant but, in the second dying declaration, the deceased stated that it was appellant who had come at 2 a. m. in the midnight and poured kerosene from a 5 litres can which was lying in her house and set her on fire. In the second dying declaration, she stated that her mother-in-law and her daughter were sleeping at the threshold of the room but, in the first dying declaration, she stated that her mother-in-law and father-in-law reside separately. In the first dying declaration, she even suspected Malanbai and Umalabai, the acquitted accused persons along with the appellant as persons who had set her on fire. But, in the second dying declaration, she blamed the appellant alone. In both the dying declarations it is noticed that she was sleeping when the incident took place. We have noticed following infirmities in the prosecution evidence :a) The evidence is not clear as to whether deceased Dhamabai was awake when the appellant came to her house. b) There is contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that mother-in-law of deceased Dhamabai was sleeping in the room of Dhamabai on the day of incident. c) The prosecution evidence lacks in establishing motive for the appellant to commit offence of murder of deceased Dhamabai. d) Though some of the witnesses and neighbours had seen the appellant running from the house of Dhamabai after setting her on fire, nobody could catch the appellant. c) The prosecution evidence lacks in establishing motive for the appellant to commit offence of murder of deceased Dhamabai. d) Though some of the witnesses and neighbours had seen the appellant running from the house of Dhamabai after setting her on fire, nobody could catch the appellant. e) There is absence of endorsement of the Medical officer regarding consciousness of the deceased, on the statement of Dhamabai recorded by A. S. I, on 23rd May, 1995. ( 18 ) THE dying declaration has to be considered and believed as a whole. It is impermissible to pick and choose either of the dying declarations, if there are multiple dying declarations. It would be against law if we select a dying declaration which helps the prosecution by filling in the lacunas in the prosecution story. The dying declaration must inspire confidence of the Court. As a maker of it is not available for cross- examination by the defence, the dying declaration has to be strictly construed and cautiously appreciated. We find it highly unsafe to place explicit reliance on the second dying declaration made by the deceased, negativing the first one, for fastening the liability on the appellant for commission of a serious offence like murder, punishable under section 302 of I. P. C. We are, therefore, of the opinion that considering the discrepancies in both the dying declarations, it would be highly unsafe to place reliance on them. ( 19 ) THE witnesses like P. W. 2 Limba chavan, P. W. 3 Chatru Rathod and P. W. 7 babu Rathod have been declared hostile. In the evidence of P. W. 1 Sonabai Rathod, mother-in-law of deceased Dhamabai, it has been brought on record that the relations between appellant and the deceased were strained probably for the reason that deceased Dhamabai was not allowing to maintain illicit relations with her. Even, if we consider that the prosecution has brought on record the material to the effect that relations between deceased and appellant were strained, the same would not be sufficient to draw an inference against the appellant that he alone must be a person who had set the deceased on fire. The mother-in-law of the deceased stated that she saw the appellant running from the spot and he fell down while running. This is also not sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime. The mother-in-law of the deceased stated that she saw the appellant running from the spot and he fell down while running. This is also not sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following reported judgments : (1) (Bdlasaheb Abasaheb Farate v. State of maharashtra), 1999 (5) Bom. C. R. 170 : 1999 (1) Mh. L. J. 342; and (2) (Dada Machindra Chaudhar v. State of maharashtra), 1999 (5) Bom. C. R. 601 : 1999 (3) Mh. L. J. 325. In both the above referred cases, Division Bench of this Court, referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay), A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 22, paras 16 and 17 of which read thus :"16. C. R. 601 : 1999 (3) Mh. L. J. 325. In both the above referred cases, Division Bench of this Court, referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay), A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 22, paras 16 and 17 of which read thus :"16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law mat a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in viexv the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) chat it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be Judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had sev- eral opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. 17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. "if, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities, referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case. " ( 21 ) THE learned A. P. P. Shri Patil, submitted that in both the dying declarations, deceased Dhamabai had named the appellant. In the second dying declaration, the deceased had apparently named the appellant as a person who had set her on fire. There is evidence in the shape of testimony of P. W. 1 Sonabai, to the effect that she had seen the appellant running from the house of deceased when they woke up and deceased started shouting. The strained relationship between the deceased and appellant has already come on record and, therefore, there is abundant material on record to hold the appellant responsible or murder of deceased Dhamabai. In view of the evidence brought on record and in view of the reasons recorded by us as above, we are not inclined to accept the submissions advanced by the learned A. P. P. ( 22 ) THE learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record properly and had erred in placing reliance on the dying declarations. In view of the evidence brought on record and in view of the reasons recorded by us as above, we are not inclined to accept the submissions advanced by the learned A. P. P. ( 22 ) THE learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record properly and had erred in placing reliance on the dying declarations. The learned Judge observed in paragraph 24 of the judgment that in the instant case, the contents of dying declaration are corroborated by independent evidence of P. W. 1, 4, 5 and 8. There are minor discrepancies in the evidence of P. W. 1, according to the learned Judge. Even, if the earlier statement of deceased Dhamabai (Exh. 58) recorded by A. S. I. Ghadge had no endorsement of any doctor, but the same cannot be discarded on that ground alone. A certification by the doctor that a person making dying declaration was in a fit state of mind is a rule of caution and a dying declaration cannot be discarded on the ground that there was no endorsement of the Medical Officer. ( 23 ) WE may usefully refer to a reported judgment in the case of (Laxman v. State of Maharashtra), 2002 (6) S. C. C. 710, the Constitution bench observed thus :"the juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of ouch a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of ouch a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness. The Court, however, has alwavs to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But, where the eye-witnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a Police Officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the Court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. " ( 24 ) ON the basis of the statement of the deceased, recorded by the A. S. I. Ghadge, crime came to be registered. Defence is not in a position to satisfy us that no such statement of deceased was recorded by ASI ghade which came to be treated as first dying declaration. The learned trial Judge, on the available evidence, had acquired two ac- cused persons. We do not find the reasoning of the learned trial Judge in convicting the appellant to be correct and appropriate. ( 25 ) THE dying declaration should inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness. The statement of deceased should not be a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. Considering the nature of dying declarations in the present case, we find that the dying declarations of the deceased do not inspire confidence of the Court as they do not inspire confidence of the Court as they do not seem to be truthful. There are glaring contradictions in both the dying declarations of deceased Dhamabai. The deceased does not seem to be certain as to how the incident had taken place. In one of the dying declarations, she had raised suspicion against the appellant. It is settled law that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of the circumstances and with reference to principles governing the weighing of evidence. In one of the dying declarations, she had raised suspicion against the appellant. It is settled law that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of the circumstances and with reference to principles governing the weighing of evidence. ( 26 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we allow the Criminal Appeal No. 126/1999 by setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 5th March, 1999 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, osmanabad in Sessions Case No. 21 of 1996 convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences punishable under section 302 and 307 of I. P. C. The appellant is acquitted of the offences for which he was charged and tried. Fine amount, if paid, be refunded to the appellant. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Appeal allowed.