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2005 DIGILAW 946 (PNJ)

Parkash Chand v. Punjab, Sind Bank

2005-09-06

NIRMAL YADAV, S.S.NIJJAR

body2005
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking the issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to make necessary correction of date of birth of petitioner in his service record as 9.7.1994 in place of 17.10.1947. 2. It is not disputed that the petitioner joined the service on 25.6.1973 and he was confirmed on 25.12.1973. At the time of joining the service, the petitioner submitted his matriculation certificate in which the date of his birth was mentioned as 17.10.1947. According to the petitioner, the date of his birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate is incorrect and contrary to the record of Primary School. The petitioner claims that in the record of Primary School, the date of his birth is mentioned as 9.7.1949. Accordingly, the petitioner got the date of his birth corrected as 9.7.1949 in place of 17.10.1947 and a duplicate matriculation certificate was issued to him. Thereafter, the petitioner furnished his corrected Matriculation Certificate to the respondents-Bank and made a request to carry out the necessary correction in his service record. According to the petitioner, the respondents-Bank rejected the claim of the petitioner by order dated 19.12.1997 (Annexure P-2). 3. The respondents-Bank have filed a written statement. In the written statement it is stated that on an earlier occasion also, the petitioner had submitted a representation dated 16.6.1989 (Annexure R-1) which was rejected by order dated 24.4.1990 (Annexure R-3). 4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the paper-book. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondents-Bank is duty bound to make the necessary correction of the date of birth of the petitioner in his service record. The action of the respondents in not correcting the date of birth of the petitioner in his service record is arbitrary and discriminatory. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the respondents have rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner by orders dated 24.4.1990 and 19.12.1997, keeping in view the Guidelines adopted by the respondents-Bank (Annexure R-4 and R-5). 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the respondents have rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner by orders dated 24.4.1990 and 19.12.1997, keeping in view the Guidelines adopted by the respondents-Bank (Annexure R-4 and R-5). Learned Counsel further submits that the present writ petition has been filed after a period of 14 years from the date of first rejection of the claim of the petitioner i.e., 24.4.1990 and a period of about seven years from the date of second rejection i.e. 19.12.1997. Thus, the claim of the petitioner is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. We are of the considered opinion that the respondents-Bank have rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner, according to the guidelines (Annexures R-4 and R-5) adopted by the respondents-Bank. In the Guidelines (Annexure R-5), the relevant portion is as under: ...Since the date of birth furnished by an employee at the time of his appointment is accepted and entered in the service record by the appropriate authority, the same shall not be subjected to any alteration. 8. In our opinion, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also. The present writ petition has been filed after a lapse of about 14 years from the date when the claim of the petitioner was firstly rejected on 24.4.1990 and about seven years from the date when the claim of the petitioner was again rejected on 19.12.1997, by the respondents. We are of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed being highly belated. This view of ours finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, wherein it has been held as under: 2.... A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioners petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellants petition as well as the appeal. 9. In view of the above, we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.