JUDGMENT A. K. PATNAIK, J. : These writ petitions were heard analo¬gously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order as they raise common questions of fact and law. 2. The facts briefly are that the Bhubaneswar Development Authority (for short, ‘the B.D.A.’) issued an advertisement in the Oriya Daily “The Samaya” dated 7.1.2000 offering developed plot of 2400 sqft. in Chadrasekharpur residential area at a cost of Rs.2,40,000/- only at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. and in the said advertisement it was stated that as there were only 45 plots the allotment will be decided on first come first serve basis. In the said advertisement it was further mentioned that applications may deposit the money in the Oriental Bank of Com¬merce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar and apply in plain paper with original challan. The case of the petitioners in these writ peti¬tions is that on 7.1.2000 they applied in plain paper and depos¬ited Rs.2,40,000/- in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar in response to the said advertisement dated 7.1.2000. The B.D.A. however did not allot any plot in Chandrasekharpur residential area to the petitioners and instead decided in its 76th meeting held in 16.5.2000 to cancel the total process initi¬ated by the said advertisement and return the amount deposited by the applicants with interest at 4.5% and called for fresh appli¬cations by re-advertising the plots at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. and to allot the plots amongst the applicants on lottery basis. The petitioners have filed these writ petitions with a prayer to quash the said decision taken by the B.D.A. in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 and to direct the B.D.A. to allot the plots to them in Chandrasekharpur residential area as per their applications. 3. In O.J.C. No.5429 of 2000, the Court while issuing notice in the writ petition to the opp.parties passed an interim order in Misc. Case No.5667 of 2000 on 25.9.2000 to the effect that the impugned cancellation of allotment and any subsequent allotment will abide by the result of the writ petition and the opp.parties will not allow any new allottees to raise construc¬tion on the lands which were allotted to the writ petitioners. Similarly, while issuing notice to the opp.parties in the writ petition O.J.C. No.6728 of 2000, the Court passed an interim order in Misc. Similarly, while issuing notice to the opp.parties in the writ petition O.J.C. No.6728 of 2000, the Court passed an interim order in Misc. Case No.7263 of 2000 on 17.8.2000 that any deci¬sion taken in pursuance of the resolution adopted in the meeting of the B.D.A. on 16.5.2000 will be subject to the result of the writ petition. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the B.D.A. stating therein that in response to the advertisement published in the newspaper on 7.1.2000, 58 applicants deposited the out-right purchase cost of Rs.2,40,000/- each on 7.1.2000 and three applicants deposited Rs.2,40,000/- each on 8.1.2000, 10.1.2000 and 11.1.2000 and the fact that a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- was deposited on the very day on which advertisement ws pub¬lished, raised many eye-brows and a number of news items were published expressing doubts as to how a huge sum of Rs.2,40,000/- could be deposited by 58 persons one after the other in the bank and that too on the very day on which the advertisement was published in the newspaper. It is also stated in the said counter affidavit that the Secretary of the Lokpal by a letter dated 15.1.2000 requested the Vice-Chairman of B.D.A. to furnish a copy of the original advertisement as well as other advertisements issued earlier and the lokpal discussed the matter with the Vice-Chairman. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that taking all these facts, the B.D.A. in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 decided to cancel the total process and to return the amounts deposited with interest at 4.5% to all the persons who had deposited the amounts and to readvertise for allotment of plots by lottery. 5. At the hearing, Mr. Bijan Ray, learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.5429 of 2000 submitted that the adver¬tisement published in the newspaper on 7.1.2000 by the B.D.A. is an offer to sell developed plots of 2400 sqft. 5. At the hearing, Mr. Bijan Ray, learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.5429 of 2000 submitted that the adver¬tisement published in the newspaper on 7.1.2000 by the B.D.A. is an offer to sell developed plots of 2400 sqft. in Chandrasekhar¬pur residential area at the cost of Rs.2,40,000/- to the appli¬cants on first come first serve basis if the applicants deposit the cost in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubanes¬war and apply in plain paper with the original challans and in response to the said offer the petitioners have applied and deposited the entire cost of Rs.2,40,000/- each in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar and thereby accepted the said offer and there is, therefore, a concluded contract and this concluded contract cannot be unilaterally cancelled by the B.D.A. He cited the decision of the Kerala High Court in Hajee M. Ahamed Koya and another v. E. Murugesa Mudalier Son & Co. A.I.R. 1958 Kerala 195, wherein it has been held that a party to a contract is not entitled in law to cancel a concluded contract unilaterally and unilateral concelation by a party has no effect in law. Mr. Ray further submitted that having advertised in the newspaper that applicants will be allotted plots of 2400 sqft. in Chandrasekhaprur residential area on first come first serve basis if they apply and deposit the cost of Rs.2,40,000/- in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar and the peti¬tioners having acted upon the said advertisement by applying and depositing the cost of Rs.2,40,000/- for 2400 sqft. in Chandra¬sekharpur residential area, the B.D.A. cannot resile from its promise to allot plots of 2400 sqft. to the petitioners on first come first serve basis as this would amount to violation of doctrine of promissory estoppel and doctrine of legitimate expec¬tation. Mr. Ray further submitted that while taking the decision in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000, the B.D.A. did not indi¬cate any reason for cancellation of the total process pursuant to the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 except stating that the decision to cancel had been taken “under the above circumstances”. Mr. Ray further submitted that while taking the decision in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000, the B.D.A. did not indi¬cate any reason for cancellation of the total process pursuant to the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 except stating that the decision to cancel had been taken “under the above circumstances”. He submitted that the B.D.A. cannot now be allowed to take a plea in the counter affidavit that the cancellation was due to newspaper allegation and the letter of the Secretary of the Lokpal and discussion with the Lokpal by the Vice-Chairman of the B.D.A. He further submitted that in any case, these new pleas that there were allegations in the newspapers and the letter from the Secre¬tary of the Lokpal and discussion with the lokpal are not grounds on which the B.D.A. can resile from its offer or promise in the advertisement in the newspaper published on 7.1.2000 to allot 2400 sqft. plots in Chandrasekharpur residential area on first come first serve basis to the applicants who apply and make payment of the cost. 6. Mr. R. K. Rath,learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.6728 of 2000 submitted that the decision to cancel the process taken by the B.D.A. in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 is not in the public interest and is in violation of principles of promissory estoppel. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and anoth¬er, (1995)1 SCC 274 for the proposition that the Court will not allow a public authority to withdraw from its promise except when the public authority satisfies the Court by placing relevant materials the such withdrawal was for supervening public inter¬est. He submitted that no such public interest has been shown by the B.D.A. calling for withdrawal of the promise made in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 to allot 2400 sqft. of plots on first come first serve basis to the applicants who apply in plain paper and deposit the consideration money in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar. He submitted that no such public interest has been shown by the B.D.A. calling for withdrawal of the promise made in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 to allot 2400 sqft. of plots on first come first serve basis to the applicants who apply in plain paper and deposit the consideration money in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar. He submitted that in the 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000, the B.D.A. has not given any reason that the process initiated by the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 was being cancelled because of a letter received from the Secre¬tary of the Lokpal and because of a discussion with the Lokpal and because of allegations in the newspapers and the B.D.A. being a statutory authority cannot now be allowed to take these pleas in the affidavit filed on its behalf in the Court. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16 for the proposition that public orders, publicly made in exercise of statutory au¬thority cannot be construed in the light of explanation subse¬quently given by the officer making the order of what he meant or of what was in his mind or what he intends to do and such public orders made by the public authorities must be construed objec¬tively with reference to the language used in the order itself. He pointed out that this decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in Mohindar Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851. 7. Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.11813 and 11814 of 2000 submitted that the decision taken by the B.D.A. in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 to cancel the process initiated pursuant to the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 is also contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Au¬thority of India and others, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 that the Government in its dealings with the public while granting largess cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. Mr. Mr. D.P. Dash, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.1197 of 2003 reiterated the aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.1197 of 2003 comes within the first 45 applicants who have submitted the applica¬tions and paid the cost of Rs.2,40,000/-. 8. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Dayananda Mohapatra, learned counsel for the B.D.A. submitted that the advertisement published on 7.1.2000 in the newspaper was only an invitation to offer and not an offer made by the B.D.A. to sell plots of 2400 sqft. in Chandrasekharpur residential area to the applicants and, therefore, when the applicants submitted their applications along with the consideration money of Rs.2,40,000/- each, there was no concluded contract. He further submitted relying on the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the B.D.A. that on the very day of advertisement, i.e. on 7.1.2000 as many as 58 applicants deposited Rs.2,40,000/- each and submitted their applications for allotment and this would should some foul play and such foul play was also alleged in the newspapers and suspected by the Lokpal and for this reason, the B.D.A. had to take a decision in its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 to cancel the process initiated pursuant to the adver¬tisement and tor return the money deposited by the different applicants with interest at 4.5.% per annum and to advertise for allotment of plots afresh by lottery as to maintain fairness amongst the applicants. Mr. Mohapatra submitted that the fact that the B.D.A. in the minutes of its 76th meeting held on 16.5.2000 has not indicated that the process has been cancelled because of newspapers allegations and foul play and the letter of the Secretary of Lokpal and the discussion of the Lokpal with the Vice-Chairman of the B.D.A. cannot be a bar for the B.D.A. to take these pleas in its counter affidavit filed in this Court because the decisions of the meeting of the B.D.A. are adminis¬trative decisions and are not statutory orders. He submitted that the petitioners have been refunded the amounts deposited by them with interest and will not suffer any prejudice by the impugned decision because they can again apply and participate in the lottery for allotment of the plots. He submitted that the petitioners have been refunded the amounts deposited by them with interest and will not suffer any prejudice by the impugned decision because they can again apply and participate in the lottery for allotment of the plots. He finally submitted that in any case, no plot can be allotted at this stage at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. because the market value of the land has gone up immensely by now. 9. The first question to be decided in these batch of writ petitions is whether there is a concluded contract between the B.D.A and the petitioners for selling 2400 sqft. of plots in Chandrasekharpur residential area as a result of the advertise¬ment dated 7.1.2000 published in the newspaper and the applica¬tions of the petitioners and payment of Rs.2,40,000/- in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar by the peti¬tioners pursuant to the said advertisement dated 7.1.2000. The answer to this question will depend upon whether the advertise¬ment dated 7.1.2000 was an invitation to offer or invitation to treat. In Bank of India and others v. O.P. Swaranakar etc., and other connected cases reported in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 858, the Supreme Court has dealt at length as to what constitutes offer and what constitutes invitation to treat and how the expressions are different in law. In paragraph-50 of the said judgment at page 874 of the A.I.R., the Supreme Court has held that it is well known that the use of the term ‘offer’ or ‘proposal’ is not decisive and it would depend upon facts involved in the matter. In paragraphs-53 and 54 of the said judgment as reported in the A.I.R., the Supreme Court has quoted passages from Treitel’s The law of Contract. The passage from Treitel’s The Law of Contract quoted in paragraph-54 of the said judgment at page 875 of the A.I.R. is extracted herein below. “The question whether a statement is an offer or an invita¬tion to treat depends primarily on the intention with which it was made. A statement is only an offer if the person making it intends to be bound as soon as the person reasonably believes that it was made with this intention. “The question whether a statement is an offer or an invita¬tion to treat depends primarily on the intention with which it was made. A statement is only an offer if the person making it intends to be bound as soon as the person reasonably believes that it was made with this intention. It follows that a statement is not an offer, if it expressly provides that the person making it is not to be bound merely by the other party’s notification of assent, but only when he himself has signed the document in which the statement is contained.” It will be clear from the aforesaid passage from Treitel’s Law of Contract that the question whether a statement is an offer or an invitation to treat depends primarily on the intention with which it was made and a statement is only an offer if the person making it intends to be bound as soon as the person reasonably believes that it was made with this intention and a statement is not an offer if it expressly provides that the person making it is not to be bound merely by the other party’s notification of assent. 10. In the light of this law as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India and others v. O.P. Swarnakar etc. (supra) and Trietel’s The Law of Contract, we may now exam¬ine the statement made by the B.D.A. in its advertisement pub¬lished in the newspapers on 7.1.2000. The said advertisement published on 7.1.2000 is to the following effect :- “AN UNIQUE SCHEME OF BDA BHUBANESWAR It is a worthy offer from Bhubaneswar Development Authority. Developed plot of 2400 sqft. (60' x 40') in Chandrasekharpur residential Area at a cost of Rs.2.40 lakhs only at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. As we have only 45 (Forty five) plots the allotment will be decided on first come first served basis. Two plots for SC/2 plots for S.T./2 plots for Defence personnel and 2 plot for BDA staff are reserved which will be diverted to general category if no application with full amount is received by 12.1.2000. Scheme starts from today and will be closed on receipt of required applications. To ensure it we are naming only one Bank i.e. Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Akash Sova Building, Bhubaneswar. Out-right purchasers will get priority in allotment. Scheme starts from today and will be closed on receipt of required applications. To ensure it we are naming only one Bank i.e. Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Akash Sova Building, Bhubaneswar. Out-right purchasers will get priority in allotment. AVAIL THE OPPORTUNITY: BE A MILLENNIUM PRIZE OWNER. Deposit the money and apply in plain paper with original challan. General terms and conditions of allotment in other schemes will also be applicable in this scheme. Secretary Bhubaneswar Development Authority Bhubaneswar.” The aforesaid advertisement does state that it is a worthy offer from the B.D.A. but as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India and others v. O.P. Swarnakar etc. (supra) the use of the expression “offer” is not decisive. The advertisement clearly states that applications will have to be made in plain paper and that the allotment will be decided on first come served basis and out-right purchasers will get priori¬ty in allotment. It is clear from the aforesaid statement in the advertisement that the B.D.A. did not intend to allot the plot straight way to any person who deposited the consideration money along with the application but only held out a promise or assur¬ance to the applicants that the allotment would be decided on first come first serve basis and applicants offering to make out-right purchase will get priority in allotment. The statement of the B.D.A. in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 published in the newspaper was, thus, not an offer but an invitation to treat and consequently the applications of the petitioners along with the payment of Rs.2,40,000/- in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar in response to the advertisement were offers and not acceptance of the offers and until the offers of the petitioners were accepted by the B.D.A. by allotment of plots in the Chandrasekharpur residential area, there was no concluded contract between the B.D.A. and the petitioners for sale of 2400 sqft.plot in Chandrasekharpur residential area at Rs.2,40,000/-. Hence, the decision of the Kerala High Court in Hajee M. Ahamed Koya and another v. E. Murugesa Mudailer Son & Co. (supra)cited by Mr. Ray,learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.5429 of 2000 that a party to the contract is not entitled to cancel a concluded contract unilaterally and such cancellation has no effect in law does not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. (supra)cited by Mr. Ray,learned counsel for the petitioners in O.J.C. No.5429 of 2000 that a party to the contract is not entitled to cancel a concluded contract unilaterally and such cancellation has no effect in law does not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. But as we have held above, by the said advertisement dated 7.1.2000 published in the advertisement, the B.D.A. held out a clear and unequivocal promise to all the applicants includ¬ing the petitioners that the allotment of plots of 2400 sqft. in the Chandrasekharpur residential area at a cost of Rs.2,40,000/- at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. will be decided on first come first serve basis and that those amongst the applicants who intend to make our-right purchase will get priority in allotment. The petitioners have acted on the said promise and applied in plain paper for allotment of plot of 2400 sqft. in the Chandra¬sekharpur residential area at a cost of Rs.2,40,000/- and have also deposited money towards the said cost in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar. The B.D.A. has to fulfill the said promise and decide allotment of plots to the petitioners on first come first serve basis giving priority to those appli¬cants who intend to make out-right purchase of the plots unless the B.D.A. satisfies the Court by placing relevant materials before the Court that due to supervening circumstances fulfill¬ment of such promise by the B.D.A. will be contrary to public interest. 12. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been explained in Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and another (supra). Paragraph-11 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and another as reported in (1995) 1 SCC 274 at page 283 is quoted herein below: “The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or con¬duct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back appoint, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take place between the parties.” In paragraph-12 of the said judgment in Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and another (supra), the Supreme Court, however, indicated the circumstances in which doctrine of promis¬sory estoppel cannot be invoked. In the language of the Supreme Court: “............In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while consider¬ing the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the Court, while considering the applica¬bility of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.” Thus, it is only when the Court takes the view on the basis of materials filed before it that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to its promise, assurance or representation, the doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield to higher equity in the public interest. 13. 13. In Dai-Ichi Karkaria Ltd v. Union of India and others, (2004) 4 S.C.C. 57, the Supreme Court took note of the development of this law of promissory estoppel after the case of Kasinka Trading and another v. Union of India and another (supra) in the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India (1973)3 SCC 398 in which it was held that public interest is to be accepted as superior equity which can override individual equity and in such cases, the doctrine of promissory estoppel will not be applicable. Applying the said law to the facts of the case of Dai-Ichi Karakria Ltd., the Supreme Court found that the public interest disclosed in the counter affidavit filed in that case did not stand close scrutiny and held that the factors taken into consideration by the Government appear to be wholly irrelevant and did not sub-serve public interest and quashed the impugned notifications by which some concession from custom duty earlier granted had been withdrawn. 14. Applying the aforesaid law of promissory estoppel to the facts of the present case, the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the B.D.A. does not disclose any superior public inter¬est for not fulfilling the clear and unequivocal promise made by the B.D.A. in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 to decide the allotment on first come first serve basis and give priority to those applicants who applied for buying the plots on out-right purchase by paying the entire cost of Rs.2,40,000/- at a time in the Oriental Bank of Commerce, BDA Branch, Bhubaneswar. All that is stated in the counter affidavit is that pursuant to the said advertisement dated 7.1.2000, as many as 58 persons deposited Rs.2,40,000/- on 7.1.2000 itself and this raised many eye-brows and allegations in the newspapers and the Secretary of the Lokpal sent a letter dated 15.1.2000 requesting the Vice Chairman of B.D.A. to send a copy of the original advertisement and the Lokpal also discussed the matter with the Vice Chairman, B.D.A. No enquiry seems to have been conducted by the B.D.A. to find out as a whether any foul play actually took place and whether appli¬cants had actually come to know before the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 that plots of 2400 sqft. in Chandrasekharpur residential area at the cost of Rs.2,40,000/- at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. in Chandrasekharpur residential area at the cost of Rs.2,40,000/- at the rate of Rs.100/- per sqft. would be advertised for allotment and had accordingly arranged the money before hand and paid the said along with the applications on 7.1.2000 promptly so as to steal a march over those who have no such prior knowledge that the B.D.A. would be offering such plots in the Chandrasekharpur residential area on payment of full cost of Rs.2,40,000/- on first come first serve basis. These facts as stated in the counter affidavit are not sufficient to make out a case of superior public interest for not enforcing the promises held out in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 to the applicants that the allotment would be decided strictly on first come first serve basis and out-right purchaser will be given priority. Rather, these facts as stated in the counter affidavit of the B.D.A. are totally irrelevant for not fulfilling the aforesaid clear and unequivocal promises made to the applicants by the B.D.A. in the advertisement dated 7.1.2000. In the 76th meeting of the B.D.A. held on 16.5.2000, it has also been decided to reallot the plots in Chandrasekharpur residential area at the same cost of Rs.100/- per sqft. by lottery after fresh advertisement. Thus, the argument of Mr. Mohapatra that the market value of the land has increased in the meantime and the allotment cannot be made at Rs.100/- per sqft. on the basis of the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 also cannot be considered. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned decision in the 76th meeting of the B.D.A., Bhubaneswar held on 16.5.2000 to cancel the process initiated pursuant to the said advertisement dated 7.1.2000 is quashed and the B.D.A. is directed to consider the applications of the petitioners along with all other applica¬tions filed in response to the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 in accordance with the principle of first come first serve basis giving priority to out-right purchasers and make the allotment of 45 plots accordingly after the petitioners submit fresh bank drafts of Rs.2,40,000/- plus interest received by them from the B.D.A. on any nationalised bank at Bhubaneswar. Within a month from today the B.D.A. will intimate all applicants including the petitioners to furnish the aforesaid bank drafts within a month and the B.D.A. will take a decision regarding allotment in ac¬cordance with the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 as indicated above within four months from today. 16. Within a month from today the B.D.A. will intimate all applicants including the petitioners to furnish the aforesaid bank drafts within a month and the B.D.A. will take a decision regarding allotment in ac¬cordance with the advertisement dated 7.1.2000 as indicated above within four months from today. 16. The writ applications are allowed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. M. M. DAS, J. I agree. Applications allowed.