P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE un-successful plaintiff No. 2 in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kowur filed A. S. No. 294 of 1995. Likewise, she filed Transfer A. S. No. 127 of 1995 as against the judgment and decree made in O. S. No. 156 of 1987. ( 2 ) THE suit in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 on the file of the Subordinate judge, Kowur was filed by Smt. P. Bullemma and Smt. N. Sundaramma as plaintiffs praying for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property, past mesne profits and also future mesne profits and such other suitable reliefs. The first plaintiff is the mother and the second plaintiff is the daughter. The first plaintiff is no more. The second plaintiff-present appellant in A. S. No. 294 of 1995 is prosecuting the litigation. P. Venkatarao-defendant in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 filed the other suit in o. S. No. 156 of 1987 for perpetual injunction as against N. Dharma Rao and smt. N. Sundaramma. N. Sundaramma-second defendant in the said suit was added as per orders in I. A. No. 1627 of 1987, dated 30. 01. 1991. The learned Subordinate Judge, Kowur by common judgment dated 31. 1. 1995 dismissed the suit in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 and decreed the suit in o. S. No. 156 of 1987, granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff till he is evicted by due process of law. Aggrieved by the same, the aforesaid appeals had been preferred by N. Sundaramma. ( 3 ) SUBMISSIONS OF SRI T. S. ANAND: Sri T. S. Anand, learned counsel representing the appellant in both the appeals would contend that as far as the transfer appeal is concerned, limited relief of injunction until p. Venkatarao is evicted by due process of law had been granted and the result of the said appeals would depend upon the result of the main matter in A. S. No. 294 of 1995, which was preferred as against the suit for recovery of possession and other reliefs in O. S. No. 44 of 1985. The learned counsel also had taken this court through the findings recorded by the learned Judge and would contend that having believed Ex. A-1 and having disbelieved Ex. The learned counsel also had taken this court through the findings recorded by the learned Judge and would contend that having believed Ex. A-1 and having disbelieved Ex. B-9 and having arrived at a conclusion that ramanna had the testamentary capacity to dispose of the plaint schedule property in O. S. No. 44 of 1985, dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the relief prayed for is pre-mature, for the reason that only after the death of P. Bullemma, the relief can be prayed for, cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also pointed out that both the life interest holder and vested remainder holder as plaintiffs instituted the suit in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 and specific relief also was prayed for in the suit for recovery of possession on behalf of both the plaintiffs and hence, the said findings recorded by the learned Judge to the effect that the remedy of the plaintiff would be to file yet another suit also cannot be sustained. The learned counsel while further elaborating his submissions regarding the scope and ambit of Order 41, Rule 33 of C. P. C. , in all fairness, would contend that adverse findings also may be questioned by the ultimate successful party but, however, the learned counsel would contend that even if the evidence available on record is carefully appreciated, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that Ex. A1 is a valid document and hence Ramanna had executed the will by making duspostion of the properties this cannot be doubted in any way, especially in the light of the fact that even in Ex. B9, there is a recital relating to the existence of ex. A1. The learned counsel also would contend that merely because after testamentary duspostion, certain properties had been given to the son by Ramanna and that itself can not be taken as a suspicious circumstance. From the facts and circumstances it is clear that Ex. B9 was brought into existence only with a view to defeat the rights of the plaintiff under Ex. A1. Ultimately, the learned counsel would conclude that in the light of the clear findings, which had been recorded by the learned Judge, inasmuch as the said findings had not been questioned, atleast by way of cross objections, such findings shall normally be not disturbed by the appellate court. A1. Ultimately, the learned counsel would conclude that in the light of the clear findings, which had been recorded by the learned Judge, inasmuch as the said findings had not been questioned, atleast by way of cross objections, such findings shall normally be not disturbed by the appellate court. ( 4 ) SUBMISSIONS MADE BY SRI K. V. BHANU PRASAD: sri K. V. Bhanu Prasad, learned counsel representing P. Venkatarao- contesting respondent in both the appeals would contend that even if cross objections had not been filed questioning the adverse findings, such findings definitely can be canvassed by the successful party in an appeal preferred by the un-successful party and in this view of the matter, the validity or otherwise of Ex. A1 may have to be decided. The learned counsel also would contend that merely because Ex. B9 was disbelieved, automatically it could not be taken that Ex. A1 was proved in accordance with law and this approach adopted by the learned Judge is un sustainable. The learned counsel also pointed out several suspicious circumstances. The learned counsel would comment that the relationship of the parties needs to be taken into consideration and the present litigation has cropped up only because of the husband of the appellant n. Sundaramma. The learned counsel also pointed out that the very fact that subsequent to the testamentary dispossession, Ramanna had given substantial properties to P. Venkatarao would go to show that it was never the intention of Ramanna to give away the properties to the daughter or the wife, detriment to the interest of the son. This aspect may have to be seriously considered. The learned counsel also further commented that the mere fact that Ex. A1 is a registered document, it will not alter the situation in any way, unless, otherwise, Ex. A1 is proved in accordance with law. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the learned Judge and also the evidence made available on record and would contend that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the validity of Ex. B-9 has to be held in affirmative and the validity of Ex. A1 has to be negatived. The learned counsel placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. ( 5 ) HEARD the learned counsel. B-9 has to be held in affirmative and the validity of Ex. A1 has to be negatived. The learned counsel placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. ( 5 ) HEARD the learned counsel. ( 6 ) PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES: In O. S. No. 44 of 1985 filed by p. Bullemma, who is no more and her daughter N. Sundaramma, it was pleaded by the plaintiffs as hereunder:"the second plaintiff is the daughter of the 1st plaintiff. The defendant is the son of the 1st plaintiff and brother of 2nd plaintiff. Items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule originally belonged to late Pendurti Ramanna, husband of the 1st plaintiff and father of the 2nd plaintiff. Item 3 belongs to the 1st plaintiff. Originally item 3 was purchased by the 1st plaintiff in the year 1940. Subsequently 1st plaintiff executed a settlement deed in favour of her husband late Ramanna. The 3rd item of plaint schedule being the separate and self- acquired property of Ramanna, being conveyed by the 1st plaintiff under a settlement deed, the same property was given to the 1st plaintiff by late ramanna for her maintenance and put her in possession of the same. She has been enjoying the same in her own right. Under law the 1st plaintiff acquired absolute rights in item-3 of the plaint schedule and has been enjoying the same. Late ramanna or his son-the defendant have no rights in the same. As there were differences in the family, a suit was filed by the son of the defendant for partition against him and late Ramanna. As there were differences between Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff on one side and the defendant on the other side, late ramanna filed a petition for final decree in the partition suit filed by the defendant s son in O. S. No. 55 of 1973 on the file of the court and obtained delivery of this share through court. The defendant got only ac 6. 00 cents in the partition and Late Ramanna got more than Ac 11. 00 cents. The defendant through mediators requested late Ramanna to convey some properties that fell to his share. As the defendant is the only son and being afraid of cast customs prevailing in the locality, he agreed to convey nearly ac 9. 00 cents and on the house share to the defendant and his son. 00 cents. The defendant through mediators requested late Ramanna to convey some properties that fell to his share. As the defendant is the only son and being afraid of cast customs prevailing in the locality, he agreed to convey nearly ac 9. 00 cents and on the house share to the defendant and his son. It was also agreed that remaining property of nearly Ac 1. 93 cents of late ramanna and Ac 2. 86 cents of the 1st plaintiff herein, share be given to the 2nd plaintiff. In pursuance of that understanding the 1st plaintiff executed settlement deed dated 29. 09. 1981, settling item 3 of the plaint schedule in favour of the 2nd plaintiff. As late Ramanna executed a will dated 22. 05. 1976 bequeathing all his properties to his wife-1st plaintiff herein with a life estate and the vested remainder in favour of the 2nd plaintiff, it was thought that no further document need be executed by late Ramanna. Virtually it was an arrangement arrived at in the presence of mediators. In pursuance of the arrangement, Ramanna executed a settlement deed, settling Ac 5. 61 cents in favour of Chandrasekhar, s/o. the defendant under a settlement deed, dated 14. 10. 1981. Another settlement deed was executed by Ramanna, settling Ac 3. 31 cents on the defendant on the same date. The defendant in turn executed a settlement deed settling Ac 0. 43 cents in favour of ramanna under a deed, dated 14. 10. 1981 to make it a contiguous block. As disputes were settled, it was agreed that Ramanna should vacate the house that fell to his share, he shifted his residence along with 1st plaintiff into the house of the 2nd plaintiff. As Ramanna and his wife-the 1st plaintiff herein were unhappy with the behaviour and conduct of the defendant and as he was not caring for the welfare of his parents, Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff herein leased their lands in an extent of Ac 4. 79 cents shown in the plaint schedule to Sri Kotaru Gangaraju on yearly rent of Rs. 1500/- per acre and put him in possession of the same after receiving the total yearly rent of Rs. 7,185/- from him on 15. 10. 1981. A lease deed was executed by Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff herein in favour of Kotaru Gangaraju. 79 cents shown in the plaint schedule to Sri Kotaru Gangaraju on yearly rent of Rs. 1500/- per acre and put him in possession of the same after receiving the total yearly rent of Rs. 7,185/- from him on 15. 10. 1981. A lease deed was executed by Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff herein in favour of Kotaru Gangaraju. The schedule property was leased to Sri Kotaru Gangaraju as ramanna and the 1st plaintiff herein were unable to cultivate the schedule properties due to old age. Sri gangaraju cultivated the schedule properties with virginia Tobacco in the month of October 1981. In pursuance of the arrangement arrived at, Ramanna executed a relinquishment deed on 16. 10. 1981 relinquishing his share in the house property in favour of the defendant. Having achieved what he wanted by the arrangement, the defendant herein again started creating troubles to his parents and filed a suit in o. S. No. 1132 of 1981 on the file of DMC, Kovvur for grant of an injunction against Narukurti Dharmarao, husband of the 2nd plaintiff alleging that Ramanna created a lease on the schedule property in his favour on 17. 10. 1981 and obtained orders of temporary injunction in I. A. No. 147 of 1981. Having been benefited by arrangement, he is estopped from contending otherwise. In fact, no lease deed was executed by Ramanna and the defendant was not put in possession of the plaint schedule properties. The lease deed said to have been executed by Ramanna dated 17. 10. 1981 is a forged document or a fabricated one. The defendant cannot claim any rights under the document. Having come to know about the suit, the 1st plaintiff and her husband along with their tenant Gangaraju filed a suit in o. S. No. 1206 of 1981 on the file of the DMC Kowur and filed an application for grant of temporary injunction against the defendant in I. A. No. 1863 of 1981. The defendant herein opposed the application on the very day of its filing. The learned District munsif jointly tried both the injunction petitions mentioned above. The two petitions were heard jointly and a common order dated 31. 12. 1981 was pronounced dismissing the application filed by the defendant in I. A. No. 1748 of 1981 and allowing the application filed by Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff in i. A. No. 1863 of 1981. The learned District munsif jointly tried both the injunction petitions mentioned above. The two petitions were heard jointly and a common order dated 31. 12. 1981 was pronounced dismissing the application filed by the defendant in I. A. No. 1748 of 1981 and allowing the application filed by Ramanna and the 1st plaintiff in i. A. No. 1863 of 1981. The Virginia crop in the schedule properties became ripe for cutting. At that stage, the defendant herein preferred appeals before this Court in cm. ANos. 5 of 1982 and 7 of 1982 against the order in I. A. No. 1863 of 1981 in O. S. No. 1206 of 1981. The defendant filed an application in I. A. No. 81 of 1982 in the above C. M. A and obtained orders of suspension of injunction. By virtue of that order the defendant continued in possession of the schedule properties and removed the entire crop in the schedule properties and appropriated the same for himself. The tenant Sri Gangaraju invested heavy amounts for cultivation and other expenses in addition to the payment of the lease amount of Rs. 7,185/- to ramanna and the 1st plaintiff herein. The crop in the schedule properties was cut and removed by the defendant by the end of April and in the beginning of May 1982. As Gangaraju could not realize the crop, he demanded return of the lease amount and the expenses. The 1st plaintiff and Ramanna had to pay rs. 10,000/- to Gangaraju. The amount was paid as compensation to Gangaraju by the 1st plaintiff and ramanna in the 1st week of May 1982. The defendant unauthorisedly continued in possession of the schedule properties cut and removed the crop and appropriated the same for himself. He has no right in the land or in the crop. His possession in the schedule property is unlawful. He is a trespasser in possession of the property. He has to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation of the schedule properties. Subsequently also, the defendant has been unauthorisedly continuing and realizing the crops and appropriating the same till today. The defendant has to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation of schedule properties to this date. The schedule lands are very valuable lands capable of yielding commercial crops. The prevailing rental values are Rs. 2,000/- per acre in the area for the last four years. The defendant has to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation of schedule properties to this date. The schedule lands are very valuable lands capable of yielding commercial crops. The prevailing rental values are Rs. 2,000/- per acre in the area for the last four years. Each acre is capable of fetching not less than Rs. 3,000/- net income. But the plaintiff s claim rs. 1500/- per acre as profits for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985. In the year 1981-82 as the crop was raised by Gangaraju and expenditure was incurred by him, which was compensated by 1st plaintiff, an amount of Rs. 10,000/- for 1982 is claimed at that rate. The defendant is bound to pay interest at 12% from due dates. Ramanna died on 11. 09. 1983 without altering the will, dated 22. 05. 1976. The 1st plaintiff being the legatee under the will is entitled to claim damages that were payable to him also, tinder the will Ramanna created interest in favour of the 1st plaintiff in all his properties that were available on the date of his death. So the 1st plaintiff is entitled to claim damages from the defendant on items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule from 1982. The suit is filed for that relief also. As the defendant is in unauthorized occupation of the schedule properties, he is bound to deliver the schedule properties to the 1st plaintiff. If for any reason, the Court comes to the conclusion that the 1st plaintiff did not acquire any rights in the third item of the plaint schedule during the life time of Ramanna, it is to be held that defect in title was cured by the will executed by late Ramanna and that the 1st plaintiff acquired rights in the third item of the plaint schedule after the life time of Ramanna. These appeals filed in C. M. A. No. 5 of 1982 and c. M. A. No. 7 of 1982 and applications filed therein were jointly heard by this Court and they were dismissed with costs on 25. 01. 1985. The defendant herein preferred an appeal against the decree and order of C. M. A. No. 7 of 1982 in the High Court of A. P. The appeal is pending. In spite of the dismissal of cm. 01. 1985. The defendant herein preferred an appeal against the decree and order of C. M. A. No. 7 of 1982 in the High Court of A. P. The appeal is pending. In spite of the dismissal of cm. As by this Court, defendant has not delivered possession of the schedule properties to the 1st plaintiff. The 2nd plaintiff has vested remainder in the schedule properties after lifetime of the 1st plaintiff. As this is a suit based on title and for possession, the 2nd plaintiff is a necessary and proper party to the suit. The 2nd plaintiff is maintaining the 1st plaintiff. Eventhough the 1st plaintiff has considerable properties mentioned in the plaint schedule, she is deprived of the fruits of those properties. This year the defendant has already removed the crops in the schedule properties and realized profits from them. " ( 7 ) THE defendant resisted the suit by filing written statement with the following averments:"except the relationship mentioned in para 4, all other averments in the plaint are not true. 1st plaintiff died on 18. 10. 1985. She had 180 sovereigns of gold, pronotes and a liquid cash of above one lakh. They were appropriated by 2nd plaintiff. The averments in para 5 of the plaint that items 1 and 2 belong to late Ramanna and that item iii was given by late Ramanna to the 1st plaintiff for her maintenance and put her in possession by late ramanna is false. It is equally false to state that 1st plaintiff was put in possession of the same as maintenance holder. It is false to state that late ramanna or his son the defendant herein have no rights. The averments in para 6 of plaint that the son of the defendant filed O. S. No. 55 of 1973 in the above court for partition of the joint family properties is true. Late Ramanna pleaded in the said suit that item 3 of the schedule property herein is his self acquired property having got the same through a settlement deed executed by the 1st plaintiff in favour of her husband Ramanna. The said property was deleted from the schedule in the suit in O. S. No. 55 of 1973 as the same was self-acquired property of Ramanna. Thus it remained as the property of Ramanna. The said property was deleted from the schedule in the suit in O. S. No. 55 of 1973 as the same was self-acquired property of Ramanna. Thus it remained as the property of Ramanna. A vague averment in para 5 of the plaint that the said property was given to 1st plaintiff for maintenance is not true. It is absurd to contend likewise as there was no such dispute for maintenance. The plaint is diligently vague as to what point of time such an arrangement is done. Since the 1st plaintiff had no rights in the said property, she has no right to execute the alleged settlement deed dated 29. 09. 1981 in favour of the 2nd plaintiff. The alleged will said to have been executed by late Ramanna on 25. 02. 1976 is not true. He has executed a will dated 05. 06. 1983 in a sound and disposing state of mind. The said will was found by this defendant in an almyrah some time after the death of Ramanna. This defendant then learnt that it is last and final testament of late Ramanna. The alleged will, dated 22. 05. 1976 bequeathing his properties to the 1st plaintiff with a vested remainder to the 2nd plaintiff is not at all true. The averment that it was executed in the presence of mediators whose names are not at all disclosed is not at all true. The averments in para 6 that this defendant through mediators requested late Ramanna to convey some properties that fell to his share and that he being afraid of caste custom late Ramanna agreed to convey Ac 9. 00 of land and the house share to the defendant and his son and that it was also agreed that remaining property of ac 1. 93 cents of late Ramanna and Ac 2. 86 cents shown as item No. 3 was settled by the 1st plaintiff to the 2nd plaintiff is not at all true. The son of the defendant was always liked by late Ramanna. The 1st plaintiff and her husband ramanna became old and as such Ramanna wanted to settle some of his properties in favour of this defendant and his son and willingly executed certain documents on 14. 10. 1981. At the same time, on 16. 10. The son of the defendant was always liked by late Ramanna. The 1st plaintiff and her husband ramanna became old and as such Ramanna wanted to settle some of his properties in favour of this defendant and his son and willingly executed certain documents on 14. 10. 1981. At the same time, on 16. 10. 1981 late Ramanna agreed to enter into a lease in respect of his other properties and directed to get agreement stamps. Late Ramanna executed a kowl for one year on 17. 10. 1981 after receiving Rs. 3,500/- in the presence of his elder brother Veeraswamy who was the first attestor. The said lease was scribed by one Gadde Venkata Krishna Rao, the grand son of the sister of 1st plaintiff herein. Late Ramanna willingly executed the said document in respect of r. S. No. 172/1 in an extent of Ac 2. 86 cents, r. S. No. 171/1 in an extent of Ac 1. 29 cents and r. S. No. 251/3 in an extent of Ac 0. 64 cents. They are shown in the suit schedule in this suit as items 3,1, and 3 respectively. In pursuance of the said kowl, this defendant ploughed the lands and raised tobacco plants in the said lands. At that stage the husband of the 2nd plaintiff attempted to interfere with the possession of this defendant. This defendant filed o. S. No. 1132/81 on the file of the District Munsif court, Kowur and obtained interim injunction in i. A. No. 74s of 1981. Having been fully aware of the averments in the said suit, Pendurthi Ramanna as 1st plaintiff, Bullamma the 1st plaintiff herein as 2nd plaintiff and one Kottaru Ganga Raju together jointly filed a suit against the defendant. In the pleadings in the said suit il was admitted that this defendant obtained injunction orders in O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 but pleaded that the 3rd plaintiff Kottaru Gangaraju was in possession in spite of the injunction orders. Plaintiffs in O. S. No. 1206 of 1981 filed another LA. No. 1863 of 1981 praying for injunction against this defendant. It was opposed. The injunction application in o. S. Nos. 1132 of 1981 and 1206 of 1981 were disposed of by common orders. The said order was based on an incorrect appreciation of the question of law. The mater is now pending in the High Court. No. 1863 of 1981 praying for injunction against this defendant. It was opposed. The injunction application in o. S. Nos. 1132 of 1981 and 1206 of 1981 were disposed of by common orders. The said order was based on an incorrect appreciation of the question of law. The mater is now pending in the High Court. The 1st plaintiff had no title of any kind in respect of Item II of the suit schedule property which she settled on late Ramanna under a Registered settlement deed in which no right of revocation as reserved. As such, the title of Ramanna continued in the said land. The alleged earlier arrangement of maintenance is only pleaded to give strength to the alleged settlement by the 1st plaintiff in favour of the 2nd plaintiff in September, 1981 without the consent of Ramanna. The very fact that Ramanna executed a kowl goes to establish that he was asserting rights of title and possession in the suit schedule properties. Ramanna had no disputes with this defendant on 14. 10. 1981 or 16. 10. 1981 when he executed the documents. The averments that Ramanna should vacate the house and that the 1st plaintiff and ramanna shifted to the house of the 2nd plaintiff is not correct. The averments in para 7 that the parents of this defendant were unhappy and that he did not care for the welfare of his parents is not true. At a time when the defendant was absent from the house, the 2nd plaintiff managed to take the 1st plaintiff and late ramanna to her house and later got a suit o. S. No. 1206 of 1981 filed against this defendant. The alleged lease dated 15. 10. 1981 must have been a collusive document brought into existence to get over the injunction order in O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 obtained by this defendant. Gangaraju the 3d plaintiff in o. S. No. 1206 of 1981 is a native of Tirugudumetta and his name is suborned for the alleged tenancy. The very fact that Ramanna willingly relinquished his share in the house property belies the contention that the 1st plaintiff and Ramanna gave lease, dated 15. 10. 1981 to Gangaraju. The averments in para 8 that the defendant started creating troubles by filing O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 against the husband of the 2nd plaintiff is not correct. The very fact that Ramanna willingly relinquished his share in the house property belies the contention that the 1st plaintiff and Ramanna gave lease, dated 15. 10. 1981 to Gangaraju. The averments in para 8 that the defendant started creating troubles by filing O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 against the husband of the 2nd plaintiff is not correct. It is with true facts this defendant filed a suit. The kowl in favour of this defendant is executed on a stamped paper on 17. 10. 1981. The plaintiff cannot for a while contend that it is forged or fabricated. If it is forged it cannot be fabricated. If it is fabricated it cannot be forged. As the plaintiff cannot deny the truth of the lease, such an averment is made. It is a fact that injunction applications were heard together and disposed of but this defendant continued in possession from 17. 10. 1981. Against the orders in injunction applications C. M. As Nos. 5 of 1982 and 7 of 1982 were filed and they were dismissed. Against the same the matters are pending in the High Court. This defendant is not at all a trespasser. The plaintiff could have filed proceedings for restitution if they are so aggrieved. A suit for possession does not lie though this defendant continued in possession by virtue of the injunction order. The above referred suits are mere suits for injunction and the orders in the said suits do not affect the title of this defendant. The 1st plaintiff has no right of any kind to execute any settlement deed in respect of Item No. III in favour of the 2nd plaintiff for the property in which the 1st plaintiff does not have title or possession. As per the terms of will, dated 05. 06. 1983 the 1st plaintiff and this defendant are the legatees of all the properties of late Ramanna. Ramanna created a life interest to 1st plaintiff in respect of items 1 and 2 with vested remainder to this defendant. Ramanna gave item HI to this defendant with all rights on death of Ramanna. The plaintiffs have no right to claim any damages. This defendant is the lawful tenant in the properties of late Ramanna. The rights of the tenancy cannot be affected by means of a suit for possession and damages. The alleged damages are grossly exaggerated. Ramanna gave item HI to this defendant with all rights on death of Ramanna. The plaintiffs have no right to claim any damages. This defendant is the lawful tenant in the properties of late Ramanna. The rights of the tenancy cannot be affected by means of a suit for possession and damages. The alleged damages are grossly exaggerated. It is false to state that Gangaraju raised tobacco crop and expended Rs. 10,000/- and that the 1st plaintiff reimbursed the same. The alleged settlement in favour of the 2nd plaintiff belies the contentions of lease to Gangaraju. Gangaraju never cultivated the suit land and he never expended any amount. It is false to state that Ramanna did not alter the alleged will dated 22. 05. 1976. His last will is dated 05. 06. 1983. The fact that late Ramanna executed several documents in favour of this defendant and his son in the 2nd week of October, 1981 goes to establish that there is no will of any kind, dated 22. 05. 1976. Even if there is any such will it is deemed to be revoked in view of the above documents in respect of his properties. The plaintiff herein and the husband of the 2nd plaintiff being fully aware of the contents of lease dated 17. 10. 1981 in favour of this defendant, which was referred to in O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 got a false lease in favour of Kotharu Gangaraju, and o. S. No. 1206 of 1981. Even in the said suit the alleged arrangement of maintenance in favour of the 1st plaintiff herein was not pleaded. The suit in O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 filed by this defendant and the suit in O. S. No. 1206 of 1981 filed by the 1st plaintiff herein and other were based on tenancy agreements. Any order in the said suit in the injunction applications are deemed to be passed without jurisdiction. The said orders do not operate as resjudicata in this suit. The alleged trespass by this defendant in the year 1982 is false. If really the tenancy of Kotharu gangaraju is true, he could have moved the Tribunal for determination of his rights if any under sections 16 and 17 of Tenancy Act, instead of filing a civil suit. He did not surrender the lease if there is one as pleaded. The alleged trespass by this defendant in the year 1982 is false. If really the tenancy of Kotharu gangaraju is true, he could have moved the Tribunal for determination of his rights if any under sections 16 and 17 of Tenancy Act, instead of filing a civil suit. He did not surrender the lease if there is one as pleaded. The plaintiff while alleging that he received rs. 7,185/- as lease amount from Kottaru Gangaraju and having put him in possession of the property would not have paid him an expenditure of rs. 10,000/ -. The said averment is palpably false on fact of it. The 1st plaintiff herself having no right of any kind in item No. 3 cannot convey better rights to the 2nd plaintiff. As such she cannot claim any vested remainder in any of the properties. The 2nd plaintiff is not a necessary patty to this suit. As stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this defendant found a will, dated 05. 06. 1983 in an almyrah of the house in about November 1983. The said will discloses that he gave items 1 and 2 to the 1st plaintiff with a life interest with vested remainder to this defendant while he gave item HI to this defendant with full rights. The said will is the last and final testament of late Ramanna. The defendant is therefore the full owner of all the suit items on death of 1st plaintiff. In spite of all the above factions, this defendant being the only son of the 1st plaintiff and he was always compassionate towards parents and was paying the cist to his father during his life time on all the schedule items and lateron to the 1st plaintiff on items 1 and 2-the pronote amount and never insisted any cist receipts from his parents. The 1st plaintiff died at the house of the 2nd plaintiff under suspicious circumstances on 18. 10. 1985. By the date of death she was having 180 sovereigns of gold and some pronotes and liquid cash of about a lakh rupees. This defendant raised a dispute through Sri Yellina Rayudu, Pendurthi Surya rao and others before the corpse is removed. The corpse was kept for two days. On 19. 10. 1985 dharma Rao-husband of the 2nd plaintiff brought kowur Police and conducted cremation in the absence of this defendant who was in Police Station, kowur. This defendant raised a dispute through Sri Yellina Rayudu, Pendurthi Surya rao and others before the corpse is removed. The corpse was kept for two days. On 19. 10. 1985 dharma Rao-husband of the 2nd plaintiff brought kowur Police and conducted cremation in the absence of this defendant who was in Police Station, kowur. This defendant learnt about cremation at about 5 p. m. , when he returned back to the village. All the movables were appropriated and secreted by the 2nd plaintiff. As per the terms of the will of late Ramanna dated 05. 06. 1983, the life interest of 1st plaintiff ceased on the death of the 1st plaintiff on 18. 10. 1985. As stated above, item No. Ill is in possession of defendant with full rights in himself as the tenancy merged in full rights. As per will, this defendant is the owner of item No. 3. The plaintiffs are not entitled to any reliefs prayed for and they are not entitled to any interest. The profits claimed are excessive. 1st plaintiff died on 18. 10. 1985. The 2nd plaintiff has no right of any kind either prior to or after the death of 1st plaintiff. The above suit is engineered at the instance of the husband of the 2nd plaintiff who wants to grab the property of this defendant". ( 8 ) IN O. S. No. 156 of 1987, which was originally filed as O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Kovvur, the defendant in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 as the plaintiff in the said suit filed the suit for mere injunction, pleading as hereunder:"it was pleaded that the first defendant is the husband of the second defendant. The plaint schedule properties belong to the father of the plaintiff. He executed a lease deed in respect of the plaint schedule properties on 17. 10. 1981 and received rent of Rs. 3,500/- on the strength of the same, the suit was filed on 16. 11. 1981. " ( 9 ) THE 1st defendant filed written statement, which was adopted by the 2nd defendant-present appellant by filing an adoption memo and stated as hereunder:"bullemma executed a settlement deed on 29. 09. 1981 in respect of Ac 2. 86 cents of land in favour of the second defendant creating vested remainder. 11. 1981. " ( 9 ) THE 1st defendant filed written statement, which was adopted by the 2nd defendant-present appellant by filing an adoption memo and stated as hereunder:"bullemma executed a settlement deed on 29. 09. 1981 in respect of Ac 2. 86 cents of land in favour of the second defendant creating vested remainder. Late Ramanna and his wife Bullemma leased out the plaint schedule properties to one Kotari Gangaraju and the plaintiff was not in possession of the plaint schedule properties. " ( 10) COMMON evidence was recorded in both the suits and the parties herein after would be referred to as arrayed in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 for the purpose of convenience. PWs. 1 to 9, DW1 to 7 were examined. Exs. Al to A10, Ex. B1 to B15 and Ex. C-1 were marked. ( 11 ) ISSUES SETTLED IN BOTH THE SUITS; in O. S. No. 44 of the following issues were settled: 1) Whether the first plaintiff has got title to the schedule property? 2) Whether the settlement deed dated 29. 09. 1981 executed by the first plaintiff in favour of the second plaintiff is valid? 3) Whether the second plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the schedule property from the defendant? 4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to profits from 1981-1982 to 1984-1985? 5) To what relief? ( 12 ) IN O. S. No. 156 of 1987 the following issues were settled: 1) Whether this court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 2) Whether the alleged lease deed dated 16. 10. 1981 is true and genuine? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed for? 4) To what relief? ( 13 ) FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE LEARNED JUDGE: On appreciation of evidence, the learned Judge recorded positive findings in favour of the plaintiffs relating to the validity of Ex. A1 and disbelieved ex. B9. 10. 1981 is true and genuine? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed for? 4) To what relief? ( 13 ) FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE LEARNED JUDGE: On appreciation of evidence, the learned Judge recorded positive findings in favour of the plaintiffs relating to the validity of Ex. A1 and disbelieved ex. B9. Further, a finding had been recorded that the plaint was not amended claiming relief in favour of the second plaintiff by paying separate court fee for the relief of possession and the claims of the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff being distinct, cannot be clubbed together and the first plaintiff had got title to the schedule property during her life time only and beyond that, nothing is left to be inherited by the second plaintiff and in view of the fact that the defendant is in possession of the property, the second plaintiff cannot disturb the possession of the defendant till he is evicted by due process of law. Hence, the appeals are filed as against the judgment and decrees as referred to supra. ( 14 ) ON a careful analysis of the whole factual matrix, it is needless to say that the suit filed by the defendant is only for the limited relief and in the light of the facts and circumstances in both these appeals, the following points that emerge for consideration are: 1) Whether the findings recorded by the learned Judge in relation to Ex. A1 and Ex. 89 are to be disturbed in any way or to be confirmed? 2) Whether the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 are entitled to decree as prayed for? 3) Whether the decree for injunction granted in favour of the defendant in O. S. No. 156 of 1987 be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case? ( 15 ) POINT NOS. 1 AND 2; As stated supra, common evidence was recorded in O. S. No. 44 of 1985. PWs 1 to 9 were examined and exs. Al to A10 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, DWs 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. B1 to B15 were marked. Ex. C-1 also was marked. ( 16 ) WHILE attacking findings relating to the validity of Ex. A1, the learned counsel representing the respondents placed strong reliance on the decisions reported in STATE BANK OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS VS. On behalf of the defendant, DWs 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. B1 to B15 were marked. Ex. C-1 also was marked. ( 16 ) WHILE attacking findings relating to the validity of Ex. A1, the learned counsel representing the respondents placed strong reliance on the decisions reported in STATE BANK OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS VS. BAKSHISH SINGH, 1998 (8) Supreme 128 . KOLLA VENKATESWARLU VS. ABDUL KAREEM and ANOTHER, 2004 (5) ALT 240 . and PANNA LAL VS. STATE BANK OF BOMBAY, AIR 1963 SC 1516 . There cannot be any doubt or controversy that even if independent cross objections had not been filed questioning the adverse findings of a successful party in an appeal preferred by the other party and such party can canvass the validity or otherwise of the adverse findings recorded against him in such an appeal. Even otherwise, the learned counsel representing the appellants in both the appeals would maintain that the findings can be sustained even if whole evidence available on record is re-appreciated by the appellate court independently. It may be appropriate to have a look at the contents on Ex. A1 and Ex. B9. Ex. A1 reads as heteunder: Ex. B. 9 reads as hereunder: ( 17 ) EX. A1 is a registered will. The mam contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that subsequent to Ex. A1 also, substantial properties had been settled in favour of the son and this would throw any amount of suspicion over Ex. A1. In gunneshwar VS. HAREN, AIR 1974 Gauhati 73 it was observed as follows:"the argument of Sri Bhattacharjee that the expression "his property" used in Sections 2 (h) and 59 of the Act means the property owned by the testator on the date of the execution of the will is in a way negatived by the just mentioned decision of the supreme Court. The argument looks devoid of merit otherwise too. It cannot be gain said that an individual has a right to make the will quite in advance of his death and that normally it is so done. I feel quite sanguine that the testator can make a bequest not only of the properties owned by him on the date of the will but also of the properties which he may acquire after that date and before his death. I feel quite sanguine that the testator can make a bequest not only of the properties owned by him on the date of the will but also of the properties which he may acquire after that date and before his death. One can easily visualize a case to illustrate the point, of an affluent childless widower surviving a heart attack and apprehending repetition of it and the possibility of losing his life, taking a decision to make a will respecting his properties in favour of the person who had served him sincerely during the crisis that stared him in the face. Since such a testator is likely to acquire more liquid wealth from the immoveable properties owned by him on the date of the will, as also from the business and profession that he was then engaged in, he obviously cannot predicate on the date of the execution of the will itself what shall be the exact dimensions of his properties, movable and immovables, on the date of his demise. If the argument of Sri Bhattacharjee were to prevail then the testator in the illustrative case would be entitled to make will only in respect of the properties of which he is owner on the date of the execution of the will and not in respect of properties which he may acquire in between that date and the date of his death. The argument of Sri Bhattacharjee in my opinion appears to be self-defeating for Section 59 clearly permits every person of sound mind to make a bequest of the whole of the property that he may happen to own. Therefore, that argument has to be negatived not only from the standpoint that it is not logical because it robs an individual his right to make a will respecting property which he may acquire between the date of the will and his death, but it is also not sustainable on the plain wording of Section 2 (h) and section 59 of the Act. What the two provisions of the law contemplate is that a will can be made in respect of the property which the testator may own on the date of his death, and not necessarily only of the property of which he happens to be the owner on the date he makes the will. What the two provisions of the law contemplate is that a will can be made in respect of the property which the testator may own on the date of his death, and not necessarily only of the property of which he happens to be the owner on the date he makes the will. Wills are in the nature of amhulatory documents not only in the sense that the testators can scrap or amend them at their sweet will but a/so from the standpoint of the fortunes of the legatees thereunder. Their fortunes may dwindle if after the will the testator expends or transfers any part of his cash assets or immoveable and moveable properties, or they may swing up if he acquires more properties of either description. The legislature gives him free and absolute hand in making a bequest of all that he may own at the moment he closes his eyes never to open them again". ( 18 ) MERELY because certain of the properties had been given to the son by Ramanna, that itself cannot be taken as a suspicious circumstance. The husband of Sundaramma was examined as PW1, who had deposed in detail on behalf of the second plaintiff. This witness specifically deposed that the father of the defendant died in the year 1983 and except Ex. A1 will, he had not executed any other will. The will, dated 05. 06. 1983 is a forged one. This witness also deposed that the defendant and his father partitioned their properties through court and items 1 and 2 of the schedule properties fell to the share of the father of the defendant in partition. Son of the defendant filed a partition suit in which, the defendant and his father were parties. This witness also deposed that the father of the defendant executed a settlement deed in the year 1981 or 1982, disposing some of his properties in favour of the defendant. The father of the defendant also bequeathed his house in favour of the defendant. The first plaintiff executed a settlement deed in respect of item No. 3 of the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff reserving life estate in her favour. The father of the defendant also bequeathed his house in favour of the defendant. The first plaintiff executed a settlement deed in respect of item No. 3 of the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff reserving life estate in her favour. This witness also deposed about the filing of the suit in O. S. No. 1132 of 1981 and the first plaintiff and her husband K. Gangaraju filed a suit against the defendant in O. S. No. 1206 of 1981 for the same property. This witness also deposed how the defendant occupied the property. This witness deposed in detail relating to Ex. A1, who were the attestors and who had scribed the document. This witness deposed that Ex. A1-will was executed by P. Ramanna. PW1 ramanna, K. Subbarao and G. Subbarao were present at the time of execution of the document. G. Subrahmanyam was the scribe. Ex. A1 was scribed to the dictation of P. Ramanna. It was read over to him and p. Ramanna affixed his thumb mark in the presence of PW1, attestors and scribe. Subbarao and I. Satyanarayana attested Ex. A1. PWl-scribe and p. Ramanna witnessed the attestors attesting Ex. A1. Ex. A2 is the sale deed, dated 02. 06. 1940. Ex. A3 is the settlement deed, dated 29. 09. 1981 executed by the first plaintiff in favour of the second plaintiff. First plaintiff got the property covered by Ex. A3 from her husband for her maintenance. This witness also deposed that I. Satyanarayana and k. Surya Chandran and himself were present at the time of execution of fx. A3. First plaintiff died after filing of the suit. Ex. A4 is the will executed by the first plaintiff at her house, in the presence of Sub-Registrar. Kandregula Koteswararao, Alluri Ramachandra Rao-the attestors and gunda Rama Krishna Rao were present at the time of execution of Ex. A4. This witness at last deposed about the details in relation to Ex. A4 and ex. A4 is the last will of the first plaintiff. Ex. A5 is the settlement deed, dated 14. 10. 1981 executed by the defendant in favour of Pendurti ramanna. Ex. A6 is the kowl dated 15. 10. 1981 executed by P. Ramanna and the first plaintiff in favour of Kotari Gangaraju. Ex. A7, Ex. A8 and ex. A9 are the land revenue receipts of the schedule land paid by the first plaintiff. Ex. 10. 1981 executed by the defendant in favour of Pendurti ramanna. Ex. A6 is the kowl dated 15. 10. 1981 executed by P. Ramanna and the first plaintiff in favour of Kotari Gangaraju. Ex. A7, Ex. A8 and ex. A9 are the land revenue receipts of the schedule land paid by the first plaintiff. Ex. A1o is the ryot passbook issued in favour of the first plaintiff. This witness was cross-examined at length relating to the other litigations and several suggestions were put to him, which were denied. The elder brother of PW1 was examined as PW2, who deposed about the family affairs and Venkatarao filing the suit and taking away the crop and this witness acting as elder between the parties. This witness was cross- examined. PW-3 deposed about the attestation of the settlement deeds. He had identified the signatures in Ex. A5 and this witness also deposed about the attestation of the lease deed by Ramanna in favour of ganganna and had identified the signature in Ex. A6. This witness was cross-examined and suggestions were denied. The attestor of Ex. A6 was examined as PW4. PW5 is an important witness, who deposed about ramanna executing a will, dated 22. 5. 1976 and this witness attesting the said will. He had identified the signature in Ex. A1-will and this witness deposed that the same was drafted in his presence and he deposed about ramanna giving instructions for drafting the will and the same being read over to Ramanna, himself and the attestors attesting the will and this witness saw the other attestors attesting the will. This witness also deposed that himself and Stayanrayana attested the will in the presence of Ramanna and he witnessed while they were attesting the will and he had seen Ramanna putting his thumb mark in Ex. A1 will. This witness also deposed that pw1 was also present at that time. This witness also deposed about the other attestors and also deposed that Ramanna was hale and healthy at the time of execution of the will. In cross- examination, this witness specifically deposed that N. Dharma Rao- pw1 is not his relative and this witness denied the suggestions. PW6 is yet another attestor in relation to Ex. A1, who had deposed about the details relating to the will. This witness also deposed just on similar lines as deposed by PW5. In cross- examination, this witness specifically deposed that N. Dharma Rao- pw1 is not his relative and this witness denied the suggestions. PW6 is yet another attestor in relation to Ex. A1, who had deposed about the details relating to the will. This witness also deposed just on similar lines as deposed by PW5. This witness was cross-examined in relation to Ex. A3 and suggestions put to him were denied. PW7 is the attestor of Ex. A4, who had clearly deposed about several of the details in relation to the execution of Ex. A4. In his cross-examination, nothing serious had been elicited to discredit this witness PW7. Even otherwise, this document is not in serious controversy, though the validity of Ex. A1 is being seriously assailed. PW8 is the other attestor of Ex. A4-will, who deposed on the same lines as that of PW7. PW9 is the document writer, who had scribed ex. A4-will. As already referred to supra, the will Ex. A4 is not in serious controversy though the validity of Ex. A1 is being seriously assailed. As against this evidence, DW1-defendant in the suit deposed in detail about the family affairs. This witness deposed that his son Sreerama Chandra prasad and his mother (his first wife) filed a suit in O. S. No. 55 of 1973 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kowur against this witness and his father for partition of the joint family properties. Item No. 3 of Ac 2. 86 cents of land was claimed by his father as self acquired and it was deleted for partition. This witness also deposed that his father got this property by a settlement deed from his mother Bullemma. Ex. B4 is the registration extract of settlement deed dated 24. 01. 1954. Ex. B5 is the certified copy of the judgment in O. S. No. 55 of 1973. Ex. B6 is the certified copy of the decree. DW1 also deposed that his father executed a lease deed in his favour in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Ex. B7 is the lease deed, dated 17. 10. 1981. By the date of Ex. B7, DW1 and his father were living as joint family and they were cultivating the properties jointly and after one year from Ex. B7, DW1 continued in possession of the schedule properties as a tenant and paid rent for three years. Ex. B7 is the lease deed, dated 17. 10. 1981. By the date of Ex. B7, DW1 and his father were living as joint family and they were cultivating the properties jointly and after one year from Ex. B7, DW1 continued in possession of the schedule properties as a tenant and paid rent for three years. This witness also deposed that the husband of the second plaintiff obstructed his possession of the schedule properties. Thus, he filed a suit in o. S. No. 1132 of 1981, which was renumbered as O. P. No. 156 of 1987 and obtained injunction against the husband of the second plaintiff. This witness also deposed that his father, his mother (first plaintiff in the suit) and the alleged tenant Gangaraju filed O. S. No. 1206 of 1981 (now numbered as O. S. No. 85 of 1987) against him . This witness further deposed that his father executed a will in his favour. Ex. B9 is the will, dated 5. 6. 1983 and he had no knowledge of Ex. B9 during the lifetime of his father. The scribe of Ex. B9 is no more. In view of Ex. B9, he is the legal heir of his father. This witness also deposed that it is not true to say that his father settled item 3 of the plaint schedule property to his mother (first plaintiff) towards her maintenance. This witness also deposed about certain details relating to the disease of the mother. This witness also deposed that his father executed a will in his favour. Ex. B10 is the will, dated 06. 09. 1967, which is a registered one. The first attestor is no more and all others are alive. This witness also deposed that he is in possession of the plaint schedule lands as a tenant till the death of his father and after that his son. This witness also deposed about the other flocuments Ex. B11 to Ex. B15. Several of the suggestions including the suggestion relating to the validity of the wills had been specifically denied. This witness also deposed that he did not filed Ex. B9 along with his written statement and specifically deposed that it is not true to suggest that Ex. B9 is a forged document. DW2 was examined in relation to ex. B10. DW3 was examined in relation to Ex. C-1. This witness also deposed that he did not filed Ex. B9 along with his written statement and specifically deposed that it is not true to suggest that Ex. B9 is a forged document. DW2 was examined in relation to ex. B10. DW3 was examined in relation to Ex. C-1. This witness deposed that he is the Sarpanch of Venkatapalem Gram Panchayat and he knows pendurti Ramanna and his son Venkatarao. Ex. C-1 is his signature and he signed in the affidavit without going through it and he signed the stamped papers at the request of Venkatarao and he signed in the affidavit at the request of Venkatarao. He signed in the affidavit without going through it and he signed only in one affidavit of Venkatarao and he had gone through the agreement contained in stamp papers and then signed in it. The signature in Ex. B7 is that of this witness. This witness also deposed that he did not see the signatures of Pendurthi Veeraswami and thumb mark of Pendurthi Ramanna in Ex. B7. Veeraswami is the brother of ramanna. The signature in Ex. B9 is not that of this witness. Inala sriramulu is the son of his brother. Pendurthi Suryarao is Ramanna s brother s son. This witness also deposed that it is not true to suggest that he attested Ex. B9 and this witness also deposed that it is not true to suggest that he gave affidavit in O. S. No. 132 of 1981 in favour of venkatarao. DW4 is said to be the attestor of Ex. B9, who deposed that he attested Exb9. Pendurthi Suryarao, himself, Duggirala venkateswararao and DW3 attested Ex. B9. The contents of Ex. B9 were read over to him and he do not remember whether Pendurthi Ramanna affixed his thumb mark in Ex. B9. This is the nature of evidence, which had been let in relation to Ex. B9. DW5 is the attestor of Ex. Blo. DW6 deposed that Pendurthi Venkatarao is cultivating about Ac 4. 00 of land for the last 15 years and certain other details. DW7 is yet another witness who had identified his signatures in Ex. B9 and he deposed that he is the first attestor. This witness deposed that Ramanna called him to his house. He told him that he was executing a will. Pattabhi Ramayya, Inala sreeramulu, Inala Sarraju and Duggirala Venkateswsarao were present at that time. DW7 is yet another witness who had identified his signatures in Ex. B9 and he deposed that he is the first attestor. This witness deposed that Ramanna called him to his house. He told him that he was executing a will. Pattabhi Ramayya, Inala sreeramulu, Inala Sarraju and Duggirala Venkateswsarao were present at that time. Pattabhi Ramayya is the scribe of the will. The will was read over to Ramanna. They saw Ramanna affixing his thumb mark in the will. Ramanna witnessed these witnesses attesting the will. This witness was cross-examined and suggestions put to this witness had been denied. ( 19 ) EXCEPT the evidence of DW7, there is no other evidence forthcoming in relation to Ex. B9. The learned judge recorded reasons in detail and several of the circumstances, which would come to show that this document Ex. B9 was brought into existence only with a view to defeat ( 20 ) RELIANCE was placed on certain decisions in relation to the appreciation of evidence while deciding the genuineness or otherwise of a will reported in RABINDRA NATH MUKHERJEE AND ANOTHER VS. PANCHANAN BANERJEE (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS, 1995 (4) SCC 459 . and VRINDAVANIBAI SAMBHAJI MANE VERSUS RAMCHANDRA vithal GANESHKAR AND OTHERS, 1995 (5) SCC 215 . There cannot be any quarrel relating to the propositions laid down in the said decisions in relation to the appreciation of evidence and also the proof required in relation to the execution of a will. ( 21 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the whole evidence available on record, this court is of the considered opinion that though the findings recorded by the learned Judge are not happily worded, this court is of the considered opinion that in relation to the validity of Ex. A1, inasmuch as the very fact of the execution of Ex. A1 by way of a registered document had been referred to in Ex. B9 and also in the light of the clear evidence available relating to the due attestation and due execution of Ex. A1, the said findings are to be confirmed. As far as Ex. B9 is concerned, the evidence available on record is so shaky. Even the evidence of DW7 would not inspire any confidence especially in the light of the reasons recorded by the learned Judge in detail in relation to the suspicious circumstances. It is needless to say that Ex. A1, the said findings are to be confirmed. As far as Ex. B9 is concerned, the evidence available on record is so shaky. Even the evidence of DW7 would not inspire any confidence especially in the light of the reasons recorded by the learned Judge in detail in relation to the suspicious circumstances. It is needless to say that Ex. B9 is an unregistered document. It is no doubt true that by mere registation of a will by itself, it cannot be said that more weight may have to be attached to such a document. But definitely, it is a circumstance to be taken into consideration while evaluating the whole evidence available on record and especially where there are competing claims, one under a registered will and yet another under an unregistered will. Be that as it may, it is suffice to state that on appreciation of the evidence available on record, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned Judge has arrived at the correct conclusion in upholding the validity of Ex. A1 and negativing the validity of Ex. B9. Accordingly, the said findings are hereby confirmed. ( 22 ) TO WHAT RELIEF: It is surprising that having re corded positive findings, ultimately, the suit for recovery of possession and the other incidental reliefs had been dismissed on the ground that either the same is pre mature or separate Court fee had been paid or a separate suit has to be filed and also on the ground that the relief prayed for is by both the plaintiffs i. e. , a life interest holder and the vested remainder. Hence, the appellant-second plaintiff to be non-suited. It is needless to say that the mother of the first plaintiff is no more. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that clear evidence is available in relation to Ex. Hence, the appellant-second plaintiff to be non-suited. It is needless to say that the mother of the first plaintiff is no more. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that clear evidence is available in relation to Ex. A1, this court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 are bound to succeed and hence, the suit is liable to be decreed as prayed for It is needless to say that the relief, which had been prayed for by P. Venkata Rao-plaintiff in yet another suit in O. S. No. 156 of 1987 is only for injunction and decree granted was till he is are evicted under due process of law, inasmuch as the mam relief of recovery of possession and other reliefs in O. S. No. 44 of 1985 are being granted. The relief granted in o. S. No. 156 of 1987 is liable to be negatived and accordingly the said suit is hereby dismissed ( 23 ) ACCORDINGLY, both the appeals are hereby allowed. Despite the long drawn litigation, in view of the fact that the dispute appears to be between the blood brother and the blood sister, this coutt makes no order as to costs in these appeals