Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This writ petition relates to appointment of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (for short L.P.G.) distributorship for Mahua in the district of Vaishali. 2. According to the writ petition, the respondent-Corporation had published an advertisement on 2-6-1998 for the said purpose which could not make headway and was abandoned. The Corporation published the second advertisement for the same purpose which was published in the local dailies on 28-8-2000 (Annexure-1), was really in continuation of the earlier advertisement because of reference of the earlier one in the present one and shall be referred to at the >appropriate stage. The petitioner, respondent No. 5, and others applied for the same Call letters for interview were issued on 6-11-2003, and the select list was published on 27-11-2003 wherein respondent No. 5 figured at serial No. 1, and the petitioner at serial No. 2. It is further stated in the Writ petition that the petitioner submitted his complaint on 5-12-2003 to the Corporation (Annexure-7) which has remained unattended till date. Field inspection was completed and the letter of intent was issued to respondent No. 5 on 20-8-2004 (Annexure-A to the counter affidavit of respondent No. 5). Feeling aggrieved by the selection process as well as the inaction of the respondent authorities as to his complaint, the petitioner has preferred the writ petition. 3. The two sets of respondents have filed their separate counter affidavits wherein they have supported the impugned action. 4. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the terms and conditions of the advertisement, the candidate has to be a permanent resident of the revenue district wherein the place is situate. Village-Mahua is situate in the district of Vaishali and, therefore, respondent No. 5 has to be resident of the said district, whereas respondent No. 5 is a resident of Patna and has tenuous connection with the district of Vaishali. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Hajipur. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) -, Anil Kumar Singh V/s. Union of India and Ors. (ii) - (Bhagwan Dass and Anr. V/s. Kamal Abrol and Ors.). The petitioner is a permanent resident of Hajipur. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) -, Anil Kumar Singh V/s. Union of India and Ors. (ii) - (Bhagwan Dass and Anr. V/s. Kamal Abrol and Ors.). He next submitted that respondent No. 5 had already started working since January 2005, ineligible persons cannot be permitted to operate and, therefore, the dealership may be directed to be granted to the petitioner for which he is prepared to suitably compensate respondent No. 5 as per the assessment of the respondent Corporation. Power of judicial review should be exercised in the interest of justice. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in - , Para 9 (Babubhai Muljibhai Patel V/s. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Ors.) and 2000 (1) PLJR 935, Para 8 (Tej Pratap Singh V/s. The Union of India and Ors.). He also submitted that the petitioner is more qualified than respondent No. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 5 has submitted that the petitioner is himself ineligible to apply because the petitioners full brother is a licensee from the respondent Corporation for L.P.G. distributorship for the place Ebrahimpur Beura, district Muzaffarpur, in the handicapped category. He relies on the judgment reported in 2000 (2) PLJR 475 : AIR 2000 Pat 229 (Kaushal Kishore V/s. The Union of India and Ors.). He next submitted that the issue relating to residence raised by the petitioner involves tangled questions of facts which cannot be adjudicated on the basis of affidavits in writ jurisdiction. He has also made strenuous efforts to explain the documents relied on by the petitioner to establish that the petitioner is not a resident of Mahua. He also submitted that the petitioner is a fraud, has obtained certificates for residence for Muzaffarpur, Vaishali, Darbhanga and Patna. He has not approached this Court with clean hands. He next submitted that the petitioner has created a network of such agencies spread over the districts of Vaishali and Muzaffarpur which is running in the names of family members and/or staff. He lastly submitted that respondent No. 5 has made investments and has started operating since January 2005, The petitioner is also guilty of not approaching the respondent authorities in time, thereby allowing the petitioners right to be firmly entrenched. He relies on the judgment in Kaushal Kishore (supra) (Paragraphs 16 and 17). 6. Mr. He lastly submitted that respondent No. 5 has made investments and has started operating since January 2005, The petitioner is also guilty of not approaching the respondent authorities in time, thereby allowing the petitioners right to be firmly entrenched. He relies on the judgment in Kaushal Kishore (supra) (Paragraphs 16 and 17). 6. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 4, has supported the impugned action. He submitted that the power of judicial review with respect to such commercial decisions are very limited. He relies on the following reported judgments : (i) 2000 (1) PLJR 935, (Tej Pratap Singh V/s. Union of India and Ors.). (ii) - (K. Vinod Kumar V/s. S. Palanisamy and Ors.). (iii) 2005 (3) PLJR 97 : AIR 2005 SC 2299 , Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. 6.1 He next submitted that the petitioners complaint dated 5-12-2003, (Annexure-7) was confined to the question of correctness and description of lands sought to be made available by respondent No. 5. Clause 2 (Chha) has to He interpreted in a manner so that the handicapped persons are not excluded from consideration. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in - , (Mahinder Kumar Gupta and Ors. V/s. Union of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas). He next submitted that the person who asserts change of domicile must prove it. The test of residence has been laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in -, (Kedar Pandey V/s. Narain Bikram Sah). He next submitted that the petitioner never approached the Corporation with the issue raised herein. He lastly submitted that respondent No. 5 has made heavy investment and has started operating since January 2005. 7. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. The initial advertisement was published on 2-6-1998 (Annexure-W), which could not be pursued and was followed by the present advertisement dated 28-8-2000 (Annexure-1) which, inter alia, stated that the eligibility of a candidate would be as on the date of the previous application. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. The initial advertisement was published on 2-6-1998 (Annexure-W), which could not be pursued and was followed by the present advertisement dated 28-8-2000 (Annexure-1) which, inter alia, stated that the eligibility of a candidate would be as on the date of the previous application. Clause "Chha" of the advertisement (Annexure-1) is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : The petitioner applied for Mahua, district Vaishali, and his full brother (Sanjay Kumar Singh) had under the same advertisement applied for Ibrahimpur Beura, district Muzaffarpur, reserved for the physically handicapped persons which was granted to the latter which he is running in the name and style of Pranati Indane Gas Service, Maithi Chowk, Ibrahimpur, Beura, district Muzaffarpur. This position is admitted in paragraph No. 4 of the petitioners rejoinder. The petitioner has, however, taken the plea that disqualification clause is not attracted in the present case because his brother has been granted dealership reserved for the handicapped persons. The issue is covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahinder Kumar Gupta V/s. Union of India 1994 AIR SCW 5139 (supra), the relevant portion of Paragraph No. 5 of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : ...One of the eligibility criteria is that one among the near relations or partners or associates, in other words, among a named group of persons, alone should have dealership and there should not be any concentration by them in the distribution of its petroleum products through the dealership. The guidelines further intend to prevent frustration of the State policy by process of legal ingenuity or subterfuge. One of the criteria is relationship. The relationship criteria has been prescribed to see that the persons who already had one dealership should not apply so that the above objectives of the Constitution are achieved. In Part III, Clause (b) of the relationship category, a person from among specified near relatives has been made ineligible to apply for another dealership to any of the nationalised oil companies. The petitioner/appellants dehors the guidelines have no independent right to have business or avocation in the distribution or production or ownership of one of the petroleum products. Production and distribution of the petroleum products are the exclusive monopoly of the State under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. The petitioner/appellants dehors the guidelines have no independent right to have business or avocation in the distribution or production or ownership of one of the petroleum products. Production and distribution of the petroleum products are the exclusive monopoly of the State under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. The Government of India intended to group together certain near relations as a unit and one among that unit alone was made eligible to apply for and claim for grant of dealdership. Further, economic and social justice as envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution is sought to be achieved. Therefore, there is a reasonable nexus between the object and the prescription of the eligibility criteria envisaged in the guidelines. All those who satisfy the eligibility criteria alone are entitled to apply for the consideration of the grant of dealership. It is true that in case of physically handicapped persons, only three classes of persons were made ineligible. Physically handicapped persons have been treated as a class by themselves. Under these circumstances, any other person other than PH, cannot claim parity with PH persons. As far as partnership is concerned, if one of the persons either have a dealdership or relations who were found to be eligible under the relationship criteria, and had the dealership, then Clause 10 of the said guidelines gets attracted and such partnership also did not become eligible to apply for dealdership/distributorship. The object of Clause 10 appears to be that for those partners who either one among themselves or any of the relations of one of the partners had a dealership, the other partner or the specified relations also not be eligible to apply for grant of dealership individually or as a member of the partnership. Therefore, the guidelines are based on public policy to give effect to the constitutional creed of Part IV of the Indian Constitution. It is thus manifest that the petitioner is disqualified because of grant of dealership to his brother under the handicapped category. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, I do not find substance in the petitioners contention that is not disqualified because his brother has been granted dealership in the reserved category of handicapped persons. It is thus manifest that the petitioner is disqualified because of grant of dealership to his brother under the handicapped category. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, I do not find substance in the petitioners contention that is not disqualified because his brother has been granted dealership in the reserved category of handicapped persons. The position may perhaps have been different had the situation been the other way round, namely, a handicapped person were sought to be disqualified on the ground that his brother not being a handicapped person was granted dealership. The clause perhaps has to operate in such a manner that handicapped persons should not be deprived of the benefit of dealership. In view of the position that the latter situation does not obtain in the present case, we refrain from expressing ourselves conclusively on this point. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both the brothers were applicants under the same advertisement and, therefore, neither of them was ineligible at the time of submission of the application. In other words, they were not aware whether any one of them or both of them would be granted or denied the dealership. The contention is stated only to be rejected. The disqualification clause has been inserted to prevent concentration of dealerships in one family or one group. The same subserve the preamble and the directive principles of the State policy. Law is well settled that a person may incur a disqualification during the course of the selection process also. 9. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. 10. This, however, does not conclude matters. Elaborate submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner that respondent No. 5 is not a resident of Mahua and is instead a resident of Patna. The advertisement itself says that the residents of the revenue district of the concerned place are alone eligible to apply. There is no material on record to show that this issue was examined by the Corporation. In an effort to establish that respondent No. 5 is a resident of Patna, the petitioner has in his pleadings incorporated a lot of materials which he has summarised as follows in his written submissions : The Respondent No. 5 permanently resides at Mohalla-E/1 Bankmens colony, Chitragupta Nagar (Kankarbagh), Patna. In an effort to establish that respondent No. 5 is a resident of Patna, the petitioner has in his pleadings incorporated a lot of materials which he has summarised as follows in his written submissions : The Respondent No. 5 permanently resides at Mohalla-E/1 Bankmens colony, Chitragupta Nagar (Kankarbagh), Patna. The details thereof are as follows : (i) Identity Card dated 25-5-95 issued by the Election Commission. (ii) Order form dated 26-7-2003 for post paid Cellular connection from BSNL. (iii) Insurance policy premium of L.I.C., Patna Division for 1996 and 2001. (iv) Income Tax return form for N/S. Sat Sal Sales for 2003-04 at Patna Address. (v) Pass Book issued by SBI, Kankarbagh Branch, Patna. (vi) Voter list (2004) of Patna Parliamentary Seat (vii) Annual return of Syringa Agro Exports Pvt. Ltd. Annexure-8 Series/Page 4 Suppl. Affidavit of petitioner. (viii) The children of Respondent No. 5 are getting education in Patna. 11. The issue relating to residence of a person has been the subject-matter of a large number of judgments of Courts including that of the Supreme Court in Kedar Pandey V/s. Narain Bikram Sah AIR 1966 SC 160 (supra). 11.1 The question of residence in the context of grant of L.P.G. distributorship fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass V/s. Kamal Abrol AIR 2005 SC 2583 (supra), Paragraph 11 of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : 11. From the aforesaid analysis it is apparent that the word residence is generally understood as referring to a person in connection with the place where he lives, and may be defined as one who resides in a place or one who dwells in a place for a considerable period of time as distinguished from one who merely works in a certain locality or comes casually for a visit and the place of work or the place of casual visit are different from the place of residence. There are two classifications of the meaning of the word residence. First is in the form of permanent and temporary residence and the second classification is based on de facto and de jure residence. The de facto concept of residence can also be understood clearly by the meaning of the word residence as given in the Black Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. First is in the form of permanent and temporary residence and the second classification is based on de facto and de jure residence. The de facto concept of residence can also be understood clearly by the meaning of the word residence as given in the Black Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. It is given that the word residence means bodily presence as an inhabitant to a given place. Thus de facto residence is also to be understood as the place where one regularly resides as different to the places where he is connected to by mere ancestral connections or political connections or connection by marriage. 11.2 The issue was also discussed in the judgment of this Court in Anil Kumar Singh V/s. Union of India - (supra), Paragraphs 6 and 6.5 of which are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : 6. This takes me on to another important aspect of the matter, namely, the value to be attached to the factual position that the family owns certain landed property at village Babura particularly in view of the conclusion arrived at hereinabove that the family does not live there and has permanently shifted to Patna. Learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No. 7 have relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in - (Union of India V/s. Dudh Nath Prasad). On a perusal of the judgment, it appears to me that the judgment really supports the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that landed property is not a factor to determine the residence of a person. 6.5. It is thus manifest from the line of cases discussed hereinabove that continuous living at a particular place is the most important factor to determine the residence of a person. Occasional visits to look after properties, occasional visits to the place of origin, the attend to social function or for treatment are not relevant factors to determine the residence of a person. In that view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that respondent No. 7 is permanently living in Patna with her family for various reasons including the education of children. It is further clear that the husband and the father-in-law of respondent No. 7 hailed from Babura where they have ancestral property, taut there is no evidence on record to show that they live there at all. It is further clear that the husband and the father-in-law of respondent No. 7 hailed from Babura where they have ancestral property, taut there is no evidence on record to show that they live there at all. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the selection of respondent No. 7 for the dealership in question is in violation of one of the conditions of the advertisement and is hereby set aside. 11.3 In that view of the matter, the respondent Corporation is hereby directed to ensure a detailed investigation of the issue relating to residence of respondent No. 5 as per the terms and conditions of the advertisement and they shall be guided by the law laid down by the Courts in the aforesaid judgments. In view of the position that the petitioner has collected a lot of materials to establish that respondent No. 5 originally belonged to Mahua where he owns lands, but has for all practical purposes shifted to Patna. The Corporation would be well advised to seek his assistance so that respondent No. 5 does not engage himself in suppression of facts. 12. The materials on record prima facie create an impression that the petitioner is hit by the following clause occurring in the advertisement: The Corporation should examine the applicability of this clause in the case of respondent No. 5 as per the established procedure and with the assistance of the petitioner. 13. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.