ORDER 1.Leave granted. 2. The appellant was born on 1-9-1929. A notice of retirement was given on 15-5-1984 that the appellant would retire on 31-8-1984 upon attaining the age of superannuation. On 28-9-1984, a circular was issued by the State Government extending the age of retirement with effect from the date of the circular for a further period of three years. 3. Seeking to take advantage of the circular, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court inter alia claiming that he was entitled to the benefit of the circular. The ground for this claim was twofold. The appellant claimed that he was born after 3.00 p.m. on 1-9-1929 and, therefore, it should be taken that he was actually born on 2-9-1929. The second ground was that the rule which prescribed the calculation of the age of retirement was ultra vires the Constitution. 4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition relying upon the decision of this Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of Rajasthan1• The Division Bench dismissed the appellants appeal on the basis of the same judgment. The appellants application for review was also rejected. 5. Before us, the appellant has contended that the review application was improperly rejected on the misconception that the challenge to the constitutionality of the retirement rules had not been raised before the learned Single Judge. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the learned Single Judge from which it is apparent that the challenge had been raised in the writ petition itself. The rule in question is contained in a Note introduced by the Rajasthan Service (Amendment) Rules, 1975. The Note reads as follows: "Note.-A government servant whose date of birth is the first of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of fifty-five years." 6. The contention of the appellant is that there was no reason to discriminate between a person born on the 1 st of a month and a person born on any subsequent date of that month for the purpose of giving such person the benefit of service till the end of that particular month. 7. The contention of the appellant is that there was no reason to discriminate between a person born on the 1 st of a month and a person born on any subsequent date of that month for the purpose of giving such person the benefit of service till the end of that particular month. 7. In support of this submission, the Indian Majority Act, 1875 has been referred to where according to the appellant, it was clear that the majority was to be calculated with effect from the date of birth and not from the date preceding. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has stated that even though the challenge to the Rules may have been made before the Single Judge, nevertheless, it was not argued before the Division Bench and that this was recorded in the decision of the Division Bench. On the merits, it is submitted that the decision in Prabhu Dayal Sesma1 made it amply clear that the age of superannuation was to be calculated up to the date preceding the date of birth. It has also been submitted that the reference to the Majority Act was inapposite as that Act dealt with the commencement of the age of majority and, therefore, the actual date of birth was taken as the first date of majority. 9. In our opinion, the High Court had clearly erred in recording that the issue regarding the constitutionality of the Note in question as quoted by us earlier had been raised only pending the appeal by way of amendment. The appellant is right to the extent that the issue had in fact been raised even before the learned Single Judge. 10. However, we are unable to sustain the challenge to the retirement of the appellant on either of the grounds urged. As far as the first ground is concerned, that is a question of fact which this Court will not go into and in any event, it has not been pressed before this Court. Emphasis has been placed on the second ground. It is clear that the age of superannuation refers to the age of completion of a period of service. The attainment of majority on the other hand relates to the beginning of the age of majority. Emphasis has been placed on the second ground. It is clear that the age of superannuation refers to the age of completion of a period of service. The attainment of majority on the other hand relates to the beginning of the age of majority. Clearly, therefore, the date of completion and the date of beginning cannot be taken to be the same as the object of the two provisions are disparate. 11. In the decision in Prabhu Dayal Sesmal the rule in question prescribed that the candidate should have attained the age of 21 years but not 28 years on the 1st day of January next following. The last date for receipt of the application was 1-1-1984. The question was whether a person born on 2-1-1956 would attain 28 years on 2-1-1984 or on 1-1-1984. This Court held: (SCC pp. 63-64, para 9) "In calculating a persons age, the day of his birth must be counted as a whole day and he attains the specified age on the day preceding the anniversary of his birthday. We have to apply well-accepted rules for computation of time. One such rule is that fractions of a day will be omitted in computing a period of time in years or months in the sense that a fraction of a day will he treated as a full day. A legal day commences at 12 oclock midnight and continues until the same hour the following night. There is a popular misconception that a person does (sic not) attain a particular age unless and until he has completed a given number of years. In the absence of any express provision, it is well settled that any specified age in law is to be computed as having been attained on the day preceding the anniversary of the birthday." 12. In that view of the matter, the distinction is not between the person born on 1 st of any month and on any of the other days of that month but it relates to the question when the person attains the age of superannuation. A person who is born on the 1st of a month completes the age of superannuation the day before he was born. A person who is born on the 1st of a month completes the age of superannuation the day before he was born. He is in a different class from those who complete the age of superannuation during the next succeeding month by reason of their birth on any day from the 2nd of that month a onward. 13. In that view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.