( 1 ) BRIEF facts :- Both the appellants-defendants and respondent- plaintiff in O. S. No. 161/83 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Tanuku, challenged the decree and Judgment of the trial Court by way of a regular appeal and cross-objections, the appellants-defendants questioning the granting of very enhanced maintenance and the respondent-plaintiff questioning that the relief as prayed for should have been granted instead of granting the relief only in part. This is the claim of an old lady praying for enhancement of maintenance in view of the altered and changed circumstances and as already referred to supra, the relief was granted in part and aggrieved by the same, both parties are questioning the said Decree and Judgment on several grounds by way of appeal and cross-objections respectively (for the purpose of convenience the parties would be referred to as plaintiff and defendants as arrayed in the original suit ). ( 2 ) THE plaintiff instituted the suit aforesaid for recovery of rs. 10,000/- towards enhanced maintenance from January, 1983 being the value of 100 bags of paddy at Rs. 100/- per bag and for future enhanced maintenance at 100 bags per year in addition to the maintenance of Rs. 190/- per year already granted and to create a charge over the plaint a schedule property. The learned Judge on appreciation of evidence decreed the suit in part for Rs. 7,900/- towards maintenance for January, 1983 and future maintenance at rs. 7,900/- and the rest of the suit claim is dismissed without costs and charge over the schedule property was created for recovery of enhanced maintenance. Hence, the appeal and cross-objections. ( 3 ) CONTENTIONS of Sri Kodandaram:- sri Kodandaram, the learned Counsel representing the appellants-certain of the defendants made the following submissions:- the learned Counsel maintained that the trial Court had not appreciated the oral and documentary evidence properly and had erred in enhancing the maintenance amount from Rs. 190/- to Rs. 7,900/- per year without any acceptable material in this regard. The learned counsel also maintained that even otherwise the plaintiff is able to maintain herself and in the light of the same, on the ground of altered and changed circumstances, granting enhanced maintenance cannot be sustained. 190/- to Rs. 7,900/- per year without any acceptable material in this regard. The learned counsel also maintained that even otherwise the plaintiff is able to maintain herself and in the light of the same, on the ground of altered and changed circumstances, granting enhanced maintenance cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the prior Decree in O. S. No. 348/1945 is a compromise decree and inasmuch as the said decree was made with the consent of the parties, the plaintiff is barred from maintaining the present suit on the ground of altered or charged circumstances. The learned Counsel while elaborating his submissions had taken this Court through the terms and conditions of the compromise decree and would maintain that in the light of the same, the decree cannot be sustained. However, the learned Counsel would maintain that even otherwise the enhanced maintenance granted is on higher side and in view of the conditional order made by this Court, the quantum can be restricted to only Rs. 6,000/- per annum at the best and not beyond thereto. Reliance also was placed on certain decisions. ( 4 ) CONTENTIONS of Sri Veeraswamy:- sri Veeraswamy, the learned Counsel representing the plaintiff made the following submissions:- the learned Counsel had pointed out that the altered or changed circumstances definitely can be taken note of and this Court also can take judicial notice of the abnormal enhanced cost of living. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court through the different provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and also the prior Law governing maintenance amongst hindus and would contend that in the light of the terms and conditions entered into in the compromise decree, at any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the plaintiff is either precluded or barred from claiming enhanced maintenance. The learned Counsel also had pointed out to the specific grounds raised in the Memorandum of Cross-Objections and would contend that the plaintiff is a good old lady, aged about 80 years, who needs assistance and who is suffering with certain ailments. The learned Counsel also pointed out that instead of decreeing the suit in terms of money, the learned Judge could have decreed the suit as prayed for in terms of paddy @ 100 bags per year. The learned Counsel also pointed out that instead of decreeing the suit in terms of money, the learned Judge could have decreed the suit as prayed for in terms of paddy @ 100 bags per year. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the historical back-ground of the litigation and under what circumstances the compromise was entered into in 1945. The learned Counsel also in detail explained the properties relating to which the charge has been created and the status of the family and other attendant circumstances and had pointed out to the findings recorded by the learned Judge and would contend that having recorded positive findings, the learned Judge should have granted the relief as prayed for instead of reducing and fixing it as at Rs. 7,900/ -. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions. ( 5 ) AVERMENTS made in the plaint:- the plaintiff pleaded in the plaint as hereunder:- the plaintiff s husband Bulli Raju and Sirigina balaramanna of Velvenu are the sons of Akkayya. They constituted Hindu Joint Family having considered immovable properties including the scheduled properties. Bulliraju died intestate prior to 1945 and Balaramanna died subsequently. D. 1 is the son of late Balaramanna. The wife of 2nd defendant and the defendants 3 to 6 are the daughters of late Balaramanna. The 1st defendant was adopted by Venkanna. The 7th defendant is the son of late krishna Veni and the 2nd defendant. The defendants 8 to 10 are the L. Rs. , and heirs of 3rd defendant. All the defendants are liable to pay the suit claim from out of the income from the scheduled properties inherited through late balaramanna. The family of the plaintiff s husband and his brother owned about 30 acres during 1944. Their family was having houses, cattle, cash and other wealth. The plaintiff s husband died intestate as an undivided member of the joint family consisting of himself and the 1st defendant s father. Late Balaramanna got all the property of the joint family by survivership. Plaintiff filed O. S. No. 348/45 in d. M. C. , Tanuku, for maintenance and at the time the rate of paddy per bag was Rs. 3/ -. The necessities of the plaintiff and the style of life of the plaintiff was very limited. Late Balaramanna got all the property of the joint family by survivership. Plaintiff filed O. S. No. 348/45 in d. M. C. , Tanuku, for maintenance and at the time the rate of paddy per bag was Rs. 3/ -. The necessities of the plaintiff and the style of life of the plaintiff was very limited. Even though she belonged to a higher state of family, because the goods and amenities are rate in those days. The plaintiff compromised with the 1st defendant s father in o. S. No. 348/45 of D. M. C. , Tanuku, agreeing to take the maintenance amount at Rs. 190/- per year, taking into consideration the prevailing necessity style of life, the income from the lands and the value of the paddy. A charge over the schedule property was created for payment of the maintenance amount. The plaintiff has been receiving maintenance at that rate. Under the present day circumstance of life style, necessity and standard of living and the age of the plaintiff the maintenance of Rs. 190/- is very meager It will not be sufficient to maintain herself even for few days. The plaintiff needs an assistant, as she is not keeping good health in addition to medical aid. She requires the value of 100 bags per year at least taking into consideration the family status, needs of the plaintiff and the present day standards of life. There are so many material changes since 1945. The income and the value of the then joint family properties increased by hundred times by raising sugarcane and high yielding variety of paddy crops and number of crops in an year. The expenditure of the plaintiff has been increasing by number of times. There is abnormal raise interest cost of living. The properties of plaintiff s husband and late balaramanna are in the hands of the defendant. They have been enjoying the income from these lands. They used offer maintenance at Rs. 190/- per year and the plaintiff took maintenance up to 1982 under protest. She demanded the defendant on 19th January to pay maintenance at the rate of 100 bags per year. When the defendant offers to pay maintenance at Rs. 190/- in 1983, the plaintiff refused to receive such maintenance. Then the plaintiff got issued a registered notice to the defendants demanding the maintenance at 100 bags per year. She demanded the defendant on 19th January to pay maintenance at the rate of 100 bags per year. When the defendant offers to pay maintenance at Rs. 190/- in 1983, the plaintiff refused to receive such maintenance. Then the plaintiff got issued a registered notice to the defendants demanding the maintenance at 100 bags per year. The defendants got issued a reply and they refused to pay maintenance as claimed by the plaintiff. " ( 6 ) AVERMENTS made in the written statement:- the written statement filed by the 1st defendant was adopted by defendants 4, 5, 6, 8 to 10 and it was pleaded in the written statement as hereunder:- "several of the allegations were specifically denied. It was pleaded that the plaintiff has to prove that the plaintiff s husband family owned Ac. 30-00 of land, cattle etc. The 1st defendant does not know that the plaintiff s husband died as a joint family member. R. S. No. 43/10 does not belong to the joint family. R. S. No. 41/12 is not shown in the revenue records. In 1970 Balaramanna exchanged the land in R. S. No. 39/6 with Ac. 0. 58 cents in R. S. No. 41/6 of sirigina Satyanarayana. The allegation that the value of paddy was Rs. 3/- in 1945 is not true. It is true that the plaintiff filed O. S. No. 348/45 for maintenance and maintenance of Rs. 190/- per year is granted as per the compromise decree. The above annual maintenance of rs. 190/- was granted taking into consideration Ac. 30-00 of land, house, cattle, cash etc. , and the claiming of maintenance at 100 bags, taking into consideration the scheduled properties is unreasonable and unjustified. The plaintiff received maintenance at Rs. 190/-per year till 1983 and there is no justification to refuse to receive the said maintenance thereafter. The same rates are prevailing since last 10 to 15 years. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim maintenance either on facts or under law. The plaintiff does not require any assistant. Her relatives have been looking after her with great affection and free of cost. As per the plaint averments, the plaintiff is aged about 45 years. She is hale and healthy. She does not require any medicines. The 1st defendant was aged about 47 years, but not 40 years as shown in the plaint. Her relatives have been looking after her with great affection and free of cost. As per the plaint averments, the plaintiff is aged about 45 years. She is hale and healthy. She does not require any medicines. The 1st defendant was aged about 47 years, but not 40 years as shown in the plaint. As per the estimate of the 1st defendant. The plaintiff is aged about 60 years. The allegation that the income of the joint family is increased by hundred times is not true. The plaintiff cannot claim maintenance more than what was granted to her under the decree. The plaintiff owns Ac. 1-92 cents in R. S. No. 190/1 of mortha village. The plaintiff has been raising commercial crops and getting huge income from her land. She also owns a tiled house bearing Door No. 4/18 worth Rs. 1 lakh in mortha village. She has been doing money-lending business to a tune of Rs. 2 lakhs and she has been getting huge interest. There is no cause of action to the suit. The court fee paid is not correct. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim past maintenance of Rs. 10,000. 00. " ( 7 ) ISSUES settled by the trial Court:- on the strength of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by the trial Court:- 1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for Rs. 10,000/- towards past maintenance? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the enhancement of maintenance of a rate of 100 bags per year? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to charge over the scheduled properties? 4) To what relief? ( 8 ) ORAL evidence:- The plaintiff examined herself as P. W. 1 and also P. W. 2- V. Durgamma and P. W. 3 - Karuturi Satyanarayana were examined. Likewise, the 1st defendant examined himself as D. W. I, and D. W. 2 - Burugupalli Lakshmipathi and D. W. 3 - Edupuganti satyanarayana were examined. ( 9 ) DOCUMENTARY evidence:- The following documents were marked as ex. A series and ex. B series:- for plaintiff:- ex. A. 1/22-11-45 :- Certified copy of plaint in O. S. No. 348/45 on the file of District Munsif Court, Tanuku. Ex. A. 2/8-8-46 :- Certified copy of compromise decree in o. S. No. 348/45 on the file of District Munsif Court, Tanuku. Ex. A series and ex. B series:- for plaintiff:- ex. A. 1/22-11-45 :- Certified copy of plaint in O. S. No. 348/45 on the file of District Munsif Court, Tanuku. Ex. A. 2/8-8-46 :- Certified copy of compromise decree in o. S. No. 348/45 on the file of District Munsif Court, Tanuku. Ex. A. 3/0-1-83 :- Copy registered notice issued by plaintiff to the defendants. Ex. A. 4/3-11-83 :- Reply registered notice issued by the defendants to the plaintiff. For Defendant:- ex. B. 1/10-5-57 :- Registration extract of settlement deed executed by Karuturi Kotamma in favour of Edupuganti Anasuya ex. B. 2/ :- No. 2 Adangal relating to Nadupalli village for F. 1402 ex. B. 3/ :- Voters List of 1993 Mortha village ex. B. 4 :- Entry in Ex. B. 3 - Voters List. ( 10 ) FINDINGS recorded by the trial Court:-_the learned Judge after appreciating the whole evidence available on record, recorded a finding that the separate income of the widow in awarding maintenance cannot be taken into consideration relying upon mt. EKRADESHWARI BAHUUASTIN SAHEBA v. MOMESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, AIR 1929 P. C. , 128. PATURI VEERAYYA AND ANOTHER v. PATURI CHELLAMMA, AIR 1939 Madras, 37. and AMMIREDDI RAMAMOORTY (DIED) AND OTHERS v. AMMIREDDI SITHARAMAMMA AND OTHERS, AIR 1961 A. P. 131 and also recorded a finding that the quantum of maintenance to be determined basing upon the income from the property of the deceased husband of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that though the contention of the plaintiff is that the husband s family owns more than Acs. 30-00 of land, as per Ex. A. 3 charge was created on Ac. 5-88 cents and hence, the joint family by the date of passing of the compromise decree owned about Ac. 5-88 cents of land. A further finding had been recorded that it is necessary to record a finding whether item No. 2 belongs to Anasuya s mother, who in turn executed Ex. B. 1 in favour of Anasuya or not and without considering that question proceeded further to consider the quantum of maintenance. The remaining extent is taken into consideration and the evidence available on record had been appreciated and ultimately the enhanced maintenance of Rs. 7,900/- per annum was fixed. B. 1 in favour of Anasuya or not and without considering that question proceeded further to consider the quantum of maintenance. The remaining extent is taken into consideration and the evidence available on record had been appreciated and ultimately the enhanced maintenance of Rs. 7,900/- per annum was fixed. ( 11 ) POINTS for consideration:- In the light of what had been stated supra, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal:- 1) Whether the findings recorded in relation to the granting of the enhanced maintenance from Rs. 190/- per annum to rs. 7,900/- per annum in the facts and circumstances to be confirmed or to be disturbed in this appeal? 2) Whether the claim made by the plaintiff by way of Cross- objections for granting of maintenance as prayed for to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case? 3) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled to? ( 12 ) THE factual matrix as reflected from the respective pleadings, the issues settled, the oral and documentary evidence and the findings recorded by the trial Court, in nutshell, already had been dealt with supra. Ex. A. 2 dt. 8-8-1946 is the certified copy of the compromise decree in O. S. No. 348/45 on the file of District Munsif, tanuku. Ex. A. 1 is the certified copy of the plaint. Ex. A. 3 and Ex. A. 4 are the notice and the reply notice. Ex. B. 1 is the registration extract of the settlement deed executed by Kotamma in favour of Anasuya dt. 10-5-57. In the light of the fact that the trial Court had proceeded to decide the matter excluding the extent covered by Ex. B. 1 while deciding the quantum of maintenance, this question may not assume much importance. Neither of the Counsel advanced any submissions in relation thereto. Ex. B. 2 is No. 2 Adangal; Ex. B. 3 is Voters List and ex. B. 4 - Entry in Ex. B. 3. Elaborate submissions were made on the aspect of the maintainability of the present suit for enhanced maintenance by the plaintiff in view of Ex. A. 2. It may be appropriate to have a look at the contents of Ex. B. 3 is Voters List and ex. B. 4 - Entry in Ex. B. 3. Elaborate submissions were made on the aspect of the maintainability of the present suit for enhanced maintenance by the plaintiff in view of Ex. A. 2. It may be appropriate to have a look at the contents of Ex. A. 2, which read as hereunder:- As can be seen from the terms and conditions of the compromise decree, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the maintenance of her claim from the properties specified in the compromise decree. It is pertinent to note that it is not as though the right to claim maintenance on the plaintiff had been conferred for the first time by virtue of the decree. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiff being the wife of one of the coparceners of the joint family at the relevant point of time became entitled to the claim of maintenance by having a charge over the properties of the joint family since the total estate of the joint family passed into the hands of the other coparceners by way of survivorship. Merely because, at the instance of certain well-wishers some compromise was entered into in the year 1946 as can be seen from ex. A. 2, it cannot be said that despite the changed circumstances or altered circumstances, the plaintiff cannot claim any enhanced maintenance at all and for all times to come she should restrict her claim only to the quantum which had been specified in Ex. A. 2. Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 dealing with amount of maintenance may be altered on change of circumstances specifies that the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement, either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. The words "whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement" and the words "either before or after the commencement of this Act" and the words "if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration" would assume lot of importance. The expression "decree of a Court" would necessarily include even a compromise decree. The Division Bench of Madras High Court in SESHI ammal v. THAIYU AMMAL, AIR 1964 Madras, 217. The expression "decree of a Court" would necessarily include even a compromise decree. The Division Bench of Madras High Court in SESHI ammal v. THAIYU AMMAL, AIR 1964 Madras, 217. while dealing with the aspect held as hereunder:-"in this appeal against the Judgment of the learned judge, Mr. A. Nagarajan contends that, as the maintenance decree was one made on the basis of a compromise, it would no longer be open to the respondent to ask for an enhancement of the maintenance. In support of the contention, learned Counsel referred to the decisions in a. Surya Chandra Mohanleswara Rao v. A. Durgamba (46 mad L. J. ,189 : AIR 1924 Mad 687) and Kameswaramma v. Thammanna (1939-2 Mad LJ 460 : AIR 1939 Mad 798 ). It was held in those cases that where a widow agreed to receive a fixed sum for her maintenance giving up expressly her right to claim an increase in future even if circumstances were to change, it would be a valid agreement which would bind her for the rest of her lifetime. There can be no doubt that, if the respondent were to rely on her right under the Hindu law for being maintained out of the properties of her husband, the principles recognised in these decisions will preclude her from obtaining an enhancement of the maintenance, having regard to the covenant she entered into at the time and as part of the compromise decree aforesaid. But notwithstanding such an agreement, the statute has provided now for a widow being maintained in accordance with the changed circumstances of the times. Section 25, which is relevant in this connection, says: "the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement, either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. "the terms of the Section are very clear; the right given thereunder would supersede any contract disabling the wife from asking for more. After all the true principle is that a person liable to maintain must do so and it will be indeed inequitable for that obligation to be whittled down by technical rules like res judicata and binding nature of a contract. After all the true principle is that a person liable to maintain must do so and it will be indeed inequitable for that obligation to be whittled down by technical rules like res judicata and binding nature of a contract. The statute has therefore provided for the agreed maintenance to be enhanced if need be in conformity with the changed circumstances in the case. Mr. Nagarajan however contends that Section 25 has done nothing more than to codify the pre-existing law and that it cannot be read as meaning that additional right is given to a wife or a widow, who, under a solemn agreement, had agreed to take for all time a fixed rate of maintenance. We do not find any warrant for any such contention. The Section plainly says that, whatever might be the nature of the agreement, whether it precluded the maintenance-holder from asking for more or not she would be entitled to obtain from the persons liable what is necessary if there is a material change in the circumstances since the fixation of the original rate of maintenance. Learned Counsel then contended that the Section would have no application to a case like the present where there was not a mere agreement, but a compromise decree. According to him, a compromise decree is neither a decree nor an agreement, and, therefore, the provisions in Section 25 will not apply to such a case. Reliance was placed for the contention on the decision in Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal v. Thatha ramaswamy Chetty, ILR 35 Mad 75, where the learned judges pointed out that, although a contract was the basis of any compromise decree, the decree which superseded such contract could not be regarded as a mere contract, as such a decree would have a sanction far higher than an agreement between the parties. But that does not and cannot mean that a compromise decree is not a decree at all. The decision only recognises the familiar principle that, if an agreement between the parties were to be adopted by a Court and passed into the realm of a judgment of the Court, it acquires all the solemnity of a judicial pronouncement and will be binding upon the parties thereafter, and, if the decree so says, will be executable as such. The decision only recognises the familiar principle that, if an agreement between the parties were to be adopted by a Court and passed into the realm of a judgment of the Court, it acquires all the solemnity of a judicial pronouncement and will be binding upon the parties thereafter, and, if the decree so says, will be executable as such. But even otherwise it is a well-accepted proposition that a compromise decree partakes the character of an agreement in certain respects, and the character of a decree in regard to its finality and executability, etc. It can perhaps be said that the award of maintenance under the decree was not the result of any decision by the Court; it was the result of a contractual agreement between the parties, which was adopted by the court for purpose of making it executable at the instance of the maintenance holder. Such a case will be one where the maintenance is fixed by a decree of Court, though basis of it was an agreement. It will come directly under Section 25. We are therefore in entire agreement with the learned judge in holding that the respondent will be entitled to have an enhancement of maintenance, once she proves that there has been a material change in the circumstances justifying the enhancement. " in MUNIAMMAL v. RAJA, AIR 1978 Madras, 103. the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held as hereunder:-"before going into the question whether she was compelled by fraud and misrepresentation to enter into this full satisfaction memo, Ex. B-2, we will examine the legal position as to whether this memo of satisfaction is a legal bar to the plaintiff for asking an increased or enhanced maintenance in view of the present change of circumstances. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads that "subject to the provisions of this Section, a hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime". Sub- section (2) of S. I8 enumerates the circumstances under which a Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance, one of such circumstances being that if the husband is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy. Sub- section (2) of S. I8 enumerates the circumstances under which a Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance, one of such circumstances being that if the husband is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy. The object of this section is based on the obligation to maintain the wife which is personal in character and arises from the very existence of the relation between the parties. Section 23 gives discretion to the Court to determine the quantum of maintenance to be awarded having regard to the considerations set out in sub-s (2) or sub-s. (3) of S. 23 as the case may be, so far as they are applicable. Section 25 of the Act, which is material for the consideration of this case, reads thus: "the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement, either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. "a plain reading of the Section would leave no doubt that a decree or agreement fixing maintenance will not bar a wife from claiming increased maintenance if the circumstances justify such alteration. This Section confers ample powers on the Court to alter either by varying or modifying any order fixing the amount of maintenance made by a decree of the Court or by agreement subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. It would seem that the circumstances justifying alteration would principally be changed in the pecuniary circumstances of the parties. By now it is well-settled that a decree or agreement fixing maintenance in favour of a wife or widow or other claimant is no bar to a claim for increased maintenance under this Section if the circumstances justify such alteration and it is immaterial whether the decree or agreement was before, or after this act, notwithstanding the fact that the claimant had agreed not to claim higher maintenance even in changed circumstances. In other words, the right conferred under this Section supersedes any contract to the contrary. In other words, the right conferred under this Section supersedes any contract to the contrary. But there are also judicial pronouncements to the effect that whether a maintenance holder under an agreement has completely relinquished her right of maintenance prior to the coming into force of the she cannot claim any enhanced amount under S. 25 on the ground that there are material changes in the circumstances. No doubt, the right of maintenance is a personal right and it is an incident of the status of matrimony and a hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his wife. The obligation to maintain the wife is personal in character and arises from the very foundation of the existence of the relationship between the parties. The party who stands benefited by this Act can keep that right and enforce the same or throw it away. If the right is given up or relinquished completely in consideration of a lump sum or consolidated payment, the maintenance holder cannot agitate her claim over again unless the contract of relinquishment is attacked as vitiated by undue influence or fraud. But if the right to maintenance is given up in receipt of a consolidated amount under an agreement with a stipulation not to ask for more, but without relinquishing her subsisting right, the position will be different and, therefore, in such contingencies we have to see whether after this Act coming into force the wife or the widow can claim enhanced or increased maintenance in view of the changed circumstances justifying her claim. In CHIMALAKONDA AMBAYAMMA (DIED) AND ANOTHER v. CHIMALAKONDA GANAPATHI, AIR 1969 A. P. 213. the Division Bench of the andhra Pradesh High Court on reviewing the decisions on the point held as hereunder:- "prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, under the Hindu Law it has been held by the Madras high Court in Mouleswar Rao v. Durgamba (ILR 47 Mad 308 = AIR 1924 Mad 687) and Kameswaramma v. Thammanna (1939) 2 Mad LJ 460 = AIR 1939 Mad 798 ), that a contract by a Hindu widow with her husband s coparceners to receive a fixed maintenance per annum and not to claim increase in future even in case of changed circumstances, is a valid agreement. Section 25 of the Act, however, altered this position. Section 25 of the Act, however, altered this position. It reads:"the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement, either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. "a plain reading of the Section would leave no doubt that a decree or agreement fixing maintenance will not bar a widow from claiming increased maintenance if the circumstances justify such alteration. It is immaterial whether the decree or agreement was before or after the. Act, nor is there anything in the Section to justify the conclusion that the initial right of maintenance to a widow must have accrued to her only after the commencement of the Act i. e. , that the death of the husband should have taken place after the commencement of the Act. Section 25 was considered in (1959) 1 Andh W. R 12=air 1959 A. P. , 269) by a Bench. Subba Rao, C. J. (as he then was), examining the position of Hindu Law as existed prior to the enactment and after citing the provisions of Section 25 dealt with the contention that the section did not enlarge the pre-existing right of a widow for maintenance but only gave a statutory recognition to it. He observed at p. 14 (of Andh WR) = (at p. 270 of AIR) thus: "the Act both amended and codified the law relating to maintenance among Hindus. The word agreement is admittedly comprehensive enough to take in an agreement of either description. The Legislature does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude any category of agreements fixing maintenance from the operation of the section. If there was a valid reason for binding the parties to the terms agreed upon between them, there would also be equal justification for protecting the widow from being bound by an unjust; agreement precluding her from claiming enhanced maintenance in changed circumstances. We do not, therefore, see any justification not to give the widest meaning to the word agreement which it can bear. We hold that notwithstanding the agreement by the widow not to claim higher rate of maintenance in the changed circumstances, she would be entitled to enhanced maintenance under the provisions of the Act if there was a material change in the circumstances. We hold that notwithstanding the agreement by the widow not to claim higher rate of maintenance in the changed circumstances, she would be entitled to enhanced maintenance under the provisions of the Act if there was a material change in the circumstances. " in that case, the husband died in 1916 and after his death, his widow filed a suit in which a compromise decree was passed on 29-7-1924 awarding her maintenance at Rs. 240/- a year. It was also agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should not raise any dispute claiming enhanced rate of maintenance and that the defendants should not raise any dispute for reducing that rate. In the view of the law, which was discussed, it was held that the widow was entitled to maintenance at Rs. 2,400/- per year as determined by the trial Court. In that case it was argued, as in this case, that Section 25 applied only to a widow whose husband died after the Act came into force. But that argument was repelled, holding that Section 25 does not impose any such restrictions or limitations. The Act is an amending and codifying Act and under Section 4 thereof, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the preexisting law ceases to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act or if it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, reference seems to have been made to sections 21 and 22 of the Act and the learned Chief Justice observed that even in respect of those two provisions, the same rule will apply and that it made no difference whether the husband died before or after the commencement of the act. These observations in relation to Sections 21 and 22 came up for consideration by the Full Bench in (1960) 2 andh WR 352 = AIR 1961 A. P. , 131 FB), to which one of us (the present Chief Justice) was a party. The Full Bench did not accept the view taken by the Bench inasmuch as the considerations that are relevant for an interpretation of section 25 do not bear on Section 22. Chandra Reddy, C. J. , speaking for the Full Bench, said at p. 356 (of Andh WR) = (at p. 134 of AIR):". . . The Full Bench did not accept the view taken by the Bench inasmuch as the considerations that are relevant for an interpretation of section 25 do not bear on Section 22. Chandra Reddy, C. J. , speaking for the Full Bench, said at p. 356 (of Andh WR) = (at p. 134 of AIR):". . . On the other hand, the language of this Section contrasted with that of Section 22 also lends some countenance to the theory that Section 22 in restricted to persons claiming maintenance from the estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of the Act. "a perusal of Section 22 (2) would show thai there is a specific reference to the date of the death occurring after the commencement of the Act. Be that as it may, we are not considering the effect of Section 22 in this case s the defendant is not sought to be made liable under that provision. In an appeal against the Full Bench decision in (1960)2 Andh WR 352 = ( AIR 1961 AP 131 FB) their lordships of the Supreme Court in Gopal Rao v. Sitharamma AIR 1965 S. C. , 1970, referred to (1959) 1 andh WR 12 = (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 269) and approved of the decision therein. Bachawat, J. , speaking for the Court after setting out the facts in (1959) 1 Andh WR 12 = (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 269) observed at p. 1974:"the question arose whether in spite of this agreement the plaintiff could claim increased maintenance in view of the Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and maintenance Act, 1956. It was held that in spite of the aforesaid terms of the compromise she was entitled to claim increased maintenance under Section 25. This conclusion follows from the plain words of Section 25 under which the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by decree or agreement either before or after the commencement of the act, may be altered subsequently. The decision was, therefore, plainly right. No doubt there are broad observations in that case to the effect that the right to maintenance is a recurring right and the liability to maintenance after the Act came into force is imposed by section 22 and there is no reason to exclude widows of persons who died before the Act from the operation of section 22. No doubt there are broad observations in that case to the effect that the right to maintenance is a recurring right and the liability to maintenance after the Act came into force is imposed by section 22 and there is no reason to exclude widows of persons who died before the Act from the operation of section 22. Those observations were not necessary for the purpose of that case, because the widow in that case was clearly entitled to maintenance from the estate of her deceased husband dying in 1916 under the Hindu Law as it stood then, independently of Ss. 21 and 22 of the Act and in spite of the compromise fixing the maintenance before the commencement of the Act, the widow could in view of section 25, claim alteration of the amount of the maintenance. "reliance also was placed on the decisions of the Full Bench of Madras high Court in VEERAJU v. NARAYANAMMA, AIR 1953 Madras, 159. wherein it was held:- "on principle, we are in entire agreement with the decisions in - manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal , 27 mad LJ 291 and - veerayya v. Chellaminal . ILR 1939 mad 234. The law is well settled that the widow of a deceased coparcener in a joint Hindu family has a right of maintenance against the surviving coparceners quoad the share of her deceased husband which survives to them. This is an absolute right which accrues to her as a member of the joint family. The correct conception of the widow s right is thus set out in - lingayya v. Kanakamma , ILR 38 mad 153, at p. 154:"the wives of the male coparceners in a Hindu family are not entitled to equal shares with the males in the family estate, nor do they take their husband s shares by representation on their death, but in place thereof, they are entitled to a portion of their estate for their enjoyment during their lifetime sufficient to maintain them in comfort according to the means of the family. This is an absolute right due to their membership in the family and does not depend on their necessity arising from their want of other means to support themselves. "it follows, therefore, that on the death of her husband a widow continues to be a member of the joint family along with the male coparceners. This is an absolute right due to their membership in the family and does not depend on their necessity arising from their want of other means to support themselves. "it follows, therefore, that on the death of her husband a widow continues to be a member of the joint family along with the male coparceners. Her fortunes are bound up with the fortunes of the family. If the income of the family increases she will be entitled to the benefit of it Likewise, if the income of the family deceases she must submit to a reduction of her maintenance. The learned advocate for the appellants did not contest the proposition that the quantum of maintenance to which a widow is entitled is subject to variation, even when fixed by the Court, by reason of a change of circumstances. This feature is inconsistent with the contention of the appellants that , the widow s maintenance should be fixed taking into consideration her husband s share in the income of the joint family at the time of his death and at no subsequent time. Reference was made to the decision in - audemma v. Varadareddi , ILR 1948 Mad 803. The exact question which is now before us did not arise in that case. But Govndarajachari J. notices the apparent conflict between - rangathayi Ammal v. Munisami Chetti , 21 Mad L. J. , 706 and - manicka mudaliar v. Sowbagia Ammal , 27 Mad L J 291. It was unnecessary for the purpose of that case to resolve the conflict. But we agree with the following observations made by the learned Judge in dealing with the claim for maintenance by a widow against coparcenary property in which at one time her husband was a sharer:"if it is borne in mind that the widow s right of maintenance is the truncated right which still remains out of what was at one time a claim to a share of the family property, there will be no difficulty in recognizing that, as a necessary and logical consequence of the nature of the right possessed by the widow her maintenance would be dependent upon the varying fortunes of the family. Her comforts would dwindle if the family property is reduced; but, if the family becomes more affluent, she will be entitled to participate in that affluence. Her comforts would dwindle if the family property is reduced; but, if the family becomes more affluent, she will be entitled to participate in that affluence. "in Indira Bai Patel v. B. A. Patel, AIR 1974 A. P. 303. at paras 14 and 15 it was held:-"the only point that survives for our consideration is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, the appellant is entitled to claim enhancement of the maintenance of Rs. 65/- per month awarded to her under the compromise decree in O. S. No. 14 of 1961 and if so, what is the proper and just amount that should be fixed in the altered circumstances. The Court below has rejected the claim of the plaintiff for enhanced maintenance on the ground that the compromise decree is a bar. This view of the Court below is erroneous and unsustainable. Prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ), an agreement by a hindu widow with her husband s coparceners to receive a certain amount of maintenance per month or per annum and not to claim increase in future, was held to be valid and binding on the widow, by the Madras High Court in mouleswara Rao v. Durgamba, ILR 17 Mad 308 = (AIR 1924 Mad 687) and Kameswaramma v. Thammanna (1939) 2 Mad L J 460 = ( AIR 1939 Mad 798 ). But, however, this legal position has been altered by the enactment of Section 25 of the Act, which reads thus:- "the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered subsequently if there is material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. "section 25 entitles a maintenance holder to claim enhanced rate of maintenance if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration. The Section will apply to cases where the quantum of maintenance has been already fixed either by a decree of Court or by agreement between the parties. "a decree of Court" referred to in section 25 is wide enough to taken in a consent or compromise decree as there is no restriction with regard to the nature or type of the decree. "a decree of Court" referred to in section 25 is wide enough to taken in a consent or compromise decree as there is no restriction with regard to the nature or type of the decree. The very intendment and object of Section 25 being to benefit the maintenance holder and thereby permit her to plead higher rate of maintenance in altered or changed circumstances, the expression "a decree of Court" used therein must be construed liberally so as to take in all types of decrees including a consent or compromise decree. It may be noticed that the provisions of Section 25 are applicable to any case where the fixation of the quantum of maintenance was made, either before or after the commencement of the Act. The heard of the matter is that in order to justify enhancement of maintenance, there should be material change in the circumstances justifying such enhancement. It ma also be noticed that the expression used is "altered" but not "enhanced". Alteration may be construed as enhancement or reduction depending upon the facts and circumstances which brought out the material change for the claim of maintenance. Hence, it admits of no doubt that enhanced maintenance due to change in the circumstances is permissible under section 25 of the Act. We are fortified in this view of ours by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in chimalakonda Ambayamma v. Chimalakonda Ganapathi (AIR 1969 Andh Pra 213 ). It was held therein that though the widow had agreed under the terms of the compromise decree not to ask for increased maintenance, she was still entitled to claim for the increase under S. 25 of the Act. For all the reasons stated, we hold that the plaintiff s alternative claim for enhanced maintenance is sustainable if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying enhancement. This bring us to examine whether there is any material change in the circumstances justifying her claim for altered maintenance. The ground on which the plaintiff seeks enhancement is the abnormal rise in the cost of living. Mr. Ugle contends that there is no acceptable evidence for enhancement of the quantum of maintenance. It is stated by the plaintiff and her witnesses that there is a marked increase in the cost of the daily necessities. The Court can certainly take judicial notice of the abnormal cost of living. Mr. Ugle contends that there is no acceptable evidence for enhancement of the quantum of maintenance. It is stated by the plaintiff and her witnesses that there is a marked increase in the cost of the daily necessities. The Court can certainly take judicial notice of the abnormal cost of living. Hence, we are of the firm view that there is a material change in the circumstances justifying enhancement of the maintenance amount of Rs. 65/- fixed under the earlier compromise decree. " the Counsel for appellant - plaintiff no doubt placed strong reliance on PATURI VEERANNA AND ANOTHER v. PATURI seethamma, AIR 1969 A. P. 15. KONDAMMA v. SEETHAMMA, AIR 1973 A. P. 319. and VADLAMANI KONDAMMA AND ANOTHER v. VADLAMANI seshamma, AIR 1957 A. P. 156. to substantiate his stand. In. Kondamma s case (referred 10 supra) the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, does not apply to an agreement whereunder maintenance holder had relinquished right in consideration of a fixed sum. Yet another full Bench in Vadlamani Kondamma s case (referred 11 supra) held that if there is an agreement between the widow who surrenders the estate of her deceased husband and the next reversioner who takes the estate on such surrender, that the widow should be provided maintenance out of the estate, either by the allotment of a specific part of the property or by payment of a specific sum or otherwise the widow would be entitled to maintenance in accordance with such agreement and she cannot get enhanced maintenance in excess of the agreed stipulation if the reversioner objects and if, however, the widow surrenders the estate in favour of the next reversioners without any stipulation for her maintenance, she is not thereafter entitled to be maintained out of the estate in the hands of the reversioners and the latter cannot compelled to pay her maintenance. Strong reliance also was placed on the decision of the single Judge in Paturi Veeranna s case (referred 9 supra ). The facts of these cases are definitely distinguishable inasmuch as it was never the intention of the plaintiff, the old lady, not to claim any enhanced maintenance at any future point of time. Strong reliance also was placed on the decision of the single Judge in Paturi Veeranna s case (referred 9 supra ). The facts of these cases are definitely distinguishable inasmuch as it was never the intention of the plaintiff, the old lady, not to claim any enhanced maintenance at any future point of time. Hence, the principal contention or objection relating to the maintainability of the suit or the bar of suit in view of Ex. A. 2, in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be sustained. Reliance also was placed on gopala RAO v. SITHARAMAMMA, AIR 1965 SC 1970 . S. KAMESWARAMMA v. S. SUBRAMANYAM AND AOTHERS, AIR 1959 AP 269 . DATTU BHAU UNDAGE AND OTHERS ETC. , v. TARABAI dattu UNDAGE AND ETC. , AIR 1985 Bombay 106. KOTAGIRI VIDHYADHARA RAO v. KOTAGIRI VENKATA konda SATYALALITADEVAMMA, AIR 1974 AP 38 . and VEDAVATHI WILLIAMS v. RAMA bai AND OTHERS, AIR 1964 Mysore 263. ( 13 ) P. W. 1 - the plaintiff in the suit deposed that she was married to bulliraju at an early age and she was aged about 12 years at the time of the death of her husband and late Balaramaiah is the brother of her husband and she further deposed that she filed a suit O. S. No. 348/45 for maintenance and by that time her husband and his brother were having Ac. 16-00 of land and they purchased Ac. 8-00 of land and it is a wealthy family and they were getting 12 bags of paddy and she had deposed about Ex. A. 1 - certified copy of the plaint and Ex. A. 2 - certified copy of the compromise decree. She also deposed that she engaged a servant and has been paying monthly wage of Rs. 400/- besides food. She had explained in detail the expenditure which would be incurring towards cloths, and deposed that she requires value of 100 bags of paddy for her maintenance. P. W. 1 also deposed that the defendants have been releasing 30 bags of paddy per acre. She also deposed that Ac. 2-00 of land now in her possession was in her possession even by the date of Ex. A. 2. She also deposed about the details of the relationship. In cross-examination she also deposed about certain borrowings and the nature of her health and the other particulars. She also deposed that Ac. 2-00 of land now in her possession was in her possession even by the date of Ex. A. 2. She also deposed about the details of the relationship. In cross-examination she also deposed about certain borrowings and the nature of her health and the other particulars. She had denied the suggestion that she is having sufficient properties for her maintenance and only as a token maintenance Rs. 190/- had been given under the compromise. P. W. 2 is the maid-servant which deposed about the details. P. W. 3 deposed that he knows the properties of the Ist defendant and those properties yield 2 crops. The 1st crop yield 30 bags and the 2nd crop yield 40 hags per acre. This witness also deposed that he owns land near the lands of the 1st defendant. This witness was cross-examined and certain of the suggestions were denied. D. W. 1 deposed in detail about ex. B. l and how the property had been settled under Ex. B. l. This witness also deposed that P. W. 1 is having sufficient income to maintain herself. This witness deposed about Ex. B. 3 and Ex. B. 4, the voters list and the relevant entry. D. W. 2 deposed that he knows D. 7 and he had been cultivating Ac. 3-00 of land as tenant and the annual maktha is of 60 bags of paddy. This witness in cross-examination admitted that there is no document to prove the said lease. This witness also deposed that D. W. 1 owns about Acs. 20-00 to Acs. 30-00 of land. D. W. 3 deposed that Anasuya is his mother and she got ac. 1-74 cents through her mother and she gave Ac. 1-00 of land to him and sold Ac.-=74 cents of land and his mother executed a settlement deed for Ac. 1-00 of land. The scribe of Ex. B. 1 is no more. One Satyanarayana, attestor of Ex. B. 1, is alive. He is aged about 60 years and he is unable to move from his house. This witness was cross-examined. This is the evidence available on record. ( 14 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the findings recorded by the learned judge, the learned Judge in fact had not taken into consideration the property covered by Ex. B. 1, is alive. He is aged about 60 years and he is unable to move from his house. This witness was cross-examined. This is the evidence available on record. ( 14 ) ON a careful scrutiny of the findings recorded by the learned judge, the learned Judge in fact had not taken into consideration the property covered by Ex. B. 1 and also proceeded on the ground that the rest of the property alone to be taken as available to the family and on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that in view of the changed circumstances or altered circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to the enhanced maintenance. These are the findings recorded by the trial Court on appreciation of evidence. All the facts and circumstances had been taken into consideration by the learned Judge and proper findings had been recorded and hence, this court is of the considered opinion that the said findings deserve no disturbance at the hands of this Court. ( 15 ) POINT No. 2;- In the cross-objections, no doubt, several grounds were raised and submissions at length were made. The evidence of p. W. 1 and also P. W. s 2 and 3, and D. Ws. 1 to 3 and Ex. A. 1 to Ex. A. 4 and Ex. B. 1 to Ex. B. 4 had been appreciated in proper perspective and findings had been recorded. The learned Judge recorded reasons in detail and ultimately arrived at a conclusion to fix Rs. 7,900/- per annum. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the said fixation of the enhanced amount is just and reasonable and the same need not be further enhanced as required by the cross-objector - plaintiff. It is also pertinent to note that the plaintiff already is and sufficiently old and the requirements of such old lady had been taken into consideration by the learned Judge while fixing the quantum. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the said findings need not be disturbed and no further enhancement need be given in the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the said findings need not be disturbed and no further enhancement need be given in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 16 ) POINT No. 3:- In the light of the findings recorded above, this court concludes that the findings recorded by the trial Court do not suffered from any legal infirmity, whatsoever, and accordingly, it is needless to say that both the appeal and the cross-objections are bound to fail and the appeal and the cross-objections are hereby dismissed. Inasmuch as this is only a claim for enhanced maintenance, this Court directs the parties to bear their own costs.