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2005 DIGILAW 976 (RAJ)

Dinesh Sharma v. Babulal

2005-04-04

H.R.PANWAR

body2005
Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-This revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC is barred by limitation of 987 days. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act supported by an affidavit of petitioner No. 1 Dinesh Sharma has been filed. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 as also the Public Prosecutor for the State. I have carefully gone through the Judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.05.2001 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Desuri (for short the trial Court hereinafter.) 3. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has been stated that against the Judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.05.2001, the petitioner-complainant filed criminal leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC before this Court on 011.2001 which came to be dismissed as being not maintainable by the complainant since it was a State case being State vs. Babulal Criminal Case No. 1/1995 and therefore, the leave to appeal by complainant was not maintainable and accordingly it was dismissed. However, liberty was granted to filed revision and thereafter the petitioners have filed the instant revision against the impugned Judgment and order of acquittal. The application under Section 5 of the Act does not disclose the sufficient reasons which prevented the petitioners to file criminal revision well within the period of limitation. The petitioners have failed to explain sufficient reasons which prevented them to file revision petition within the period of limitation. In the circumstances therefore, there is no ground to condone the inordinate delay of 987 days in filing the instant revision petition. However, I have examined the case on merits also. 4. A first information report was lodged against the respondent No.1 by petitioner No. 1 being FIR No. 64/94 for the offence under Sections 454 and 380 IPC. The police investigated the matter and filed a challan against the respondent No. 1 for the offences noticed above and accordingly charges were framed. The respondent No. 1 denied the charges and sought trial. The prosecution produced PW. 1 Gajendra Singh and PW. 2 Sakaram, both witnesses of site map. PW. 4 Dinesh Sharma is the complainant. At the relevant time, he was Branch Manager of Marwar Gramin Bank and respondent No. 1 was the Cashier. The respondent No. 1 denied the charges and sought trial. The prosecution produced PW. 1 Gajendra Singh and PW. 2 Sakaram, both witnesses of site map. PW. 4 Dinesh Sharma is the complainant. At the relevant time, he was Branch Manager of Marwar Gramin Bank and respondent No. 1 was the Cashier. The Chest in which cash is stated to be kept was having two keys and it could be opened only when both the keys are simultaneously put and operated. One of key was with Cashier and another with complainant PW. 4 Dinesh Sharma. On perusal of the statement of PW. 4 Dinesh Sharma it nowhere appears that key which was in his possession went in the hands of the respondent. He only stated that he had forgotten the key in the drawer of his table. But there is no evidence that it was the respondent No. 1 who took away the key from the drawer of the complainant petitioner. It appears that the lock of the main gate was found broken, but there is absolutely no evidence who broke opened the lock. There is no witness produced by the prosecution who could state that it was the respondent No. 1 who broke the lock and committed lurking house break or lurking house trespass in order to commit the offence punishable with imprisonment. There is absolutely no evidence that the respondent No. 1 committed the offence of theft. The entire prosecution case hinges on presumption, surmises and conjectures that since one of the key was with the accused respondent, therefore, he could have broken the lock and opened the safe. Much has been argued by the learned Counsel for the complainant that the respondent No. 1 stated that he committed a mistake. That in itself cannot be said to be an evidence of extra-judicial confession regarding the lurking house break or house trespass as also committing of the theft. The trial Court by an elaborate and well reasoned Judgment and order impugned came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused respondent beyond reasonable doubt and in my view rightly so. The trial Court by an elaborate and well reasoned Judgment and order impugned came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused respondent beyond reasonable doubt and in my view rightly so. There being absolutely no evidence connecting the respondent No. 1 with the commission of alleged crime, the State rightly did not seek leave to appeal against the order of acquittal by complainant is very limited and in exceptional cases a revision by complainant against the order of acquittal is to be entertained. 5. In Jagannath Choudhary vs. Ramayan Singh, reported in 2002 AIR SCW 2338, the Honble Supreme Court relying on earlier decision of the Apex Court in Janata Dal vs. H.S. Choudhary, 1992 (4) SCC 305 held that the main question which the High Court has to consider in an application in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. If however, the same has been an appeal, the applicant would be entitled to demand an adjudication upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the only question is whether the Court should interfere in the interests of justice. Where the Court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned Judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. 6. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (Now Jharkhand) reported in 2002 AIR SCW 3315, Honble Supreme Court held that it has been repeatedly observed by the Supreme Court that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercise only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate Court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into question of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. It was further held that revision challenging order of acquittal at instance of private party, normally the revisional Court should not exercise discretion and interfere with finding of acquittal and accused cannot be made to face second trial. 7. It was further held that revision challenging order of acquittal at instance of private party, normally the revisional Court should not exercise discretion and interfere with finding of acquittal and accused cannot be made to face second trial. 7. In Harihar Chakravarty vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 266 , the Honble Supreme Court held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant. 8. Keeping in view the law propounded by the Honble Apex Court as also the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it cannot be said that in order to do substantial justice interference in the order of acquittal is required. On the contrary, it is not at all a fit case warranting any interference in revisional jurisdiction, that too, in a revision filed by a private party. Thus, the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as also the revision petition on merits stand dismissed.