ORDER The question in these appeals is whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the incentive scheme which had been brought into effect by the State of Bihar in 1995. under Bihar’s industrial policy, with a view to attracting capital investment in the State and accelerate the economic development and also generation of employment in the State, it was decided to grant various perquisites to certain industries setting up business within the State. Amongst the perquisites so envisaged was giving of industrial LT/HT electricity connection on a priority basis. Another perquisite envisaged was the grant of relief from sales tax. The beneficiaries would inter alia, be the new industrial units which were defined for the purpose of the policy as industrial units which had come into operation between 1-9-1995 and 31-8-2000. 2. In pursuance to this policy, a notification was issued on 22-12-1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the first notification") under Section 7(3) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981. Under this notification exemption was granted in respect of raw materials used by new industrial units as wel1 as units undertaking expansion/diversification and modernisation provided the new industrial unit or the expanded unit commenced production in between 1-91995 and 31-8-2000. A similar notification was issued granting exemption in respect of finished products of such industries. The first notification also provided for the procedure for the grant of certificate of tax exemption. The only other relevant clause of this notification is clause 1(a) whereby a new industrial unit was defined not only as one which had commenced production in between 1-9-1995 and 31-8-2000 but one which had obtained a licence/letter of memo/letter of intent of registration certificate from the Industries Department/Industrial Area Development Authority /Director of Industries or a competent authority of the Government of India. 3. M/s Beekay Steel Limited (whose appeal is taken up as the lead matter) applied for and obtained an industrial licence from the Government of India on 18-10-1995. However, it could not commence production within d the period 1-9-1995 to 31-8-2000. According to the appellant this was because the electricity connection which had been promised to the industries setting up business within the State had not in fact been granted to the appellant within the aforesaid period despite the appellant having taken every step to obtain the same. 4. According to the appellant this was because the electricity connection which had been promised to the industries setting up business within the State had not in fact been granted to the appellant within the aforesaid period despite the appellant having taken every step to obtain the same. 4. In this state of affairs, the second notification was issued by the State of Bihar on 2-3-2000 (referred to as "the second notification"). The second notification was issued in amendment of the first notification. In effect, it extended the time for the new industrial units to commence production beyond the period 31-8-2000 provided such units obtained the prior permission from the State Government (Department of Industries) before 318-2000 to commence such production within five years from the date of such prior permission. 5. The procedure for obtaining such prior permission has also been provided in the second notification. We are concerned with the case of medium industry. As far as medium industries are concerned, which the appellant claimed to be, a committee under the chairmanship of the commercial Commissioner consisting of the Industries Director and Director (Technical Development) was put in charge of granting the prior permission. The order for prior approval was to be issued by the officer of the Industries Department. It was made clear that if the Committee did not intimate its decision within 60 days from the receipt of an application then the application could be placed before the Industrial Development commissioner who after receiving the advice of the Commercial Tax Commissioner would implement his decision within 60 days. 6. The appellant did not apply to the Committee but applied to the Director of Industries on 21-6-2000 for the prior permission. The appellant has justified this move by stating that the first paragraph of the notification stated that the prior permission was to be granted by the State Government (Department of Industries). According to the appellant, the Committee was merely to consider the grant. We will assume for the purpose of this appeal that the application was properly made. As it happened, there was no response to the application within 60 days. The appellant then applied to the Industrial Development Commissioner for prior permission. While the application was pending before the Industrial Development Commissioner, the State of Jharkhand, the present respondent before us, came into being on 15-11-2000. 7. As it happened, there was no response to the application within 60 days. The appellant then applied to the Industrial Development Commissioner for prior permission. While the application was pending before the Industrial Development Commissioner, the State of Jharkhand, the present respondent before us, came into being on 15-11-2000. 7. It is not in dispute that the appellant had not received any prior permission when it in fact commenced production in July 2001. After commencing production, it applied for grant of the exemption certificate. The procedure prescribed for grant of such exemption was complied with and the Sales Tax Officer recommended the appellants case for grant of the exemption. However, the Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Tax) was of the view that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of sales tax exemption and recommended that the case should be rejected by the Joint Commissioner. The Joint Commissioner issued a show-cause notice to the appellant giving it a copy of the order of the recommendation for rejection. The show-cause notice was replied to by the appellant. 8. Before the Joint Commissioner gave any decision in the matter the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court on an alleged oral intimation by the Joint Commissioner that the exemption certificate would be refused because the appellant had not obtained prior permission in terms of the second notification. 9. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court which held that the appellant admittedly did not have the prior permission and. therefore, could not get the benefit of the exemption as granted by the first notification as amended by the second notification. It is also found that the appellant was guilty of delay in applying for the prior permission. 10. Before us the appellant has submitted that the appellant was being penalised for the gross inaction on the part of the respondent authorities. It was stated that the appellant could have commenced production within the period mentioned under the first notification but could not do so because of the non-supply of electricity by the State. It is said that repeated representations were made within the period of the first notification but the electricity was not supplied. It is, therefore, submitted on the basis of the authority of this Court in Hitech Electrothennics & Hydropower Ltd. v. State of Kerala1 that the appellant should be granted the benefit of the exemption. 11. It is said that repeated representations were made within the period of the first notification but the electricity was not supplied. It is, therefore, submitted on the basis of the authority of this Court in Hitech Electrothennics & Hydropower Ltd. v. State of Kerala1 that the appellant should be granted the benefit of the exemption. 11. It is also submitted that all the stages for the grant of exemption a certificate had been complied with. The application for prior permission was made within time but was not disposed of by the authorities concerned. Here again, it is submitted that the appellant should not suffer by reason of the laxity on the part of the respondent authorities. 12. Finally it is submitted that in any case this Court should remand the b matter back to the Joint Commissioner for decision of the appellants case on merits. 13. It is unnecessary to consider the facts in Mittal Polypacks (P) Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand separately in detail because in this case also it is admitted that the industry concerned had not commenced production within the period of the first notification and had also not obtained prior permission within the meaning of the second notification when it in fact commenced production. 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has stated that apart from the fact that the decision of the High Court was entirely correct, this appeal should not be entertained since the appellant had based its case on factual averments relating to the officers of the State of Bihar. Complaints have been levelled as to their inaction, etc. None of these officers d of the State of Bihar have been made parties. The State of Jharkhand could not be held responsible for such inactivity. We have been referred to the provisions of Section 41(2) of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 in this connection. It is also submitted that the appellant has no right to claim exemption. It was open to the State of Jharkhand, assuming it to be properly arraigned in this appeal, to provide for an exemption on the basis of certain conditions. Relying on the authority of this Court in State Level Committee v. Morgardshammar India Ltd.2 it is submitted that this Court would not ignore these conditions and extend the exemptions. It was open to the State of Jharkhand, assuming it to be properly arraigned in this appeal, to provide for an exemption on the basis of certain conditions. Relying on the authority of this Court in State Level Committee v. Morgardshammar India Ltd.2 it is submitted that this Court would not ignore these conditions and extend the exemptions. It is stated that in any event a person invoking an exception or an exemption provision must strictly see that the case falls within the plain language of the exemption and in case of doubt f it must be resolved against the appellant. It is submitted that in this case, the language of the two notifications was plain and that in any event even if there were any doubt regarding the time-limit within which the exemption should be claimed, the notification would have to be construed in the light of the policy which clearly demarcated the cut-off date. 15. In our view, apart from the submissions of the learned counsel for the 9 respondent which we accept as correct, we are of the view that the appellants were entitled to claim exemption only if they strictly complied with the terms of the exemption notification. For whatever reason they could not commence production within the time mentioned in the first notification they should have then obtained the prior permission if they wished to take advantage of the second notification. The fact remains that they have not got such prior permission. Furthermore, grant of prior permission would require some consideration by the authorities concerned. It is not as if either the Committee or the Industrial Development Commissioner would grant such prior permission as a matter of course. They would have to examine each case for the purpose of determining whether an industry was capable of commencing production and should be allowed to commence such production within the extended time. 16. In any event, it was always open to the appellants to have approached the court by reason of non-grant of the prior permission had the appellants thought that they were entitled to the prior permission which was being withheld by reason only of the dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents. The period of 60 days from the date of the application expired in 2000. The period of 60 days from the date of the application expired in 2000. The writ petition in the appellants as well as in Mittal Polypacks case was filed after they had commenced production. We are of the view that the appellants have disentitled themselves to any relief by reason of delay. 17. In any event, whether the appellants were in fact disabled from commencing production within the time granted by the first notification is a question of fact which the High Court would not be in a position to resolve under Article 226. We also do not think that this is an appropriate case for the exercise of our discretion under Article 142. We do not also consider it appropriate to remand the matter back to the Joint Commissioner for the purpose of deciding the rights of the appellants to an exemption certification. In the related appeal of Mittal Polypacks (P) Ltd., the Joint Commissioner had in fact issued an order rejecting the appellants case for exemption. 18. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, the appeals are dismissed without order as to costs.