Judgment P. S. BRAHME, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties and learned A. P. P. for State, perused the records, Judgment and Orders passed by the trial Court. ( 2 ) THE Criminal Appeal No. 349/1994 is against the Common Judgment and Order dated 7-7-1994 passed by the 4th additional Session Judge, Nagpur in 1] Sessions Trial No. 435/1992, 2] Sessions trial no. 618/1992 and 3] Sessions Trial No. 118/1993 acquitting the respondents of the offences under section 147, 148, 307, 302 read with sections 149 of I. P. C. While Criminal Appeal No. 385/1934 is against order passed by the same learned Additional Sessions Judge under section 454 of Criminal procedure Code challenging the order dated 29-10-1994 wherein the trial Court has rejected the application filed by applicant ravindar Singh for delivery of possession of scooter bearing R. T. O. registration No. MP 04-A-0917, on the ground that the State has preferred appeal in High Court against the order of acquittal. ( 3 ) IN respect of the incident that took place at the night of 15-5-1992 in which the victim Paramjeetsingh @ Raja was done to death and there was an attempt to commit murder of Prithvipalsingh (P. W. 1) who was the brother of deceased, respondents nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were tried in Sessions Trial No. 435/1992 and respondent no. 7 Narendrasingh was tried in Sessions trial No. 618/1992 and respondent No. 8 amarjitsingh Makan was tried in Sessions trial No. 118/1992 by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, at Nagpur and by common judgment and order dated 7-7-1994, all the respondent came to be acquitted. ( 4 ) IN brief the prosecution case may be stated as follows : deceased-Paramjeetsingh, his brother complainant Prithvipalsingh and his other two brothers were running transport business at Nagpur. They also owned garage at Gangabai Ghat at Nagpur. There was dispute between deceased and accused no. 3 Bhupendrasingh @ Boby over money transaction in as much as respondent No. 3 owed sum of Rs. 50,000 /-to the deceased. Prior to the incident there was quarrel on that issue between deceased and respondent No. 3 in which scuffle shirt of deceased was torn. It is stated that this quarrel had taken place on the day of incident around 5. 00 to 6. 50,000 /-to the deceased. Prior to the incident there was quarrel on that issue between deceased and respondent No. 3 in which scuffle shirt of deceased was torn. It is stated that this quarrel had taken place on the day of incident around 5. 00 to 6. 00 p. m. when deceased had attended funeral of the son of one wasudeosingh. Deceased had on his return home at about 7. 30 p. m. informed his wife smt. Harmeet Kaur (P. W. 10) about the said incident of quarrel. Thereafter, the deceased left his house for attending his transport business. It is alleged by the prosecution that at about 9. 00 p. m. on that day, respondent No. 3 Bhupendrasingh along with other respondents Narendrasingh @ kalasingh, Balvindarsingh @ Tony, gurubindersingh, Bittu @ Gurumitsingh, raju @ Jasbindersingh armed with swords went to the house of the deceased, they asked his wife whether he was in the house. When they were informed that he was not in the house, respondents retorted saying that they would not have left him alive had he been in the house. ( 5 ) THEN all the accused persons when came to know that he was in the telephone booth which was near his garage located near Kamal Square, Nagpur reached there at about 11. 00 p. m. and seeing him in telephone booth at once started assaulting him with swords, which they were armed with, inflicting multiple injuries on his person as a result of which he fell down. His brother/ prithvipalsingh and his servant Vishnu ramchandra Khadgi (P. W. 2) were there. All the accused persons assaulted prithvipalsingh by means of swords inflicting injuries on his person and then they fled away. Then Prithvipalsingh and P. W. 2 vishnu brought victim to Panchpaoli Police station at about 11. 30 p. m. on their way to the hospital P. S. I. Gajanan Jaibhaye (P. W. 14) who was then attached to the panchpaoli Police Station enquired with prithvipalsingh who told him that his brother Paramjeetsingh was assaulted near telephone booth. P. S. I. Jaibhaye seeing that the victim was seriously injured, immediately took steps to remove him to the hospital along with (Police Constable. He also took entry in the station diary to that effect vide copy Exhibit 158. Thereafter he proceeded towards Meyo Hospital, with a view to record statement of the deceased. P. S. I. Jaibhaye seeing that the victim was seriously injured, immediately took steps to remove him to the hospital along with (Police Constable. He also took entry in the station diary to that effect vide copy Exhibit 158. Thereafter he proceeded towards Meyo Hospital, with a view to record statement of the deceased. When he reached the hospital he was told by doctor that deceased has expired. He then recorded statement of Prithvipalsingh in the hospital vide Exhibit 71 and after returning to the Police Station registered offence vide Crime No. 316/1992 for offences under sections 147, 148, 307, 302 read with section 149 of I. P. C. It was on the basis of that first information report vide Exhibit 161 was drawn. ( 6 ) DURING the course of investigation, post-mortem was carried out on the dead body of deceased by Medical Officer- Dr. Pradeep Dixit (P. W. 3) who prepared postmortem report Exhibit 115 in that he noted that injuries 1,2,3,4 and 5 were found on vital parts of the dead body and that these injuries Nos. 1,2,3,4 and 5 were individually sufficient to cause death. After completing investigation, charge sheets were filed against the respondents and the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, nagpur committed the case to the Court of sessions for trial. ( 7 ) AT the trial all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Their defence is that of total denial. It is their contention that they have been involved falsely on account of enmity. So far as respondent No. 8 is concerned he has in addition taken a plea of alibi contending that he has been to his native place as his father was ill who subsequently died. At the trial the court examined in all 15 witnesses including prithvipalsingh (P. W. 1), Vishnu (P. W. 2); dr. Pradeep Dixit (P. W. 3), Dr. Dattu Satai (P. W. 5) examined complainant prithvipalsingh for injuries on his persons as noted in his certificate Exhibits 142 and p. S. I. Gajanan Jaibhaye (P. W. 14) who conducted investigation in the matter. The trial court Judge on appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence recorded a finding of acquittal of respondents, as he found that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove on the evidence on record that deceased was done to death by the respondents. The trial court Judge on appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence recorded a finding of acquittal of respondents, as he found that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove on the evidence on record that deceased was done to death by the respondents. The claim of both the eye-witness namely Prithvipalsingh and Vishnu was discarded in the weight of attending circumstances brought on recorded as also failure on the part of Prithvipalsingh as well as deceased to disclose the names of the assailants at any point of time i. e. at the earliest point of time deceased was taken to the police Station and thereafter when he was removed to the hospital, the witness prithvipalsingh before his statement was recorded did not disclose to the Medical officer as to who and where he and deceased was assaulted. Hence this appeal challenging the order of acquittal. ( 8 ) THIS order of acquittal is assailed by state basically on the ground that the order suffers from non appreciation of evidence and mis-appreciation of evidence so also mis-appreciation of law. With the assistance of learned A. P. P. we have scrutinized the entire record of the case and reappreciated the evidence on record. Learned a. P. P. Shri Parihar submitted that the trial court has committed an error in treating sana entry Exhibit 158 as first information report and the report Exhibit 71 as mere statement of P. W. 1 under section 162 of criminal Procedure Code. That the trial court has erred in holding that two instances that occurred prior to the main incident have not been established on the evidence on record when P. W. 10 has substantiated in her evidence in respect of the said two incidents. However, the trial Court has discredited her testimony giving undue importance to so called omissions and contradictions brought by defence in her evidence. That the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in correct perspective. He further submitted that the prosecution relied on those two incidents to prove motive on the part of accused to commit the crime. However, the trial Court has discredited her testimony giving undue importance to so called omissions and contradictions brought by defence in her evidence. That the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in correct perspective. He further submitted that the prosecution relied on those two incidents to prove motive on the part of accused to commit the crime. But then failure to prove the two incidents, by itself is not sufficient to discard prosecution case as the prosecution was banking upon direct evidence of witness prithvipalsingh and Vishnu who have given clinching evidence as to the incident in question and that is much more so when that evidence is consistent and inspiring evidence He further submitted that the fact that witness Prithvipalsingh suffered injuries at the place of occurrence during that assault that itself lends assurance to his claim that the victim was assaulted by the accused persons. He has identified all the respondents as the assailants of the victim. He has disclosed the names of assailants immediately after he was reached to the hospital when his statement was recorded. Learned A. P. P. further submitted that situation that prevailed, more particularly regarding serious condition of victim paramjeetsingh who was almost on death bed was such when he was taken to the police Station by P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 that it was not expected of any of them to disclose the names of assailants. Therefore, non-disclosure of the names of the assailants by these persons does not bring infirmity in the prosecution case much less it discredited the testimony of witness prithvipalsingh, when immediately he was reached in the hospital, his statement was recorded in which the names of assailants i. e. the respondents before the Court have been disclosed. He therefore, urged that the findings recorded by the trial Court discarding the prosecution evidence in acquitting the respondents are perverse and against the weight of evidence on record which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Therefore, he urged that in this appeal against acquittal interference by this Court is required in the interest of justice. ( 9 ) AT the outset we make it clear that the principles of law pertaining to interference with the order of acquittal are now settled. Those principles are considered by this Court in a judgment in (2003 Cri. L. J. 2106 ). ( 9 ) AT the outset we make it clear that the principles of law pertaining to interference with the order of acquittal are now settled. Those principles are considered by this Court in a judgment in (2003 Cri. L. J. 2106 ). It is a cardinal rule of law in criminal jurisprudence that where two views on appreciation of evidence are possible, one favourable to the accused is liable to be accepted. This principle applies with more vigor when appeal against acquittal is under consideration. ( 10 ) IN a decision of Apex Court in A. I. R. 2004 S. C. W. 3985 (State of Rajasthan v. Bhanvarsingh and others), the Apex Court has observed that view of the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in doubting the veracity of the prosecution case when defence version is probable one and accordingly the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by it, can not be said to be perverse in any manner so as to be interfered with by this Court. It is well settled that in a case where two views are possible, one of acquittal and other of conviction, High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal impugned before it. ( 11 ) THE position of law is well settled, when the findings recorded by the trial court are reasonable and possible, even if it is considered possible that two views on appreciation of evidence are possible, merely because a different view can be taken, is not a ground to interfere with the order of acquittal. ( 12 ) THE Apex Court way back in 1979 in the case of (Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra), A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 135, held that when two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court as a matter of judicial caution should refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the court below. The order of acquittal lends assurance to the innocence of the accused persons. Therefore, that should not be disturbed by the High Court. ( 13 ) WE may refer to another decision of the Apex Court in A. I. R. 2004 S. C. 124 (Shingarasingh v. State of Haryana and another ). The order of acquittal lends assurance to the innocence of the accused persons. Therefore, that should not be disturbed by the High Court. ( 13 ) WE may refer to another decision of the Apex Court in A. I. R. 2004 S. C. 124 (Shingarasingh v. State of Haryana and another ). In paragraph 26 of the judgment the Apex Court observed :"it is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record but having done so if it finds that the view taken by the trial Court is a possible reasonable view of the evidence on record. It will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court. Only in cases where the High Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial court are unreasonable or preserve or that the Court has committed a serious error of law or where the trial Court had recorded its findings in ignorance of relevant material on record or by taking into consideration evidence which is not admissible, the high Court may be justified in reversing the order of acquittal . "so bearing in mind these principles we have to re-appreciate the evidence in the case before hand to find out whether the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court is perverse or that the Court has committed a serious error of law or the trial court has recorded its finding in ignorance of relevant material on record or by taking into consideration evidence which is not admissible. As we have observed in earlier part of judgment, if on re-appreciation of evidence, we find that the view taken by the trial Court in acquitting the accused persons is possibly reasonable view, then we should as a matter of judicial caution refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, even though the view other than the view taken by the trial Court is possible. We have throughly and carefully considered the evidence on record so also the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondents and learned A. P. P. On our assessment of evidence we have found that certain facts are either not disputed or the same are established clinchingly on evidence on record. We have throughly and carefully considered the evidence on record so also the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondents and learned A. P. P. On our assessment of evidence we have found that certain facts are either not disputed or the same are established clinchingly on evidence on record. In the first place it is born out on the evidence on record and also not disputed that at the time and place of the incident the deceased Paramjeetsingh and witness Prithvipalsingh were assaulted with deadly weapons and as a result of that assault deceased suffered multiple injuries on vital part of his body and as a consequence of that he died homicidal death. It is further born out on the record that when deceased was assaulted, he was accompanied by Prithvipalsingh and witness Vishnu at the Telephone Booth and witness prithvipalsingh also suffered injuries. There were to two injuries out of which one was a stab wound over left hypochondrium region in anterior axillary line over 10th rib, while other was an incise wound at distal I. P. J. 1" X 1/2 over index finger. The incident of assault took place at the Telephone Booth which fact is further established on the basis of spot Panchnama Exhibit 130 wherein there was pool of blood noticed at the cabin of the Telephone Booth. Apart from that if the defence is considered minutely it is revealed that no where defence has denied factum of incident that had taken place at the time and place. During the course of investigation weapons were seized consisting of swords and one hockey stick. However, as can be seen from the report of Chemical Analyser no blood is detected on any of the weapons. It is further revealed from the report of Chemical Analyser that blood group of the blood of the deceased could not be determined while on manila of accused No. 6 Bhupendrasingh though human blood was detected, its blood group could not be determined. Even as regards the findings of human blood on the shirt of accused No. 6 the learned Counsel shri V. M. Deshpande has rightly pointed out that this circumstance can not be taken into consideration as in that regard no question was put to the accused persons in his examination under section 313 of Criminal procedure Code. Even as regards the findings of human blood on the shirt of accused No. 6 the learned Counsel shri V. M. Deshpande has rightly pointed out that this circumstance can not be taken into consideration as in that regard no question was put to the accused persons in his examination under section 313 of Criminal procedure Code. That apart in our view finding of human blood by itself without there being any further conclusiveness as to the blood group, that by itself is no way can be an incriminating circumstance. That is much more so, when the blood group of blood of the deceased could not be determined. It is further revealed that the prosecution has not led any independent evidence though available to substantiate two small incidents which occurred prior to the incident in question. All that in that regard was based on the evidence of witness harmeet Kaur widow of the deceased. It has come in the evidence on record that in respect of later part of the incident of accused having rushed to the house of deceased that day at around 9. 00 p. m. , the matter was reported to the police on phone and that two other brothers of deceased were very much present in the house when the accused persons held threats to kill the deceased. It has come in the evidence of witness Harmeet Kaur that the accused had come to the house, after the deceased had left the house and they were armed with swords and they threatened to have killed him had he been found in the house. But then though the evidence could have been collected, has not been adduced to support the version of witness Harmeet Kaur for the reasons best known to the prosecution. Similar is the position as regards the incidents that took place around 6. 00 p. m. on that date when deceased had gone to the attend funeral at Gangabai Ghat, where it is alleged that one of the accused bhupendrasingh @ Boby had quarrel in which the shirt of the deceased was torn. The deceased when came home informed his wife and brothers that such incident has taken place, but then in that regard, no report was lodged to the Police Station. Therefore the prosecution in that regard was banking on the solitary version of witness harmeet Kaur. The deceased when came home informed his wife and brothers that such incident has taken place, but then in that regard, no report was lodged to the Police Station. Therefore the prosecution in that regard was banking on the solitary version of witness harmeet Kaur. ( 14 ) IT is further brought on record by the defence that the servant of the owner of the telephone Booth was very much present at the time of occurrence. But then for the reasons best know to the prosecution his statement is not recorded. It is also brought by defence in cross examination of witnesses including the Investigating Officer P. S. I. Jaibhaye that in the vicinity of Telephone booth there is a liquor shop which was open at that time and in front of that there were few stalls. It is needless to say that when such incident had occurred in the Telephone booth which has created hue and cry when a person was assaulted by the number of persons and assailants with deadly weapons in their hands, in all probability the attention of persons who were in the vicinity must have been attracted. If that is so then the prosecution did not examine even a single soul to highlight the happening of the incident in question much less did not record statement of any of such independent witness, then that is said to be a lacuna and serious fault on the part of the prosecution. In that regard no explanation is coming forth from the side of prosecution, though both the Investigation Officers led evidence before the Court. In our opinion this speaks volumes and the trial Court therefore was justified in doubting the claim of the prosecution witness Prithvipalsingh and Vishnu. In our considered view absence of corroborat ion of independent evidence when these cwo witnesses who were interested one were available, the Court has to scrutinize the the evidencw of these two witnesses with abundant caution. ( 15 ) IT is true that when deceased was brought to the Police Station by P. W. 1 immediately after the assault on him, P. S. I. Gajanan Jaibhaye (P,w, 14) was informed by P. W. 1 that is brother i. e deceased was assaulted near Telephone Booth and then he was taken to the hospital. In that regard in Police Station diary an entry was made vide Exhibit 158. In that regard in Police Station diary an entry was made vide Exhibit 158. This entry Exhibit 158 clearly shows that when asked deceased paramjeetsingh disclosed that he was assaulted at Telephone Booth. The witness gajanan Jaibhaye in his cross-examination stated that he personally enquired from paramjeetsingh, when he was brought in the hospital as to what happened and thereafter he told him that he was assaulted in telephone Booth. At that time paramjeetsingh did not state the name of the assailants. Prithvipalsingh (P. W. 1) and vishnu (P. W. 2) were present there and they also did not state the names of the assailants to him at that time. He further confirmed that the names of the assailants were not known to him till he recorded the statement of witness Prithvipalsingh in the hospital. The names of the assailants were not told to him by any one till he recorded the statement of the complainant. It is a matter of record that the report Exhibit 71 which is in the form of statement of witness prithvipalsingh was treated by P. S. I. Jaibhaye as report on the basis of which the offence came to be registered and first information report was drawn. Whole controversy is about the treating the report Exhibit 71 as the first information report giving go-bye to the entry is Station Diary vide exhibit 158, accepting the contention of the learned Counsel for the accused persons, the trial Court recorded a finding that the station diary Exhibit 158 is first information report and consequently Exhibit 71 is the bare statement of P. W. 1 recorded under section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code. ( 16 ) THE learned A. P. P. placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in 1997 cri. L. J. 1183, (Sunil Kumar and others appellants v. State of Madhya Pradesh, respondents), vehementially submitted that even telephonic information to the Police Station about the cognizable offence recorded in a daily diary book, though the said information not mentioning the names of the appellants, but investigation is started on the basis of it would be treated as first information report. In that case it was found that the High Court had erred in not treating the telephone information which was given by the witness to the Police Station as first information report. In that case it was found that the High Court had erred in not treating the telephone information which was given by the witness to the Police Station as first information report. We fail to understand as to how this case is of any assistance of learned A. P. P. In our opinion this case is applicable on all force in the case before hand to support the contention of respondents that entry in station diary Exhibit 158 should have been treated as first information report. It is pertinent to note that in that case though the names of all the assailants were not mentioned in the said information, it was treated as the first information report as the investigation in the matter has started on the basis of that. This clearly shows that what is the criteria to determine the particular information given to the Police Station as the first information report is basically the fact when by said information the investigation in the matter has started which indicates that police has taken cognizance of cognizable offence. In that context it is certainly irrelevant whether the names of all the assailants are disclosed in the information. It is also possible that if the offence is registered on the basis of that information during the course of investigation the names of the assailants are traced. In our view it also depends upon the person who gives information. If the persons who gives the information is a person who is witness to the incident that has taken place, then that information has to be treated as first information report on the basis of which it is mandatory on the part of the police to register the offence and then to proceed for investigating the same. In this context we may refer to the decision reported in 2001 Cri. L. J. 3329 (T. T. Ar. tonyv. State of Kerala and others), relied upon by Mrs. Sirpurkar learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. It is observed that:"apartfrom a vague information by a phone call or cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is the first information report F. I. R. postulated by section 154 of cri. Sirpurkar learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. It is observed that:"apartfrom a vague information by a phone call or cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is the first information report F. I. R. postulated by section 154 of cri. P. C. All other information made orally or in writing, after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and enr ered in the station house diary by the Police Officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under section 162 of cri. P. C. No such information / statement can properly be treated as an F. I. R. and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be in conformiy with the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code". ( 17 ) SHRI V. M. Deshpande, Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 as also Shri anil Mardikar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 have placed reliance on a decision of our High Court reported in 2004 All. M. R. (Cri.) 1308 (Pradeep narayanrao Raigure v. State of Maharashtra ). It is a decision of Division Bench of which one of us (Justice P. S. Brahme) had occasion to consider question as to first information report. In that case the station diary entry was made on oral report made by informant and in fact the entry disclosed with reasonable certainty commissions of cognizable crime by four persons. This report disclosed that assault was made by means of sword and axe and the deceased was lying in front of his house. In that respect P. S. I, stated that the informant was in a frightened condition and he was insisting that P. S. I, should accompany with immediately on account of which he was not giving report presently. This explanation was found in the cross-examination of that witness, however it is pertinent to note that P. S. I, in cross-examination himself has admitted that it is true that the initial disclosure of the informant about the assault on deceased by means of sword and farsha by four persons with specific names was constituting cognizable offence. This explanation was found in the cross-examination of that witness, however it is pertinent to note that P. S. I, in cross-examination himself has admitted that it is true that the initial disclosure of the informant about the assault on deceased by means of sword and farsha by four persons with specific names was constituting cognizable offence. ( 18 ) THEREFORE, station diary entry recorded at 0005 hours shall not be treated as F. I. R. in this case and subsequent statement of the informant which is said to have been recorded at 0030 hours cannot be treated as First Information Report, but it shall only be a statement recorded in the course of investigation under section 162 criminal Procedure Code. In our considered view this decision clinches the issue. Having regard the evidence of P. S. I Jaibhaye to which a reference was made by us in earlier part of judgment, when inquired with deceased, information was disclosed that he was assaulted with weapons, thereby it was informed by the victim and also by witness Prithvipalsingh that the victim as well as this witness suffered injury as a result of assault. If that is so then the information which was recorded in station diary entry Exhibit 158 was sufficient for P. S. I. Jaibhaye to take cognizance of the offence and therefore, to register the offence. The trial Court was therefore, right in treating exhibit 158 as first information report and the subsequent statement of Exhibit 71 of p. W. 1 as a bare statement recorded under section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code. ( 19 ) THE learned A. P. P. tried to justify the action of the P. S. I. Jaibhaye in not treating the sana entry Exhibit 158 as the first information report, but specific statement exhibit 71 as the first information report on the ground that the situation when the deceased accompanied by P. W. 1 reached to the Police Station was such that nothing more could have been expected, therefore, there was justification for not disclosing the names of the assailants. Even for a moment we accept that the situation was such and more particularly the victim was practically on death bed, as it is revealed that by that time he was reached to the hospital he was declared dead. Therefore, it was legitimate rather not to disclose the names of the assailants. Even for a moment we accept that the situation was such and more particularly the victim was practically on death bed, as it is revealed that by that time he was reached to the hospital he was declared dead. Therefore, it was legitimate rather not to disclose the names of the assailants. But then that does not come in the way of Investigating Officer in treating that entry Exhibit 158 as first information report. We have said earlier discloser of names of assailants is not sine qua non to treat the information given to the Police station as to commission of cognizable offence. That apart we do not agree with the submissions of learned A. P. P. that the statement of P. W. 1 recorded in the hospital was quite in succession that it could be treated as part of the information that was reduced into writing in the station diary. Therefore, it was submitted with emphasis that the investigation in the matter did not commence till the statement of P. W. 1 was recorded in the hospital. It is very difficult to agree with the submission of learned A. P. P. in this regards. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the Exhibit 158 entry in the station diary is first information report and the statement Exhibit 71 is statement of P. W. 1 during the course of investigation under section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code. But then we make it clear that disclosure of names of assailants namely of respondents herein by P. W. 1 in the statement Exhibit 71 by itself can not be discarded and therefore, P. W. 1 was so to say justified in his evidence before the Court in disclosing the names of the assailants as respondents herein which was factually an improvement. Therefore the evidence of witness P. W. 1 in that regard cannot be objected though Exh. 158 is treated as first information report. But credibility of disclosure by P. W. 1 of the names of the respondents as the assailants has to be testified by close scrutiny of his evidence. It is in this context that defence has right from inception has contended that P. W. 1 has made improvement in his evidence in disclosing the names of the respondents as assailants. But credibility of disclosure by P. W. 1 of the names of the respondents as the assailants has to be testified by close scrutiny of his evidence. It is in this context that defence has right from inception has contended that P. W. 1 has made improvement in his evidence in disclosing the names of the respondents as assailants. The trial Court accepting the contention of the defence has recorded a finding that disclosure of names of the respondents is afterthought and that is germain for holding that the respondents have been falsely implicated in this case because of enmity. ( 20 ) IT is a matter of record that the victim was accompanied by P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 vishnu when they reached Police Station. It has come on record in the evidence of p. S. I. Jaibhaye that none of them disclosed the names of the assailants when inquired. We can understand that it was not probable in that situation for deceased paramjeetsigh to disclose the names of the assailants as he was practically on death bed having suffered multiple severe injuries. But for whatever short span of time, p. W. 1 and P. W. 2 were in the hospital then p. W. 1 and P. W. 2 claimed to be eye-witness to the incident, why they refrained from disclosing the name of the respondents as assailants. This infirmity even continued till the statement of P. W. 1 was recorded. Learned Counsel for the respondents and more particularly Mr. Mundhra appearing for respondent vehemently urged that even to the Medical Officer there was no disclosure of names of assailants by the P. W. 1. It has come in the evidence on record that by the time he was reached in the hospital before the statement of P. W. 1 was recorded, the relations had already reached to the hospital. In the background of the enmity as has been pointed and which is also basis of prosecution against the respondents. Certainly a suspicion is entertained as regards disclosure of respondent No. 6 as the assailants being afterthought and that to as outcome of deliberations. ( 21 ) IN respect of first incident of quarrel of deceased at the time of funeral with accused Boby in which shirt of deceased was torn and he as threatened, only evidence is that of P. W. 1 Smt. Harmeet Kaur. ( 21 ) IN respect of first incident of quarrel of deceased at the time of funeral with accused Boby in which shirt of deceased was torn and he as threatened, only evidence is that of P. W. 1 Smt. Harmeet Kaur. Her evidence is however totally shattered in cross- examination. Other two witnesses (P. W. 1 and 2) have stated nothing in their evidence in that regard. Admittedly that incident was not reported to police. So that is not proved on evidence. ( 22 ) AS regards second incident that alleged to have taken place at about 9. 00 p. m. on that day, P. W. Harmeet Kaur has stated in her evidence. Reading her version, it is reflected that the incident was certainly serious of which Police should have taken cognizance. But in her cross-examination defence has brought that whatever she claimed about that incident was after thought in the sense, she has made improvement in that regard in her evidence before the Court. In para 8 of her crossexamination she has admitted that in her statement before Police she has not stated about earlier alleged incident. That apart she has been falsified by the witness P. W. Gajanan Jaibhaye when he stated no information was received in Police Station about that incident, the fact remains that though that incident was serious one, none reported to Police Station. That apart, witness P. W. 1 Gajanan Jaibhaye in his evidence stated that when he had gone to the house of deceased on 16-5-92, no family members disclosed to him that same accused persons armed with swords had come to their house and threatened to kill deceased. Though he stated that it was so disclosed to him on 18-5-1992. However, he stated emphatically that no report or complaint in Police Station from the family members of Raja Sethi relating to that incident. In this background we do not agree with submission of learned a. P. P. that conducted of P. W. 10 or other family members in not reporting that incident to police is not very relevant as the incident was of trivial nature. We have no hesitation in saying that no such incident of threats immediately prior to the incident had taken place. In other words, P. W 1 made a false claim in that regard. This makes her evidence untrustworthy. We have no hesitation in saying that no such incident of threats immediately prior to the incident had taken place. In other words, P. W 1 made a false claim in that regard. This makes her evidence untrustworthy. Therefore, as rightly submitted by learned counsel Shri V. M. Deshpande, Shri Mardikar and shri Mundra in their submission, introduction of the theory these two alleged incidents was an attempt on the part of witnesses to make it parabolise that the victim was assaulted by respondents. That in our opinion also discredits the testimony of p. W. 1 and P. W. 2. ( 23 ) THE learned A. P. P. submitted that failure to prove these two incidents, at the most would lead failure to prove motive on the part of accused in committing the murder of deceased. He further submitted that with direct evidence of P. W. 1 and 2, failure to prove motive is of no consequence and relevant. It is no doubt true that though motive plays important role its absence or failure on the part of the prosecution to prove it, will not affect the prosecution case, when on direct evidence its case is proved beyond every shadow of doubt. Hence as we have observed, the impact of failure to prove these submissions not only disproves the motive but also impairs the credibility of witnesses. There is certainly impact of falsity of P. W. 10 on the veracity of P. W. 1 and P. W. 2. ( 24 ) THIS takes us to consider the evidence of P. W. 1 and 2, who certainly gave eyewitness account of main incident. We also agree with learned A. P. P. that P. W. 1 having suffered injuries in that incident this fact adds weight to his testimony thereby, apparently his version before Court, at the first blush makes one believable and probable. But as has been rightly submitted by learned Counsel for respondents bringing to our notice, material contradictions and omission in their evidence, his evidence read as whole suffers from credibility. He has suppressed material facts. He admitted that he did not disclose to police names of assailants either to Medical Officer or to police, till his statement was recorded. This conduct on his part is certainly incongruous. Evidence shows that, though he sustained injuries, he was discharged from hospital on the same day. He has suppressed material facts. He admitted that he did not disclose to police names of assailants either to Medical Officer or to police, till his statement was recorded. This conduct on his part is certainly incongruous. Evidence shows that, though he sustained injuries, he was discharged from hospital on the same day. This shows that injuries he suffered were not serious. So such conduct improbable behaviour, makes his claim as against respondents very doubtful. ( 25 ) SO far as P. W. 2 Vishnu is concerned, his evidence is shattered. He did not inform police the names of assailant and when he accompanied deceased and p. W. 1 to P. S. this conduct on his part of remaining stoic speaks volume. Both witnesses are interested being very, close to family of deceased. Therefore, it is quite natural for them to implicate respondents falsely. That must be the probable inference we can draw on the basis of close scrutiny of their evidence. That is not to say that we have rejected their evidence outrightly merely because they are related and interested witnesses. But on close scrutiny of their evidence, will all possible caution with attending circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that their evidence is not trustworthy. In addition to that absence of corroboration by independent evidence, though available, as pointed out earlier, with contradiction in their evidence, that are bound to be material we confirm the finding recorded that trial Court regarding discarding evidence of P. W. 1 and 2. ( 26 ) THERE is one more important fact left to be considered regarding incident of assault on Indrapalsingh Chawala on that day. Here, witness P. S. I. Gajanan in his evidence stated, on receiving information in that regard entry vide Exhibit 156 was made in station diary that as per original record exhibit 157 one Indrapalsingh Chawala came in Police Station and told him that he had been assaulted by Raja Sethi. That Raja was asking for Tony P. W. 10 after recording statement of Chawala, sent him to medical examination and treatment. In his crossexamination by Counsel for original accused no. 1 and 2 he stated in paragraph 8 page 390 I was told by Indrapalsingh that Raja sethi, his two brothers and 2/4 his associates had come holding swords and iron rod in their hands. In his crossexamination by Counsel for original accused no. 1 and 2 he stated in paragraph 8 page 390 I was told by Indrapalsingh that Raja sethi, his two brothers and 2/4 his associates had come holding swords and iron rod in their hands. ( 27 ) THIS evidence of P. W. 14 when read in correct prospective and in the sequence of what the defence has stated, clinchingly goes to show that it was deceased amarjitsingh and his brothers had quarrel at about 9. 00 a. m. on that day with indrapalsingh Chawala when later intervened when they ransacked Chicken shop in Kashmiri lane to which accused Boby was concerned. No investigation in regard to assault on Chawala was done as stated by P. W. 14 as Paramjeetsingh died. But the happening of that incident does show that deceased Raja and his brothers had enmity against Chawala. If that was so, then possibility of victim and witness Prithvipalsingh being assaulted on that night by them cannot be ruled out. This therefore probabilise false implication of accused. In this background, non disclosure of names of assailants by P. W. 1 or P. W. 2 at first opportunity in Police Station assumes importance. That is why subsequent disclosure of names of respondents, as assailants, when P. W. 1s statement was recorded, appears to be tainted, as an embellishment so also afterthought. The trial Court rightly and correctly appreciated evidence in this regard, so as to discard evidence of P. W. 1 and 2, though apparently they stressed their claim as eyewitness account of the incident. We therefore, confirm finding of the trial Court. ( 28 ) SO far as respondent No. 8 is concerned, we accept the submissions of learned Counsel Smt. Sirpurkar, who supported on the evidence led in defence with material; documents his plea of alibi. That is additional reason we justify acquittal of the respondent No. 8. ( 29 ) MR. Parihar, learned A. P. P. referred to decision of Apex Court in 2003 Cri. L. J. 3070, (Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh), wherein it is held that telephonic message about incident given by constable on night patrol duty only mentioning that three persons assaulted deceased and made request for sending police force, is not a F. I. R. of incident but merely entry made regarding departure of police. L. J. 3070, (Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh), wherein it is held that telephonic message about incident given by constable on night patrol duty only mentioning that three persons assaulted deceased and made request for sending police force, is not a F. I. R. of incident but merely entry made regarding departure of police. Therefore, non mention of names of assailants in that entry, was not fatal. That was on the basis of fact of that case. In the case at hand information was given by victim as well as P. W. 1 who were eye-witnesses to the incident. Therefore, information about the incident given by name, as noted in station diary was rightly F. I. R. through names of assailants were not disclosed. ( 30 ) IN the decision reported in 2004 (12) s. C. C. 492, (Shashidhar Purandhar Hegde and another v. State of Kamatakal), it is found that Appellate Court while re-appreciating the evidence intrinsic and probative value of the evidence having been overlooked by the trial Court, held on facts that the High court was justified in interfering with the trial Courts judgment of acquittal. The ratio laid down, is accepted. But on facts, it is found that the trial Court appreciated evidence in correct perspective and that learned A. P. P. could point out that trial court has overlooked intrinsic probative value of evidence. Nor our assessment of evidence, shows that intrinsic and probative value of evidence was overlooked. Therefore, we confirm the acquittal. ( 31 ) THE principles laid down in 2002 (4) s. C. C. 679, (Dharmendrasingh @ Mansing ratansinhv. State of Gujrat), by the Apex court as to appreciation of evidence in paragraphs 12 and 17 are accepted and bearing in mind these principle, we have independently scrutinized the evidence by way of reappreciation and based on that confirmed the finding of trial Court. ( 32 ) IN 2003 (11) S. C. C. 27, (State of Punjab v. Kamail Singh), the Apex Court has laid down, principles as to appreciation of evidence of witnessed who are interested. We have bearing in mind these principles, reached to conclusion that finding recorded by the trial Court is required to be confirmed and no interference is called for in judgment of acquittal. We have bearing in mind these principles, reached to conclusion that finding recorded by the trial Court is required to be confirmed and no interference is called for in judgment of acquittal. ( 33 ) IN the result on re-appreciation of evidence we have found that the trial Court has scrutinized the evidence correctly and based on that, has recorded finding of acquittal. Hence we confirm that finding. As the view taken by the trial Court is possible and reasonable one and it being that of acquittal, we find ourselves justified in not interfering with the judgment and order of acquittal we therefore dismiss the appeal. ( 34 ) AS regards the Criminal Appeal No. 385/1994 is concerned, as the order under challenge shows the application submitted by the appellant/applicant for disposal of vehicle came to be rejected by the trial Court as appeal challenging acquittal of respondent was pending this Court. Since we by this judgment are dismissing the appeal, confirming the judgment and order of acquittal, we feel it proper to remit the application filed by applicant to trial Court, to decide and pass appropriate order on hearing the parties. Consequently we set aside the order of rejection of application and remit back that application to trial Court to decide the same afresh as observed. Hence the order. ORDER1. Criminal Appeal No. 349/1994 is dismissed, the bail bonds of respondents shall stand cancelled. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 385/1994 is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. However, the application filed appellant in this appeal is remitted back to trial Court to decide the application in the light of observations made in the judgment for that record and proceedings be send back to the trial Court. Order accordingly.