Judgment Rajendra Prasad, J. 1. In this appeal filed by sole appellant Nanhak Ram from jail, the appellant has challenged legality and correctness of judgment and order of conviction dated 29th June, 1987, passed against him by Ashok Kumar sinha, District and Sessions Judge, Saran, chapra, in Sessions Trial No.55 of 1987 arising out of Manjhi P. S. Case No.53/86 dated 18.4.86, whereby and where-under learned District and Sessions judge convicted the appellant for the offence under Sec.302 of the Indian penal Code and sentenced thereunder to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution story, as it appears from fardbeyan (Ext.1) of informant jai Narain Singh (P. W.6) recorded by ASI pran Mohan Jha (P. W.9) on 18.4.1986 at 17 hours at the door of Jai Narian Singh (P. W.6) is as follows: On 18.4.1986 at about 9 hours in the morning while brother Ramnarain Singh (deceased) of the informant (P. W.6) was going to his khalihar and when he reached at a distance of 200 yards south from his house all on a sudden the appellant assaulted with mussar of wood on neck head and other places of body of brother (deceased of informant) with the result the brother of informant fell down there and succumbed to his injuries. The son of informant Rajeshwar Singh (P. W. .7) aged about 10 years, who was playing there came running and informed about the occurrence when the informant was at his khalihan. After the informant came he knew about the occurrence. Thereafter villagers, namely, Parmeshwar dubey, Krishnadeo Tiwary and others took the dead body of brother of informant at his darwaja. The informant also stated that right from four days before the occurrence, appellant Nanhak Ram used to behave like mad and had attempted to assault one Ram Shakal Singh alias bhardul Singh with bhala but Ram Shakal singh had escaped. The appellant also entering into house of one Ugam Ram in the night had scattered his clothes, boxes etc. Day before yesterday, i. e. , on 16.4.86 an iron chain was put in the hands of appellant and appellant had managed to take out his right hand from the chain. The informant also stated that after death of his brother in order to control the appellant and to put chain in the hands of appellant people had assaulted the appellant with lathi resulting hurt to appellant. 3. The informant also stated that after death of his brother in order to control the appellant and to put chain in the hands of appellant people had assaulted the appellant with lathi resulting hurt to appellant. 3. On the basis of fardbeyan (Ext.1) a case under Sec.302 I. P. C. was registered against the sole appellant and formal F. I. R. (Ext 2) was drawn. The case was investigated by police and after completion of investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the sole appellant for committing offence under sec. 302 I. P. C. Later on cognizance of the offence was taken against the appellant and the case was committed to the court of session for trial. The appellant was put to trial and the learned District and Ses-sions Judge, Saran, Chapra, found the appellant guilty of offence under Section 302 I. P. C. and convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life as indicated in paragraph 1 of this judgment. 4. As it appears from suggestions put to prosecution witnesses in course of their cross-examination, the defence is plea of insanity and that on the alleged date and time of the occurrence the appellant by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act, he was doing, was either wrong or contrary to law. 5. In the background of facts and circumstances and the manner in which occurrence is alleged to have taken place and also defence of insanity taken by the appellant accused, the points for consideration would be whether the appellant accused at the time of occurrence, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing, was either wrong or contrary to law and whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish charge under Sec.302 I. P. C. levelled against the appellant accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 6. Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned sr. 6. Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned sr. Advocate, who is appointed amicus curiae to assist the Court though did not emphasise and dispute that deceased died a homicidal death on account of sudden assault by appellant with a mussar of wood on neck and other parts of the body of deceased yet learned amicus curiae contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when not only facts stated in the fardbeyan (Ext.1) but also it is apparent from statements of prosecution witnesses before court that right from before four days of the occurrence appellant was behaving like a mad, the appellant had attempted to assault one Ram Shakal Singh alias Bhardul singh with bhala who had escaped, in the night after entering into house of one ugam Ram the appellant had scattered the clothes, boxes etc. , day before yesterday the appellants hands were chained with iron chain, appellant had removed his right hand from the chain and after the alleged occurrence and death of deceased many persons had assaulted the appellant in order to put chain in the hands of appellant so as to control him, in all fairness to the appellant, the investigating agency should have sent the appellant immediately for medical examination and had the appellant been medically examined immediately, in all probabilities the evidence as to his insanity would be available to show that the acts attributed to appellant were committed by him when he was afflicted with mental insanity with which he was suffering and the learned Sessions Judge, in the circumstances, was not, therefore, right in rejecting plea of insanity raised by the accused, merely because the accused had not led any evidence to show that at the time of commission of offence by reason of insanity of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Learned amicus curiae also submitted that the approach of learned sessions Judge in reaching the conclusion is erroneous. Learned amicus curiae also submitted that the approach of learned sessions Judge in reaching the conclusion is erroneous. Even if there was no positive evidence available regarding the mental disease, having regard to the facts stated on record, the absence of motive for the commission of offence was also sufficient to raise a doubt if the accused had or had not the necessary intention of committing the offence of murder levelled against him and that benefit of doubt was to be given to the accused and not the prosecution and, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence as passed against the accused cannot be sustained. On the point that accused appellant in his statement recorded under sec. 313 Cr. P. C. admitted that he had assaulted the deceased with mussar on his neck and just after the occurrence he was apprehended with a piece of broken mussar and was also scolded by witnesses, learned amicus curiae submitted and contended that purpose of recording statement of accused under Section 313 Cr. P. C. is a provision to afford accused further chance to defend himself after charge was explained to him and so any statement of accused given by him under Sec.313 Cr. P. C. alone shall not prove and establish the guilt of the accused as it is well settled principle of law that it is duty of the prosecution to prove and establish the charges levelled against accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. Learned amicus curiae contended that in this case even if the factum of murder is found to be proved and established there are sufficient materials on record so as to prove and establish that at the time of occurrence the appellant was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law and if this aspect of the case is taken into consideration the appellant cannot be said to have committed offence alleged against him as provided under Sec.84 of the indian Penal Code. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Someshwar Dayal, learned a. P. P. appearing for the State, on the other hand, submitted and contended that mere absence of motive is not by itself sufficient to conclude that at the material time of the incident the accused was either of unsound mind or incapable of knowing the nature of the acts committed by him or that he was incapable of knowing the acts so being committed by him were wrong or contrary to law. He submitted, the burden of bringing the case within the exception covered by Sec.84 I. P. C. being on the accused and the accused having not adduced any evidence regarding unsoundness of mind at the relevant time in regard to the commission of the offence, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in finding the accused guilty and there are no substantial reasons to interfere with the order of conviction and sentence passed on the accused. Referring statement of appellant recorded under Sec.313 Cr. P. C. learned A. P. P. further pointed out that in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. P. C. the appellant himself admitted that he had assaulted the deceased with mussar on his neck and just after the occurrence he was apprehended with a piece of broken mussar and was also by witnesses which is also scolded indicative that the appellant had committed the offence of murder in. the manner as alleged. 8. As stated earlier, the deceased died homicidal death on account of sudden assault by the appellant with a mussar of wood on the neck and other parts of the body of deceased. The evidence of doctor (P. W.8) in this behalf having remained unchallenged, we do not consider it necessary to go into this aspect of the case. 9. In view of submission and contention advanced on behalf of amicus curiae and also learned A. P. P. before us, the material point that requires to be considered is whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea, that is to say, whether the acts of violence attributed to the accused were committed by him with the requisite intention of causing the death of the deceased or causing such bodily injuries as the accused knew were in all probability likely to cause his death. The burden of proving this beyond reasonable doubt lies heavily on the prosecution. The burden of proving this beyond reasonable doubt lies heavily on the prosecution. It is also well established that this burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. While thus the general burden to bring home the necessary ingre-dients of the offence of murder rests throughout on the prosecution and the prosecution successfully discharge the burden then the accused has to satisfactorily establish his plea of insanity by placing such material before the Court oral or documentary this may be either by admissions elicited from the witness or the materials placed by the prosecution itself. In the case of Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court while enunciating the law on the point has observed as follows: "it is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in S.299 of the i. P. C. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, s.84 of the I. P. C. provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was Incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under s.105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under S.105 of the evidence Act, read with the definition of "shall presume" in s.4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of "prudent man". If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of "prudent man" the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under S.105 of the evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in S.299 of the i. P. C. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity. " Proceeding further, after a review of various decisions expounding the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of plea of insanity, the Supreme Court has observed as follows (Para 7): "the doctrine of burden of proof in the context to the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by S.84 of the I. P. C. the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence-oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged. " 10. Those very principles have been reiterated and re-emphasised in the de- , cisions in the cases of Bhikari V/s. State of u. P. ; Ratan Lal V/s. State of M. P. , S. W. Mohammed V/s. State of Maharashtra and oyami Ayatu V/s. State of M. P. 11. While ordinarily the existence of motive for the commission of an offence alleged and the manner of its commission-the weapons used and the vital parts of the body on which the injuries are inflicted-may themselves be sufficient in a given case to establish that the accused had committed the acts of violence with such intention of causing the death of the person murdered, because every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his acts; but where the acts of violence are committed by a person apparently for no motive and in an ordinarily ununderstandable manner killing a person against whom he had no grouse, a doubt necessarily arises in the mind of the Court as to whether at the relevant point of time the accused was an ordinary person who can be presumed to know the consequences of his acts. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed, and whether the accused was in such state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of S.84 I. P. C. can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime. 12. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed, and whether the accused was in such state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of S.84 I. P. C. can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime. 12. Though there is no burden cast on the prosecution to establish negatively that the accused was not of unsoundmind when he committed the acts of violence resulting in the death of the person or persons murdered, yet in the circumstances of the instant case where the prosecution story as disclosed by the informant (P. W.6) itself indicates that right from four days before the occurrence the appellant. Nanhak used to behave like mad, had attempted to assault one Ram shakal Singh Bhardul Singh with bhala, entering into house of one Ugam Ram in the night had scattered his clothes, boxes etc. , day before yesterday, i. e. , on 16.4.86 iron chain was put in the hands of appellant and appellant had managed to take out his right hand from the chain and after the alleged occurrence the appellant was not only chained but also assaulted by people resulting hurt to him, fairness in investigation does requires probing into this aspect with an unbiased approach particularly when the accused himself cannot in the very nature of things asset in unravelling the necessary facts being in custody and may be being mentally imbalanced. Therefore, it becomes obligatory on the part of the investigating agency, particularly when the accused is apprehended at about the time of the commission of the offence or shortly thereafter, to subject the accused to medical examination, at least to ensure itself that the accused was in fact a person of ordinary state of mind. If that is done, it necessarily rules out the possibility of the accused having committed the acts of violence attributed to him on account of mental disease or lunacy. The prosecution must place all such materials that could possibly be had. The failure to subject the accused to such medical examination immediately and to place all evidence that could be available may -have, depending on facts and circumstances of a case, a serious consequence on the prosecution case. The prosecution must place all such materials that could possibly be had. The failure to subject the accused to such medical examination immediately and to place all evidence that could be available may -have, depending on facts and circumstances of a case, a serious consequence on the prosecution case. When such plea of insanity is raised by the accused at the trial, as that may give rise to a doubt whether the act or acts of violence were committed with the requisite intention of committing a particular offence and any such failure on the part of the prosecution to collect the evidence and place before the Court on the mental aspect of the accused, creates serious infirmity in the case of the prosecution and consequently the benefit of doubt will nay to be given to the accused. 13. Coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant admittedly had previous history of lunacy, inasmuch as none but informant (P. W.6) in his fardbeyan categorically stated that right from (our days before the occurrence appellant Nanhak Ram used to behave like mad and had attempted to assault one ram Shakal Singh alias Bhardul Singh with bhala but Ram Shakal Singh had escaped, the appellant also entering into house of one Ugam Ram in the night had scattered his clothes, boxes etc. Day before yesterday, i. e. , on 16.4.86 iron chain was put in the hands of the appellant and the appellant had managed to take out his right hand from the chain and that after death of his brother in order to control the appellant and to put chain in the hands of the appellant people had assaulted the appellant with lathi resulting hurt to appellant. All these facts stated by none but informant in his fardbeyan itself are sufficient to indicate that the mental condition of the appellant was not normal right from four days before the occurrence till the relevant time of occurrence Not only the statement of the informant (P. W.6) indicate the mental condition of appellant at the relevant time of occurrence but the statement of p. W.5 Raj Bahadur Singh that the appellant uttering that he would offer Ram narayan Singh (deceased) to Goddess assaulted him (deceased) with mussar is also indicative that the mental condition of the appellant at the relevant time of occurrence was not that of a normal man. The statement of P. W.5 in his cross-examination that appellant had no, enmity with the deceased is also indicative that appellant had no motive to commit murder of the deceased. P. W.6 Jai Narain singh, the informant, also stated before court that appellant had chased Ram shakal Singh to assault him with bhala and further that appellant always had been doing such acts. P. W.7 Rajeshwar singh who appears to have claimed to see the appellant assaulting deceased with mussar, in his statement before court also stated that before the alleged occurrence appellant had chased Bhardul singh with bhala. P. W.9 Pran Mohan Jha who had investigated the case also stated that he had arrested the appellant while he was injured and his lefts and hands were chained. 14. Taking into consideration the statement of informant and other prosecution witnesses itself in its totality, it is evidently dear that appellant had not only previous history of lunacy but he was of unsound mind at the relevant time of occurrence also. In view of the above, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that he was an ordinary person presumed to know the consequences of his acts, when he allegedly committed the acts of violence. No doubt the burden to establish the legal insanity lies on the accused, but the burden cannot be as heavy as it lies on the prosecution to establish its case. Even if the accused appellant had failed to establish conclusively the plea raised by him regarding the legal insanity within the meaning of sec. 84 I. P. C. , the facts and circumstances, established in the case do show that the appellant had suffered mental insanity and, when under such influence of insanity, his behaviour was abnormal. Though it is not possible to say on account of insanity to what extent the behaviour of the accused used to be abnormal and if there was or not any homicidal tendency at the relevant time of occurrence, the failure on the part of the investigating Officers to lead evidence as to the mental condition of the accused when he was in custody and to produce evidence about nature of insanity, in the given facts and circumstances if the case here, introduces an infirmity in proving the presence of mens rea, the essential ingredients of the offence of murder. This given rise to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court and therefore the accused would be entitled to an acquittal on the ground that the persecution has failed to discharge the general burden that lies on it and established the case beyond all reasonable doubt. Learned Sessions Judge, in our opinion, was not, therefore, right in the circumstances of the case here, in his conclusion that the accused was in perfect state of mind when he committed acts of violence resulting death of deceased. The circumstances relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge to reach that conclusion are not by themselves sufficient to show what was the real state of mind of the accused. 15. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed on the appellant-accused Nanhak ram by the Sessions Judge, Saran, chapra, in Sessions Trial No.55 of 1987 and acquit him. Since the appellant is on bail he is also discharged from the liabilities of the bail bonds. Appeal allowed.