ORDER : 1. These two Criminal Petitions arise put of the Order dated 21-07-2006 in Grl.M.P. No. 498 of 2006 in FIR No. R.C. 14(A)/06-CBI-Hyd. on the file of the learned Special Judge for C.B.I. Cases, Hyderabad. Therefore, they are disposed of by this common order. 2. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the impugned Order. By the impugned order, the petitioner/A-9 was granted anticipatory bail on certain conditions, in the above crime. Criminal Petition No. 3474 of 2006 is filed by the petitioner/A-9 to reduce the amount of surety as ordered by the learned Special Judge in the impugned order, whereas Criminal Petition No. 3688 of 2006 is filed by the State represented by the CBI/SPE/Hyderabad for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioner/A-9. 3. The brief facts that led to filing of Criminal Petition No. 3688 of 2006 may be stated as follows: The present petitioner is A-9 in the above crime. Some of the bank officials of Indian Overseas Bank, Basheerbagh branch, Hyderabad conspired with some private persons including the present petitioner in the matter of irregular sanction and disbursement of housing loans and caused wrongful loss to the bank to a tune of Rs. 47 lakhs and odd. When the present petitioner was summoned for the purpose of investigation, he avoided to attend before the investigating officer and absconded. While the bail application was pending, the learned Special Judge directed the C.B.I. to conduct detailed verification about existence of 3 flats in Pooja Residency and submit a report. Accordingly, the Inspector of Police submitted a detailed report along with photographs and videographs. It is alleged that against one flat, the present petitioner secured 3 housing loans and G. 1 and G. 2 flats were actually non-existent and only one flat is existing in ground floor. Two more cases were also registered for allegedly cheating of banks to a tune of Rs. 4.9 crorers in irregular sanction and disbursement of 54 housing loans. It is alleged that the present petitioner mobilised 54 borrowers and submitted fake pay slips, employment certificates, income tax returns and fabricated lease deeds to the banks. During the course of investigation, the present petitioner did not co-operate with the investigating agency. It is alleged that he is a habitual offender, who defrauded many banks. It is alleged that the present petitioner mobilised 54 borrowers and submitted fake pay slips, employment certificates, income tax returns and fabricated lease deeds to the banks. During the course of investigation, the present petitioner did not co-operate with the investigating agency. It is alleged that he is a habitual offender, who defrauded many banks. At this stage, allowing him to go on anticipatory bail would be detrimental to the investigation in this case. The Special Court granted the pre-arrest bail without considering the material collected by the investigating agency in proper perspective. The learned Special Judge, having called for the report, granted the anticipatory bail without even adverting to the report, hence, the Criminal Petition. 4. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by A-9 stating that the C.B.I. has to approach the Special Court which granted the anticipatory bail, for cancellation of the bail. For the last two years, A-9 has been subjected to severe harassment in the hands of officials of C.B.I. for the reasons best known to them. The then investigating officer Mr. N. Ashwini Kumar approached A-9 and asked him to pay certain amount and then only his name would be excluded from the case. As A-9 was advised not to indulge in such malpractices he did not heed to the demand, and so the present case is registered against him. A-9 was arrested on 30-09-2004 in R.C. No. 28(A)/2004, but as no material was placed before the Special Court, he was not remanded to judicial custody. Thereafter, another case in R.C. No. 36(A)/2004 was registered against A-9, and he was arrested on 10-01-2005. This time also, he was not remanded to judicial custody in view of the fact that there was no prima facie material available to show his involvement in the crime. The investigating officer is acting in high-handed fashion and he himself is the person who conducted search and everything. Thus, the cases are foisted because A-9 did not fulfil the illegal demands made by said Ashwini Kumar. The main allegation is that A-9 is the owner of one flat, but as a matter of fact, he purchased 3 flats under registered sale deeds and has been paying property tax to the flats, and he has not furnished a single false or fake document and he has not involved in any act of fabrication or forgery or misrepresentation. The main allegation is that A-9 is the owner of one flat, but as a matter of fact, he purchased 3 flats under registered sale deeds and has been paying property tax to the flats, and he has not furnished a single false or fake document and he has not involved in any act of fabrication or forgery or misrepresentation. The allegation that A-9 is about to flee the country, is baseless since he has never applied for passport. The record would go to show that A-9 was fully co-operating with C.B.I. in investigation. There are no grounds to cancel the anticipatory bail granted and hence, it is prayed to dismiss the Criminal Petition No. 3688 of 2006. 5. The Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I. contended that the learned Special Judge without considering the material on record and without adverting to the report filed by the C.B.I. mechanically passed the order in a serious case of this nature; that no reasons are assigned in the impugned order. He further contended that it is a clear case of fraud played by A-9 and cheating the bank to a tune of Rs. 47 lakhs and odd in this case and about Rs. 4.9 crores in other cases registered against him; that custodial interrogation is necessary for smooth conduct of investigation in eliciting material; that for the first time in this petition, A-9 is making wild allegations against the officials of C.B.I. about demanding illegal amounts. 6. The Special Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision in Directorate of Enforcement v. P.V. Prabhakar Rao, (1997) 6 SCC 647 wherein it is held as follows: (Para 12) “The most glaring feature which even the respondent did not repudiate is the magnitude of the criminal conspiracy hatched, the ingenuity with which the cabal was orchestrated and the meticulousness with which it was implemented and the colossal amount of foreign exchange siphoned off from the country. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law.” 7. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law.” 7. The Special Public Prosecutor also relied upon a decision in State represented by the C.B.I. v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 wherein it is held as follows: (para 6) “We find force in the submission of the C.B.I. that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremedous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a prearrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders.” 8. In another decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : AIR 1980 SC 1632 case, a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court held as follow: (para 13). “This is not to say that anticipatory bail, if granted, must be granted, without the imposition of any conditions. That will be plainly contrary to the very terms of Section 438. Though sub-section (1) of that section says that the Court “may, if it thinks fit” issue the necessary direction for bail, sub-section (2) confers on the Court the power to include such conditions in the direction as it may think fit in the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions mentioned in Cls. (i) to (iv) of that sub-section. The controversy therefore is not whether the Court has the power to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail. It clearly and expressly has that power. (i) to (iv) of that sub-section. The controversy therefore is not whether the Court has the power to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail. It clearly and expressly has that power. The true question is whether by a process of construction, the amplitude of judicial discretion which is given to the High Court and the Court of Session, to impose such conditions as they may think fit while granting anticipatory bail, should be cut down by reading into the statute conditions which are not to be found therein, like those evolved by the High Court or canvassed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. Our answer, clearly and emphatically, is in the negative. The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on such conditions as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant under Section 439 of the Code.”. 9. The Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I. also placed strong reliance on a decision in Muraleedharan v. State of Kerala, (2001) 4 SCC 638 : 2001 (2) ALT (Crl.) 48 (SC) wherein it is held as follows: “If the position is thus in regard to an accused even after arrest, it is incomprehensible how the position would be less when he approaches the court for pre-arrest bail knowing that he would also be implicated as an accused. Custodial interrogation of such an accused is indispensably necessary for the investigating agency to unearth all the links involved in the criminal conspiracies committed by the persons which ultimately led to the capital tragedy. We express our reprobation at the supercilious manner in which the Sessions Judge decided to think that “no material could be collected by the investigating agency to connect the petitioner with the crime except the confessional statement of the co-accused.” Such a wayward thinking emanating from a Sessions Judge deserves judicial condemnation. No court can afford to presume that the investigating agency would fail to trace out more materials to prove the accusation against an accused. No court can afford to presume that the investigating agency would fail to trace out more materials to prove the accusation against an accused. We are at a loss to understand what would have prompted the Sessions to conclude, at this early stage, that the investigating agency would not be able to collect any material to connect the appellant with the crime. The order of the Sessions Judge, blessing the appellant with a pre-arrest bail order, would have remained a bugbear of how the discretion conferred on Sessions Judges under Section 438 Cr.P.C. would have been misused. It is heartening that the High Court of Kerala did not allow such an order to remain in force for long by the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court an unwholesome benefit wangled by the appellant was rightly reversed.” 10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor placing strong reliance on the aforesaid decisions, contended that custodial interrogation of A-9 is necessary and that the learned Special Judge ought not to have granted the anticipatory bail and hence, he prayed to cancel the bail. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for A-9 vehemently contended that it is a total misuse of power by C.B.I. officials in implicating the petitioner in false cases; that C.B.I. has not filed any material to show that A-9 committed fraud on the banks or cheated the banks; as A-9 did not fulfil the demands made by the officials, false cases are foisted against him. He further contended that under 3 registered sale deeds, 3 flats were purchased by A-9 by taking loans and that encumbrance certificate and property tax demand notices would clearly go to show about the existence of 3 flats in Pooja Residency and that C.B.I. falled to file any prima facie material about involvement of A-9; that on two earlier occasions, the Special Judge for C.B.I. cases refused the request of C.B.I. to remand A-9 to judicial custody and that after considering the entire material on record in right perspective, the Special Judge granted anticipatory bail; that it is nowhere alleged that the A-9 is trying to tamper with the evidence and though it is stated that he would flee to abroad, it is absolutely false in view of the fact that A-9 never applied for passport nor does he possess a passport at all; hence, he prays to dismiss the petition filed by C.B.I. for cancellation of anticipatory bail and further prays to reduce the surety amount ordered by the Special Judge as it is onerous. 12. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for A-9 relied on a decision in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, 1994 Crl.L.J. 2269 wherein it is held as follows: (Para 50) “Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police officer and a Magistrate but also under certain circumstances or given situations to private persons. Further, when an accused person appears before a Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the Magistrate is empowered to take that accused person into custody and deal with him according to law. Needless to emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the arrest of the person concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice-versa and that both the words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not synonymous terms. To put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the arrest of the person concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice-versa and that both the words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not synonymous terms. Though ‘custody’ may amount to an arrest in certain circumstances but not under all circumstances, if these two terms are interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted and adopted, would lead to a startling anomally resulting in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi, (1984 Cri.L.J. 134 (FB) (Mad.)).” 13. There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court that the Magistrate is not empowered automatically to remand an accused to judicial custody and he has to apply his mind and do so if he is satisfied that adequate ground exists therefor. The order passed in other two cases are not under challenge before this Court. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for A-9 has no application to the facts of the present case. 14. The Apex Court in State of U.P. through C.B.I. v. Amarmani Tripati, 2005 (3) ALT (Crl.) 294 (SC) : (2005) 8 SCC 21 case, considered various decisions and held that the circumstances to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behavious, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. 15. Now, it has to be seen whether the above principles have been followed by the learned Special Court while granting anticipatory bail in this case. 15. Now, it has to be seen whether the above principles have been followed by the learned Special Court while granting anticipatory bail in this case. The relevant portion of the order impugned reasons as follows: (Para 8) “The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was already granted bail in two other crimes on similar set of facts is not denied by the learned public prosecutor and as the prosecution is not in a position to apprehend the accused even from the date of filing of this petition i.e., 14-06-2006 i.e. since more than a month, and as the investigating officer has stated in his counter that he has not yet commenced investigation in this case, I am of the opinion that there cannot be a change in the situation, if the petitioner/accused is not available to the police. I am, therefore, inclined to grant anticipatory bail with conditions to make him available to the prosecution for the expeditious completion of investigation. The point is answered in favour of the petitioner.” 16. It is the only reason assigned by the learned Special Judge for granting the anticipatory bail to A-9. The case of the prosecution has not at all been considered by the Special Judge. The observation “…. as the investigating officer has stated in his counter that he has not yet commenced investigation in this case……” is without any basis. There is no such averment in the counter filed by C.B.I. Admittedly, during the pendency of bail application, the Special Court by its Order dated 05-07-2006 in Crl.M.P. No. 568 of 2006 requested the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. Hyderabad to direct any other competent police officer to verify the fact on ground whether three different flats are in existence in Pooja Residency as G. 1, G. 2 and G. 3 as contended by the counsel for A-9 or there is only one flat in the ground floor as contended by the C.B.I. Counsel, and submit a report on or before 11-07-2006. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police submitted a detailed report on 12-07-2006 after examining the witnesses and after taking photographs and videographs of the disputed premises. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police submitted a detailed report on 12-07-2006 after examining the witnesses and after taking photographs and videographs of the disputed premises. It is stated in the report that A-9 cheated the bank by wrongfully describing his flat as G. 1, G. 2 and G. 3 on various occasions, but in reality there is only one flat availabel in ground floor and there are no flats with Nos. G. 1, G. 2 and G. 3 in Pooja Residency. It is only on a field enquiry, they came to conclusion that ground floor in pooja Residency contains only one flat i.e. Flat No. 001 which has been unauthorisedly bifurcated into flat Nos. 001 and G. 3 and there are no flats bearing Nos. G. 1 and G. 2 in Pooja Residency having called for such a report in the bail application filed by A-9, the learned Special Judge ought to have prima facie accepted or rejected the report giving reasons. There was no reference at all to this report in the impugned order. No doubt, grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the discretion of Special Court, but at the same time, such a discretion has to be exercised judicially, the circumstances under which bail can be granted have not at all been considered by the Special Court. The order should not be capricious. 17. When a specific stand has been taken by the C.B.I., that A-9 would not co-operate with the investigation if he is ordered to be released on anticipatory bail and that he would tamper with the witnesses and destory the material objects which affect the speedy and fair investigation and that it is a serious economic offence as the Indian Overseas Bank sustained huge loss of Rs. 47 lakhs and odd, these aspects have not at all been considered by the Special Court. In a mechanical or routine manner, the impugned Order has been passed granting anticipatory bail to A-9. 18. The petitioner is allegedly involved in two other cases. One in F.I.R. No. RC. 28(A)/04 wherein it is alleged that A-9 herein conspired with Senior Manager of Corporation Bank, Banjara Hills branch, and got irregular sanction and disbursement of 54 home loans. In a mechanical or routine manner, the impugned Order has been passed granting anticipatory bail to A-9. 18. The petitioner is allegedly involved in two other cases. One in F.I.R. No. RC. 28(A)/04 wherein it is alleged that A-9 herein conspired with Senior Manager of Corporation Bank, Banjara Hills branch, and got irregular sanction and disbursement of 54 home loans. Further, A-9 herein opened fictitious accounts in other banks in the names of genuine builders to siphon off the loan amounts sanctioned in the name of the builders and thereby caused loss of about Rs. 490 lakhs to the bank and A-1 to A-4 therein gained unlawful gain to themselves. The other case in F.I.R. No. 36(A)/04. The allegations therein would go to show that bank officials conspired with private persons like A-9 herein, and obtained loans to the tune of Rs. 82.45 lakhs on improper pre-sanction and pre-disbursement verification. The serious allegations in these two cases have not been considered by the learned Special Judge while granting the bail. The learned Special Judge totally ignored the relevant considerations for grant of anticipatory bail. The learned Special Judge has not exercised his discretion properly and judiciously in granting the anticipatory bail and so the impugned order is liable to be quashed to secure interests of Justice. In the result, without expressing any opinion with regard to cancellation of the anticipatory bail, the matter is remitted to the Court below for disposal of the bail application afresh bearing in mind the principles laid down by the Apex Court in State of U.P. through C.B.I. v. Amarmani Tripati case (6 supra) and uninfluenced by any observation or finding made hereinbefore. Criminal Petition No. 3688 of 2006 is, accordingly, allowed quashing the impugned Order. 19. In view of the quashing of the impugned Order, question of relaxing the condition as prayed for in Criminal Petition No. 3474 of 2006 does not arise and hence, the same is dismissed.