Judgment Prakash Tatia, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is against the Judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 01.08.1995 and dismissal of the appellants appeal by the appellate Court vide Judgment and decree dated 17.03.1998. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction of the defendants, who are the descendants of original tenant Dr. N.K. Gulati. As per the facts pleaded by the plaintiff landlord and substantially which are not in dispute, the suit property was let out to deceased dentist Dr. Gulati for running dental clinic, on 10.06.1966. Unfortunately, Dr. Gulati died on 211.1992. The plaintiff filed the suit against the heirs of said Dr. Gulati for possession of the suit premises on the ground that since the suit premises was taken on rent for only purpose of running dental clinic and Dr. Gulati himself was running, the dental clinic in the suit premises and he died and none of his family members were working with the said tenant in the dental clinic during the life time or at the time of death of Dr. Gulati, therefore, none of the legal heir of deceased tenant is entitled to any protection under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short the Rent Control Act of 1950) and they are not tenant as per the definition of tenant given in Section 3(vii) of the Rent Control Act of 1950. Another ground of eviction is that after the death of Dr. Gulati, the suit premises is not in use for any purpose and more than six months have already passed, therefore, even under the Rent Control Act of 1950, the plaintiff is entitled to decree for possession against the defendants (descendants of deceased tenant Dr. Gulati). 4. In the written statement, the defendants admitted that Dr. Gulati was dentist and he was running the dental clinic in the suit premises. The defendants further pleaded that the dental clinic is still running (even after the death of Dr. Gulati on 211.1992). The defendants also pleaded that even the Defendant No. 1, wife of the original tenant, was also giving help to the deceased tenant in running his clinic. However, the defendants admitted that the Defendant No. 2 is in Government service and the Defendant No. 3 is a student. Gulati on 211.1992). The defendants also pleaded that even the Defendant No. 1, wife of the original tenant, was also giving help to the deceased tenant in running his clinic. However, the defendants admitted that the Defendant No. 2 is in Government service and the Defendant No. 3 is a student. However, during his studies, the Defendant No. 3 also used to do work in his fathers clinic. It is also submitted that even the Defendant No. 2 was also helping the deceased tenant in his clinic. It is further pleaded that in running the dental clinic, the speciality and degree is required for the purpose of surgery but the other connected works can be done even by a 10th passed student. In reply to the allegation of non-user of the premises, the defendants pleaded that it is wrong to say that the suit premises was not used without any reasonable cause and at the same time, also pleaded that the suit premises never remained closed and the clinic is going on. 5. The trial Court framed three issues and thereafter, while deciding the Issue No. 1 held that the Defendants No. 1 and 2 were not doing any work with the deceased tenant and they are not tenants. However, so far as the second son-Defendant No. 3 is concerned, the Court held that he was helping his father, therefore, he falls in the category of tenant as defined under Section 3(vii) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 and protection is available to him against his eviction under the Rent Control Act of 1950 and he can be evicted only upon proving any of ground for his eviction as provided under Section 13 of the Rent Control Act of 1950 only. While deciding Issue No. 2, the trial Court held that so far as closure of suit premises after the death of original tenant for 12 days is concerned, it was reasonable but keeping the premises closed thereafter for more than six months, it was without any reasonable cause. In view of the above, only on the ground of non-user of the suit premises by the tenant without any reasonable cause for more than six months, the trial Court decreed the suit for eviction of the tenant by the Judgment and decree dated 01.08.1995. 6. In view of the above, only on the ground of non-user of the suit premises by the tenant without any reasonable cause for more than six months, the trial Court decreed the suit for eviction of the tenant by the Judgment and decree dated 01.08.1995. 6. Aggrieved against the said Judgment and decree, the defendants preferred appeal which was dismissed by the first appellate Court vide Judgment and decree dated 17.03.1998. Hence, this second appeal. 7. It is not in dispute that after the dismissal of the appeal, the possession of the suit premises has been taken over by the landlord obviously by executing the decree. 8. This second appeal was admitted by this Court on 08.07.1998 on finding that the following substantial question of law arise in this case:- "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case where the original tenant who was a dentist died and the premises were not used for the purpose for which the original tenant was inducted in them for a period of about 10 months before filing of the suit, it could not be held that the premises were not used for the purpose they were let without any reasonable cause?" 9. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, it is settled law that drawing inference from the admitted facts or proved facts is a question of law and in this case, it is the substantial question of law because of the simple reason that admittedly, the tenant died on 211.1992 and that was the reason for not running the clinic by the tenant himself . That cause cannot be said to be a cause not reasonable. It is also submitted that one of the defendants, none else than the son of the original tenant was working in the dental clinic during life time of his father - tenant hence, he has been held tenant by the two Courts below. This finding of fact is not under challenge and is binding also. Coupled with this fact, it is not in dispute that after some time, at least from 01.01.1994, the tenants son started the clinic business in the suit premises. This finding of fact is not under challenge and is binding also. Coupled with this fact, it is not in dispute that after some time, at least from 01.01.1994, the tenants son started the clinic business in the suit premises. However, according to learned Counsel for the appellant, in fact the son of the appellant was doing the business of clinic in the suit shop from the time of his father and he continued so thereafter also and it is vehemently submitted that even if finding of fact has been recorded against the appellants so far as continuation of the clinic by the tenants son, even then in the facts of this case, when the tenants son was in the medical college and he was about to clear his medical course within a short period of 1 ½ years only or less than that, then not running of dental clinic for that short period cannot be said to be an unreasonable long period. In the totality of the facts, if the cause was there for not doing the business by the tenant and cause continued for some longer period than six months and one of the heirs of the deceased tenant became eligible to do the same work which the original tenant was doing in the suit shop, then in such circumstances, no eviction decree can be passed because in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the tenant or his descendants have not used the suit premises without any reasonable cause. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the Judgment of this Court delivered in the case C.P. Massey vs. Hira Chand, reported in 1977 RCR 582 = 1976 WLN (UC) 415. In the said case, the tenant left the town to reside with his wife who was in service. This Court held that even as per the pleadings of the plaintiff himself , there was a reasonable cause and the decree for eviction cannot be passed against the tenant in such fact circumstances. 11. The Judgment referred herein above was again considered by this Court in the case of Sewa Ram vs. Manoj Kumar, reported in 1994 (1) WLC 45 (Raj). 11. The Judgment referred herein above was again considered by this Court in the case of Sewa Ram vs. Manoj Kumar, reported in 1994 (1) WLC 45 (Raj). The view which was taken in the case of C.P. Massey(Supra) has not been distinguished or referred to any larger bench and the single bench of this Court in Sewa Rams case also observed that in the case of C.P. Massey, the statement on the face of it showed that there was reasonable cause for the tenant not to occupy the premises during the period of six months preceding the date of suit. However, it may be relevant to mention here that so far as observation about not pleading the words "without reasonable cause" specifically in the plaint is concerned, the Court observed that the observation made in C.P. Masseys case (Supra) is only obiter dicta and not the ratio of decision. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellant further heavily relied upon the Judgment of Bombay High Court delivered in the case of Achut Pandurang Kulkarni vs. Sadashiv Ganesh Phulambrikar, reported in AIR 1973 Bombay 210. In this case the Bombay High Court observed that the petitioner established beyond any reasonable doubt that he wanted himself and his family to occupy the premises at all stages but as he was compelled to stay in Sholapur, he appeared to have shifted temporarily to that place. The facts that he went on paying rent regularly paid electricity charges and the fact that the petitioner and his wife were trying to be on good terms with the respondent by even inviting the respondent to stay with them in Sholapur, clearly show that the tenant never intended to stop the use of the suit premises for his own residence. In the said case, the Bombay High Court also observed that the tenant was compelled not to stay in the suit premises because of his transfer. He had reasonable cause, having regard to his conduct and the circumstances of the case, for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. 13. He had reasonable cause, having regard to his conduct and the circumstances of the case, for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the plaintiff himself relied upon the advertisement issued by the defendants and which is projected to show that the clinic was started on 01.01.1994 whereas in fact, at that time, only new persons were inducted in running dental clinic of the defendants. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances, the two Courts below committed serious error of law. 14. It is also submitted that even if the defendant would not have submitted his written statement even then and even if the Court would have proceeded ex-parte against the tenant, it was the duty of the Court to record its satisfaction about the existence of the ground for eviction of tenant and in this case, about the cause for non-user of the suit shop. Though both the Courts have decided against the appellant but both the Courts below have drawn wrong inference from the facts and evidence available on record. 15. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent vehemently submitted that the plea taken by the appellants before this Court in second appeal is not tenable only on the ground that no case set up by the appellants that in fact, death was the cause of non-user of the suit shop but contrary to it according to defendants/appellants, doctors presence was not at all necessary for running the dental clinic. Not only this but the defendants specifically pleaded that clinic was never closed but it continued even after the death of dentist tenant. By arguing that death was cause for closer of dental clinic, the appellants want to withdraw their admission made in pleading by oral submission or by taking ground in memo of appeal only which is not permissible under law. Further it is not the pleading of the defendants that the suit shop remained closed and there was reasonable cause and that cause continued till deceased tenants son acquired qualification of MBBS. Further it is not the pleading of the defendants that the suit shop remained closed and there was reasonable cause and that cause continued till deceased tenants son acquired qualification of MBBS. It is also not the case of the defendants that in hope that one of the son of the deceased tenant was student of medical course and he will acquire qualification of dentist in future and thereafter he will run the dental clinic. It is also submitted that when that was not the issue raised by the defendants, the defendants now cannot say that whether the closure of the dental clinic for the period atleast from 211.1992 to 01.01.1994 was due to reasonable cause. 16. It is also submitted that this Court in the case of Sant Lal vs. Harbans Singh, reported in 1982 RLW 274, held that the facts relating to non-user of premises with or without reasonable cause are within the special knowledge of the tenant and the burden of proof lies upon him (tenant). 17. Yet another Judgment of Bombay High Court delivered in the case in Amrutlal Devichand Jain & Anr. vs. Smt. Nagibai Hari Thakur, reported in 1986 (Sup.) RCR 297, is relied by the learned Counsel for the respondent wherein the suit shop was let out for tailoring business and the tenant died. The wife and son of deceased tenant were using the premises occasionally for residential purpose and business of tailoring was not started and no evidence was there that they would revive the business. In the fact circumstance, the Bombay High Court held that it amounts to non-user of the premises without reasonable cause and the tenant is liable to be ejected. 18. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the reasons given by the two Courts below. 19. The relevant clause giving rise to the landlord to seek eviction on the ground of non-user is Clause (j) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 which is as under:- "(j) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit." 20. The emphasis is on the interpretation of words "without reasonable clause" used in Section 13(1)(j). The emphasis is on the interpretation of words "without reasonable clause" used in Section 13(1)(j). The whole gamut of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that in the facts of this case, firstly, the suit premises was not closed even after the death of tenant. Secondly, even if it is held that the suit shop remained closed from 211.1992 till the clinic started from 01.01.1994 that closer was not "without reasonable cause". It is also submitted that it is the duty of the Court to assess the reasonableness also before passing the decree for eviction of the tenant when sought under Section 13(i)(j). 21. It is true that before passing a decree for eviction of a tenant, the Court is required to be satisfied about the existence of the grounds for eviction as enumerated in Section 13(1) and the tenants have statutory protection against their eviction if Court is not satisfied about the existence of ground for eviction of the tenant under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act of 1950. It is also settled law that even by agreement of the parties, the decree of eviction cannot be passed when the grounds are non-existent. 22. In this case, the facts are very peculiar in nature because of the simple reason that the plaintiff specifically pleaded that the suit shop was let out to a doctor for the purpose of running dental clinic. This fact has been specifically admitted by the defendants in their written statement. Therefore, their premises was let out for not broader commercial purpose but was let out for specific purpose only and that is for running dental clinic. Plea of the appellants taken in written statement that dental clinic can be run by even unqualified person is liable to be rejected because one can work as dentist only after study of specific and specialised course for the subject. A person doing any job in dental clinic, how long it may be, by mere working there cannot become dentist, may he have worked there for years and decades. Preparing denture (which also can be under supervision of dental doctor and also can be as per specification given by the doctor) also cannot make such person competent person to run dental clinic itself . Preparing denture (which also can be under supervision of dental doctor and also can be as per specification given by the doctor) also cannot make such person competent person to run dental clinic itself . Therefore, it was the duty of the defendants - legal heirs of deceased tenant to prove that the dental clinic could have been run by any of the family member of the deceased tenant after the death of dentist tenant and further that said family member was doing so in such rented clinic in the life time of dentist tenant. Not only this, but it is also not the case of the defendants in written statement and in evidence that at the time of death of Dr. Gulati, the tenant, any dental doctor was working with him or even thereater, who could have run the clinic. Even if that would have been the situation, it is doubtful whether it could have saved the tenant because as per Sub-clause (vii) of Section 3, tenant can be only family member doing business with tenant at the time of death of the tenant. However, this issue is left open as not arising in this case. 23. It is true that despite the above legal position, the Courts below held that one of the sons of the tenant namely, Vishal Gulati, who subsequently became doctor (not dentist), was working with the deceased tenant in the clinic and, therefore, he is tenant covered under the definition of tenant given under Section 3(vii) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 but that appears to be on the assumption that any activity supporting running of dental clinic itself is also running of dental clinic, but that appears not to be correct because of the reasons mentioned above. It appears that two Courts below failed to draw distinction between running a clinic and doing business relating to the clinical work. If the view given by the Courts below is accepted, then it will result into accepting the position that a dental clinic can be run by any person having no qualification of medical education of dental course. 4.24. At this stage, it will be relevant to mention that a doctor can run dental clinic without any infrastructure like X-ray, MRI facility, preparation of denture and connected work. He can run his dental clinic by advising the patients for treatment. 4.24. At this stage, it will be relevant to mention that a doctor can run dental clinic without any infrastructure like X-ray, MRI facility, preparation of denture and connected work. He can run his dental clinic by advising the patients for treatment. But all other works like taking X-Ray, MRI, preparing dentures etc. alone or jointly are ancillary to medical practice. Taking X-Ray, MRI, preparing dentures etc. as per the requirement sent by the doctor cannot make the said unit a dental clinic. That can be a laboratory or medial shop but in no case, a clinic. This view finds support from the evidence of the defendants themselves. The only witness who can be said to have knowledge on the subject is defendant Dr. Vishal Gulathi himself and he is son of deceased tenant Dr. Gulati. He in his cross-examination clearly admitted that for running a clinic, a special degree is required and that was with Dr. Gulati. This statement of defendant gives a correct picture. However, he thereafter stated that he is also having a degree of dental surgery but that degree was not produced either in the trial Court or before the first appellate Court nor it is a case of the defendants now in the second appeal that the tenants son also became dental surgeon. The said statement of DW 1 Vishal Gulati that he has degree of dental surgery is also wrong because of the reason that he admitted that after the death of Dr. Gulati an advertisement was published by them in the newspaper Rajasthan Patrika on 05.01.1994 informing the public that in Dr. N.K. Gulatis clinic, special dental care services are available and consultant has been shown as Dr. Umesh Vyas, BDS and in this advertisement (Exhibit 2), name of defendant - deceased tenants son has not been given. The obvious reason is that he was general doctor and even as on 05.01.1994, he was not qualified to run the dental clinic. It is not the case of the defendants that thereafter also, anybody from the family of the deceased tenant became qualified to run the dental clinic. Therefore, it is also held that the dental clinic was not run by any of the legal heir of deceased Dr. Gulati himself , not even after 05.01.1994. Not only this but it is not the evidence of Dr. Therefore, it is also held that the dental clinic was not run by any of the legal heir of deceased Dr. Gulati himself , not even after 05.01.1994. Not only this but it is not the evidence of Dr. Vishal Gulati that after his completion of medical course, he started his medical practice (not dental) in the said clinic and as per his admission, he is not qualified to work as dentist. Hence, it is proved that the suit shop was not used for the purpose for which it was taken on rent by the tenant after the death of the tenant. 25. For burden of proof , once cause arises for not using the premises for the purpose for which it was let out than after initial discharge of burden of proof by the plaintiff landlord, the onus shifts upon the tenant. It is heavy duty of the tenant to show cause for non-user of the premises and prove it by evidence. The view finds support from the several Judgment s and one of which has been rightly relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant and that is Sant Lals case (Supra). 26. It appears that the defendants failed to notice distinction between cause for non user of shop by the tenant and consequence thereof . Obviously, because of this reason only, they failed in admitting that due to reasonable cause (and, that is death of sole tenant) the suit premises was not used by the tenant for the purpose for which it was let out. Even if the defendants have not pleaded so, this Court is of the view that due to death of tenant, there was reasonable cause for not using the premises for the purpose (even for any purpose) for which the premises was let out but at the same time, it is also held that it is not case of temporary closer of dental clinic but it is a case where none of the family members of deceased tenant was in position to run dental clinic nor any of the family member acquired any qualification to run the clinic. Tenant, if doctor and took the premises for his own clinic, then he should run the clinic himself and after his death, his family member can run the clinic himself , provided he is qualified to do so. Tenant, if doctor and took the premises for his own clinic, then he should run the clinic himself and after his death, his family member can run the clinic himself , provided he is qualified to do so. Keeping other doctor on contract basis or in service of family member will not be sufficient. Even giving permission to run clinic to qualified doctor also cannot save the tenant from eviction which depend upon the term of original tenancy. 27. Furthermore, from the defence set up by the defendants, no case is made out by the defendants that due to death of the original tenant, the shop remained closed or the descendants of the original tenant were not in position to run the clinic. Contrary to it, the defendants specific pleading is that it was never closed, therefore, it is too late for taking a defence that there was reasonable cause for not running the clinic. If we go by the stand taken by the defendants in their written statement, then according to the defendants themselves, the death of the original tenant was totally irrelevant because the defendants were running the clinic and the tenants son was helping his father for running the clinic and thereafter, the said clinic continued. The defendants very specifically pleaded that for running the clinic, no spcialised person was necessary except for the purpose of surgery and other work for preparing denture etc. can be and could have been done by any person with the qualification of even 10th pass and that has been disproved by defendant himself by his own statement. Since, that finding recorded by the two Courts below of not running the clinic from 211.1992 to 01.01.1994 is a finding of fact and is binding and if the pleadings are strictly construed, then it is not the case of the defendants that the clinic was closed at any time. In such a situation, tenant is not entitled to submit that cause for closer of clinic was reasonable and also failed to prove that that cause survived for some longer period, period upto which any of the family member of the defendants becomes dental doctor. 28. In such a situation, tenant is not entitled to submit that cause for closer of clinic was reasonable and also failed to prove that that cause survived for some longer period, period upto which any of the family member of the defendants becomes dental doctor. 28. This Court in the case of Sant Lal (Supra), in a detailed Judgment after considering even the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence Act coupled with Section 13(1)(j) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 observed that the facts relating to non-user of the premises with or without reasonable cause are within the special knowledge of the tenant and burden of proof lies on him. The said proposition is in consonance with the legal proposition that for negative burden, the plaintiff can discharge the burden by simple word of mouth and onus shifts on the defendant. Therefore, it was for the defendant to take plea whether the shop was closed or not and if it was closed, then it was for reasonable cause. As stated above, the defendants categorically and unequivocally stated continuation of the clinic and they failed in providing the said fact, therefore, though the substantial question of law has been framed that whether in the facts of the case where the tenant was dentist and died and premises were not used for the purpose for which the original tenant was inducted in the premises and has not been used for the purpose they were let out without "any reasonable cause" but as stated above, that was not the defence of the defendants before the trial Court in the written statement nor it was the issue despite the fact that the Issue No. 2 was framed putting burden upon the plaintiff to prove that after the death of the original tenant the suit premises remained closed for more than six months without any reasonable cause. The allegation could have prompted the defendants to plead the facts about reasonableness for closure of the shop. The allegation could have prompted the defendants to plead the facts about reasonableness for closure of the shop. This Court is also conscious of the facts that the tenant was dentist, his son was studying in the medical college, he completed the medical course in the month of February, 1994 and thereafter, he started the business in the suit premises are the facts not much in dispute by any of the parties, but at the same time, this Court is also cognizant of the fact that the plaintiff s son acquired the degree of MBBS, as admitted by learned Counsel for the parties, and not as of dentist. His degree is a qualification of doctor is equivalent to qualification of any other person but not qualification of a dentist. At this stage, we may again recapitulate the admitte