RAM MOHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, the holder of a contract carriage permit issued by the Transport Authority of Andhra Pradesh for the route Proddatur to Bangalore, applied for and secured a counter signature of the chairman of the Transport Authority, Karnataka on 9 - 11 - 2001, which when questioned in a writ petition by the State Road Transport corporation, the 2nd respondent, was allowed by order dated 3-9-2002. The petitioner claims that the order was called in question in SLP Nos. 20039 - 20053 of 2002 before the Hon'ble Supreme court. ( 2 ) THE petitioner having questioned the validity of the permit which was for a period of one year, by invokling the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, was allowed by order dated 3-10-2002, holding that the permit granted was effective for a period of five years. Thereafter the 1st respondent Karnataka State Transport authority (for short KSTA) by order dated 8 - 4 - 2003 Annexure - C granted a fresh counter signature. The 3rd respondent filed Revision petition No. 309/2003 before the Karnataka State Transport Appellate tribunal, for short KSTAT, calling in question the counter signature, while the 2nd respondent KSRTC too filed RP No. 1/2005. The kstat by common order dated 15 - 11 - 2005 Annexure 'e' allowed the Revision Petitions and set aside the counter signature. Hence this petition. ( 3 ) THE petition is opposed by filing statement of objections dated 21 - 12 - 2005 of the 3rd respondent seeking to support the order impugned as being well merited, fully justified and not calling for interference. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the Learned Counsel for the petitioner the following four questions arise for consideration: 1. Whether inter - state agreement is necessary as held by the Supreme Court in the Case in ashwanl KUMAR vs REGIONAL transport AUTHORITY, BIKANAR, AIR 1999 SC 3888 for the Purpose of grant of counter signature for a contract carriage permit? 2. Whether the Kolar Pocket Scheme in respect of the stage carriage prohibits the grant of contract carriage permit? 3. Whether the Secretary, who granted the counter signature was competent to do so? 4. Whether respondents 2 and 3 who challenged counter signature before KSTAT could be considered as aggrieved persons under section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988? 2. Whether the Kolar Pocket Scheme in respect of the stage carriage prohibits the grant of contract carriage permit? 3. Whether the Secretary, who granted the counter signature was competent to do so? 4. Whether respondents 2 and 3 who challenged counter signature before KSTAT could be considered as aggrieved persons under section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988? ( 5 ) SRI C. V. Kumar, Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that Section 88 of the Act, if interpreted to exclude a contract carriage permit, then, there is no need for an inter - State agreement. Learned counsel hastens to add that the Supreme Court in ASHWANI KUMAR vs REGIONAL TRANSPORT A UTHORITY, BIKANAR (Supra) held that under me provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (for short the Act) it was the prerogative of the two or more concerned states only to open, establish and create an inter State route lying in the respective jurisdiction by entering into a reciprocal agreement and to get it finalized by following the procedure prescribed under sub - sections (5) and (6) of Section 88 of the Act. According to Sri Kumar, since the facts of that Case relate to a stage carriage permit, while the petitioner holds a contract carriage permit, the ratio in Ashwin Kumar's case is not applicable. ( 6 ) SRI S. V. Krishnaswamy, Learned Counsel for R3 arid Sri k. Nagaraj, Learned Standing Counsel for R2 maintain that in Ashwani kumar's Case, the interpretation of Section 88, of the Act was in relation to a permit and not in a specific Case of stage carriage permit. Learned Counsel point out to the exceptions as set out in sub - section (8) and (9), in relation to special permit and All India Permits. According to the Learned Counsel, sub - section (31) of Section 2 of the Act defines permit to mean a permit issued by a State or Regional transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under the act authorizing the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle. ( 7 ) THERE is considerable force in the submission of the Learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3. ( 7 ) THERE is considerable force in the submission of the Learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3. Abare reading of sub - section of (31) of Section 2 of the Act defines a permit to mean a permit issued by the State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorizing the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle. The Supreme Court while interpreting Sec. 88 of the Act in Ashwani Kumar's Case observed thus: "7. Accepting the submissions made on behalf of the appellants would result in frustration of the objective sought to be achieved by the Act. The interpretation put by the High court is rationale, legal and proper. In the absence of existence of inter state route, the authorities under the Act were not justified in granting the u to the appellants. The existence of permits depends upon the reciprocal agreements between the states covered by the route which, admittedly, did not exist in the instant Case. The orders of the authority granting permit in favour of the appellants were thus without jurisdiction. " (emphasis supplied; ( 8 ) IT is true that the only two permits exempted are as provided for in sub Section (8) and (9) relating to special permit and All India permit respectively. The ratio laid down in Ashwani Kumar's Case was upheld by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in the Case of a. VENKATAKRISHNAN vs STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, kerala (2004)11 SCC 207 . ( 9 ) HAVING regard to the Law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashwani Kumar's Case and affirmed in A. VENKATAKRISHNAN case, (Supra) it is needless to State that the contention advanced by the petitioner that Section 88 as interpreted by the Apex Court, in the aforesaid two judgments was in respect of a stage carriage permit, inapplicable to contract carriage permit, is without merit and is rejected. ( 10 ) FOLLOWING the decisions of the Apex Court, holding that the law requires the existence of an inter - state agreement for issue of a counter signature, the first question raised by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is answered in the negative. As a consequence questions 2 and 3 do not survive for consideration. ( 10 ) FOLLOWING the decisions of the Apex Court, holding that the law requires the existence of an inter - state agreement for issue of a counter signature, the first question raised by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is answered in the negative. As a consequence questions 2 and 3 do not survive for consideration. ( 11 ) THE next question for consideration is the locus standi of respondents 2 and 3 to maintain revision petitions under Section 90 of the Act. It is not in dispute that respondents 2 and 3 are also operators whose line and nature of operation on the route in question are common with that of the petitioner, although, admittedly, the petitioner is a contract carriage permit holder, and respondents 2 and 3 are stage carriage permit holders. ( 12 ) THIS question need not detain the Court for long. A Division bench of this Court in SADASHIVA REDDY vs LALA SHERIFF,ilr 1999 Kar. 666 following the observations of the Supreme Court in MITHILESH garg vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, AIR 1992 SC 443 observed thus: "14. Even the observations of the Judgement in Mithilesh Garg's Case relied upon by the High court of Kerala does not support the view that the grant of a permit cannot be questioned by a rival operator. Basically, in the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, grant of a permit depended on the establishment of a need for the introduction of a stage carriage service and for that purpose, Section 47 and 57 had been enacted. Subject to chapter vi, Section 72 and 80 of the Act of 1988 has changed the whole basis and grant of a permit is the rule and the rejection is the exception. From this circumstance an inference that there is no right given to an existing operator to challenge the grant, on the ground that it is illegal or improper, cannot be inferred. The decision in AIR 1993 Kerala Page 191, in our opinion cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that a rival operator cannot challenge the grant of a stage carriage permit on the grounds specified in Section 90 of the act. The decision in AIR 1993 Kerala Page 191, in our opinion cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that a rival operator cannot challenge the grant of a stage carriage permit on the grounds specified in Section 90 of the act. " ( 13 ) THE Division Bench further held that a rival operator on making allegation, that prima facie demonstrates a grievance which calls for examination, is entitled to have his revision examined on merits in accordance with Law and he cannot be thrown out at the threshold on the ground that he has no grievance. When once the Tribunal exercises the power to examine the order impugned, it is needless to state that it, has to examine the order as to whether it is improper or illegal and has to decide the matter on merits. ( 14 ) IN the light of the observations of the Supreme Court followed by the Division Bench of this Court holding that a rival operator making allegations is a grievance calling for examination in a revision under Section 90 of the Act, it is needless to State that the fourth question raised by the petitioner deserves to be rejected. Respondents 2 and 3 being operators on the very same route have every right to question the counter signature issued by the 1 st respondent in favour of the petitioner by filing a revision petition, alleging the same to be illegal and unsustainable. ( 15 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the Case, respondents 2 and 3 being stage carriage operators on the route in question, common with that of the petitioner, a holder of contract carriage permit, it is needless to State that being permit holders are entitled to question the counter signature by filing revision petition under Section 90 of the act. In the result, Writ Petition is without merit and is accordingly rejected.