S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ( 1 ) ALL the writ petitioners, in these proceedings seek a quashing order in respect of the decision and order dated 31. 5. 1985 by which they were sought to be terminated from the services. ( 2 ) THE Delhi Rural Primary Co-operative Societies Service Rules, 1979 (hereinafter called the Rules ) were framed by the Lt. Governor in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 96 of the Delhi co-operative Societies Act, 1972. In the Rules, cadre is defined as a group of posts of Secretary/manager of Primary Agricultural Credit Societies. cadre committee was a Committee constituted by the Lt Governor for controlling the cadre; the General Manager of the Delhi State Co-operative Bank Ltd. was constituted as Member Secretary. The Rules, prescribed recruitment to the service by transfer on deputation of officials holding analogous posts in Delhi administration, Delhi State Co-operative Bank in the ratio of 70% and 30% respectively, failing which by direct recruitment. The essential qualifications for direct recruitment are provided in Rule 6 (a) were :i) Degree from University in Economics/agriculture. ii) Knowledge in Hindi. Desirable qualification for direct recruit is - (a) Rural background. ( 3 ) THE age limit for direct recruits indicated was between 18 years and 30 years, relaxable in case of Schedule Castes and Tribes. Rule 10 provided that every person appointed to the Service shall be on probation for a period of two years. It further provided that the Cadre Controlling Committee may in the case of any person, extend the period of probation but the total period of extension of probation/trial shall not, (save where it is necessary by reasons of departmental or legal proceedings pending against the officer) exceed twice the period specified as probation. The probationer could be discharged from the grade/service at any time without assigning any reason provided that if he holds a lien on any permanent post of the service under Delhi Administration or lower grade of service, he was liable to be reverted to that post/grade. Rule 11 provided that an officer shall have to under go training in Co-operation as and when deputed by the Cadre Controlling Committee to a School/college imparting training in Co-operation. Rule 12 dealt with termination, resignation, retirement, discipline and disciplinary proceedings. Rule 11 provided that an officer shall have to under go training in Co-operation as and when deputed by the Cadre Controlling Committee to a School/college imparting training in Co-operation. Rule 12 dealt with termination, resignation, retirement, discipline and disciplinary proceedings. ( 4 ) THE petitioners claim to be duly qualified, being diploma holders in junior basic course in Co-operation from the Delhi State Cooperative Training centre (except the 7th petitioner who holds diploma from the Training Centre at patiala ). It is stated that they were appointed as Managers/secretaries in the various Societies in the pay scale of Rs. 295-920/ -. The appointments were made after their names (except the name of petitioner No. 7 who had directly applied) had been sponsored by the Delhi State Cooperative Training Centre, Nangloi and after they had been selected in the interviews held for the purpose. The interviews were held by the Cadre Committee ( 5 ) IT is averred by the petitioners that as per the 1979 Rules, the appointments were on probation for a period of two years. They allege that a large number of others were appointed as Secretaries/managers on deputation from different Departments of the Delhi Administration. ; after one year they were repatriated to the parent Cadre. The petitioners replaced their services as direct recruits by a circular dated 12. 4. 1983. It is claimed that the period of probation provided for under the Rules ended in January 1984 and none of them had been communicated with any adverse remarks. By an order dated 19. 7. 1984, however they were informed that the primary agricultural credit Societies were unviable and therefore, their services would not be required after 31. 8. 1984. The petitioners allege that their services were being dispensed with not on account of their deficiencies but on the alleged claim of unviability of the functioning of the credit Societies. It is further claimed that in December 1983, itself the Cadre Committee had resolved that services of the petitioners should not be continued after 1983, but this was not made known to them. ( 6 ) THE petitioners represented on 5. 12. 1983 to the authorities pointing out that the cooperative Societies had been reorganized as a result of which the scheme of the 1979 Rules were amended. ( 6 ) THE petitioners represented on 5. 12. 1983 to the authorities pointing out that the cooperative Societies had been reorganized as a result of which the scheme of the 1979 Rules were amended. They had also relied upon their good track record and contended that at all material times their work and functioning of the Societies were under the supervision of the Cadre Committee and the registrar of Cooperative Societies. It is alleged that the Delhi State cooperative Bank, the financing body for various societies, did not like the idea of constituting the Cadre Committee and the appointment of the paid independent officers such as Managers/secretaries for supervision of such societies. This allegedly interfered with the plan of various officers of the bank, who were interested in the appointment of their candidates and relatives. Such officials, it is averred, started creating troubles in the way of smooth working of the petitioners in various ways such as by harassing them, by not giving various loans under the various schemes etc. ( 7 ) IT is alleged that the the harassment meted out to the petitioners was fully detailed in a representation submitted to the Registrar of Cooperative societies on 24th July 1984. The Bank indulged in harassment of officers like the petitioners and creating obstacles in the smooth working of the Societies, also because under the Rules, it had to deposit a sum of Rs. One lakh in the cadre fund every year. In spite of lapse of four years, the Bank deposited its contribution only once. Even the contribution of the Societies was made only twice, though four installments became due. Resultantly, the officials of the bank were hunting for excuses to terminate the services of the petitioners. ( 8 ) THE petitioners aver that on one had no reply was received by them to any of their representations and, on the other hand, they were served with the order dated 19th July, 1984 informing them that their services would no longer be required after 31st August, 1984 on the alleged ground that the Primary agricultural Credit Societies had not become viable. ( 9 ) THE petitioners allege that since no order extending the period of probation had, by that time, been served on them and since, the termination of their services was not on account of any defect in their work or performance, they had automatically been confirmed to the services on the expiry of period of probation, i. e on 21st January, 1984/ 1st February, 1984. ( 10 ) THE petitioners allege that after receiving the said order dated 19th July, 1984, they met the authorities concerned and reminded them of their representations dated 10th October, 1983 and 5th December, 1983 which had already been pending with them. It is alleged that the order dated 19th july, 1984 was not implemented and, on the other hand, the petitioners were served with the order dated 30th August, 1984 whereby their probationary period was further extended by two months by the Cadre Committee through its Resolution no. 1 dated 25th August, 1984. ( 11 ) IT is alleged that the said Resolution No. 1 dated 25th August, 1984, decided that since a team of officers consisting of Registrar, Co- operative Societies, nominee of NABARD and the Coop. Bank had been detailed to fix up a time bound programme for rehabilitation of the Bank in which the question of progress of PAC s was also involved, the findings of the team could be awaited. Therefore, in the meantime, the petitioners were allowed to continue by extending their probationary period. It is alleged that simultaneously, letters were written by the Registrar of Coop. Societies to various Departments, seeking absorption of the petitioners. It is alleged that in a meeting held on 17th December 1984, it was repeated that there was no scope for P. A. Cs becoming viable and successful in Delhi on account of prevailing peculiar circumstances (which were not specified or enumerated ). The representative of the NABARD (National Bank for Agricultural and Rural development) was, however, of the view that the existing set up of the P. A. Cs could be continued as in other states in the country. It is alleged that the decision, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The representative of the NABARD (National Bank for Agricultural and Rural development) was, however, of the view that the existing set up of the P. A. Cs could be continued as in other states in the country. It is alleged that the decision, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) IT is alleged that in a meeting of the Cadre Committee held on 29th January, 1985 a decision was taken on account of the intervention of the representative of the NABARD, who did not agree that Societies cannot become viable, to make efforts to improve viability of at least 5/10 societies and thereafter in a meeting held on 26. 2. 1985, the representative of the NABARD, examined the files of all the PACs for ascertaining their viability. Pending this move, it was decided to allow the petitioners to continue in their appointments. The petitioners further allege that while the progress of the societies was being watched, unfortunately the authorities chose to terminate their services from 30th June, 1985 on the ground that the societies were unviable. ( 13 ) THE termination order is attacked as arbitrary and motivated, and in utter violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is alleged that the decision to not continue the services, apart from arbitrariness, was based on irrelevant considerations, and issued by ignoring the true state of affairs. ( 14 ) MR. G. D. Gupta, learned Senior counsel, appearing in support of the petitions, submitted that the impugned terminations were motivated and unsustainable in law. He relied on the fact that pursuant to the power under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, Rules were framed, and the 1979 Cadre committee, with the objective of constituting a common cadre, was created. All these signified the State s intention to actively participate in the Primary Co- operative Societies Sector. The Cadre Committee was to be funded by the Bank. However, the latter did not perform its duties, and release the necessary funds. Therefore, the Cadre Committee took the position that the activities were not viable. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel urged that the Rules prescribed two years probation, and since all the petitioners had put in more than that period, they were deemed to have been confirmed. However, the latter did not perform its duties, and release the necessary funds. Therefore, the Cadre Committee took the position that the activities were not viable. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel urged that the Rules prescribed two years probation, and since all the petitioners had put in more than that period, they were deemed to have been confirmed. It was submitted that there was sufficient material on the record, to justify a conclusion that the impugned order was a ruse to get rid of the petitioners, since the respondents were primarily responsible for starving the primary co-operative societies, of the funds, so that the cadre committee was rendered helpless. It was also contended that the nabard representative held a different opinion, and wanted the co-operatives to be given a second chance. Without waiting for any development, the respondents issued the impugned termination order. ( 16 ) THE respondents justified their stand, in the counter affidavit, by contending that the action was bona fide, in view of the fact that the co- operatives were not viable. It was submitted that whatever be the deliberations of the NABARD, the respondent Committee had decided that it was not possible to continue with the services of the petitioners. Being a bona fide policy decision, the petitioners could not impugn it. ( 17 ) THE petitioner s contention about possessing the prescribed qualifications were disputed. It was also averred that the petitioners were never confirmed to the services, and continued functioning as probationers; their services could be terminated, for valid considerations, as was done in this case. In the counter affidavit, it has also been averred as follows:"11. The contents of this paragraph are denied. The Delhi State Co-operative bank had contributed Rupees one lakh in 1980/81 and a similar amount in 1982/83 but when no improvement or progress was noticed in the working of the PACs and bank was also running into losses the contribution by the bank was stopped in view of the decision taken by the Finance Sub Committee. It is incorrect to say that the services of the petitioners were terminated for the reason that the officers of the bank were interested in the appointment of their men and relatives. There are rules for appointments. Nobody can act contrary to to the provisions of such rules for the benefit of their own relatives or men. It is incorrect to say that the services of the petitioners were terminated for the reason that the officers of the bank were interested in the appointment of their men and relatives. There are rules for appointments. Nobody can act contrary to to the provisions of such rules for the benefit of their own relatives or men. It is incorrect to say that the petitioners were harassed in their work in any way by the Cadre Committee or by the bank. The representations made by the petitioners were without any substance. The Societies could not even repay the loan to the bank. They could not become viable to meet the salary of the paid Secretaries and Managers. It was for this reason that 16 persons taken from Delhi administration on deputation were repatriated. The question of employing persons from the bank did not arise. ""12. In reply to para 12 it is submitted that the situation was assessed from time to time in the meeting of the cadre committee as noted in the earlier part of this reply. After careful consideration and after several opportunities having been given to the petitioners the final decision was taken to terminate the services of the petitioners as it was not in a position to continue with their services and pay their emoluments. It is incorrect to say that the termination was made to tarnish the career of the petitioners. In fact the Cadre Committee itself was very anxious that the Petitioners be absorbed elsewhere and for this purpose their bio-datas were called for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies for being forwarded to sister Departments. ""13. The allegations made in para 13 are denied. The fact that the period of their probation was extended from time to time has already been mentioned earlier. It is incorrect to say that the petitioners had automatically become confirmed on 31. 1. 84/1. 2. 84. The petitioners were probationers and remained till their services were terminated. The Petitioners are estopped from taking this plea because they themselves accepted the extension of their probation period and worked during that extended period. Under the Rules their probationary period could be extended upto four years and in the absence3 of any rules to the contrary they cannot deemed to have been confirmed unless a specific was passed to that effect. Under the Rules their probationary period could be extended upto four years and in the absence3 of any rules to the contrary they cannot deemed to have been confirmed unless a specific was passed to that effect. The petitioners had been meeting the authorities and have been aware of the proceedings of the meetings of the Cadre committee from time to time. They were well aware of the situation and knew fully well what was happening in their case. Their probationary period was extended on account of humanitarian grounds and their request. There was no scope for further extension of their probation. It was not considered necessary to send any reply to the representations of the petitioners as the points raised therein were taken into consideration during the course of deliberations in the meetings. " ( 18 ) THE Court had while entertaining this petition on 26thy June, 2005, stayed operation of the impugned order of termination. That order was subsequently confirmed. The matter was heard on 19th February 2003 when it had been asserted that by virtue of interim orders, some of the petitioners continued to work with the Primary Credit Co-operative Societies as manager/secretary. By the subsequent order dated 16th April, 2004 the Court had recorded statements on behalf of the third respondent (Cadre Committee) that the co-operative Societies of which the petitioner claimed to be working were defunct as per the records and accounts maintained by the Delhi State Co- operative Society. ( 19 ) THE law on the subject, regarding confirmation, rather deemed confirmation of probationers was noticed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs- S. Manjunath AIR 2000 SC 2070 , where it was held as follows:"this Court had an occasion, to review, analyze critically and clarify the principles on an exhaustive consideration of the entire case law in two recent decisions reported in Dayaram Dayal s case (supra) and Wasim Beg s case (supra ). One line of cases has held that if in the Rule or Order of appointment, a period of probation probation is specified and a power to extend probation is also conferred and the officer is allowed to continue beyond the prescribed period of probation, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed and there is no bar on the power of termination of the officer after the expiry of the initial or extended period of probation. This is because, at the end of probation he becomes merely qualified or eligible for substantive permanent appointment. The other line of cases are those where even though there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The constitution Bench which dealt with the case reported in State of Punjab vs dharam Singh AIR 1968 SC 1210 , while distinguishing the other line of cases held that the presumption about continuation, beyond the period of probation, as a probationer stood negatived by the fixation of a maximum time limit for the extension of probation. Consequently, in such cases the termination after expiry of the maximum period upto which probation could be extended was held to be invalid, inasmuch as the officer concerned must be deemed to have been confirmed. ""11. The principles laid down in Dharam Singh s case (supra) though were accepted in another Constitution Bench of a larger composition in the case reported in samsher Singh, etc. vs State of Punjab and Anr. AIR 1974 SC 2192 the special provisions contained in the relevant rules taken up for consideration therein were held to indicate an intention not to treat the officer as deemed to have been confirmed, in the light of the specific stipulation that the period of probation shall be deemed to be extended if the officer concerned was not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. Despite the indication of a maximum period of probation, the implied extension was held to render the maximum period of probation a directory one and not mandatory. Hence, it was held that a probationer in such class of cases is not to be considered confirmed, till an order of confirmation is actually made. Despite the indication of a maximum period of probation, the implied extension was held to render the maximum period of probation a directory one and not mandatory. Hence, it was held that a probationer in such class of cases is not to be considered confirmed, till an order of confirmation is actually made. The further question for consideration in such category of cases where the maximum period of probation has been fixed would be, as to whether there are anything else in the rules which had the effect of whittling down the right to deemed confirmation on account of the prescription of a maximum period of probation beyond which there is an embargo upon further extension being made, and such stipulation was found wanting in Dayaram Dayal s case (supra ). ""12. The decision in Wasim Beg s case (supra) also purported to classify these type of cases into three categories, on a review of the entire gamut of law. It was observed therein as follows:""15. Whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab vs Dharam singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 M. K. Agarwal vs Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 Om parkash Maurya vs U. P. Coop. Sugar Factories Federation, 1986 Supp SCC 95; state of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav 1987 (4) SCC 482 ""16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation, beyond the maximum period, the courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation, beyond the maximum period, the courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh vs state of Punjab which was the decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, this Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corpn. vs Ashok Kumar Mishra 1991 (3) SCC 325 . In Satya narayan Athya vs High Court of M. P 1996 (1) SCC 560 although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. ""17. The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. In this line of cases, one can put Sukhbans Singh vs State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1711 ; State of U. P. vs Akbar All Khan AIR 1966 SC 1842 ; Kedar Nath Bahi vs Stale of Punjab, 1974 (3) SCC 21 ; Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai vs State of Gujarat 1985 (2) SCC 5 and Tarsem Lal Verma vs Union of India, 1997 (9) SCC 243 ; municipal Corpn. vs Ashok Kumar Misra 1991 (3) SCC 325 and State of Punjab vs baldev Singh Khosla 1996 (9) SCC 190 . In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal vs state of M. P 1997 (7) SCC 443 . vs Ashok Kumar Misra 1991 (3) SCC 325 and State of Punjab vs baldev Singh Khosla 1996 (9) SCC 190 . In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal vs state of M. P 1997 (7) SCC 443 . (to which one of us was a party) all these cases have been analysed and it has been held that where the Rules provide that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of the maximum probationary period unless there is anything to the contrary in the Rules. " ( 20 ) IN a later judgment, in High Court of M. P. through Registrar and Ors. v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 the Supreme Court held as follows:"the question of deemed confirmation in service jurisprudence, which is dependent upon the language of the relevant service rules, has been the subject- matter of consideration before this Court, times without number in various decisions and there are three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. The other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry the order of termination has not been passed. The last line of cases is where, though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. The last line of cases is where, though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor has the person concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. "in Smt. Archana Dayal Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 120 (2005) DLT 100, this court held as follows:"the Constitution Bench has opined in S. Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, air 1962 SC 1711 that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of probationary period, automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. In State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, 1968 (3) SCR 1 the Constitution Bench has enunciated that - "where on the completion of the specified period of probation an employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the Service Rules, the initial period of probation is deemed to be extended by necessary implication `. In Partap Singh v. Union Territory of chandigarh and another, AIR 1980 SC 57 it has been held that the concerned officer cannot be deemed to have been confirmed in the absence of an order of confirmation even at the end of the probation of three years. Similar views have been expressed in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U. P. and Ors. , AIR 2000 SC 1706 where Regulation 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations had come up for consideration. The Court observed that the period of probation was for two years and the Regulation was silent as to the maximum period beyond which it could not be extended. , AIR 2000 SC 1706 where Regulation 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations had come up for consideration. The Court observed that the period of probation was for two years and the Regulation was silent as to the maximum period beyond which it could not be extended. The Apex Court held that in the absence of any such prohibition, even if the appellant had completed two years of probationary period successfully and without any blemish, his period of probation must be treated as having been extended, as a permanent status can be acquired only by means of a specific order of confirmation. The same conclusion has been arrived at in High court of M. P. through Registrar and Ors. v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 . " ( 21 ) THE facts narrated above are that admittedly rules were framed in 1979 which inter alia created a cadre of Managers/secretaries to work in the rural Primary Co-operative Society. Rule 10 provided that such personnel were on probation/trial for a period of two years; as per Rule 10 (2) the Cadre controlling Committee could extend the period of probation. A total period of four years (two years plus a maximum extended period of two years) was provided for as the outer limit for probation. ( 22 ) THE Petitioners admittedly joined the services on 1st February, 1982. As per the scheme of the Delhi State Co-operative Bank, the Primary Rural agricultural Co-operative Societies were to be funded, for the purpose of salaries of such Managers/secretaries. The petitioners allege that adequate funding was not granted,which is disputed by the respondents. A decision was taken in 1984 to dispense with the services of the petitioners on the ground that the functioning of the Primary Agricultural Co-operative was not viable. Apparently, at their request, the decision was not given effect to. In the meanwhile, a series of meetings to review the viability was undertaken in which some difference of opinion existed between the Delhi State Co-operative Bank and nominees of the NABARD. Eventually, the impugned order was issued on the footing that the functioning of the co-operative had become unviable. The petitioners claimed that in view of Rule 10 they were confirmed in the services since no orders extending the period of their probation had been issued. Eventually, the impugned order was issued on the footing that the functioning of the co-operative had become unviable. The petitioners claimed that in view of Rule 10 they were confirmed in the services since no orders extending the period of their probation had been issued. ( 23 ) THE rules relied upon by the petitioner, framed in 1979, state that the period of probation shall be two years; extendable for another period; the total period could not exceed twice the period of probation. The order of termination was issued on 31-5-1985, ie. before expiration of the maximum 4 year period. A conspectus of these facts, show that: (1) There is nothing to show that the period of probation if not extended, under the regulations, upon expiry of the intial period, the employee was to be deemed as a confirmed officer/ employee; (2) There is no regulation, nor was one brought to the notice of the court, that at the end of any period, the employee would stand automatically (deemed) confirmed. ( 24 ) IN the light of the above facts, I am of the opinion that the contention of the petitioners that they was automatically, or deemed to have been confirmed, is without any basis. The facts of this case fall in line with the decisions in Sukhbans Singh; Satya Narayan Jhavar, as also the decision of this court, in Smt. Archana Dayal?s case (supra ). In the absence of any rule to the contrary, or a positive action, ending the period of probation, with a confirmation order, the petitioners could not claim to have satisfactorily completed probation. Indeed, their services were extended as probationers in 1984. Their status were extended as continued to be that of probationers. ( 25 ) IN these proceedings, the Court had recorded the statements of some of the Presidents of the Primary Agricultural Credit Societies. They had deposed that the Petitioners had been working in such Societies. ( 26 ) DURING the course of hearing, counsel for both parties contended on the subsequent facts as to whether the petitioners could be said to have continued. On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that as a consequence of the interim order they carried on working with the Primary agricultural Co-operative Societies which are in existence. ( 26 ) DURING the course of hearing, counsel for both parties contended on the subsequent facts as to whether the petitioners could be said to have continued. On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that as a consequence of the interim order they carried on working with the Primary agricultural Co-operative Societies which are in existence. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents, particularly the thrid respondent asserted that the materials on record do not reveal a consistent picture and that the copies of accounts and returns filed in these proceedings, raised disputed questions of facts. He also contended that the societies do not seem to have been transacting business as is evident from a reading of the balance sheets. ( 27 ) THE next question is whether the decision to dis-continue the petitioners services on grounds of economic viability of the societies was justified. An attempt was made on the part of the petitioners to portray the action as arbitrary, with reference to certain minutes of meeting where a committee was constituted and also where representatives of NABARD had given their own assessment about the situation. Counsel had sought to build a contention that these betray a pre-disposition by the respondents, to starve the co-operatives and ensure that they were closed down. It was also contended that officers of the Delhi State Co-operative Bank were interested in putting their own relatives and nominees in employment in stead of petitioners. ( 28 ) I am of the opinion that the pleadings and documents are not sufficient to justify a conclusion of mala fides by the respondents or even that the impugned order amounted to malice in law. The Minutes of Meeting at best disclose a different perspective by the nominees of NABARD; nevertheless there is no material to show that the funds were deliberately withheld from the co- operatives in order to terminate the petitioners? services. Further more, as far as the question of employing relatives of bank officials is concerned, there are no materials or even material averments in that regard. In these circumstances, the order cannot be invalidated on grounds of malice or mala fides of the respondents. ( 29 ) THE Court had stayed the impugned order but the interim order was issued much after the termination itself became effective, namely, on 31. 5. 1985. In these circumstances, the order cannot be invalidated on grounds of malice or mala fides of the respondents. ( 29 ) THE Court had stayed the impugned order but the interim order was issued much after the termination itself became effective, namely, on 31. 5. 1985. It is no doubt true that no act of Court should prejudice anyone. In that sense if the petitioners have indeed been working with the Rural Primary co-operative Societies, and their services have been found satisfactory, nothing said in this judgment should disturb that position. However, this cannot be construed as clothing the petitioners with the right to claim continuity of services or assert any right against the respondents on account of the impugned order, which is otherwise legal and valid. The question as to whether the primary Co-operatives Banks are de-funct or are not functioning is not a subject matter of these proceedings. If the petitioners indeed have any grievance about services with such bank for the period after 31. 5. 1985, it is for them to assert it and claim the relief in appropriate proceedings. ( 30 ) IN view of the above findings it is held that the impugned order is valid. The writ petition is dismissed granting liberty to the petitioners to assert such rights as are available to them in law for the services claimed to have been rendered by them with the Primary Co-operative societies against such PACs for the period after 31. 5. 1985. Rule discharged. No costs. .