Punjab and Sind Bank, rep. by its Chairman, New Delhi v. Ratan Steel Company
2006-01-31
C.V.RAMULU
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER This Civil Revision Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated 29-8-2005 made in IASR No.1968 of 2005 in O.S.No.246 of 2000 on the file of the learned XII Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Secunderabad. 2. The revision petitioners are the defendants and the respondent is the plaintiff in the suit O.S.No.246 of 2000. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 3. Suit was laid for recovery of money on the ground of deficiency of service on the part of the defendants in not releasing the letter of credit. In the said suit, the present IASR No.1968 of 2005 under Section 31 of Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short the Act) was filed by the defendants, seeking to transfer the present suit i.e.O.S.No.246 of 2000 on the file of the learned XII Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Secunderabad to the file of Debts Recovery Tribunal, wherein the connected matter in OANo.989 of 1999 is pending between the parties. The plaintiff resisted the said application. After a detailed consideration of the respective arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge dismissed the said application at the stage of filing holding that the Civil Court cannot entertain any application under the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that Section 19 of the Act empowers the petitioners to claim set-off and counter claim and in view of Section 18 of the Act, it must be deemed that since the counter-claims and set off claims are also now made available for being made in the original proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the present suit also is liable to be transferred since it is in the nature of a counter-claim. 5.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that since the amendment has no retrospective operation, the suit filed for recovery of money in the nature of damages cannot be taken up by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the question of transfer of the same from the Civil Court to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act does not arise. 6. Before going into the merits of the case, it may be necessary to notice few provisions of the Act as under:- Section 17 of the Act:- Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals:- (1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debt due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act. Section:-18: Bar of Jurisdiction:- On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. Section :- 19: Application to the Tribunal:- (7) The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order in respect of both of the original claim and of the set-off. (8) A defendant in an application may, in addition to his right pleading a set-off under sub-section (6), set up, by way of counter - claim against the claim of the applicant, any right of claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the applicant either before or after the filing of the application but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of claim for damages or not. (9) A counter-claim under sub-sec. (8) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order on the same application, both on the original claim and on the counter-clam.
(9) A counter-claim under sub-sec. (8) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order on the same application, both on the original claim and on the counter-clam. Section 31: Transfer of pending cases:- (b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit or other proceedings, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made under Section 19 from the stage Which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage as the Tribunal may deem fit." 7. There is no necessity to go into the merits whether it is a set off or a counter-claim etc. It is suffice to notice that there was no such provision in the Act enabling to have set-off, counter-claim etc., prior to 2000 amendment which introduces clauses-7, 8, 9 (sic. sub-sections (7), (8) and (9)) to Sec. 19 of the Act as noticed above. Further, there is no dispute that the said provisions have only prospective effect and no retrospective effect. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners also placed before this Court the statement of Objects and Reasons while carrying out the amendment. In the entire statement of objects and reasons, there is no mention that in view of pendency of number of claims and counter claims elsewhere, the amendment is brought in and in view of this amendment, all these cases which are pending before the Civil Court are desirable to be transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal to be tried together with the main case. Further, Section 17 of the Act contemplates that a Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day, any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters specified therein. What Section 17 of the Act contemplates is that a Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. Section 18 of the Act isa bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters. Section 31 of the Act contemplates transfer of pending cases as on the date of the Act came into force on 24-6-1993. 9.
Section 18 of the Act isa bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters. Section 31 of the Act contemplates transfer of pending cases as on the date of the Act came into force on 24-6-1993. 9. As seen above, the Section 19 (7) to (9) of the Act have been introduced only in 2000 and they have come into force. w.e.f. 17-1-2000 and applied prospectively. There is no provision which is brought to the notice of this Court that even a claim, or a counterclaim or some other matters incidentally related to the suit pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which is tried by a Civil Court also is liable to be transferred. What all Section 31 of the Act contemplates is that the pending cases as on the date when the Act came into force are transferable and not other cases. Therefore, in my view, neither there is any bar in entertaining such suits by the Civil Court in the amended Act nor there is any other provision of law requiring transfer of pending cases other than those contemplated under Section 17 of the Act. 10. In view of the absence of any bar of trial of such suits by the Civil Court either in the Section 31 of the Act or under Section 19 (7) to (9) of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that the Civil Court has rightly rejected the application and the Court below has not committed any error in dismissing the application at the filing stage calling for interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.